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The Envelope of Global Trade: The Political Economy and Intellectual History of 
Jute in the Bengal Delta, 1850s to 1950s 
 
Abstract 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, peasant smallholders in the Bengal 
delta – an alluvial tract formed out of the silt deposits of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, 
and Meghna river-systems – expanded their cultivation of jute, a fibrous plant that 
was the world’s primary packaging material.  Jute fibres were spun and woven into 
course cloths used to pack the world’s commodities – its grains, sugar, coffee, cotton, 
wool, and so forth – in their journey from farms and plantations to urban and 
industrial centres of consumption.  The fibre connected the Bengal delta and its 
peasant smallholders to the vicissitudes of global commodity markets.  This 
dissertation examines connections between the delta and international commodity 
markets from the 1850s to the 1950s – it is a local history of global capital.   
I explore how the commodity shaped the delta’s economic, political and 
intellectual history, how economic lives, social and cultural formations, and political 
processes in eastern Bengal were informed and influenced by the cultivation and 
trade of jute fibres.  First, I look at how commodity production changed peasant 
households’ economic lives, particularly intensifying peasant interactions with 
markets.  I focus on peasant households’ market-based consumption, and argue that 
consumption informed peasant politics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Second, I look at how the circulation of the commodity transformed the 
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physical and ecological landscape of the delta.  I focus on the emergence of jute-
specialized market towns along the delta’s rivers and railways, where jute was bulked, 
assorted and packaged before being dispatched to metropolitan Calcutta.  Third, I 
look at how the commodity emerged as a political and intellectual concept, as 
imperialists, anti-colonial nationalists, post-colonial statesmen, intellectuals and poets 
imbued fibre with meaning – relating jute to ideas of poverty and prosperity, religious 
ethics and practice, economic development and modernization and territorial 
nationalism.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 
From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, jute fabrics – gunnies, 
hessians, burlap – were the premier packaging material in world trade.  Jute sacks 
were used to pack the world’s grains, cotton, sugar, coffee, guano, cement, and even 
bacon, as these commodities made their journey from farms and mines to centres of 
consumption.  While the fabric circulated globally, the production of fibre was 
concentrated in a small corner of the world – the Bengal delta, an alluvial tract 
formed out of the silt deposits of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna river-
systems.  Peasant smallholders in the delta cultivated jute on small lots of land, using 
a combination of household and hired labour and stored and borrowed capital.  
Peasant produce journeyed westwards from the peasant homestead, along the delta’s 
waterways and railways, through river-ports and railway towns, to Calcutta.  From 
Calcutta, part of the crop went north, to the jute mills along the banks of the 
Hooghly and the rest was exported overseas, to jute mills in Britain, continental 
Europe and North America.  The mills spun and wove the fibres into fabrics that 
were dispatched to the world’s farms, plantations, and mines.  From there, wrapped 
around a multitude of primary products, jute sacks traveled the globe.   
The sack connected the delta’s jute tracts to circuits of global capital, to the 
rhythms and vicissitudes of global commodity markets.  My dissertation focuses on 
the transformations wrought by the cultivation and circulation of fibre on the Bengal 
delta.  I examine how fibre shaped the delta’s economic, political and intellectual 
history from the 1850s to the 1950s, exploring how economic lives, social and 
cultural formations, and political processes in eastern Bengal were informed and 
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influenced by the region’s connections to global circuits of capital forged by jute.  
The emergence of jute cultivation in the Bengal delta should not be seen as a moment 
in the region’s transitions to capitalism, a one-off event with a less capitalist before 
and a more capitalist after.1  The relationship between commodity-producing region 
and global commodity markets was continuous – repeated and reiterated and 
sometimes reshaped and reoriented each time Bengal’s cultivators sowed their lands 
with jute and bought fibres to sale into global markets.   
I examine the relationship between commodity-producing region and global 
commodity markets during the hundred years spanning the Crimean War (1853-56) 
and the Korean War (1950-53).  The Crimean War interrupted Britain’s supplies of 
Russian flax and hemp leading textile mills in Dundee, Scotland, to switch en masse 
to jute. Though initially concentrated in Dundee, jute mills were established in 
continental Europe, the USA and in western Bengal during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. By 1910, about half of the world’s jute manufacturing 
capacity was located along the banks of the Hooghly, to the north of Calcutta.2  
Bengal’s peasant smallholders responded to the sharp rise in global manufacturing 
                                                        
1 Dipesh Chakrabarty’s critique of transitions to capitalism ,and the consignment of nations and societies  
to the “waiting room of history,” awaiting this transition, is apt.  Chakrabarty argues that the story of 
capitalism and colonial societies should be seen as an open-ended process, constituted of two intertwined 
narratives – which he labels History 1 and History 2.  History 1 is the story of capital transforming the 
world it encounters in its own image and History 2 is that of local culture and meanings which predate and 
survive the onslaught of capital, and subsequently subvert and interrupt the course of History 1.  While I 
am not convinced that History 2 should be placed exclusively in the pre-capitalist or understood solely as 
histories of culture and meaning, Chatterjee’s categories certainly provide a more useful and productive 
framework to study the history of capital in colonial societies than that of “transitions to capitalism.” 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, 2000, Chapter 2.   
2 D.R. Wallace, The Romance of Jute: A Short History of the Calcutta Jute Mill Industry, Calcutta: 1928, provides an 
entertaining and first hand account of the tremendous growth of the Calcutta jute industry in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   Donald Stewart’s Jute and Empire: Calcutta Jutewallahs and the 
Landscapes of Empire, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998 provides an account of the increasing 
competition between Dundee and Calcutta jute mills in an imperial context.   
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requirements, and the delta’s jute acreage increased from about 50,000 acres in the 
1850s to close to 3 million acres in the 1900s.3  I conclude my narrative of how global 
jute markets shaped the history of the world’s sole jute tracts with the Korean War of 
the 1950s, when jute prices spiraled upwards and provided a brief but significant 
economic boom to the post-colonial Pakistani state and its impoverished jute 
cultivators.   
This hundred-year span covers two distinct time periods with respect to the 
standard of living in the Bengal delta.  The period between 1850 and 1913 was an era 
of prosperity, as cultivators with larger landholdings produced both sufficient rice for 
household subsistence and commercial fibre for sale.  They were thus relatively 
insulated from sharp falls in commodity prices, and could use jute revenue to 
consume market-place goods and colonial governments’ services, specially legal 
services and, to a much lesser extent, educational services.  Peasant prosperity 
manifested most visibly in their rising consumption of market goods – imported 
cloth, corrugated tin-sheets for houses, household utensils, children’s toys, and so 
forth. By the turn of the century, however, conditions were beginning to change.  
First, land fragmentation driven by a rapidly growing population meant that 
cultivators adopted a market-based subsistence livelihood strategy: exchanging jute 
for rice in local markets to secure household subsistence needs.  Second, cultivators 
slid into debt, and interest payments were taking up an increasing proportion of 
peasant expenditures.  Third, the ecology of the delta deteriorated, and peasant 
households were struck by more frequent and intense ecological shocks, especially 
                                                        
3 Ali, M.W., Jute in the Agrarian History of Bengal, 1870-1914, Rajshahi, 1998 describes the steady increase in 
jute cultivation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
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floods and water-borne epidemics.4  The period after World War I was marked by a 
rapid and thorough process of agrarian immiseration in the delta, culminating in the 
tragedy of the 1943 famine, when about 3 million people died of starvation or 
hunger-related causes.5 
In the dissertation, I explore three inter-related aspects of this relationship 
between the global and the local over a hundred years spanning the 1850s and the 
1950s.  First, I look at peasant commodity production, especially how jute cultivation 
changed agrarian relations of production and at how peasant prosperity, poverty, and 
hunger became closely integrated with global commodity prices.  Second, I look at 
the jute commodity chain and the spatial configurations of metropolis, hinterland, 
and intermediary market towns.  I especially focus on the market town, arguing that 
these towns were crucial nodes connecting peasants and their smallholdings to global 
markets.  Third, I look at how ideas and politics of jute in the world’s sole jute tracts 
changed along with changes in peasant production and livelihoods.  In the remainder 
of this introduction, I will expand on these inter-related themes of peasant 
production, commodity circulation, and the politics of jute.   
                                                         
4 Sugata Bose discusses the demographic impact of landholding and the increasing debt burden during the 
twentieth century, particularly after the Great Depression: Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social 
Structure, and Politics, 1919-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  Omkar Goswami describes 
the impact of worsening market conditions and the declining returns to peasant production after WWI: 
Goswami, Omkar, Industry, Trade, and Peasant Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern India, 1900-1947, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1991.  Iftekhar Iqbal describes the ecological deterioration of the delta from the 
beginning of twentieth century, as delta’s drainage was blocked by railways and the invasive weed, the 
water hyacinth.  Iqbal, Iftekhar, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State, and Social Change, 1840-1943, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.   
5 As Amartya Sen has argued, hunger and starvation came about due to loss of “exchange entitlements,” as 
a wide-range of people could no longer afford to purchase rise in exchange for their labour or other 
resources.  Famine, as always, was the result of poverty; not, as Sen has convincingly demonstrated, from 
crop failures and food availability decline.  Sen, Amartya, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981 
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JUTE AND PEASANT COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
The late nineteenth century witnessed a rise in the peasant production of 
“commodities of empire” in Europe’s colonial possessions in Asia, Africa, and the 
Americas.   In these peripheral economies, peasant smallholders and sharecroppers 
devoted more of their land and labour to produce industrial raw materials and 
consumer comestibles for global commodity markets housed in distant imperial 
metropolises.6  In addition to jute, peasant smallholders in British India produced 
cotton, sugar, indigo, opium, rice and wheat for distant colonial markets.7  Peasant 
smallholders produced rubber in colonial Malaya,8 sisal and coffee in East Africa, 9 
cocoa on the Gold Coast,10 and so forth.  Perhaps the most stunning example of the 
rise of peasant commodity production during the late nineteenth century was the 
“rapid geographic expansion of the worldwide web of cotton production,” to use 
                                                        
6 The tremendous rise of commodity production in Europe’s colonial possessions during the nineteenth 
and twentieth century is the focus of a special issue of the Journal of Global History titled “Commodities, 
Empires, and Global History,”  As the editors of the issue, Sandeep Hazareesingh and Jonathan Curry-
Machado note, “The growing resource, manufacturing, and consumption needs of industrializing society, 
the emergence of the steamship and the railways … escalated demand for raw materials and foodstuffs, 
and quickened and intensified commodity transactions, bringing profound changes to regions and societies 
in both south and north.”  Hazareesing, Sandeep and Curry-Machado, Jonathan, “Editorial – Commodities, 
Empire and Global History,” Journal of Global History, 4(1), March, 2009 
7  For sugar in the United Provinces, see Amin, Shahid, Sugarcane and Sugar in Gorakhpur: An Inquiry into 
Peasant Production for Capitalist Enterprise in Colonial India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984.  For cotton 
in the Berar, see Satya, Laxman, Cotton and Famine in Berar, 1850-1900, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997.   On 
peasant production of opium, see Richards, John, “The Indian Empire and Peasant Production of Opium 
in the Nineteenth Century,” MAS, 15(1), 1981, pp. 59-82.   
8 Rubber was growth both on plantations and by indentured labour and peasant smallholdings with peasant 
labour.  Drabble, John H., Rubber in Malaya, 1876-1922: The Genesis of the Industry, Kuala Lampur: Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 
9 Peasant production of sisal in Tanganyika began in the 1920s, during a less favourable period in 
commodity markets.  Westcott, N., “The East African Sisal Industry, 1929-1949: The Marketing of a 
Colonial Commodity During Depression and War,” The Journal of African History, 25(4), 1984, pp. 445-461.  
A good overview of peasant coffee cultivation also in Tanzania is provided in Mbilinyi, Simon M., The 
Economics of Peasant Coffee Production: the Case of Tanzania, Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1976 
10 Polly Hill’s excellent study of cocoa farmers in southern Ghana is a classic in the field of peasant 
commodity production in colonial contexts.  Hill, Polly, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study 
in Rural Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963  
  6 
Sven Beckert’s phrase.  In the wake of the American Civil War and emancipation, 
cotton cultivation expanded rapidly in India, Turkestan, Egypt, and Brazil, and was 
everywhere, including in post-emancipation southern USA, produced by “cultivators 
who would work their own or rented land with the input of family labor and 
metropolitan capital.”11  The rise of jute cultivation in Bengal was, therefore, a 
specific instance in the sweeping and global history of the rise of peasant production 
of commodities of empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
The emergence of commodity production was often preceded and 
accompanied by changes in the social relations of agrarian production.  Imperial 
commodity production was often more credit-intensive than subsistence production 
and moneylenders were ubiquitous in peasant commodity producing regimes in the 
colonial world.12  The rise of jute cultivation in Bengal was accompanied by 
increasing agrarian indebtedness, as credit emerged as the major mechanism of 
surplus appropriation of peasant labour during the late nineteenth century.13  Credit 
markets and produce markets were closely integrated, a fact that was borne out 
during the Great Depression of 1930, when the crash in commodity prices was 
accompanied by a credit squeeze in Bengal’s jute tracts and other primary commodity 
producing regions in the colonial world.14   
                                                        
11 Beckert, Sven, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in 
the Age of the American Civil War,” American Historical Review, 109(5), 2004, p. 35 
12 This was the case with peasant cotton cultivation around the world and sugar cultivation in northern 
India, to cite just two instances.  See, Beckert’s “Emancipation and Empire” for cotton and indebtedness 
in India, Egypt and Brazil, and Amin’s Sugarcane and Sugar in Gorakhpur for sugar in north India.   
13 Sugata Bose has argued that the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of debt in the Bengal 
countryside.  Bose, Sugata, Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal since 1770, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, especially Chapter 4.  
14 Sugata Bose has demonstrated the devastating effects of the global depression on Bengal’s agrarian 
economy.  Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal, chapter 4 
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Peasant commodity production was also often preceded and accompanied by 
significant changes in relationships of land.  Commodity production was spurred by 
colonial reforms of agrarian land tenure.  Revenue-hungry colonial governments were 
primarily interested in revenue extraction and law and order and their reforms tended 
to crystallize relations of domination and authority in agrarian land tenure.15  Superior 
tenure holders often coerced peasants and sharecroppers to produce imperial 
commodities.  This was most notably the case with indigo, where peasants rebelled 
against landlords and planters forcing indigo cultivation.16  After the “blue mutiny,” 
indigo cultivation was restricted to Bihar, where landlords had far greater power over 
their tenants and their allocation of resources to particular crops.17  
Peasant commodity production did not necessarily involve the coercion of 
superior tenure holders.  Unlike indigo, peasants were never coerced to cultivate jute.  
Peasant jute production involved cultivators’ decisions – within the context of 
prevailing social relations of agrarian production – on how to allocate land and labour 
between imperial commodities and articles of household consumption.  This decision 
relied not only on the social relations of the land but on the land itself – the size and 
quality of peasant holdings.  In the late nineteenth century, the decision to grow jute 
was driven by land availability.  Peasants cultivated jute on new lands thrown up by 
the delta’s active river-systems, augmenting cash incomes without compromising 
household food security.  As landholdings fragmented and land became scarce, the 
logic of peasant jute production changed.  In the twentieth century, cultivators grew                                                         
15 Washbrook, David, ““Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies, 15(3), 
1981, pp. 649-721.    
16 Kling, Blair, The Blue Mutiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859-1862, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1966 
17 Bose, Sugata, Colonial Capital and Peasant Labour, p. 52 
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jute as part of a market-oriented subsistence livelihood strategy.  The earlier period of 
expansion has parallels with peasant cocoa cultivation in West Africa, while the latter 
has more in common with commodity production in East Africa, particularly Kenya, 
where peasant holdings were reduced by land alienation for European settlers.   
The most significant impact of peasant commodity production in Bengal, as 
in other parts of colonial Asia and Africa, lay in intensifying peasant households’ 
engagements with markets, not only as producers but also as consumers.  A “natural 
economy,” consisting of the production of use-values and simple exchange between 
producers, did not exist in the Bengal delta or other parts of South Asia characterized 
by settled agriculture.  Settled agriculturists in Asia and Africa produced commodities 
for regional and inter-regional markets along the Indian Ocean rim prior to the 
advent of European empires.  Imperial commodity production, however,  intensified 
peasants’ market-engagements and linked the peasant household not just to regional 
or inter-regional markets but to distant markets connected by the flows of European 
colonial capital.   
Before the 1850s, Bengal’s major cash crop doubled as its subsistence crop.  
Bengal rice was exported inland to northern India and along the Bay of Bengal coast 
to Madras and Ceylon from at least the sixteenth century onwards. Markets for 
Bengal rice expanded in the era of European empires – in the growing colonial 
metropolis of Calcutta, in the specialized sugar islands of the Indian Ocean, and in 
Britain and Europe itself.18  Jute displaced rice in stages.  Initially, in the 1850s and 
1860s, jute was cultivated on new lands accreted by the delta’s active rivers, on 
                                                        
18 For the pre-colonial rice trade in the Bay of Bengal, see Arasaratnam, S., “The Rice Trade in Eastern 
India, 1650-1740,” MAS, 22(3), 1988, pp. 531-549 
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uncultivated lands, or lands that formerly grew indigo.  As cultivation expanded 
further, during the 1870s and 1880s, jute displaced commercial grain production, but 
most cultivators would try to sow enough rice for secure household subsistence 
before allocating land to jute.  Peasant households cultivated jute to finance the 
consumption of goods and services, including Manchester cloth, corrugated tin 
sheets for housing, ornaments, toys, foodstuffs, utensils, cooking and lamp oil, salt, 
and the colonial governments’ legal and educational services.  In the 1900s, as 
landholdings fragmented, cultivators were no longer able to produce sufficient rice 
for household subsistence and substituted grain for commercial fibre.  Although the 
delta’s agrarian economy was already commercialized, it was only with the advent of 
jute that peasant households’ subsistence became tied to markets.  With the 
emergence and rise of jute, the exchange of peasant produce for articles of household 
of consumption and subsistence in these markets came to constitute the core of 
peasant livelihoods and survival.   
Peasant commodity production also led to peasant differentiation in Bengal as 
in other colonial worlds.  One group of peasants households, endowed with greater 
landholdings, capital stocks, or political and social connections, prospered through a 
combination of commodity production, moneylending, and trade. Another group, 
with smaller landholdings and limited stocks of capital, were impoverished through 
market shocks and increasing indebtedness.19  With respect to agrarian Bengal, the 
                                                        
19 For India, David Washbrook has argued that cash crops like cotton, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar 
strengthened and enriched a small section of wealthy peasants in Madras: Washbrook, David, The Emergence 
of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 68-93.  
Frederick Cooper has warned against exaggerating this process of peasant differentiation and the 
emergence of a capitalist elite peasantry in African history.  Cooper, Frederick, “Peasants, Capitalists, and 
Historians: A Review Article,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 7(2), 1981, pp. 284-314.   The story of 
impoverishment through commodity production in Berar’s cotton tracts has been narrated by Laxman 
Satya, Cotton and Famine in Berar.    
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debate on peasant differentiation has been dominated by Rajat and Ratna Ray’s 
“jotedar thesis” – the argument that jotedars, rural households with very large 
landholdings who had their lands cultivated by sharecroppers and wage labourers, 
replaced zamindars as the dominant power in the countryside.20  Sugata Bose has 
demonstrated that the jotedar was limited to northern Bengal particularly the Rangpur 
district while landholdings in eastern Bengal – the jute tracts of Faridpur, Dacca, 
Mymensingh and Tippera – were more evenly distributed between cultivators.21   
However, even small variations in the size of landholdings could and did 
make a difference in the economic trajectory of peasant fortunes.  Peasant 
households with enough land to grow sufficient subsistence grain for the household 
and commercial fibre for markets were relatively insulated from global market shocks.  
A difference between 1 or 2 acres and 5 or 6 acres of landholdings could and did lead 
to significant divergences in the fortunes of peasant households. Market and 
ecological shocks drove the former group deeper into debt and, especially during the 
depression years of the 1930s, led to loss of lands.  This group of farmers was steadily 
converted into sharecroppers and agricultural wage-labourers, were most vulnerable 
to market and ecological shocks, and perished in large numbers in the 1943 famine.  
On the other hand, peasant households with larger landholdings managed to prosper 
during favourable years and hold their own during economic and ecological shocks.  
They were able to diversify sources of income, by going into the petty jute trade or 
other forms of small business, to purchase intermediary tenures, such as talukdaris, 
go into petty moneylending, and, in some case, to even send their sons to formal 
                                                        
20 Rajat and Ratna Ray, “Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study of Rural Politics in Bengal,” MAS, 9(1), 1975.   
21 Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal, Chapter 1.   
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schools and enter the ranks of the salaried middle-classes.  This group developed 
stronger connections to the market towns that emerged along the delta’s waterways 
and railways.22 
 
JUTE AND MARKET TOWNS 
Commodities circulated through routes of built-up capital, or capital that had been 
fixed into the land – railways, ports, docks, warehouses, baling presses, and so forth.23  
In the jute tracts, built-up capital concentrated in small market along the delta’s 
waterways and railways.  With populations ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, 
these small market towns were nodes connecting peasant smallholdings to global 
commodity markets.  In the towns, intermediary traders purchased small lots of un-
assorted peasant produce, and bulked, stored, quality graded, and packaged fibres 
before dispatching it to Calcutta, and thence to mills.  Peasant produce was converted 
into a standardized unit of quantity, quality, and price – the bale, which was used in 
forward purchases, futures transactions, and commodity exchanges.  As the volume 
of jute circulating through the delta increased, so did concentrations of built-up 
capital in the delta’s small towns.  The tremendous increase in jute production during 
                                                        
22 A similar argument about the political rise of a class of relatively wealthy peasants is made by Joya 
Chatterji in Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994.  Chatterji revisits the jotedar argument, taking issue with Bose’s characterization of an 
undifferentiated peasantry.  Bose is correct in his depiction of patterns of land distribution.  The peasants 
who came to form a new group of political elites were not jotedars – they were small landholders with just 
enough lands to benefit from jute cultivation without compromising household food security.  
23 Harvey, David, The Limits to Capital, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.  Harvey’s larger argument is that 
circulations of commodity and liquid capital through concentrations of built-up or fixed capital leads to 
competing geographical spaces and consequently war.  The small-towns in question represent much 
smaller concentrations of capital that were cogs within the broader geographical space marked out by 
circulations of jute which included the delta’s farms and the mills along the Hooghly.  There never was any 
question of market towns going to war.   
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was accompanied by the growth of 
the hinterland’s market towns.  
Historians of imperial commodities and colonial India have, by and large, 
neglected these hinterland market towns, and have focused more exclusively on 
metropolitan centres of finance and trade.24  Metropolitan nodes in circuits of global 
capital have been the focus of several excellent histories of global capital in the 
colonial world.25  Yet each of these cities was connected to small market-towns 
deeper in the hinterland, often along the waterways connecting coasts to interior 
farms and along the railways introduced by colonial governments.26  In these market 
towns in Africa, Asia and the Americas, as in the ganjes of Bengal, cultivators and 
petty traders brought in peasant produce from the surrounding countryside for sale 
to larger traders or agents of metropolitan firms.                                                           
24 Two important exceptions Indian history are Chris Bayly’s study of the north Indian qasbah and Anand 
Yang’s detailed analysis of intermediary and secondary markets in Bihar:  Bayly, Chris, Rulers Townsmen, 
Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983 and Yang, Anand, Bazaar India: Markets, Society, and the Colonial State in Gangetic Bihar, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998.   By and large, however, historians of colonial Asia and Africa have 
neglected the small market town.  Charles Good’s 1973 review article on African market towns notes that 
“markets [in Africa] were hardly likely subjects for serious scholarly attention … [because] during he 
colonial period markets and African commerce generally had a low level of official encouragement and 
visibility.”  Good, Charles, “Markets in Africa: A Review of Research Themes and the Question of Market 
Origins,” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 13, Cahier 52, 1973, pp. 769=780 
25 The classic study of a commodity metropolis is William Cronon’s history of Chicago and its relationship 
to its hinterland: Cronon, William, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, New York: W.W. Norton, 
1992.  On the other hand, histories of colonial metropolises have not focused on the relationship of the 
city to the countryside, but on industry and labour.  For example: Cooper, Frederick, On the African 
Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987; Chandavarkar, Raj, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the Working 
Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; and Dutta, Partha, Urbanization, 
Local Politics, and Labour Protest: A Case Study of Jute Mills Area of 24-Parganas (North), 1900-1959, Malda: 
Dipali Publishers, 2008.   
26 There are a few monographs explicitly concerned with the small market town in colonial Africa.  For 
instance, P.O. Pedersen’s Small African Towns: Between Rural Networks and Urban Hierarchies, Aldershot: 1997, 
is an ethnology of two market-towns in Zimbabwe – Gotu and Gokwe – emphasizing these towns’ 
“external relations to the rural hinterland, the larger urban centres and the national and international 
economy.”  Pederson and Jonathan Baker have developed this theme of the small market town in Africa in 
two edited volumes: Baker, Jonathan (ed.), Small Town Africa: Studies in Rural-Urban Interaction, Uppsala: 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1990; and Baker, and Pederson, P.O., (ed.) The Rural-Urban 
Interface in Africa: Expansion and Adaption, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992. 
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These towns were also centres of state administration and of cultural and 
intellectual production.  They housed not only the built-up facilities of commodity 
trade, but also branches of government that were charged with administering, 
monitoring, regulating, policing, and extracting revenue out of agrarian production 
and transactions of agricultural produce.  The expansion of peasant commodity 
production was accompanied by the penetration of the state and its various branches 
into rural hinterlands.  Small towns were sites of state formation in agrarian 
hinterlands.   
These mofussil towns – to use the term employed by colonial government and 
European capitalists – were located in-between the jute hinterland and metropolitan 
Calcutta.  They provided settings for encounters between the countryside and the city, 
and between rural peasants and urban capitalists, lawyers, government officials, and 
school-teachers.  Cultivators from the surrounding countryside visited these towns to 
sell and buy commodities, conduct legal and financial affairs, send their children to 
school, attend fairs, participate in organized politics, and so forth.  The small towns 
were centres of cultural and intellectual life, many of which operated printing presses, 
accommodated bookstores and literary societies, and published local newspapers. By 
and large, historians have ignored the cultural and intellectual production of these 
small towns and have focused on more vibrant metropolitan settings.   
This bias towards the metropolis is even more pronounced in Bengal, where 
Calcutta was the centre of an admittedly remarkable flowering of creativity in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  In the words of Aurobindo Ghosh, the 
Indian nationalist leader of the early 1900s, “Calcutta is to Bengal what Paris is to 
France, it is from Calcutta that Bengal takes its opinions, its inspirations, its leaders, 
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its tone, its programme of action.”27  Dazzled by Calcutta’s intellectual production, 
historians have tended not to take the small-town intelligentsia seriously, relegating 
them to the status of “rustics” who expressed “peasant consciousness” rather than 
well-formulated ideas worthy of intellectual histories.28  As I argue in this dissertation, 
a distinctive intellectual and political culture, influenced but certainly not determined 
by the metropolis, emerged out of the jute tracts’ mofussil towns. 
 
POLITICS 
The relationship between bourgeois nationalism and subaltern politics has been one 
of the major themes of the subaltern school of Indian history.  Subalternist scholars 
have argued that subaltern politics occupied an autonomous domain, and operated 
independently of elite nationalist politics.  Ranajit Guha has argued that the 
nationalist project of “mobilizing the masses” took place in the absence of hegemony, 
as nationalist elites relied on coercion rather than persuasion in enlisting subaltern 
participation in the nationalist movement.29  Partha Chatterjee describes a “moment 
of maneuver” in the development of anti-colonial nationalism, when bourgeois 
nationalism suspended its discourse of modernity and rationality to gain subaltern 
support.  The moment of maneuver was exemplified by Gandhi’s anti-modernist                                                         
27 Karmayogin, No. 27, January 8, 1910.   
28 Partha Chatterjee has argued that mofussil poets and pamphlets represented a “complex of peasant 
sentiments,” in  “Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-1935,” Subaltern Studies, Vol. I, 
1982, pp. 27-30.   Sugata Bose and Omkar Goswami use these mofussil texts as sources for the economic 
history, of peasant prosperity and poverty and the changing social relations of agrarian production.  Bose, 
Colonial Capital and Peasant Labour and Agrarian Bengal, and Omkar Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant 
Society.  These historians do not, however, consider these texts as expressions of a distinctive and coherent 
mofussil discourse on agrarian political economy.   
29 Guha, Ranajit, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997, particularly Chapter 2 titled, “Discipline and Mobilize: Hegemony and Elite Control 
in Nationalist Campaigns.” 
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ideas, particularly his critique of bourgeois “civil society.”30  More convincingly, 
Shahid Amin has argued that the subaltern idea of the “Mahatma,” as worked out in 
the “popular imagination,” was distinct from Gandhi the person.  Hence, peasants in 
Gorakhpur were responding to their own idea of Gandhi rather than to Gandhi 
himself.31  If Gandhian and Congress nationalism consisted of elites, masses, and 
mobilization, Bengali Muslim politics has sometimes been seen as the relationship of 
elites, masses and “communalization.”  Tajul Islam Hashemi has argued that an 
alliance of Muslim upper-peasantry, Muslim landlords and members of the Bengali-
speaking ulama “communalized” cultivators in the 1920s and 1930s, that is, instructed 
them to place religious identity above class identity.32   
I overlay the class categories of elite and subaltern and the religious categories 
of Muslim and Hindu with the spatial categories of hinterland, metropolis and mofussil.  
I focus especially on politics in the hinterland’s small towns, a distinctive mofussil 
political culture emerged in these towns in the early twentieth century.  The 
nationalist project of mobilization – an attempt to enlist the hinterland in the 
nationalist project – was conducted from the metropolis and through the mofussil.  
Mobilization often consisted of whistle-stop tours of mofussil towns by charismatic 
nationalist leaders.  The hinterland’s small towns also provided settings for peasant 
politics, which often consisted of groups of peasants from the countryside attacking                                                         
30 Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, Zed Books, 1986, 
particularly Chapter 4, “The Moment of Manoeuvre: Gandhi and the Critique of Civil Society.” 
31 Amin, Shahid, “Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-2” in Subaltern Studies III, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984.  Amin’s longer study of the Chauri Chaura incident in 1922 is a 
detailed analysis of the Gandhian mass mobilization movement in Gorakhpur: Amin, Shahid, Event, 
Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.   
32 Hashmi, Tajul Islam, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-
1947, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992.  For a more focused analysis of “communalization” during the 
1920s, see Hashmi’s article, “The Communalization of Class Struggle: East Bengal peasantry, 1923-1929,” 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1988, 25(1), 
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agents and symbols of economic exploitation in the towns.  Further, and most 
significantly, the mofussil market town emerged as a distinctive centre of intellectual 
production and political activism, influenced but certainly not determined by 
metropolitan nationalism.  Mofussil ideas of jute production and peasant livelihoods 
were in the political ascendancy during the 1920s and 1930s, and constituted a 
significant challenge to metropolitan and bourgeois nationalism. 
Focusing on mofussil politics, I argue, enables us to take apart the notion of an 
autonomous domain of a peasant politics and, relatedly, to shift the focus from the 
peasant insurgent to the everyday stuff of peasant politics.  The dominant image of 
peasant politics in colonial South Asia has been of armed and violent insurgency 
against agents and symbols of peasant exploitation.33  However, as I argue, peasants 
did participate in the more mundane and day-to-day forms of electoral, representative 
and legislative politics.  This was particularly the case after the Montagu Chelmsford 
reforms of 1919 carved the jute hinterland into constituencies, where a very limited 
numbers of voters elected representatives to the legislature in Calcutta.  The 
Government of India Act of 1935 increased the number of mofussil constituencies 
and considerably expanded the franchise.  The populist Krishak Praja Party was the 
main vehicle of peasant participation in electoral and representative politics in the 
1930s.  Drawing its support primarily from the mofussil, the KPP scored significant 
electoral victories in the 1936 elections in rural, hinterland constituencies on a 
campaign promising legislative reforms of land tenure and credit markets.  Joya 
                                                        
33 The focus on the peasant insurgent is probably due to Ranajit Guha’s brilliant study of peasant 
insurgencies: Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1983 
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Chatterji has described the KPP’s electoral triumph as the “emergence of the mofussil 
in Bengal politics.”34 
The idea of Pakistan was not solely the preserve of metropolitan intellectuals 
and politicians – it was also a peasant idea, worked out in the mofussil and in the 
context of party politics and electoral campaigns.  The delta’s inhabitants voted in 
overwhelming numbers for the Muslim League in the provincial elections of 1946, 
which the League had converted into a referendum on Pakistan.  The Muslim League 
contested the election with slogans like “Land Belongs to the Plough,” “Abolish 
Zamindari Without Compensation,”  “Labourers will be Owners,” and “Pakistan for 
Peasants and Labourers.”35  Pakistan was portrayed a post-famine peasant utopia, a 
land without hunger.  Pakistan was to be the “land of eternal Eid,” the Muslim 
festival celebrating the end of Ramadan.36  The campaign worked – as evidenced not 
only by the Muslim League’s electoral victory, but also the fanfare and enthusiasm 
with which the delta’s inhabitants celebrated the birth of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.   
In the immediate post-partition years, these hinterland ideas of Pakistan came 
into conflict with the post-colonial projects of state building, as the new Pakistani 
state attempted to impose their authority and control over commodity production 
and circulation.  The Pakistani state’s territorial inheritance comprised solely the 
impoverished agrarian jute tracts, shorn of the metropolitan and industrial centres of                                                         
34 Chatterji, Joya, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  See especially Chapter 2 titled “The Emergence of the Mofussil in Bengal Politics,” 
pp. 55-102 
35 Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor, Dhaka: Srijan Publishers, 1988, p. 248 
36 Hashmi, Tajul Islam, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-
1947, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992.  Ahmed Kamal provides a more focused discussion of the 
various utopian ideas that east Bengalis attached to the idea of Pakistan in, Kamal, Ahmed, “A Land of 
Eternal Eid: Independence, People and Politics in East Bengal,” Dhaka University Studies 46, June 1989.   
  18 
western Bengal.  Upon this hinterland without a metropolis, the Pakistani state 
undertook an ambitious project of industrialization and economic modernization.  In 
order to carry out this project, the government imposed territorial and national 
sovereignty over jute, attempting to transform the former commodity of empire into 
a national resource producing revenue for the state.  This statist project the 
heightened regulation and policing of the production and circulation of fibre that, I 
will argue, translated into the everyday harassment of its citizenry, and occasionally 
took the form of state-sponsored violence.  Ahmed Kamal has chronicled the brutal 
and violent suppression of peasant movements by the post-colonial Pakistani 
government in East Bengal’s jute tracts.  In East Pakistan, he argues, the “state” 
turned against the “nation” and the vision of Pakistan as peasant utopia died a cruel 
and swift death in the Bengal delta.37   
 
*   *   * 
 
In Chapter 1, I look at the emergence and expansion of jute cultivation between 1853 
and 1913, arguing that the conditions of peasant production allowed many of them to 
benefit from commodity production.  The most visible manifestations of increased 
prosperity lay in cultivators’ consumption of market-based goods and the colonial 
governments’ legal and, to a lesser extent, educational services.  Peasant politics was 
                                                        
37 Kamal, Ahmed, State against the Nation: The Decline of the Muslim League in pre-independence Bangladesh, 1947-
1954, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2009.  See also Ahmed Kamal’s article on the violent suppression 
of the nankar movement by the state in East Pakistan, “Peasant Rebellions and the Muslim League 
Government in East Bengal, 1947-54,” in Chakrabarty, Majumdar and Sartori (ed.) From the Colonial to the 
Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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the politics of consumption – on the consumption of enhanced property rights 
through the colonial government’s legal institutions during the rent disputes of the 
1870s and on resisting the nationalist boycott of imported goods during the Swadeshi 
movement of 1905-06.  The relatively prosperous delta was an anomaly for the 
emerging Indian nationalist movement, a space that defied the nationalist charge 
against the British Empire – impoverishing the nation, draining her of her wealth.  I 
argue that metropolitan nationalists resolved this anomaly by accusing jute cultivators 
of selfishly aggrandizing themselves at the expense of their community.   
In Chapter 2, I look at the emergence of market towns along waterways and 
railways in the deltaic hinterland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
These towns were nodes connecting primary commodity producers to global 
commodity markets, spaces where peasant produce was bulked, stored and assorted 
before being dispatched to Calcutta and, thence, to jute mills across the world.  As 
the volumes of jute circulating through the delta expanded, more capital was invested 
in warehouses, docks, and baling presses in these towns.  The overlaying of the 
delta’s existing transport infrastructure of oar and sail-powered boats with the coal-
powered river-steamers and railways during the late nineteenth century drove the 
distribution and growth of mofussil towns.  Further, these towns were not only 
intermediary centres of the jute trade, but also housed branches of the colonial state 
and were sites of the metropolitan nationalist encounter with the hinterland subaltern.   
These mofussil towns were also centres of intellectual production and political 
activism that, though influenced by metropolitan Calcutta, was certainly not 
determined by it.  In Chapter 3, I examine a distinctively mofussil economic and 
political discourse that emerged in jute tracts after WWI, during an era of agrarian 
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immiseration.  This mofussil discourse consisted, on the one hand, of reforms to 
peasant production and consumption and, on the other, of legislative reforms of 
agrarian factor markets.  Mofussil ideas of agrarian immiseration, I argue, came to 
constitute the stuff of everyday peasant politics, peasant participation in electoral, 
representative and legislative politics rather than the more spectacular episodes of 
peasant insurgency.  An examination of mofussil discourses of agrarian political 
economy illuminates the intellectual and political conditions that gave rise to the 
Krishak Praja Party and its particularly brand of peasant populism during the 1930s.  
The Krishak Praja Party scored significant electoral victories in the 1936 
elections, and its charismatic leader A.K. Fazlul Haq was appointed the premier of 
colonial Bengal.  In Chapter 4, I examine the limits of peasant populism under the 
colonial context, by focusing on attempts and failures of the new government to 
bolster jute prices between 1939 and 1943.  Operating under colonial constraints and 
in the context of World War II, the populist government was unable to crack the 
price-setting powers of Calcutta mills – with tragic consequences.  The great Bengal 
famine of 1943 was caused, at least partly, by the unfavourable terms of trade 
between fibre and grain, and was a consequence of the peasant populist government’s 
failure to bolster jute prices.   
The final chapter examines partition and Pakistan in the immediate post-
colonial period.  Muslim League politicians portrayed Pakistan as a post-famine 
utopia – a place characterized by abundance, “the land of eternal Eid” in the words 
of a contemporary poet.  The idea of Pakistan as peasant utopia came into conflict 
with the exigencies of state-building in a post-partition, post-colonial context.  
Partition had carved out the impoverished jute tracts, separating farms from the 
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existing metropolis in Calcutta – East Pakistan was a hinterland without a metropolis.  
The post-colonial Pakistani state aspired to build a modern, metropolitan and 
industrial economy on the hinterland.  From the state’s perspective, jute was a 
national resource that would provide revenue and for the basis of economic 
modernization.  However, the idea of jute as national resource came into conflict 
with ideas of Pakistan as peasant utopia and with the realities of fibre as means of 
peasant livelihood.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Politics of Peasant Consumption: 
Jute Cultivation in the Bengal Delta, 1853 to 1918 
 
In this chapter, I look at how participation in global markets transformed material 
and political life in the delta during the late nineteenth century, from the outbreak of 
the Crimean War to the outbreak of World War I.  The Crimean War inaugurated the 
large-scale production and trade of jute as it interrupted Britain’s supplies of Russian 
flax and hemp and led textile mills in Dundee, Scotland, to switch en masse to jute.  
Over the following half-century, the production of jute fibre and fabric rose rapidly – 
until World War I.  The outbreak of war in Europe, in August 1914, known in the 
jute tracts as the “German War,” caused a sudden collapse in prices and the virtual 
disappearance of jute markets just as cultivators were bringing the fibre to market.  
WWI brought to an end a prolonged period of expanding jute cultivation and relative 
prosperity in eastern Bengal.  After 1918, very few people would speak of eastern 
Bengal and jute cultivators as anything but impoverished. 
 Prior to WWI, the prosperity of the delta was manifested in jute cultivators’ 
new and varied forms of cash-based consumption.  Consumption and prosperity, I 
will argue, came to constitute the core of material and political life in the delta.  
Consumption lay at the heart of peasant movements prior to World War I – the anti-
rent movement between 1872 and 1885 and resistance to the Swadeshi economic 
programme of boycott in 1905/06.  Jute consumers’ prosperity also informed 
nationalist and colonial perceptions of eastern Bengal’s jute tracts and these 
perceptions changed along with the changes in jute production.  As jute acreage was 
extended and rice cultivation receded, seasonal food shortages and indebtedness 
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became important aspects of peasant livelihoods.  For most commentators in the 
1870s, consumption was an uncomplicated indication of the jute cultivators’ progress 
and prosperity; at the turn of the century, consumption came to be associated with 
indebtedness and extravagance.  The Swadeshi movement and its associated 
programme of economic boycott was a broad attack on peasant consumption.  This 
attack was informed by an emerging nationalist discourse of Indian poverty and it 
was accompanied by a Bengali middle-class antipathy towards jute cultivation.  The 
failure of the Swadeshi movement to gain traction in eastern Bengal’s jute tracts 
should be, I argue, seen in terms of nationalist economic ideas.   
 
PRODUCTION 
Jute remained inextricably tied to the soil of the Bengal delta.  Attempts to transfer 
jute cultivation to other parts of the world during the nineteenth century failed.  In 
1873, the Queensland society requested and received jute seeds from Bengal, though 
little seems to have come out of it.1   A more concerted attempt to introduce jute 
cultivation in Louisiana, in the Mississippi delta, also failed – though it caused 
consternation amongst colonial officials in Bengal.2  A report by the United States 
agricultural department noted success in growing the plant in the Mississippi delta’s 
ecology but concluded that unless the process of extracting the fibre was mechanized, 
                                                        
1 Supply of jute seed to the Queensland Acclimitization Society, NAI, Revenue and Agriculture, Fibres and 
Silk, 9/13, Part B, January, 1874 
2 In a government resolution to investigate the cultivation and trade of jute, George Campbell, the 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, noted: “the Americans are actively prosecuting the experimental growth 
of the plant in various parts of their country.”  “Resolution,” February 4, 1876, GoB, Agri Dept, Agri 
Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB. 
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farmers would not take up large-scale cultivation.3  Agricultural wages were too high 
and farm families in the American south were unwilling to exploit family labour.  
Bengal’s monopoly over jute cultivation was maintained through low wages and 
through the exploitation of women’s and children’s labour.  Agriculturists in other 
parts of the world were simply not willing to work for as little as the Bengali farmer.   
The world’s increasing consumption of jute fibre and fabrics was met entirely 
by the land and labour of peasant smallholders in eastern Bengal.  As demand rose 
through the late nineteenth century, so did the quantity of land devoted to cultivating 
the jute plant.  M.W. Ali has estimated that the quantity of land under jute increased 
from 50,000 acres annually in the 1850s to close to 420,000 acres in the early 1870s.4   
Omkar Goswami estimates that 553,000 acres were under jute in 1876, which 
increased to 1.6 million acres in 1896-97.5 The colonial government’s statistics of jute 
acreage began in 1896-97 but were notoriously inaccurate; they indicate that jute 
acreage increased until World War I, from 2.1 million acres in 1900 to 3.1 million 
acres in 1913, with a peak of close to 3.5 million acres in 1912-13.6  
The bulk of Bengal’s jute was produced in the eastern and northern districts 
of the province (see Table 1).  These districts were located on the alluvial lands 
formed out of the delta’s shifting river-systems: in the northern districts of Jalpaiguri, 
Rangpur, Pabna, Bogra and western Mymensingh on lands accreted by the 
                                                        
3 Waterhouse, S., Report on Jute Culture and the Importance of the Industry, Department of Agriculture: Special 
Report, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1883, p. 14 
4 Ali, M.W., Jute in the Agrarian History of Bengal, 1870-1914, Rajshahi, 1998. 
5 Goswami, Omkar, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern Bengal, New Delhi, 1991, p. 
4 
6 Government of India, Agricultural Statistics of British India 1904-05 to 1914-15, Calcutta, 1916 
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Brahmaputra, in the central districts of Faridpur and western Dacca on the deposits 
of the Ganges; and in eastern Mymensingh, eastern Dacca and Tipperah by the 
Meghna.  The jute tract was bound in the south by the estuaries of  the rivers as they 
entered the Bay of Bengal, to the west by the relatively high and dry Barendra region, 
and in the north and east by the foothills of the Himalayas in Assam and Hill 
Tipperah.  Within these bounds lay the Bengal delta, an alluvial tract formed out of 
the silt deposits of the three river-systems and crisscrossed by their numerous 
tributaries. 
 
 It was difficult to distinguish land and water in the delta.  The shifting rivers 
were constantly swallowing up land from its banks, and throwing up new lands, both 
on its edges and out of the riverbed.  The delta flooded each year, during July and 
August, when the monsoon rains and the summer snowmelt in the high Himalayas                                                         
7 Chaudhuri, N.C., Jute in Bengal, Calcutta, 1921, pp. 210-211 
Table 1.1: Acreage of jute in major jute-districts of northern and eastern Bengal, 1872 
to 19107 
District 1872 1880 1890 1900 1910 
Jalpaiguri 50,000 15,400 20,500 63,000 94,800 
Rangpur 100,000 131,200 600,000 277,000 237,600 
Dinajpur 117,600 14,600 96,000 80,000 92,000 
Pabna 122,900 102,300 150,000 136,500 180,100 
Bogra 46,600 36,600 35,000 88,000 120,000 
Mymensingh 48,000 160,900 301,000 519,000 717,500 
Dacca 40,000 115,000 180,000 161,000 184,600 
Faridpur 16,600 79,600 80,000 100,000 120,200 
Tippera 78,400 0 190,800 219,000 236,900 
Rest of Bengal 139,205 140,200 272,800 321,100 447,900 
Total 759,305 795,800 1,926,100 1,964,600 2,431,600 
Proportion of Bengal's 
jute cultivated in above 
districts 81.7 82.4 85.8 83.7 81.6 
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caused the rivers to swell and spill their banks.  The colonial bureaucrat J.C. Jack’s 
description of the delta, published in 1916, points to all of the above features: 
The delta of the Ganges … is a peculiar country, worth knowledge and worth 
description.  It is made up of new mud, old mud and marsh; it contains rivers 
as large as any in the world, linked together by an amazing network of lesser 
rivers, streams and ditches; it mostly disappears under water for several 
months in the year; yet it grows abundant crops everywhere and supports a 
very considerable population in considerable idleness.8 
 
Jute grew abundantly in the delta’s unique ecology of soil and water.  The fast-
growing plant survived and prospered in standing water.  Unless floods arrived early 
or sowing was delayed – because April showers were late – the plant would outpace 
the rising rivers.   Jute was harvested in August and September, at the height of the 
annual floods, and peasants and labourers would wade into knee or even waist-deep 
water to cut the stems.  The stems were steeped in water for a week or more before 
the fibre was stripped, a task rendered much easier by the ready availability of water 
in the flooded delta.  The floods also facilitated transport – every part of the delta 
was accessible by wooden country boats. When the fibres were ready to be marketed, 
they could be transported cheaply from the farmer’s home to the delta’s river-ports 
and railway towns.  
Jute competed with a plant equally suited to the delta’s ecology, a plant with 
an older and richer heritage: rice.  The region produced two rice crops – spring rice 
or aus, and winter rice or aman.  The crop calendars for aus and jute overlapped 
exactly.  Both plants were sown broadcast with the spring rains, both grew rapidly to 
escape the rising floodwaters, and both were harvested at about the same time – aus                                                         
8 Jack, J.C. The Economic Life of a Bengal District: A Study, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916, p. 2 
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slightly earlier in July and August and jute in August and September.   The winter rice 
crop, aman, on the other hand was transplanted in September and October, when 
floodwaters receded, and harvested in early January.  Though it was possible to 
transplant aman onto land from which jute had been just harvested, it was not 
profitable.  Jute is an exhaustive plant, and transplanting aman seedlings onto land 
just cleared of jute seriously reduced yields. Jute cultivation implied forgone rice 
production.  The rapid increase in jute acreage during the nineteenth century came at 
the expense of rice and commercial fibre displaced subsistence grain. 
This displacement took place over stages.  Initially, jute was not cultivated on 
rice lands – but on new lands accreted by the regions’ rivers, recently cleared 
wastelands or on land that would otherwise be left fallow. Contemporary colonial 
bureaucrats commented on the importance of new accretions of land to the 
expansion of jute cultivation.  According to the Collector of Brahmanbaria, these 
lands, “the large churs thrown up by the Meghna … opened his [the cultivators’] eyes, 
and the plant [jute] now forms the staple produce of the country next to paddy.”9  
Jute also replaced indigo cultivation and may have been one of the motivating factors 
behind the indigo riots of the 1850s.10  The remarkable productivity of the delta 
meant that, until the early 1870s, jute and rice production increased simultaneously.  
In the early 1870s, it was reported that in the important jute-growing district of 
Mymensingh, “the extent of land under rice cultivation … [has] increased in quantity 
                                                        
9 Excerpted in the report of the Chittagong Commissioner, 2nd September, 1872, in D.J. McNeile, Secy, 
Board of Revenue, Lower Bengal to Secy, GoB, Gen Dept., 4th February, 1873, in GoB, Agri Dept, Agri 
Branch, List 14, Bundle 4 
10 Several witnesses before the Indigo Commission of 1860 claimed that cultivators were reluctant to sow 
their lands with indigo because greater profits could be made from jute, safflower and rice cultivation.  
Report of the Indigo Commission, 1860, ed. Das, Pulin, Darjeeling: University of North Bengal, 1992, pp. 91-92 
and p. 160 
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within the last twenty years by about twenty per cent.”11  The emergence and 
expansion of jute cultivation in the same period had not hindered the expansion of 
rice acreage in Mymensingh, or in other parts of the delta.12  Most districts in eastern 
Bengal, with the exception of densely populated and relatively urban Dacca district, 
were net exporters of paddy until almost the end of the century.13  
For much of the nineteenth century, cultivators in eastern Bengal switched 
back and forth between commercial grain and commercial fibre cultivation.  In the 
jute-cum-rice tracts of the Bengal delta even small variations in landholdings could 
and did come to make a huge difference to peasant household’s prosperity and 
poverty.  Peasants with enough land to grow subsistence rice in addition to 
commercial fibre could absorb sudden price shocks without being pushed into 
hunger, debt and poverty by a sudden collapse in jute prices.  Such farmers were also 
better able to cope with ecological shocks and reduced yields.  Unfortunately, as the 
population of the delta rose rapidly during the late nineteenth century, farm sizes 
fragmented and landholdings shrank.14  At the same time, jute cultivation continued 
to be extended at the expense of rice cultivation.   According to J.C. Jack, by 1916, 
jute had almost completely replaced subsistence rice cultivation in Faridpur: 
some of the cultivators have given up the growing of their whole food supply 
on a calculation that it would be more profitable to grow jute and buy grain.  
… Nowadays the cultivator tends to grow jute on all the land fit for the 
purpose and to grow rice and other food crops only on the remainder.  If that 
                                                        
11 Hunter, W.W., A Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. V, London: Trubner & Co., 1877, p. 420 
12 In Tipperah, similarly, the expansion of jute cultivation was accompanied by rising rice acreage, Hunter, 
W.W., A Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. VI, London: Trubner & Co., 1876, 392 
13 Hunter, W.W., Statistical Account, Vol, V, p. 90 
14 Bose, Sugata, Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital, Cambridge University Press, 1993 
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remainder is insufficient to supply the family requirements in food, he prefers 
to buy rather than to reduce the amount of land under jute.15 
 
The reduction in subsistence rice production meant that the region as a whole 
had become dependent on imported rice.  This dependence was timed with the 
opening up of the Irrawaddy delta in Burma, the British Empire’s latest imperial 
acquisitions in South Asia.16  By the 1890s, eastern Bengal’s rice production had been 
reduced to dangerously low levels and peasant smallholders were vulnerable to 
seasonal scarcity, especially if crops failed or jute prices dropped precipitously.  
Peasant vulnerability to ecological and market shocks took the form of seasonal 
hunger.  The aus crop was harvested in July and August while the aman crop was 
harvested in December.  Hunger most often reared its head in the months 
immediately preceding the two harvests – when stocks of grain (or cash) from the 
previous harvest crop were running low, and the new crop was yet to come in.  The 
consequences of hunger was most frequently debt and as jute gradually displaced 
subsistence rice, levels of indebtedness in the delta and instances of cultivators’ 
mortgaging their lands to secure loans increased.   
 In August and September 1893, large portions of Brahmanbaria subdivision 
in Tipperah flooded, when the Gumti – a tributary of the Meghna river-system – 
breached its embankment.  This flood was an early indicator of the increased 
vulnerability of cultivators to external shocks as a result of reduced food production.  
The floods affected the standing aman crop, destroying fields and severely reducing 
                                                        
15 Jack, J.C., The Economic Life of a Bengal District: A Study, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1916, p. 85 
16 Adas, Michael. The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852-1941, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, 
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yields, which, according to government estimates, were about half of what may be 
expected in a good year.  Even in the 1890s, after almost three decades of continually 
expanding jute cultivation, a portion of Brahmanbaria’s aman crop was normally 
exported.  However, the reduced yields of that year meant that rice had to be 
imported into the delta: in other words, cultivators had to purchase rice from 
marketplaces.  In May of the following year, a serious shortage of grain was felt in the 
district, or to use the colonial government’s euphemism for seasonal hunger, 
residents in Brahmanbaria experienced “distress.”17  This distress lasted from April 
and May until July and August, until the aus and jute harvests came in.  During those 
months, farmers in Brahmanbaria whose severely reduced aman harvest had run out, 
“managed to subsist by mortgaging their lands, selling some property, or borrowing 
to get enough to carry them on to till the aus paddy and jute are cut.”18   
In addition to ecological shocks, peasant smallholders were more vulnerable 
to market shocks.  Farmers with sufficient stocks of subsistence grain to feed their 
households between aman and aus harvests would not be driven to market their fibre 
out of hunger – they would be able to hold on to their crop for longer.  If the aus 
harvest was sufficient to feed the peasant household between September and 
December, when the aman harvest came in, the farmer would not be forced to sell 
his fibre out of hunger.  The pressure for cash did not come from landlords, who 
found it difficult to exercise power in the fluid ecology of the delta, or from 
moneylenders, who were known for making emergency loans in times of trouble 
                                                        
17 R.M. Waller, Commissioner of Chittagong Division to GOB, Revenue Dept., 19 May, 1894, GoB, Agri 
Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 14, NAB 
18 M. Waller, Commissioner of Chittagong Division to GOB, Revenue Dept., 21 June, 1894 in ibid.  
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rather than recalling outstanding loans.19  Moneylenders did tide subsistence 
cultivators through such hard times, though they did so at high interest and 
frequently with devastating consequences for the peasant producer.20  Unfortunately, 
however, price falls were often accompanied by credit crunches.21   
Subsistence jute cultivators were much more dependent on moneylenders and 
as fibre replaced grain, credit became the main means of combating hunger.  The 
pressure to borrow was felt most sharply when the aus harvest ran out, jute earnings 
had been spent, and the aman harvest was yet to come in.22  Similarly, seasonal 
hunger drove cultivators to borrow during April and May, when the aman harvest 
was running out and the aus harvest was yet to come in.  The pressure to borrow 
during these months was compounded by the need to hire labour to thin and weed 
the jute fields.23  Agricultural workers in jute fields had to be paid in cash, while those 
employed to harvest rice tended to be paid in grain.  Jute cultivation and the 
substitution of rice with jute during the nineteenth century increased the use of credit 
in peasant livelihoods.  Sugata Bose has argued, credit replaced rent as the main 
mechanism of surplus extraction in the delta during the late nineteenth century: the 
                                                        
19 Iftekhar Iqbal discusses difficulties in assessing and collecting land taxes in the Bengal delta in the 
nineteenth century, Iqbal, Iftekhar, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State and Social Change, 1840-1943, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
20 I discuss one such incident below, spanning 1914 to 1922. 
21 This was most notably and devastatingly the case with the Great Depression of 1930-31 (see Bose, 
Sugata, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure, and Politics, 1919-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).  As I discuss below, this would also be the case with the price collapse of World War I.   
22 F.A. Sachse, Settlement Officer, Mymensingh discusses the relationship between credit and the jute crop 
calendar in detail in his letter to the Secy, GoB, Rev Dept, 21st February, 1914, in “Jute Cultivation: 
Enquiry as to the causes which hamper further extension, Agriculture Dept, Auguat, 1914, Nos. 1-25, GoB, 
Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 22, NAB 
23 ibid. 
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rise of credit was, at least partly, due to the rise of jute production, the displacement 
of rice cultivation and seasonal hunger.24  
In the following section, I will compare jute cultivators’ responses to two 
price shocks – in 1872, when the onset of the Long Depression led to a sudden 
collapse in prices, and in 1914, when World War I broke out just as cultivators were 
beginning to harvest the crop.  The mostly rice-surplus jute cultivators of the early 
1870s were much better able to absorb the sudden fall in prices of the fibre than the 
mostly rice-deficient cultivators of 1914.  
 
Two market shocks: 1872 and 1914 
Between 1866 and 1872, high and rising prices for the commodity in London and 
Dundee markets drove the acreage of jute up rapidly.  Several colonial officials 
stationed in the delta dated the emergence of jute cultivation in their region to the 
rising prices of 1866.  The Collector of Bogra stated that “the growth of jute has 
extended enormously since 1866.”25  Prices for the fibre reached record levels at the 
opening of the season in 1871.  High prices spurred cultivators to sow a hitherto 
unprecedented quantity of land with jute during 1872.  The royal commission enquiry 
into jute estimated that there was a 30% increase in jute production in 1872 over 
1871, “induced” by “high prices and heavy demand.”26  In August and September 
1872, just as cultivators were bringing the largest jute crop that they had ever                                                         
24 Bose, Sugata, Colonial Capital and Peasant Labour. 
25 D.J. McNeil, Secy, Board of Revenue, Lower Bengal to Secy, GoB, General Dept., 6th February, 1873, 
Agriculture Department, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
26 Kerr, Hemm Chunder, Report on the Cultivation of, and Trade in Jute, in Bengal, London, 1874, p. 47  
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produced to market, prices collapsed.  One of the more serious economic recessions 
of the nineteenth century, the Long Depression had set in, and – in consequence – 
commodity prices collapsed across the board.27  As demand for jute disappeared, 
markets were glutted and prices collapsed.  The Royal Report estimates that the 
prices of best quality jute in Sirajganj fell from Rs. 5 per maund to Rs. 3 and a half 
per maund.  The collapse in prices was even steeper in the case of inferior fibres, 
which were selling in Narayanganj for “as low as” 1 rupee per maund.28  
The communication of prices between Calcutta – most directly exposed to the 
global market, interior markets like Sirajganj and Narayanganj, and the village trader is 
captured in a Calcutta-based jute shippers market report for November, 1872.  
This market has become dull …  All the regular buyers are in the bazaar, but 
do not exhibit much inclination to operate, whilst holders of stocks on the 
other hand, appear very eager in their endeavours to carry through sales.  The 
daily importations continue freely, and are now in excess of deliveries, which 
have fallen off considerably, in consequence off which our local stocks have 
increased to over 80,000 maunds.  The dullness prevailing locally has already 
affected the up-country marts, and values there have fallen from 3 to 5 annas 
per maund.  The cultivators are now withholding their fibre from the export 
depots, in the hope that prices may again rally, but we consider it doubtful 
that these people can afford to hold their jute back long enough to have any 
serious effects on rates in this bazaar.29 
   
As the above report notes, cultivators were still holding on to their fibre in 
November 1872.  The Jute Commissioner’s tour of the jute tracts of western Bengal 
in March and April of the following year, 1873, confirmed that some jute cultivators                                                         
27 The Long Depression, which lasted from 1873 to 1879 has been described as “the first truly 
international crisis.”  See Glasner, David and Cooley, Thomas F., “Crisis of 1873”, Business Cycles and 
Depressions: An Encyclopedia, New York: Garland Publishing, 1997, pp. 132-133 
28 Kerr, Report on Jute, p. 62   
29 Economist, “Commercial Epitome,” 18 January 1873, p. 18, Vol 031, Issue 1534. 
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were still holding on to their crop, “all those who could afford to do so had held in 
hopes of better prices.”30  In the eastern delta, however, the Commissioners 
discovered that cultivators had not even bothered reaping their crop when prices fell: 
“In both Dacca and Mymensingh districts we were informed, everywhere, that 
quantities of jute grown last season had been left abandoned in the fields.”31  The 
Collector of Tipperah reported a similar phenomenon in his district, particularly in 
the subdivision of Bardakhat, where jute cultivation was most concentrated: “the 
rayats [in Bardakhat] left one-fourth of the crops rotting in the fields uncut.”32   
Why were cultivators able to simply abandon their crop, absorbing the sunk 
costs of cultivation?  I suggest that this was mainly because most of them were still 
cultivating sufficient subsistence rice, their need for cash was not driven by hunger.  
The entire jute crop in eastern Bengal had not been abandoned and, what had been 
harvested, was dispatched to Calcutta.  The Commissioners found that the entire jute 
produced in eastern Bengal had been exported to Calcutta.33  They harvested and 
sold at least some of their jute to pay landlords or finance other forms of market-
based consumption, not to purchase subsistence.  They cut down on market 
consumption and many borrowed to tide them over their difficulties.  The increase in 
indebtedness came to the attention of colonial officials stationed in the jute tracts.  As 
the Collector of Bogra reported in 1872: “The cultivators of jute, however, have 
                                                        
30 H. Anstruther and H.C. Kerr, Jute Commissioners to Secy, GoB, Statistical Dept, 10th April, 1873, GoB, 
Proc A, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB.  
31 H. Anstruther and H.C. Kerr, Jute Commissioners to Secy, GoB, Statistical Dept, 10th May, 1873 GoB, 
Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
32 Hunter, W.W., Statistical Account, Vol. V, p. 391 
33 H. Anstruther and H.C. Kerr, Jute Commissioners to Secy, GoB, Statistical Dept, 10th May, 1873 GoB, 
Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
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suffered a check during the year under review, from the fall in its market price; and 
the greatly increased sale of non-judicial two-anna stamps seems to indicate that the 
rayats in many cases have preferred borrowing to reducing their expenditure.”34  
The bulk of the peasantry was able to absorb losses from jute cultivation in 
1872 because those losses did not translate into hunger and food deprivation. The 
ecology of the delta and average landholdings were such that most peasants could 
produce both subsistence rice and surplus fibre.35  The tremendous rise in jute 
production between 1866 and 1872 had not even displaced the production of surplus 
commercial rice in the delta.  In the early 1870s right through to the 1890s, eastern 
Bengal produced surplus rice for export to the rest of India.  The jute-cum-rice 
cultivators of Eastern Bengal had profited considerably from the spike in rice prices 
during the Madras famine of 1866.  In the early 1870s, it was said about Tipperah, 
that “a famine in any other part of Bengal forms a source of prosperity; each man 
keeps for himself and his family all the food that he requires, and he is enabled to sell 
his surplus rice at an enhanced rate for exportation.”36  Even the estimated 30% 
expansion between 1871 and ’72 did not displace subsistence rice, though it did come 
at the expense of rice.  Every district except Dacca was a net exporter of rice in 1872 
and even in Dacca, the Collector of the district reported, farmers only cultivated jute 
after securing sufficient rice to feed their household.37    
                                                        
34 Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. VIII, London: Trubner & Co., 1876, p. 206 
35 Iqbal, Iftekhar, The Bengal Delta, p. 91 
36 Hunter, Statistical Account, Vol. VI, p. 388 
37 Hunter, Statistical Account, Vol V, p. 92 
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However, as jute cultivation extended during the rest of the century, 
commercial rice production was displaced and then finally so was the production of 
subsistence rice.   The tremendous rise in jute cultivation between 1900 and 1913 
took place under very different material conditions.  Farmers were now producing 
jute as part of a market-based subsistence strategy, that is, jute-cum-rice producing 
households subsisted by purchasing grain out of revenues from sales of jute.  With 
increasing import of rice from Burma, peasant subsistence in eastern Bengal 
depended on the exchange – in global commodity markets – of Bengal’s jute for 
Burma’s rice.  As long as the price of Bengal jute to relative to Burmese rice was high, 
farmers benefitted from these market-based subsistence strategies – earning enough 
cash from sales of jute to purchase subsistence rice and finance other forms of 
consumption. As Omkar Goswami has demonstrated, jute-cum-rice cultivators 
financially benefitted from substituting rice with jute between 1900 and 1913.38  
During those years, jute acreage expanded rapidly as high fibre prices encouraged 
more and more farmers to abandon subsistence rice for commercial jute and throw 
their very survival on the course of global markets.  However, there were more 
serious implications of the rise in subsistence jute production: it led to the increasing 
importance of debt and credit for peasant livelihoods. 
The expansion of jute cultivation between 1900 and 1913 was accompanied 
by increasing levels of indebtedness, despite the high prices commanded by the 
commodity.  On the other hand, the extension between 1866 and 1872 was 
accompanied by a reduction in debt, as many peasants used their incomes to pay off 
existing debts.  In the 1860s and 70s, fibre had not displaced subsistence grain and                                                         
38 Goswami, Omkar, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society, p. 52 
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the production of jute did not entail market purchases of grain.  Hence, jute 
cultivation did not entail accumulating debt to stave off hunger and jute profits could 
be used to pay off outstanding loans.  The displacement of subsistence grain in the 
1900s meant that jute cultivators incurred debt and jute earnings serviced, rather than 
paid down, debt. 
Not only did jute cultivation as a market-based subsistence strategy increase 
levels of debt, it also heightened the cultivators’ vulnerability to price shocks.   This 
vulnerability would be cruelly revealed in August 1914, when the outbreak of World 
War I led to a virtual cessation of all shipping and trade and markets for jute virtually 
disappeared.  When selling resumed in September, prices were absurdly low – 2 
rupees a maund for the best jute, compared to the 10 to 12 rupees that ordinary jute 
sold for during 1913.39  Fearful of panic spreading through the delta, the colonial 
government distributed pamphlets through the jute tracts urging cultivators to hold 
on to their crop, as markets would be restored and prices would rise again.  The 
pamphlet issued on August 15, 1914 read “On account of the sudden outbreak of 
war in Europe buyers have stopped buying jute temporarily ... but such a state of 
things will not last long. … If you can wait a little, there will not be any big loss, but if 
you sell in a hurry, the loss will be great.”40   
However, as their own officials would discover, many cultivators were unable 
to hold on for any length of time.  L. Birley, the Magistrate of Dacca, toured the jute-
growing villages in the district during August and September 1914 to keep an eye on                                                         
39 L.Birley, District Magistrate, Dacca, to Commissioner of Dacca, 5th October 1914, in “Depression in 
jute trade on account of the outbreak of war in Europe,” February, 1915, Gob, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri 
Branch, List 14, Bundle 29, NAB 
40 Note dated 15th August 1914, in ibid. 
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developments. He noticed that cultivators had decided to forego employed labour 
and exploit household labour: “I was informed by all classes that cultivators were 
stripping their jute for themselves instead of by hired labour; in many places I saw a 
man with one or two small boys stripping jute and I think that this statement is 
correct.”41  Unlike in 1872, cultivators did not – could not – abandon their crop in the 
fields and instead they intensified the exploitation of household labour.  Their 
inability to hold on to the crop was related to hunger.  As Birley said: “the tour had 
left me with the impression that the raiyats had more staying power than we had 
credited them with at first, but that they were feeling anxious, and that if they could 
not sell their jute soon those who did not get a good crop of aus dhan would feel the 
pinch until the time of the harvesting of the winter rice.”42  The most desperate 
cultivators had already sold their jute at very low prices, but found that they could not 
buy rice with their returns from jute.  Birley spoke to a group of “small cultivators 
who had sold all their jute at this price [Rs. 2 a maund] and were subsisting on loans 
of rice from friendly cultivators.”43  
The market shock of 1914 proved a decisive push into poverty for many of 
the delta’s inhabitants.  In 1921, on his way from Kishoreganj to Mymensingh, Shah 
Abdul Hamid – a native of Kishoreganj and the author of several tracts on the 
Muslim peasantry of eastern Bengal – observed the following scene of a tearful 
farewell at a rural railway station.44  An elderly man was standing in the entrance to a 
                                                        
41 L.Birley, District Magistrate, Dacca, to Commissioner of Dacca, 5th October 1914,in ibid. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 Hamid, Shah Abdul, Krishak Bilap, Bandulia, 1328 b.e., (1921).  The title translates as “extinction of the 
peasantry,” the main theme of this pamphlet.  His two previous publications, mentioned in the foreword 
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third-class carriage.  His wife and children, with their belongings wrapped up in 
sheets, were inside the car, behind him.  On the platform stood another teary-eyed 
family, congregated to say farewell.  A man was holding on to the elderly man’s legs, 
kneeling on the platform and wailing and weeping.  As the train started, he refused to 
let go, and had to be dragged away.  After the train departed, Hamid asked this man 
what happened.  The man replied that that was his brother, who had lost all his 
possessions and was going away with his family to build a new life in the jungles of 
Assam.  The man proceeded to narrate how his brother was reduced to such 
destitution: 
In the last German war, when the price of rice was 16 takas a maund and that 
of jute, one taka, my older brother fell into trouble.  He had about fifteen or 
sixteen mouths to feed in his family and they had to buy rice from the market.  
Driven by hunger, he went to see a large moneylender – who has over a lakh 
takas outstanding in loans at any time – in a nearby bazaar.  From the 
moneylender, my brother borrowed six and a half maunds of rice, valued at 
100 rupees.45  
 
Three years later, he had not repaid anything and the moneylender sent a 
message that he was on “his way, with papers, to the courthouse in Mymensingh.”  
The brothers interrupted the moneylender at the railway station, with fifty rupees in 
cash.  The debt was renegotiated – under the new terms, the moneylender was owed 
300 rupees and his farm mortgaged.  Misfortune, however, piled on misfortune.  His 
two oldest sons, who looked after the farm, died of small-pox within a few days of 
each other.  He lost his crop to floods one year.  For five years, debt continued to 
pile up until finally the moneylender claimed his mortgage – taking away the                                                                                                                                                               
to Krishak Bilap are titled Prajakahini (Stories of Prajas) and Shashon-shongskarey Gramya Mussalman (Rural 
Muslims in Political Reforms).  I was not able to locate either of those publications.  
45 Hamid, Krishak Bilap, pp. 9-10 
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unfortunate farmer’s arable land and, finally, even the tin sheets out of which his 
house was built.  In the end, losing everything, he left with his family for the Assam 
jungles.46 
The above events began with the market shock produced at the onset of 
World War I – when jute markets virtually disappeared and rice prices spiked.  This 
was not an unusual or unique narrative in the delta, as low jute prices forced many 
subsistence cultivators to mortgage their lands in lieu of loans, and they lost their 
lands when unable to repay and were forced into the Assam jungles. Market shocks 
did not produce poverty to a similar extent and depth during the nineteenth century 
because, I have argued, most peasant households were not dependent on markets for 
subsistence and hence could absorb market shocks.  As population increased and 
farm sizes fragmented, more and more cultivators sacrificed subsistence rice for the 
sake of commercial fibre, especially during the sharp rise in jute production between 
1900 and 1913.  Increased peasant dependence on markets for subsistence led to 
increasing levels of indebtedness – during the early 1900s, credit and interest had 
been firmly established as the major mechanism for the expropriation of peasant 
surplus.  Increased indebtedness was accompanied by a heightened vulnerability to 
market shocks.  Market shocks were compounded with environmental shocks, as the 
ecology of the delta deteriorated during the early 1900s, peasants households were hit 
more frequently by water-borne epidemics and floods.47  After World War I, jute was 
no longer associated with wealth and vitality but with poverty, with debt, hunger and 
disease.                                                          
46 ibid, p. 11 
47 Iftekhar Iqbal argues strongly that ecological conditions worsened in the early twentieth century as the 
delta’s drainage was blocked by railways and water hyacinth.  Iqbal, Iftekhar, The Bengal Delta, 2010 
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CONSUMPTION 
Kaminikumar Chakrabarty, an employee of a zamindari estate in Sherpur, described 
the jute cultivators’ relationship with the plant in an agricultural manual published in 
that town in 1882: 
These days there is a lot of affection (ador) towards jute in this country.  For 
this reason cultivators plant an excessive (odhik) quantity of jute.  The 
romantic (shuromik) Cultivators love (bhalobasha) jute so much that they sing 
songs like “there is no crop like jute” while working the fields.48 
 
It is unusual to think of the cultivators’ relationship to the plant as one of 
“love” and “affection.”  The above phrase seems particularly out of place in an 
otherwise dry and technical treatise on the best cultivation practices for a variety of 
crops, including exotic European fruits and vegetables.  Chakrabarty appears to be 
critical of jute cultivators, accusing peasants of an irrational attachment to the plant 
and “excessive” cultivation.  The cultivation for the fibre, I argue below, was related 
to consumption and prosperity.  As Bengali poets liked to point out, you could not 
eat your jute; that is, cultivators could not consume the fibre in the same sense that 
they could consume rice or their other edible produce.49  However, the cash earned 
from jute financed modern forms of consumption and consumption was associated 
with prosperity.  
                                                        
48 Chakrabarty, Kaminikumar, Krishak, Sherpur, Published by Sree Tamijuddin Ahmed, 1893, p. 38 
49 Amongst many other poets from eastern Bengal, Abed Ali Mian, from Mymensingh, wrote extensively 
on the inedibility of the fibre, contrasting it with the taste of home-grown rice.  Mian, Abed Ali, Kali Chitra, 
Rangpur, Alamnagar Lokaranjan Press, 1917 
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Nineteenth century colonial officials and Bengali bhadralok noted – 
occasionally with wonder – the increasing numbers of possessions of cultivators.  
Sambhucharan Mukherjee, a prominent member of the Calcutta intellectual scene 
and editor of Mukherjee’s Magazine, described his impressions while floating down the 
Meghna, through the jute tracts of Tipperah, en route from Calcutta to Agartala: “It 
is something that so many about here are well protected in this cold weather by the 
cheap cottons and woolens of Europe.  The women have all more costly ornaments 
… Silver clearly predominates.  … It was all due to jute.”50  Jute cultivator’s shiny 
new tin homes were perhaps the most noticeable indicator of increased prosperity – 
even more so than the Manchester fabrics and silver ornaments that caught 
Shambhucharan’s eye.  A nineteenth century proverb about the wealth of jute 
cultivators ran: “One who deals in jute has seven huts in his home and his home is 
built with strong Joanshahi timber.”51  The sub-inspector of madrassas in Sirajganj, 
Mokhtar Ahmed Siddiqi, wrote about Sirajganj subdivision in 1914, “The jute trade 
has improved the conditions of ordinary people so much that there is no poverty in 
these parts.  In every village and in every neighbourhood we see many tin houses – 
only because of jute.”52   A poem titled “The Jute Song”, also published in Sirajganj 
in 1914, makes a similar observation on tin homes: “Those who did not have straw 
hovels/ now their houses are covered/ four-cornered, eight-cornered, shining.”53 
                                                         
50 Mookerjee, Sambhu Chandra, Travels and Voyages between Calcutta and Independent Tipperah, Calcutta, 1887, p. 
10 
51 Quoted in Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 80 
52 Siddiqi, Maulvi Mokhtar Ahmed, Sirajganjer Itihas, Sirajganj,  1916, p. 53 
53 “Jar chhilo na chhoner kurey/Tahar ekhon bari jurey/Chouchala atchala koto jhilmil kopat!” Gobindo 
Chandra Das, “Paater Gaan,” Islam Robi, Bhadro, 1321.  (September 1914), Reprinted in Siddiqi, Sirajganjer 
Itihas, p. 88 
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Cultivators consumed a wide variety of goods.  The Collector of Bogra, 
writing in 1873, noted the wealth of the jute cultivators in a variety of consumer 
goods – brass utensils, umbrellas and ponies:  “those who used to do very well with 
earthen pots and pans now have vessels of brass and copper.  Vendors of these 
vessels say that they now sell as many at a single fair as they formerly sold at three.  
Well-to-do raiyats constantly walk about with umbrellas, and import small ponies for 
their own use.”54  Conversely, contemporaries saw poverty as absence of goods – tin 
for houses, brass utensils, etc.  J.C. Jack, in his 1916 account of Faridpur, wrote: “in 
the poorer homesteads the most obvious signs of poverty will be holes in the walls of 
the huts and the absence of brass plates, pots and jars.”55 
Visible manifestations of consumption were not only in housing, furnishing, 
utensils, clothing and ornamentation, but also in diet.   In 1916, Mokhtar Ahmed 
Siddiqi was complaining that jute cultivators were driving up prices of hilsa, the 
quintessential Bengali fish: “They [jute cultivators] pay one taka, one and a half takas 
for a simple hilsa.  On the other hand, bhadraloks, salaried men and businessmen do 
not dare to pay more than 10 or 11 annas for the same fish.”56  J.C. Jack commented 
on more cultivators’ buying sweets and fruits at country bazaars: “In the harvest 
season nine out of every ten cultivators returning from the market will carry an 
earthen jar full of sweetmeats and at least a pair of the best fish obtainable, whatever 
                                                        
54 Hunter, W.W., Statistical Account, Vol. VIII, p. 205 
55 Jack, J.C. , Economic Life, p. 29 
56 Siddiqi, Maulvi Mokhtar Ahmed, Sirajganjer Itihas, Sirajganj, B.E. 1322.  p. 25 
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may be their price; if the large jack-fruit, which is not unlike a melon and a great 
favourite of the cultivator, is in season, he will carry home two or three also.”57   
The increased consumption of goods was matched by the consumption of 
services, particularly services provided by the colonial state.  During the late 
nineteenth century, cultivators contested more lawsuits and more of them – though 
still quite a small number – were likelier to send their sons to village schools.  The 
colonial state constructed and staffed courtrooms, police-stations, and school-houses 
in the delta during the nineteenth century.  The expansion of education took place 
through a programme of state-supported government schools at the district level and 
grant-in-aid for private schools following the Woods dispatch of 1854.  In an 
influential essay, David Washbrook has argued that the colonial state brought 
agrarian society under the rule of law during this period through changes in agrarian 
law, the construction of courtrooms and the appointments of judges.58   
It is not, however, sufficient to look at the increased penetration of state 
educational and legal services in the delta as a purely supply-side phenomenon.  
There was considerable demand for such services and, moreover, jute cultivators had 
the money to purchase such services.  Aminur Rahim has argued that jute earnings 
financed the increased enrollment of Muslims in government schools and drove 
demand for government-aided schools in the jute tracts.59  Numerous contemporaries 
noted the cultivators’ fondness for lawsuits and associated litigiousness with jute 
                                                        
57 Jack, J.C., Economic Life, p. 48 
58 Washbrook, David, “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies, 15(3), 1981, 
pp. 649-721 
59 Rahim, Aminur, “The Political Economy of English Education in Muslim Bengal, 1871-1912,” 
Comparative Education Review, 36(3), Aug 1992, pp.309-321  
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earnings.  For example, the Collector of Tipperah thought of litigation as a form of 
entertainment: 
The absurd quarrels among the people, which result in the most wantonly 
false charges at the police-station, show they must take a positive pleasure in 
the progress of the case, quite apart from any idea of getting justice or 
obtaining any solid advantage… I can only suppose that the investigation of a 
case is a pleasurable break in the monotony of a dull life; but it is at least to be 
regretted that choice should be made of so extravagant a diversion.60  
 
More than anything else, the image of peasant litigiousness appeared to 
confirm the view that peasant expenditure was “frivolous.”  The notion of “frivolous” 
and “recklessly extravagant” jute cultivators gained in currency during the 1890s and 
1900s as levels of indebtedness in the delta soared.  In some contemporary’s minds, 
consumption became associated with indebtedness rather than prosperity, informing 
the widespread charge that peasants spent frivolously.  The colonial government’s 
report on material conditions of the Bengal peasantry noted about Dacca district, 
“Unhappily thrift is the last passion which dominates the Dacca peasant’s breast.”61  
Writing in 1913, F.A. Sachse, the District Magistrate of Mymensingh, associated 
peasant consumption with poverty rather than prosperity: 
The crores of rupees paid for the raw article have had no visible effect on the 
manliness or contentedness of the agricultural classes or even on their 
material prosperity.  They have no idea of saving, and in most cases their 
earnings from jute are frittered away on profitless extravagances long before 
the next crop is on the ground.  By increasing their credit the inflated prices 
of jute have deepened rather than diminished their general indebtedness.62                                                         
60 Hunter, Tipperah, p. 388 
61 Memorandum on the Material Conditions of the Lower Orders in Bengal,  (1892), in GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri 
Branch, List 14, Bundle 12, NAB.  
62 F.A. Sachse, Settlement Officer, Mymensingh to Revenue Dept, Government of Bengal, 21st February 
1914. GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 28, NAB 
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The shift from a dominant view of consumption as a simple indicator of 
prosperity to one of frivolousness, extravagance and indolence took place gradually, 
as fibre displaced grain, seasonal food-scarcity reared its head and debt emerged as 
the main strategy of staving off hunger.  For most external observers in the 1900s, 
prior to World War I, the jute cultivator’s prosperity was undeniable and 
consumption continued to be the clearest and most visible manifestation of such 
prosperity.  K.C. Dey, a junior colleague of Sachse in the colonial civil service, held 
similar views on extravagance and indebtedness, while painting an altogether more 
positive portrait of the conditions of the cultivator: 
The jute cultivator is notoriously improvident.  The high prices he has been 
getting during the past ten years has turned his head altogether and upset his 
domestic economy.  The large amount of cash that he handles has made him 
extravagant, and his style of living has risen in a remarkable degree.  He eats 
much better, wears better clothes, and lives a cleaner and more sanitary life 
than before.  His house has improved, corrugated-iron has taken the place of 
thatch, and the compounds and gardens are cleaner.  He educates his children 
in many cases, sending them to English schools, which are fast springing up, 
and calls in doctors in case of illness.  He indulges more frequently in 
litigation and marries more wives, paying a good deal more for each than 
before.  But all this advance in the ways of living is much more than is 
warranted by his material prosperity.  The money that he gets by the sale of 
his crop he squanders in a few months, and very often, I am inclined to think, 
almost universally, he runs into debt before he can sell his next harvest.63 
 
From the cultivators’ perspective, consumption was not frivolous: it was 
serious business.  The two major peasant political movements in the jute tracts during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolved around peasant 
consumption – the anti-rent movement of the 1870s and early 80s, and the anti-                                                        
63 K.C. Dey to GOB, Revenue Dept., 4th February 1914, in Agriculture Dept, GoB, August 1914, in ibid. 
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Swadeshi resistance of the 1900s.  In the following sections I will discuss these 
peasant political movements as instances in the politics of peasant consumption.   
The anti-rent movement of the 1870s and early 1880s centred on courtrooms, 
as peasants brought lawsuits against landlords attempting to enhance their rent.  The 
large numbers of rent-suits instituted in the period were a concerted attempt by jute 
cultivators to reconfigure relations of power between landlord and cultivator through 
the consumption of colonial state’s legal services.  The consumption of legal services 
more generally was related to the reconfiguration of a range of power-relations in the 
countryside – between peasant smallholders and sharecroppers or between men and 
women within peasant households, with men gaining increasing control over 
women’s resources. Lawsuits were not merely a form of frivolous entertainment. 
The anti-Swadeshi resistance of the 1900s took place when educated, middle-
class Bengalis attempted to introduce the doctrine of boycott – of not consuming 
imported articles – into the rural bazaars of eastern Bengal.  Resistance to the boycott 
transformed the rural bazaars – weekly or biweekly hats, where peasants bought cloth, 
salt, oil, hilsa, jackfruit and sweetmeats from itinerant traders – into sites of violence 
and conflict.  As I argue, the anti-Swadeshi movement demonstrates the significance 
of the marketplace, the site of consumption, as a political sphere.   As the failure of 
the Swadeshi movement to gain currency amongst peasants and small traders 
demonstrated, the consumption of imported goods was integral to peasant economic 
life in the delta.  
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The Anti-Rent Movement, 1873 to 1885 
In May 1873, peasant smallholders in the Yusufshahi pargana of Pabna district 
organized and resisted their landlords’ attempts to enhance their rents. Yusufshahi 
pargana probably had one of the highest densities of jute cultivation in all of Bengal.  
Yusufshahi was in the Sirajganj subdivision, close to the port-city Sirajganj, at the 
time the “greatest jute mart in eastern Bengal.”  It was estimated that of the 192 
square miles sown with jute in Pabna during 1872-73, 123 square miles was in 
Sirajganj subdivision.64  Within two months, agrarian leagues had emerged 
throughout Pabna and, over the following years, landlord and cultivator tensions 
spread throughout the jute tracts of eastern Bengal, as cultivators organized 
themselves into agrarian leagues and resisted landlords’ demands for enhanced rents.  
With the exception of Rangpur, all of the jute tracts of the region were scenes of 
organized peasant resistance.65  Tensions between landlords and cultivators simmered, 
occasionally boiling over into violence all through the latter half of the 1870s and the 
first half of the 1880s.  The rent-disputes were brought to a close only in 1885, with 
the introduction of a new Tenancy Act by the colonial state, granting cultivators 
enhanced security of tenure and further protection against rent enhancements.  
K.K. Sengupta, the historian of the Pabna disturbances, ascribed an important 
role in the movement to a group of “substantial ryots,” and proceeds to define that 
group in terms of its ability to make “huge profits through the cultivation of jute.” 
                                                        
64 The relatively small district of Pabna had the most land sown with jute in 1872-73 according to 
government estimates.  Kerr, Report on Jute, 1874. 
65 With the exception of Bakarganj and – to a lesser degree – Faridpur, all of the affected districts had 
significant jute acreage.  Also, agrarian leagues did not emerge in western Bengal, not even in the jute-tracts 
of Hooghly and 24-Parganas.   
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The leadership of the league, therefore, was provided by men of considerable 
means such as petty landlords … village headmen … and jotedars … This 
disgruntled section of the rural gentry found a large number of supporters 
amongst the occupancy ryots described by Sir Richard Temple, “as the most 
influential section of ryots.”  Some of the occupancy ryots made huge profits 
through the cultivation of jute, a cash crop which only the substantial ryots 
could afford to cultivate. … These substantial ryots were sufficiently well-to-
do to offer an effectual resistance to the zemindars.66 
 
The role of the substantial, “sufficiently well-to-do,” jute cultivating peasantry 
across the jute tracts of eastern Bengal was underpinned by their ability to finance 
expensive and lengthy lawsuits.  Peasants conducted their anti-rent struggle, for the 
most part, through colonial legal institutions.  The formation of an Agrarian League 
in Pabna was immediately preceded and probably inspired by the conclusion of a 
court case in Sirajanj, where a ryot had successfully sued against the landlords’ 
enhancement of rent.  The primary function of the Pabna Agrarian League was to 
raise subscriptions to support members in legal disputes.  Each of the districts 
convulsed by the anti-rent movement, witnessed steep increases in rent suits during 
the period.67  
These suits were being conducted under the Rent Act of 1859, particularly 
Act X, which created a class of occupancy ryots with enhanced security of tenure and 
protection against rent enhancements.68  From the perspective of the peasantry, the 
legal conduct of the dispute of the 1870s and early 1880s was a success.  The costs of 
instituting and running suits in the colonial courts drained zamindars’ resources 
                                                        
66 Sengupta, K.K., Pabna Disturbances and the Politics of Rent, 1873-1885, New Delhi: People’s Pub. House, 
1974, p. 13 
67 Sengupta, Pabna Disturbances, pp. 45-46 
68 Given how long-running and widespread agrarian protests of 1873-1885 were, outbreaks of violence 
were rare.   
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quicker than that of the peasantry. K.K. Sengupta argues, “the landlords who had 
enough resources in 1875 to harass their tenants in the civil courts had become by 
1878 quite impoverished,” which suggests that the Agrarian Leagues were effectively 
pooling resources, but was more directly due to the fact that peasants had stopped 
paying all rents to their zamindars while the cases were pending.69   
Is it appropriate to talk about legal suits between jute cultivators and their 
landlords as the consumption of legal services, in the same class as a wider set of 
market-based consumption?  Tenancy legislation in 1859 had created a new class of 
peasantry with more security to their land and greater protection against landlord’s 
enhancements of rent.  However, in order to enjoy such rights, cultivators had to be 
able to finance prolonged lawsuits against their zamindars.  After 1864, provincial 
civil-courts – rather than the local Revenue Department – were empowered to 
adjudicate rent suits.70  Hence, the courthouse became a vendor for enhanced 
property-rights, not solely a refuge from landlord extraction and oppression.  By 
incurring the necessary expenditure in sustaining lawsuits at these courthouses, 
cultivators were able to enjoy these enhanced rights.   In the absence of this 
expenditure, to contest these lawsuits, they would have been denied those rights by 
the zamindars.  Like the consumption of Manchester cloth and tin sheets, the 
consumption of enhanced property rights in colonial courtrooms was financed by 
jute earnings. 
The colonial government had a different perspective on the links between jute 
prosperity and anti-rent disputes.  The official theory of the rent disputes was that                                                         
69 Sengupta, Pabna Disturbances, p. 91 
70 Sengupta, K.K., Pabna Disturbances, p. 75 
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landlords were attempting to raise rents to gain an increasing share of the rising 
prosperity of the cultivators.  In the words of the Commissioner of Chittagong 
Division, “the rise which has taken place during the last few years in the price of 
produce and in the value of land, combined with the absence of any well-defined 
rules to regulate the rate of rent has caused a feeling of uncertainty to rise, which has 
alienated the tenantry from their landlords and embittered relations.”71  Act X of 
1859 specified that increases to rents had to be passed through the civil courts of the 
government and peasants were aware of this stipulation.  Hence, all attempts to 
enhance rents made their way into the courtroom.  However, while Act X allowed for 
rates to be enhanced because of rising value of the produce, it was vague about the 
extent to which rents could be enhanced.  Hence, the cases lingered in the courts.  In 
the meantime, peasants had, in an organized fashion closed off all payments of rent, 
and an uneasy tension prevailed between landlords and tenants.  This chain of events 
is neatly captured by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal’s three step of model of the 
anti-rent disputes:  
1st- That there are large disputes pending between zemindars and ryots 
regarding the degree in which rent may be enhanced by reason of the increase 
during recent years in the value of the produce of land; 
2nd- That when these disputes become embittered, then, besides the question 
of enhancement, other questions become involved, such as the levy of certain 
cesses, the payment of alleged arrears, the past rate of rent, the area of actual 
holdings – the end of all this being that the payment of rent altogether in 
some places is likely to be held in abeyance for some time; 
                                                        
71 From the Commissioner of Chittagong to the Revenue Department, GoB, July 29, 1875, in Proposed 
Amendment of the Rent Law in Bengal, Dept of Rev, Agri and Comm, Land Revenue and Settlements, Feb, 
1879, Nos. 11-29, File 21, 1879, NAI 
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3rd- That under such circumstances zemindars have sometimes attempted, or 
may attempt, to collect rents by force, which attempts are forcibly resisted, - 
the result being breaches of the peace.72 
  
The colonial diagnosis of the issue as one of vagueness in property laws led to 
a lengthy discussion in bureaucratic circles about necessary reforms to agrarian 
property rights in Bengal.  In 1881, the colonial government circulated a draft 
Tenancy Bill, further enhancing security of tenure and offering even greater 
protection against rent enhancements to the occupancy ryot.  The zamindars reacted 
angrily, claiming loudly that the new bill would destroy them.73  The Tenancy Act of 
1885 curbed the zamindar’s powers vis-à-vis their tenants and, as Sugata Bose has 
argued, brought to an end the rent and revenue offensive against the peasantry of 
Bengal: from then onwards, zamindari rents would no longer be the primary 
mechanism of surplus extraction from the Bengal peasantry.74   
The legal codification of enhanced property rights was not, however, 
sufficient in itself to bring an end to the zamindari exaction.  It had to be 
accompanied by the occupancy ryot’s ability to pay the necessary court fees to enjoy 
those rights – an ability that was, at least in part, created by the occupancy ryots’ 
ability to profitably cultivate jute.  In other words, the end of the rent and revenue 
offensive took place when a section of cultivators had purchased, out of cash earnings 
from jute, enhanced property rights to the land they tilled at provincial courthouses in 
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the delta.  The colonial government’s supply of legal services, in the form of new 
agrarian laws, courthouses and judges, was accompanied by – in fact, had to be 
accompanied by – an effective demand for such services.  
 
Swadeshi, 1905-06 
Between 1905 and 1906, in scores of rural marketplaces throughout rural eastern 
Bengal, groups of school children, lawyers and doctors, and employees of zamindars 
attempted to prevent the sale and purchase of imported articles.75  During the first 
half of 1906, the government of eastern Bengal and Assam received reports of 
Swadeshi activists picketing against the sale of foreign merchandise from across 
eastern Bengal, especially the districts of Pabna, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Dacca, 
Barisal, Khulna, Faridpur and Tippera districts.76  Rumours that colonial authorities 
had enforced the ban on imported goods and that imported salt and sugar contained 
pig and cow bones were also circulating in those areas.77 
The boycott programme relied much more on intimidation and coercion than 
it did on persuasion.  P.C. Lyons, the senior bureaucrat in the Home Department of 
the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that schoolboys were being 
organized, sometimes by their teachers, to “picket the shops and prevent the sale of 
                                                        
75 Statement of the Inspector General of Police, December 1, 1905, in State of Affairs in Eastern Bengal 
and Assam and Bengal in connection with the partition and the swadeshi movement, Home, Public-A, 
Nos. 169-186, June 1906 
76 See the numerous reports from the various districts in ibid. 
77 According to the Inspector General of Police, the movement “was given a fillip by Judgish Chundra Roy, 
a pleader, who in a meeting at Pabna made the claim that English sugar was purified with the blood and 
bones of cows.” Ibid. 
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European goods by forcible interference with both purchasers and sellers.”78  
Resistance by “purchasers and sellers” was met with retribution, often along caste-
lines, as in the case of a shopkeeper in Brahmanbaria, who, “under grave 
provocation, struck a Brahmin boy picket, was made to tender an apology, shave his 
head, and give away ten pairs of English cloth, which were carried in procession 
through the streets to the accompaniment of patriotic songs and finally burnt.”79 
Swadeshi coercion bred resentment and resistance.  In eastern Bengal, this 
resentment took a communal form, as the cultivators who were the main consumers 
of foreign-goods tended to be Muslim and the Swadeshi activists Hindu.  As early as 
February, 1906, the resentment amongst Muslims and the danger of Hindu-Muslim 
violence as a result of the Swadeshi boycott was noted by F.C. Lyons, in a report to 
the central Government of India: 
And, in all places, the members of the Muhammadan community were more 
specially subjected to oppression of this kind [forcible purchase of Swadeshi 
goods], until, at the time that the agitation reached its height, a danger had 
arisen of organized reprisals, which would have raised trouble of a very 
serious nature.  Muhammadans form 60 per cent of the population of Eastern 
Bengal, chiefly belonging to the cultivating class.  The effect of the artificial 
demand for country-made goods was to raise prices very greatly, and the 
cultivators have suffered heavy pecuniary losses from the ostracism of 
imported articles.80 
 
For P.C. Lyons, as for almost everyone else at the time, in eastern Bengal the 
religious category “Muslim” was interchangeable with the livelihood category 
“cultivator.” However, the religious tag took on greater significance during the 
                                                        
78 From P.C. Lyon, Chief Secy, G of EB&A to Secy, Home Dept, GoI, February 21, 1906, ibid. 
79 From R.W. Carlyle, Chief Secy, G of EB&A to Secy, Home Dept, GoI, January 25, 1906, ibid. 
80 From P.C. Lyon, Chief Secy, G of EB&A to Secy, Home Dept, GoI, February 21, 1906, ibid. 
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Swadeshi movement, as the mostly-Muslim cultivators encountered the mostly-Hindu 
Swadeshi activists.  Religious symbols, as Sumit Sarkar has demonstrated, certainly 
played a role in Swadeshi related conflicts in eastern Bengal.81  The Swadeshi 
movement had alienated Muslims through the explicit use of Hindu symbols, slogans, 
and caste distinctions, for example, the slogan “Bande Mataram” or in shaving the 
head of the Brahmanbaria shopkeeper for striking a Brahmin youth.  Moreover, the 
counter-Swadeshi movement spearheaded by the Nawab of Dacca and the newly 
formed Muslim League played an important role in mobilizing Muslim religious 
sentiment against the Swadeshi movement.  However, as the events at Brahmanbaria 
and Jamalpur subdivision described below demonstrate, the livelihoods of cultivators 
played at least as significant a role as their religious sentiments in shaping the 
encounter between jute cultivators and anti-colonial nationalists during the Swadeshi 
movement. 
 
Mogra Hat 
The Swadeshi movement arrived in Tippera in the persons of A. Rasul and Bepin 
Chandra Pal and through the medium of a mass meeting.  On 23rd February, 1907, 
Rasul presided over and Pal addressed a meeting of a mostly Hindu middle-class 
audience consisting of pleaders, schoolteachers, and schoolboys.82  The meeting 
resolved to oppose the partition of Bengal, boycott foreign-made goods, government 
education and legal services, and to promote scientific agriculture and sanitary 
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82 From the Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 25th February, 1907; reprinted in Riots at Comilla and certain other places in 
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improvements.  They also decided to form a Tippera People’s Association, 
headquartered in Comilla but with branches all over the district, to further these 
goals.  A sub-conference was held at Kasba, a small town in Brahmanbaria 
subdivision, where it was decided to start 80 branch committees in the jurisdiction of 
the Kasba police station.83  On the 17th of March, 1907, the first of these branch 
committee met at Mogra, a hat or market town, 29 miles north of Comilla, very close 
to the Agartala railway station on the Assam-Bengal Railway and in the Chakla 
Rawshanabad estates owned by the Maharaja of Hill Tippera. At this meeting it was 
resolved to disallow the sale of foreign goods at Mogra, particularly Liverpool salt 
which was traded in significant quantities at the bazaar.  This attempt to implement 
the Swadeshi goal of economic self-reliance erupted in violence. 
 On the 18th of March, a public swadeshi meeting was held in Mogra.  The 
next day, a Tuesday and a bazaar-day, Swadeshi activists went around the market 
warning vendors not to deal in foreign goods.  The activists were entirely Hindu and 
traders and shoppers were overwhelmingly Muslim.  On the next bazaar-day, 
Saturday, the 23rd, Swadeshi activists tried to physically stop a Muslim trader, who 
had come from Brahmanbaria, from selling Liverpool salt.  In the ensuing row, two 
men were injured and the Brahmanbaria trader’s stall upturned.84  Fearing that there 
would be an escalation of violence on the following hat day, the 26th, D.H. Wares, the 
SDO of Brahmanbaria arrived in person, accompanied by two of his inspectors – one 
Muslim and one Hindu – and a small contingent of village chowkidars.  Over the 
course of an eventful afternoon, Wares had to intervene twice: once to separate 
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84 D.H. Wares, SDO, Brahmanbaria to Collector, Tipperah, 25th March, 1907, in ibid. 
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“about 300 Muhammadans … and about half the number of Hindus [who were] 
thrashing each other with lathis and throwing stones at each other” and then to 
defuse the situation between “perhaps a couple of hundred Hindus endeavouring to 
guard [the bazaar] against a larger number of Muhammadans.”85   
There was no looting involved, this was a show of force: as the District 
Magistrate of Tippera notes, “both sides came… prepared to fight.”86  It seemed that 
the Muslims, being in a numerical majority, were prepared to carry on the fight.  On 
the 27th of March, a group of Muslims attacked seven Hindu shops and several stalls 
at a small hat in Ghatiara, between three and four miles from Mogra, and part of the 
Sarail zamindari.  On the 28th of March, a group of 500 Muslims collected to attack 
the village of Binauti, 3 miles south of Mogra, and home to a number of wealthy and 
“respectable” Hindu families.  D.H. Lees, District Magistrate of Tipperah, received 
an anxious call for help from these prominent Hindus and arrived in time to avert 
violence.  The arrival of 25 armed gurkhas on the 26th and a further contingent of 15 
armed policemen on the 27th of March ensured that an uneasy peace prevailed.87 
The colonial authorities did take one further measure to defuse the situation – 
they reasserted the doctrine of free and unrestricted trade. They arranged with the 
Maharaja of Tipperah Hill State, to have the following notices circulated in Mogra hat 
and surrounding areas: 
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It is hereby notified that in Hats, Bazaars and Melas … there is full liberty for 
all persons to buy and sell any article they please.  In case of any interference 
in this connection information should be given by the aggrieved party to the 
sub-manager of the district concerned.88 
 
A similar notification was issued in Ghatiara and surrounding villages, this time by 
the Collector of Tippera in his role as the manager of the Sarail zamindari, which was 
at that time under the Court of Wards: 
Allegations having been made that in certain bazaars and other places undue 
pressure has been put on sellers as well as buyers not to deal in certain articles, 
it is hereby notified that in all bazaars, hats, melas, etc. in the Sarail estate, full 
liberty exists for people to buy and sell what they please.  If there is any 
interference in this respect, information should be given by the aggrieved 
party to the undersigned.89 
 
Nangalband 
On April 20th, 1907, B.C. Allen, the District Magistrate of Dacca, went to the 
Nangalband fair, to find “things fairly quiet, but bands of young men … walking 
about carrying big lathis and shouting ‘Bande Mataram.’”90  That evening, at 7 pm, 
“some Muhammadan shopkeepers came up and complained of picketing.”  They also 
had a specific complaint: a small boy who had bought a German looking glass, for an 
anna or two, and then subsequently returned it, allegedly after being coerced by 
Swadeshi activists.  Allen went to the fair and found a “certain number of ‘volunteers’ 
there with lathis but no overt sign of picketing.”91 
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 The following morning, at 7:30 am, he received another complaint: a small 
boy had been coerced into returning a small box labeled “Made in Germany.”92  After 
breakfast, however, the situation - which had been clearly simmering – boiled over. 
Seeing a number of men running from the direction of the fair, B.C. Allen went there 
to find that “the Muhammadans had shut their shops and one man excitedly said that 
there had been looting.”  While inquiring about the looting, which Allen felt was 
“highly exaggerated,” a group of volunteers with lathis gathered around.  He 
managed to eject them and continue his enquiry into the alleged looting, when all hell 
broke loose.  The subsequent events in Allen’s narrative are confused, reflecting the 
confusion of the melee that ensued after a “crowd of one or two hundred men came 
running down the road … shouting Bande Mataram and brandishing lathis.”93 
 A more coherent description of the events at Nangalband on the 21st of April, 
is provided by R. Nathan, the Commissioner of Dacca who arrived on the scene a 
couple of days after the incident and was presumably able to piece together a 
coherent narrative out of several accounts:  
… things went on smoothly to 3 or 3-30 P.M.  At this time some two 
hundred zamindari servants, pleaders, mukhtears and volunteers, with lathis, 
with an elephant, marched round and entered the Mela shouting “Bande 
Mataram.”  The volunteers wore conspicuous badges.  They molested the 
shopkeepers and destroyed a certain amount of European toys and 
sweetmeats and scattered some Liverpool salt.  The shop-keepers and the 
Muhammadans attending the Mela became enraged and attacked the 
volunteers, using sticks and booth poles and lathis which it is said were 
snatched from the “volunteers.”  The “volunteers” scattered and fled … The 
Muhammadans pursued striking and shouting … and endeavouring to get at 
the fugitives … ten Muhammadans entered the Durgabari in pursuit of 
fugitives and … partly damaged the image which had been prepared for the 
[Janmasthami] festival and did some other damage.  … [they also] entered                                                         
92 ibid. 
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three swadeshi shops, and damaged some of the stalls … they pelted the 
cutcheries of the … Gauripur estates and of the Ramgopalpur estate.94   
Upon Nathan’s arrival on the morning of the 22nd, “some local Hindu and 
Muslim leaders” approached him, and a meeting of local leaders of both communities 
was arranged for that evening.   The Dacca Commissioner had the local leaders – 10 
Hindus and 7 Muslims – sign a written statement, saying that they “deeply deplore” 
the disturbances and that they would use their “utmost influence on their 
communities to promote peace.”  Nathan’s description of the signing ceremony is 
quite revealing:   
They [the leaders] promised me that their signatures meant that they would do 
their utmost to prevent provocation, oppression and violence against the 
other community.  At the request of the Muhammadans, I asked the Hindus if 
their promise included “swadeshi” oppression, and in the presence of the 
Muhammadans they replied that it did.95 
 
POLITICS 
The Swadeshi movement was a failed attempt to introduce an elite, urban nationalist 
ideology and politics into a rural, agrarian setting.  This failure, as has been rightly 
noted, was mostly due to religious and cultural differences between mostly-Hindu 
nationalists and mostly-Muslim cultivators.  Cultural differences, however, were 
matched by a difference in economic ideas – as events in marketplaces demonstrated, 
elite nationalists alienated Muslim support not only with the very-Hindu rallying cry 
of “Bande Mataram” but also by adopting an economic programme hostile to the 
market-based livelihoods of cultivators.  Peace was restored when the colonial state 
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intervened, by announcing the “full liberty exists for people to buy and sell what they 
please” in Brahmanbaria and brokering an end to “Swadeshi oppression” in Jamalpur.  
The hats, bazaars and marketplaces of eastern Bengal became, due to Swadeshi 
activism, battlegrounds for economic ideas, particularly ideas of poverty and 
prosperity.   
Bipan Chandra has argued that late nineteenth century Indian nationalist 
thought revolved around the crucial question of poverty: was India poor and had 
British rule impoverished India?96  The champion on the nationalist side was 
Dadabhai Naoroji, the “Grand Old Man of India.”  In the 1870s and 80s, Naoroji 
delivered a series of lectures in Bombay and London proving Indian poverty through 
back of the envelope calculations of India’s per capita wealth and an estimate of a 
poverty line.97  Naoroji attributed India’s poverty to the “drain of wealth” out of 
India, which was captured in India’s balance of payments surplus.  Naoroji argued 
that this surplus represented a flow of wealth out of India without a corresponding 
return in the form of consumer goods or bullion.  Naoroji argued that this surplus 
paid for Home Charges, remittances by colonial officials stationed in India, and 
interest payments on loans made to India.98  The concept of a “drain of wealth” was 
considered dangerous by the colonial government, which in 1908 issued a 
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memorandum urging its officials to “study the arguments put forward in support of it 
[the drain theory] and to seize upon every opportunity of exposing their fallacy.”99   
Between 1897 and 1900, a series of devastating famines swept through central 
and western India claiming, according to the contemporary British medical journal 
Lancet, nineteen million lives.100  Turn of the century famines made it impossible for 
the British to deny the charge of poverty.  The famines provided Naoroji’s arguments 
with not only credibility but also much wider circulation. During the early 1900s, the 
years leading up to the Swadeshi movement, several popular and influential books 
were published arguing that colonialism had caused poverty in India.  Naoroji’s 
economic writings from the 1870s and 1880s were collected and published in the 
enormously influential Poverty and Un-British Rule in India in 1901.101  William Digby’s 
“Prosperous” British India, also published in 1901 had estimates of India’s per capita 
wealth running down its spine, a powerful visual demonstration of the pauperization 
of India.102  R.C. Dutt’s hugely popular two-volume Economic History of British India, 
where Dutt traced the course of impoverishment from the days of the Company Raj 
to the Victorian era, was published in 1902.103  The horrors of turn of the century 
famines had been extensively covered in the western press, replete with graphic 
photographs of starving victims.104  Confronted by these devastating famines, the                                                         
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charge of poverty and pauperization was undeniable – with the notable exception of 
eastern Bengal’s jute tracts. 
Eastern Bengal had been spared the horrors of late nineteenth century 
famines.  There was widespread consensus that eastern Bengal, and in particular its 
jute cultivators, were a prosperous lot – as evidenced by their consumption of market 
goods.  Colonial officials often seized on the example of eastern Bengal to disprove 
growing accusations of pauperization.  The colonial government would occasionally 
instruct local officials to collect information “in order that, when occasion arises, 
material may be provided for dealing effectually with the allegations that are 
frequently made as to the poverty and want of the lower classes.”105  This 
information was occasionally collated into Moral and Material Progress Reports, 
which claimed that, with the exception of a few regions, India was prospering.  
Nowhere was this claim of prosperity made as strongly as with respect to the jute 
tracts of eastern Bengal.   Jute, it was claimed in an 1892 memorandum on material 
conditions of the peasantry, “pours a flood of wealth into Central and East Bengal … 
[and] it would be difficult to over-state the influence for good on the material 
condition of the peasant exercised by the vast and ever-growing volume of 
international trade.”106  The report went on to the familiar association of prosperity 
with consumption, though as described above.  With regard to Dacca division, the 
report claimed: 
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Owing to the improved facilities for export, and the growing value of jute, the 
standard of comfort in the cultivating class has definitely advanced during the 
decade.  The raiyat wears better clothes and shoes than his father, eats 
moreabundantly, and sleeps on a more luxurious bed.  His cottage is brightly 
and cheaply lit by a rude kerosene lamp.  He kindles his fire with Swedish 
safetymatches which have driven this English product from the market.  
When ill, he calls in a doctor, and uses quinine and other costly drugs.107 
 
While colonial claims of material progress in other parts of India could 
bedismissed – especially in light of famines – Indian nationalists found it difficult to 
square their doctrine of pauperization with the apparent prosperity of eastern 
Bengal’s jute tracts.  One approach to accounting for this anomaly was to attribute 
Bengal’s relative prosperity to a relatively low incidence of land tax.108  R.C. Dutt 
developed this argument fully by correlating famines with the level of land tax: Bengal 
came out best – lowest land tax, zero famine.109  Dutt argued that eastern Bengal was 
wealthier than the west because land assessments were lower: “If the cultivators of 
India generally were as prosperous as in Eastern Bengal, famines would be rare in 
India, even in years of bad harvests.  But rents in Western Bengal are higher, in 
proportion to the produce, than in Eastern Bengal; and this Land Tax in Madras, 
Bombay and elsewhere is higher than in Bengal.”110 
R.C. Dutt, along with several other nineteenth century nationalists, explained 
the anomaly of eastern Bengal through reference to its less onerous tax burden – a 
problematic argument given the rise of credit, rather than rent, as the major                                                         
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mechanism of surplus extraction from the peasantry.  Dutt was pointedly reserved 
about the role of jute in eastern Bengal’s prosperity.  In over 600 pages devoted to 
the economic history of British India, he devotes barely two paragraphs to the subject 
of jute, noting that “while this new article of export added to the resource of 
cultivators, it restricted the area of land under rice cultivation.”111  While 
acknowledging that jute did enrich cultivators, Dutt pointed out its negative 
consequences.  In a much earlier publication on the Bengal peasantry, published in 
1874, when Dutt was a younger man with very different political and economic views, 
he expressed similarly mixed feelings towards the fibre: 
The cultivation of jute has considerably increased within the last few years, 
and in several districts specially in the east, the peasantry have much improved 
in their condition by jute cultivation.  There is considerable diversity of 
opinion as to whether the production of jute improves or impairs the 
productive powers of the soil.  Another contested point with regard to jute 
production is whether it is unhealthy.  It is generally supposed that the 
production is not unhealthy, but that the process of rottening the stalks is 
injurious to health if it takes place in or near villages.112 
 
R.C. Dutt’s statements on the negative consequences of jute cultivation – that 
it displaces rice, reduces productivity of the soil, and affects public health – were part 
of a broader elite discourse of jute cultivation.  Shambhu Chandra Mookerjee, who 
commented extensively on the prosperity of jute cultivators while floating along the 
Meghna, described the fibre as “anti-piscine,” a serious charge for fish-loving 
Bengalis.  In October 1882, while in Agartala in the employ of the Maharajah of Hill 
Tipperah, Mookerjee met Nabakumar Sen, a lawyer, who had just returned from a 
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short trip into the country on a case.  Sen related the “sufferings” he had endured, all 
of which was due to the effects of rotting jute: 
The air is filled with the stink of jute – it was impossible to breathe – not a 
square inch of pure air is to be had in the whole country.  … It was worse 
than dung – the jute decomposition.  Worse than the vilest animal excreta! he 
[Sen] exclaimed.  My own language! thought I, as I remembered my 
experience … when walking from the boat to the mansion of the Mookerjees, 
I was obliged to run for life from the stench. 
Sen got no fish to eat and had to live on pulse, which is the detestation of the 
Eastern Bengalis who, by the way, don’t know how to cook it.  … There is no 
fish in consequence of the state of the water from jute decomposition.  I 
wonder whether Government ever heard of this fish famine. … Here is a bad 
prospect for fishy Bengal.113 
 
The ecological damage wreaked by jute decomposition was an oft-repeated complaint 
of the urban bhadralok, who blamed it for fish famines, malaria and a generally 
unhealthy environment.  Government-sponsored scientific examinations “proved” 
that retting was not harmful to health, but the complaints continued.114     
The middle-class had a long list of complaints against jute production.  A 
poem published in 1918 in Calcutta, Shekal-ekal (“Those days, These days”) by 
Chandrashkar Kar attributed reduced supplies of fish, milk and the adulteration of 
ghee to the spread of jute cultivation on to land formerly left fallow for cattle to graze:  
[Those days] there were fish in the canals and lakes, rice on the fields 
Cows would give plenty of milk 
There was no jute cultivation anywhere in the country 
There were fields of grass here, there, and everywhere.115 
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The most often-repeated and serious accusation leveled against jute was that it 
had displaced rice – the “war” between subsistence grain for local consumption and 
“fibre” for export to Europe.  The following depiction of fibre and grain at war is 
taken from an essay by Dwijdas Datta, a lecturer in agriculture at Shibpur engineering 
college: “Jute is now in competition with paddy.  Both are involved in a great war.  
Who can predict whether our own food-grain will win or whether the foreign-
required fibre will win in this Kurukshetra and whether we will have to learn to eat 
jute in order to survive.”116  The charge that expanding jute cultivation would reduce 
Bengalis would to eating the fibre was repeated in essays, poems, pamphlets and 
novels of the early twentieth century. 
The litany of elite complaints against the “excessive” cultivation of jute points 
to the way in which nationalists squared jute cultivators’ apparent prosperity with a 
more generalized narrative of national decline and impoverishment.  Jute cultivators 
were prospering at the expense of the nation, they were selfishly forsaking the 
interests of their own community and producing for global markets.  Nikilnath Roy’s 
pro-Swadeshi pamphlet, Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal), published in Calcutta in 1906, 
at the peak of the Swadeshi movement explicitly leveled the accusation of selfishness 
at jute cultivators: 
From outside it seems that in this life-struggle [jute production], our 
cultivators are winning.  But what is happening inside?  The cultivation of rice 
has been reduced to such an extent, that ordinary people are experiencing 
starvation every year … it is true that a few cultivators may have made some money, 
but there is no doubt that lack of rice cultivation has driven ordinary people 
and even some cultivators to hunger and death.  On top of that, the rotting of 
jute in rural waterbodies has destroyed the health of these areas and the very 
cultivators who grow jute are spending their money on quinine and other                                                         
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foreign medicines. … only if everyone can survive equally out of this, can we say that 
we are winning this life-struggle.  Otherwise there is no value to victory.117 
 
Dwijdas Datta, the agriculture professor at Shibpur engineering, took a 
different tack – instead of accusing jute cultivators of selfishness, Datta tried to 
convince them that jute was not as profitable a crop as they supposed.  In an 
imaginary dialogue between himself as expert, and a jute cultivator, Datta goes about 
teaching the farmer the proper way of calculating profit and loss: 
Amongst jute cultivators, those who have a little bit of business knowledge – 
they may say, while scratching their heads, that they make a profit of 10 takas 
per bigha out of jute.  We have got this answer from a lot of cultivators we 
have questioned.  Then I ask the cultivator, “did you take into account your 
own and your family’s labour?”  Answer, “of course.”  “Have you included 
their wages into your calculations?”  “No I did not include that.” “The food 
that you give labourers that work in the field – have you included the cost of 
that food?”  “No I did not include that.”118 
The imagined conversation continue in this vein, with the expert asking the 
cultivator if he included interest payments to the moneylender, the legal expenses 
when a cow wanders into the jute fields, and so forth.  In each case, the answer is no.  
The conversation concludes when the author asks, “with all these expenses taken into 
account tell me, is jute profitable or loss-making?”  The answer, inevitably, “very loss-
making.”119   
Swadeshi ideology vilified the consumption of imported goods even more 
than it did jute cultivation.  The economic boycott programme was informed by a 
particular theory of commercial relations, whereby commerce with Britain had de-                                                        
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industrialised Bengal; it was hoped that protection from European competition, 
offered by the boycott, would re-industrialise the region. The consumption of 
foreign-made goods – Manchester cloths, imported salt, and, in the Nangalband fair, 
German-made toys – was portrayed as anti-national and people were urged, or 
coerced, to purchase more expensive Swadeshi commodities, for the national good.  
In the nationalist charge that the consumption of foreign-made goods had de-
industrialised and impoverished India, the main villains were – once again –jute 
cultivators.  In the previous section, I had discussed two very different responses to 
jute cultivators’ consumption: a celebration of cultivators’ prosperity and 
“comparative civilization,” on the one hand, and a condemnation of cultivators as 
indulgent, extravagant and indolent, on the other.  Swadeshi economic discourse had 
added another dimension to the condemnation of jute cultivators’ consumption – 
impoverishing the entire subcontinent.   
The middle-classes who spearheaded the Swadeshi movement had suffered 
from the jute cultivators’ increased consumption.  Jute cultivators’ cash earnings had, 
it was widely reported, pushed up the prices of consumer goods, squeezing middle-
class household budgets. In January 1914, J.A.L. Swan, the Collector of Rajshahi 
reported that the “bhadralok class … oppose jute cultivation because it sends up the 
price of rice, and pollutes the water-supply.”  Swan proceeded to depict a tragic image 
of the impoverishment of the salaried middle-class: 
People who a few years ago lived comfortably on Rs. 20 a month are now 
hard put to it to make both ends meet on Rs. 30, while the salaries paid to 
some Government servants, which were formerly, if not generous, at all 
events reasonable, are now the merest pittance … This ever-growing dearness 
of food, coupled with the corresponding rise in the price of other necessaries 
of life, the high house-rents, and the difficulty of obtaining employment, is 
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gradually reducing the majority of the bhadralok class to comparative 
poverty.120 
 
The sub-inspector of madrassas in Sirajganj, Mokhtar Ahmed Siddiqi 
complained that cultivators, upon selling their harvest, lost all sense of proportion 
and paid far more for commodities than ordinary middle-class salary-holders would 
dare.121  The reckless extravagance of jute cultivators pushed prices of simple 
consumer goods up beyond the reach of their non-jute cultivating neighbours.  
Market-based consumption benefitted the individual jute cultivator at the expense of 
their community – much like jute production.   
Nationalist economic discourse vilified jute cultivators portraying them, at 
best, as stupid and recklessly extravagant and, at worst, as selfishly aggrandizing 
themselves at the expense of their communities.  Jute cultivation and the 
consumption practices of jute cultivators were blamed for shortages of fish, the lack 
of pure ghee, the price of hilsa, the import of low-quality Burmese rice, deterioration 
in public health, the unaffordability of consumer goods, and the de-industrialisation 
and pauperization of India.  Given that the fibre and its producers were the villains of 
Swadeshi economic ideas, it should not be surprising that Swadeshi activism proved 
unpopular in the jute tracts.  Elite nationalists alienated the jute tracts not only 
through explicitly Hindu religious symbols and slogans, but also through economic 
ideas hostile to the very livelihoods of jute farmers.  Swadeshi activists, however, 
remained focused on the religious rather than economic categories, and addressed 
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appeals to join the movement towards “Muslims” rather than “jute farmers.”  A 
pamphlet circulated in the jute tracts read: 
Mussalmans, mother entertains high hopes in you.  Strong as you are, broad 
as your chests are, strong as your arms are, fear not to die, to save our mother 
from dishonour.  Say once “Din!” “Din!” “Allah ho akbar” and take 
possession of the towns by whatever means you find to hand, lathi or sword, 
sticks or guns, or anything.122 
 
WWI AND AFTER 
If nationalist economic discourse lost the battle of economic ideas, does that imply 
that colonial economic thought was victorious?  Were jute cultivators more 
responsive to the colonial government’s doctrines of free trade, to proclamations of 
the liberty to buy and sell as posted around Brahmanbaria after the Mogra riots?  If 
the colonial government believed that jute cultivators were doctrinaire free traders, 
they would be disabused by incidences of looting in eastern Bengal’s rural markets in 
December 1917 and January 1918, barely ten years later.  These cases of looting 
demonstrated that peasant politics in the jute tract were about the viability of their 
market-based livelihoods – about prosperity and poverty – rather then about 
doctrinaire ideas of free trade or economic boycott. 
During December 1917, the colonial government reported 91 cases of looting 
in rural marketplaces in eastern Bengal and another 28 during January 1918.  A 
majority of these incidents took place in the jute tracts of eastern and northern 
Bengal: 22 of them in the jute-regions of Rangpur.123  Similar incidents took place in                                                         
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the jute-growing region of Purnea, in the province of Bihar, and in the Sylhet district 
in Assam: Sylhet was in the Meghna valley, adjacent to Mymensingh and Tipperah, 
and ecologically, economically, and culturally similar to those important jute-growing 
districts.124  The Government of Bengal stated: “there can be no doubt that the main 
cause of these disturbances is the high price of salt and cloth, which people attribute 
to the greed of shopkeepers.  The discontent is accentuated by the low prices 
obtained for paddy and jute.”125  In several instances, looters claimed that the 
Government had given permission to loot shops charging excessively high prices: “an 
absurd idea had got abroad that Government would not be adverse to people taking 
the law into their own hands and compelling the vendors of cloth and salt to bring 
down their prices.”126   
The government of Bengal decided to respond in December, 1917 by 
enlisting the support of prominent locals “who can explain to their tenants and 
others the economic causes of the high prices and the futility of the looting.”127  The 
futility of attempting to control riots through economic theory became apparent to 
the Government of Bengal when cases of looting did not abate during January 1918.  
The situation “eased” in February and it was “attributed partly to the fall which had 
taken place in the price of salt and partly to the promptness with which the rioters 
have been apprehended and placed on trial.” Significantly, a public announcement 
was made that the Government would bring the prices of salt and cloth under                                                         
124 Govt of Bihar and Orissa to Home Department, Govt of India, 22nd January, 1918 and Govt of Assam 
to Govt of India, February 1, 1918, ibid. 
125 Govt of Bengal to Govt of India, 14th December, 1917, ibid. 
126 Govt of Assam to Govt of India, 1st February, 1918.  Also, Govt of Bengal to Govt of India, February 
1st 1918 and Govt of Bihar and Assam to Govt of India, 22nd January, 1918, ibid. 
127 ibid. 
  73 
control.  Looting came to an end with price controls – the very opposite of the 
proclamation of “full liberty for all persons to buy and sell” in Mogra and 
Nangalband in 1905.  
The cases of looting also took place in a particularly vulnerable period in the 
crop calendar – during December and early January, just before the aman harvest 
came in.  The situation eased in late January and February, as the aman crop was 
harvested.  The Government of Bengal feared that violence would recur once more, 
in the “hot weather” as the aman crop depleted and before the aus and jute harvest 
came in: “It is … far from improbable that disturbances may break out again in the 
hot weather, when the resources of the cultivating classes will be depleted owing to 
the poor prices which they have received both for jute and for rice.”128 
The lootings of 1917/18 were about the viability of market-based livelihoods 
and a response to high prices of consumer goods and low prices of agricultural 
produces.  When shopkeepers charged high prices for consumer goods, beyond the 
affordability of cultivators impoverished by several years of low prices for jute, 
cultivators targeted them.  Similarly, ten years previously, when Swadeshi activists 
attacked jute cultivators’ consumption of goods in markets, they were resisted and 
even attacked.  While the colonial state and Indian nationalists were debating free 
trade or economic boycott,  progress or pauperisation, jute cultivators were focused 
on the viability of market-based livelihoods.  Their politics of commercial life was 
played out in centres of commerce and exchange – the hats, bazaars and marketplaces 
of eastern Bengal. 
                                                        
128 Govt of Bengal to Govt of India, February 1st, 1918, ibid.  
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An important shift in this politics had taken place between the anti-Swadeshi 
resistance of 1905/06 and the looting of 1917/18.  Prior to World War I, the politics 
of jute cultivation revolved around notions of prosperity, but the disappearance of 
jute markets at the outbreak of World War I and consistently low prices between 
1914 and 1918 drove large numbers of cultivators into destitution.  After World War 
I, politics in the delta revolved around questions of poverty, deprivation and 
destitution.  I will conclude this chapter with a poem titled “The Jute Song,” written 
by Gobinda Chandra Das, nicknamed Saurabh, that appeared on September 2, 1914 
in a journal published out of the jute-town of Sirajganj.  The poem captured the rising 
prosperity and political autonomy of jute cultivators until World War I and was a 
prescient foretelling of the sharp reversal of fortunes for Bengal’s jute cultivators. 
“Jute Song” 
 
Oh! My tasty jute! 
You are spread out over Bengal’s crown, Bengal’s fields 
Where ever I go, I see you, 
In every village you have an office, in every neighbourhood a market. 
They leave rice and cultivate you, 
They don’t listen to objections, 
In every home they count money, the cultivator has more guts. 
. He who had a straw hovel, 
 Now has across his house, 
 Four-cornered, eight-cornered so much shiny tin! 
 If your yield is low, 
 It is difficult to pay the landlord, 
King and subject are both in trouble, serious hardship. 
Serbia Austria are fighting, 
We are not scared of that, 
But if your sales come to a stop, then “Gourango” wood. 
The moneylender gives no money 
 How are we supposed to survive, 
 Desperation in Punjab, Madras, in Bangla, Gujarat.
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Chapter 2 
 
The Metropolis, the Hinterland, and the Mofussil:  
 The Spatial Formations of Jute, 1853 to 1918 
 
 
Jute produced by peasant households traveled through the delta’s river-ways and 
railways, westwards to the jute mills and seaports of Calcutta.  En route to Calcutta, 
the fibres changed hands, traveled on ox-carts, country-boats, steamships and 
railway-wagons, and were bought and sold, stored, bulked, and assorted in the jute 
tract’s river-port and railroad market towns.  As it passed through layers of 
intermediary traders, jute also changed in form – from small lots of peasant produce 
of variable quality to standardized units of quantity, quality and price.  The built-up 
capital through which jute circulated – steamships, railways, jetties, docks and 
warehouses – connected the delta’s jute tracts to metropolitan Calcutta.  At the turn 
of the twentieth century, Calcutta was home to half the world’s jute mills and the 
bulk of jute presses in Bengal.  The flow of fibre transformed eastern Bengal’s jute 
tracts into Calcutta’s hinterland and, conversely, Calcutta into the delta’s metropolis.   
 The relationship between the hinterland and the metropolis was mediated 
through small towns – or the mofussil.1  These small towns, housing about 2% of the 
total population, was estimated in the 1901 census to have grown by 12.7% in the last 
decade.  Growth was most marked in the railway and river markets that specialized in 
the jute trade – the population of jute marts like Chandpur, Narayanganj, Jamalpur,                                                         
1 Strictly speaking, as the Hobson-Jobson describes it, the mofussil was a relational term, from the 
perspective of Calcutta, the delta’s small-towns were the mofussil, but from those small towns themselves, 
the surrounding countryside was the mofussil.  The Hobson-Jobson definition of the mofussil is “The 
provinces – the country stations and districts, as conta-distinguished from ‘the Presidency; or, relatively 
rural localities of  district as contra-distinguished from the sudder or chief station, which is the residence of 
the district authorities.” p. 570.   
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and Madaripur had increased by more than 20% in the last decade, and Narayanganj’s 
had doubled in the last two decades.  Amongst these towns, only Narayanganj had a 
population of more than 20,000.  New mofussil towns had also emerged along 
recently constructed railway tracks, and were being enumerated for the first time in 
1901: Akhaura in Tippera, and Domar, Haldibari and Nilphamari in Rangpur district. 
The 1901 census report – like most official publications of the period – celebrated 
the growth of small-towns as manifestations of the jute-tract’s prosperity: “the 
country is prosperous and trade is increasing, and the most progressive towns are 
those connected with the export trade in jute.”2 
These small-towns were intermediate spaces between the metropolis and the 
hinterland.  They were the settings for encounters between the hinterland and the 
metropolis.  Peasant households visited these towns to sell their produce, purchase 
imported goods, attend fairs, contest lawsuits, register land tenure contracts, and so 
forth.  In the towns, they encountered various agents of the metropolis – jute 
purchasers and other traders, pleaders and mukhtears, and government clerks.  This 
chapter will look at three interactions between the hinterland and the metropolis that 
took place in the mofussil – in transacting jute, in interacting with the state, and in 
nationalist politics.   
Mofussil jute markets grew up along the delta’s waterways and railways, along 
the routes connecting peasant farms to Calcutta.  Small village-level traders known as 
farias or beparis sold fibres purchased from peasant smallholders to mahajans, more 
substantial capitalists usually acting as agents of jute balers in these markets.  During 
the nineteenth century, intermediary jute traders invested in mofussil towns, building                                                         
2 Government of India, Census of India, 1901, Part VI, pp. 31-33 
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warehouses, river-docks, railway-sidings and kutcha presses – hand-powered screws 
that packed fibres into bales of 4 to 6 maunds (160 to 240 kilograms).  In the first 
section of this chapter, I argue that the patterns of mofussil growth in the delta was 
underpinned by the overlaying of coal-powered transportation, railways and river-
steamers, over the delta’s existing infrastructure of oar and sail-powered boats during 
the late nineteenth century.  
As was usually the case in the British Empire, colonial capital was 
accompanied by the colonial state.  The mofussil towns housed not only the 
warehouses and baling presses of jute capitalists, but also the paraphernalia of the 
colonial government.  The forward institutions of the colonial state in the mofussil 
were those of revenue extraction and law and order.  Courthouses, police-stations, 
and land administration offices in mofussil towns were perhaps the most visible signs 
of colonial authority in the hinterland.  By the early twentieth century, the colonial 
government had established branches of a different type of government institution – 
the developmental.  The extension of the Agricultural Department, formed in 1885, 
into the hinterland was carried out at the behest of global jute capital, as the 
government published forecasts of the probable outturn of jute and attempted to 
“improve” peasant production by increasing yields and alleviating quality.  In the 
second section, I will look at the increasing penetration of the state into the delta.   
The third section will look at the mofussil as a site for nationalist politics, 
especially as metropolitan nationalists attempted to mobilize the hinterland’s peasant 
masses into the Swadeshi movement.  Metropolitan activists introduced Swadeshi 
ideology into the hinterland through whistle-stop tours of eastern Bengal’s mofussil 
towns, traveling on the very railways and steamers that conveyed jute and stopping to 
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address public meetings in the very towns that served as centres of the jute trade.  
The core of eastern Bengal’s Swadeshi activists were drawn from bhadralok, Hindu 
mofussil middle-classes – pleaders and mukhtears, school-teachers, doctors, clerks, 
and zamindari amlas residing in the mofussil.  While mofussil towns were mostly 
Hindu and middle-class, the surrounding countryside was overwhelmingly Muslim 
and peasant.  Attempts to enforce the Swadeshi economic program of boycott pitted 
the mofussil town against the surrounding countryside.  I will argue that these 
conflicts took place between the overlapping categories of Hindu and Muslim, 
bhadralok and peasant, and town and countryside. 
 
CIRCULATION 
In its journey from farm to factory, peasant produce stopped at the mofussil town, 
where it was bulked, stored, assorted and packed before being dispatched to Calcutta.  
The distribution and growth of these market towns in the delta was driven by the 
overlaying of a coal-powered transport infrastructure of railways and river-steamers 
on top of the delta’s existing infrastructure of sail and oar-powered boats.  In the 
initial days of the jute trade, the bulk of Bengal’s jute was conveyed to Calcutta by 
boats, entering Calcutta through the Nadia canal and to a far lesser extent through 
the Midnapore and Hidgellee canals.   
The largest proportion of Calcutta’s jute was consigned on boats in ganjes or 
large wholesale marts in Bengal.  Sirajganj and Narayanganj emerged as the premier 
jute marts of Bengal in the 1870s.  These towns were ideally located on the delta’s 
river-routes to collect jute from the surrounding countryside and dispatch it to 
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Calcutta.  Sirajganj was on the banks of the Jamuna, the major tributary of the 
Brahmaputra river-system, and collected jute from northern Bengal and western 
Mymensingh.  Narayanganj was on the confluence of the Buriganga and Dhaleswari 
rivers, and collected jute from eastern Mymensingh, Dacca, and Tippera.  Further, 
these towns became the centres of operation for two different trading communities 
who played hugely important roles in the jute trade – the Marwaris and the 
Armenians.  In Sirajganj, the jute trade was dominated by Marwari merchants who 
arrived in large numbers from western India in the late nineteenth century; in 
Narayanganj, trade was dominated by Armenian merchants who had been trading 
hides, skins, and salt in nearby Dacca.   
Sirajganj and Narayanganj were served by smaller river-ports scattered 
throughout the region.  Pabna, Mymensingh (or Nasirabad), Kishoreganj, Jamalpur, 
Munshiganj, Dacca, Bhairab Bazaar, Brahmanbaria and Chandpur were smaller but 
still significant river-ports in the delta’s jute trade, though most often fibres were 
consigned to Narayanganj or Sirajganj rather than direct to Calcutta.  The notable 
exception was Madaripur, in Faridpur district and on the banks of the Kumar, close 
to the Sundarbans route to Calcutta.  Madaripur was a depot for the jute produced in 
Faridpur and an important jute mart that, between 1877 and 1880, consigned an 
annual average of 450,000 maunds jute directly to Calcutta.3   
Sirajganj and Narayanganj’s importance as river-mart preceded the rise of jute 
as a major global commodity in the 1860s.  In 1854, an American missionary 
described a brief visit to Sirajganj: “As we approached Serajgunge [traveling from 
Pabna, up the Jamuna] the forests of masts reminded me of the shipping of New                                                         
3 Government of Bengal, Reports on the Internal Trade of Bengal, 1877-80. 
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York or Liverpool.  We were ten hours and half passing by them, as they were 
moored to the bank, two, three, or five deep.  I computed them at the time above 
600, but was afterwards informed they were more than a thousand.”4  In the late 
1860s, Sirajganj was considered to be the “emporium of Bengal jute.”  Sirajganj’s pre-
eminent position in the hinterland’s jute trade declined from the 1880s onwards, as 
river-routes were overlaid with railways and country-boats displaced by river-steamers.       
 In 1862, the Eastern Bengal Railway, consisting of a line from Sealdah station 
in Calcutta to Kushtia was opened.  In 1870, the Eastern Bengal Railway opened a 
45-mile extension to Goalundo, on the confluence of the Brahmaputra and Meghna 
river systems, in an attempt to capture Bengal’s riverine trade.  The Eastern Bengal 
Railway also operated a steamer service connecting Goalundo to the important jute 
towns of Narayanganj and Chandpur to the east and Sirajganj to the north.  The 
rivers, however, did not prove cooperative – substantial portions of the railway and 
the town itself was washed away during floods in 1875.  After that, Goalundo was no 
longer a fixed space, but a “wandering terminus” shifting frequently to avoid the 
unpredictable and unstoppable rivers.  The town consisted solely of “a very large 
bazar and railway and steamers officers’ quarters which follow the terminus in its 
wanderings.”5 
Through its location at the terminus of the region’s largest rivers, Goalundo 
became the central transshipment point for the delta’s jute.  Jute from inland marts 
traveled through Goalundo en route to Calcutta.  Though country-boats passed                                                         
4 “Letter from Dr. Peck,” The Missionary Magazine, XXXIV (6), June, 1854 p. 164 
5 W.W. Hunter, et. al., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 12, Oxford: 1908, p. 279.  In 1908, after numerous 
shifts, Goalundo was located 7 miles from its original location 1865 location.   Further, enormous sums 
were expended in dredging the Padma near the rail-terminus, in an effort to prevent the rivers from 
displacing excessively.   
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through Goalundo, their cargo was not necessarily transferred to railway wagons.  
The railway would not displace country boats until the 1890s, only after tracks 
penetrated deeper into the countryside.  Between 1870 and 1872, more than half of 
Calcutta’s jute arrived by countryboat: 8.5 million maunds by countryboats, 6 million 
by railway, and 2 million by river steamer.6  The Report on the Internal Trade of Bengal for 
1876-77 noted the inability of railways to displace country-boats with some concern: 
“it is evident that the railway has not succeeded in displacing the waterways of Bengal 
as the favoured channel for the supply of this important staple to Calcutta.  And yet 
almost the whole of this jute passes by the railway station of Goalundo.”7  However, 
coal and steam would replace oar and sail, as railway lines and river-steamer services 
were extended throughout the delta.  Between 1876-77 and 1889-90, arrivals of jute 
in Calcutta by boat rose from 3.8 million maunds to 4.5 million maunds.  On the 
other hand, arrivals by railway more than doubled from 3.4 million to 8.4 million 
maunds and by river-steamer almost quadrupled from 860,000 to 3 million maunds 
(see Table 2.1).   
The next major colonial railway project was the Northern Bengal State 
Railway opened in 1878 and connecting Calcutta with Assam and traversing the jute 
districts of northern Bengal, particularly Rangpur.  Within two years of the line 
opening, the government of Bengal proclaimed that “the easy communication 
afforded by the railway has given a powerful impetus to the development of the jute 
                                                        
6 Kerr, Report on Jute, 1873, p. 59 
7 Reports on the Internal Trade of Bengal for the year 1876-77, Calcutta, Government of Bengal: 1877, p. 69.  In 
1872-73, George Burnett reported that there were two ways to send jute from Sirajganj to Calcutta: “the 
steamers of the Eastern Bengal Railway, and the rail itself from Goalundo to Calcutta, at six annas per 
maund, while by native boats it costs three to four annas per maund, but occupies thirty to forty days in 
transit.”  Burnett, George, The Jute-Growing Districts and Markets of India with Notes of a Tour, 1872-73, 
(Reprinted from the Dundee Advertiser), Dundee, 1873, p. 15 
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trade in this district [Rangpur].”8  By 1880, two Calcutta firms had opened agencies in 
Rangpur and Domar, hitherto a relatively small hinterland town and over the 
following years many more agencies would follow.  During the 1880s, quantities of 
jute consigned in towns along the Northern Bengal State Railway increased rapidly: in 
Rangpur itself from 18,000 maunds in 1879-80 to 241,024 maunds in 1889-90, in 
Domar from 186,000 maunds to 326,674 maunds, and in Haldibari from 44,000 to 
292,592.  By the early twentieth century, Domar was described as “a large jute-
exporting centre, containing jute presses.”9  The emergence of the jute trade in these 
towns meant a corresponding diminution of Sirajganj’s trade, as the Rangpur jute that 
was previously dispatched to Calcutta via Sirajganj was now consigned directly to the 
metropolis in railway wagons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 Report on the Internal Trade of Bengal for the year 1879-80, Calcutta: 1880, p. 63 
9 W.W. Hunter, et. al., The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XI, Oxford: 1908, p. 367  
Table 2.1: Arrivals of jute into Calcutta (in maunds of 40 kg)1 
  By boat By rail        By steamer 
1876-77 3,839,404 3,382,406 857,829 
1877-78 4,784,000 3,978,000 1,072,000 
1878-79 5,802,593 3,008,233 1,207,921 
1879-80 4,455,549 4,331,058 1,480,696 
1880-81 4,086,302 3,701,097 1,339,809 
1881-82 4,569,560 5,783,536 4,569,560 
1882-83 5,973,703 7,001,350 2,085,968 
1883-84 4,908,379 3,252,194 1,888,244 
1884-85 4,910,687 4,875,739 2,756,718 
1885-86 4,113,237 4,543,907 2,959,478 
1886-87 3,661,176 5,289,909 2,788,585 
1887-88 4,012,692 6,772,599 2,959,382 
1888-89 4,818,743 7,428,638 3,218,564 
1889-90 4,491,833 8,398,930 3,053,984 
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In 1885, the Dacca section of the Eastern Bengal Railway, connecting 
Narayanganj and Mymensingh was opened.  With the opening of the Dacca section 
of the EBR, Narayanganj gained in importance as a jute depot.  It was connected 
both to Calcutta and hinterland markets by steam powered transport technologies.  
The river-steamer trade between Narayanganj and Calcutta increased rapidly.  In 
1889-90, Narayanganj sent 1,585,000 maunds of jute to Calcutta by river-steamers, 
while Sirajganj sent just 945,000 maunds. Sirajganj had, however, retained its 
importance as a centre of the country-boat trade: that same year, Sirajganj sent more 
than 780,000 maunds of jute to Calcuta by country-boat against the mere 165,000 
maunds dispatched from Narayanganj.   As railways and river-steamers displaced 
country-boats in the hinterland’s jute trade Narayanganj eclipsed Sirajganj as east 
Bengal’s main jute emporium.  Sirajganj was not connected to the railway network 
until 1915, with the opening of the Sara-Sirajganj line.  By this point, Narayanganj 
had already eclipsed Sirajganj as the premier jute entrepot of the Bengal delta. 
Sirajganj’s decline as Bengal’s pre-eminent jute emporium was not solely due to 
competition from railways.  As the imperial gazetteer of India commented in 1908: 
“Sirajganj has of late somewhat declined in importance owing to the damage done by 
the earthquake of 1897, and to a change in the course of the Brahmaputra, which is 
now three miles distant from the town.”  The earthquake had destroyed the 
Serajgunge Jute Company, the only jute manufacturing concern in eastern Bengal 
prior to 1947.10  
The combination of steamer and railway services connecting Narayanganj to 
both the jute-tracts of Dacca and Mymensingh to the north and Calcutta to the west                                                         
10 Hunter, W.W., et. al., The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 23, Oxford: 1908, p. 17.   
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led to the rapid growth of this river port.  By the turn of the century Narayanganj had 
displaced Sirajganj as east Bengal’s premier jute mart.  Narayanganj’s population had 
more than doubled between 1881 and 1901, and stood at 24,472 people.  In 1908, 
there were 53 jute packaging factories employing 73 presses and employing 6,000 
workers in Narayanganj.11  On the other hand, there were only 14 presses in Sirajganj 
and another 5 more in the neighbouring jute town of Bera.12  While Narayanganj’s 
population had doubled between 1881 and 1901, Sirajganj’s population had increased 
from 21,037 to only 23,114.13   
Unlike in Sirajganj, where Marwari traders from Rajasthan dominated the jute 
trade, European capital concentrated in Narayanganj.  This, perhaps, explains why 
Narayanganj was widely considered the model colonial “upcountry” market town.14  
According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India of 1908: “Narayanganj has the 
appearance of a Western rather than of an Eastern town, and has not unjustly been 
called the model municipality of Bengal.”15 European traders formed the Narayanganj 
Chamber of Commerce in 1904, and until 1912 represented “the jute interest” in the 
Governor of Bengal’s Legislative Council.  The dominance of the European-
dominated NCC in local municipal politics, to the exclusion of Indian traders, lasted 
into the 1930s.  In 1926, Tarit Bhushan Roy of the Bengal Mahajan Sabha, an 
association of mofussil Bengali traders and financiers, complained in the Legislative 
                                                        
11 Hunter, W.W., et. al., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 23, Oxford: 1908, p. 373 
12 Hunter, W.W., et. a., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 19, Oxford: 1908, p. 301 
13 Census of India, 1901, Volume 6, Part 1, p. 19 
14 Rumer Godden’s 1946 novel The River, and Jean Renoir’s 1951 film based on it, is depicts the social life 
of a British family in Narayanganj, whose income earner is employed at a jute press. 
15Hunter, W.W., et. a., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 18, Oxford: 1908, p. 301 
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Council that the Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce dominated the Narayanganj 
Municipal Board despite the fact that the Indian commercial community paid about 
1/3rd of municipal taxes.16   
The last major colonial railway project in eastern Bengal was the Assam 
Bengal Railway, opened in 1892, connecting the southeastern port of Chittagong with 
Assam’s tea plantations.  The branch line from Laksham to Chandpur, an important 
jute trading station on the banks of the Meghna, was opened in 1903. Chandpur was 
already an important jute-trading town, and the terminus of the EBR steamers 
running to Narayanganj and Goalundo.  The Census Report for 1901 ascribed the 
37% growth in the population of Chandpur subdivision (not just the town) to “the 
development of trade in Chandpur town.”17   In proposing the branch line in 1895, 
the ABR stated that it would make Chittagong the “port for all jute from Narainganj 
and the country north of that place.”18  Calcutta jute interests, represented by the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the Indian Jute Mills Association, and the Calcutta 
Baled Jute Association, opposed the Chandpur branch as its object was to “compete 
with a long-established private enterprise.”19   
The ABR captured a sizeable portion of the jute trade, in 1903-04, their 
wagons carried 45,000 tons (about 1,115,000 maunds) of jute.20  However, Calcutta 
jute interests’ fears did not materialize.  Though Chittagong’s exports of jute                                                         
16 Roy’s request for one seat for the Indian commercial community on the municipal board was refused. 
BLC, Vol. XX, No. 3, p. 112 
17 Census of India, 1901, Volume 6, Part 1, p. 79.  Chandpur was not officially recognized as a town and 
the census figures did not include the urban population.   
18 Quoted in “Assam-Bengal Railway,” Herapath’s Railway Journal, Vol. 60, Sept. 9, 1898, p. 935 
19 Quoted in ibid. 
20 Hunter, W.W., et. al., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 23, Oxford: 1908, p. 384 
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increased somewhat, the bulk of Chandpur’s jute trade was with Calcutta.  The EBR 
ran two steamers daily from Chandpur to Narayanganj and Goalundo.  The steamers 
would arrive from Calcutta in the morning; after their arrival, two trains would depart 
– one north for Assam and the other south for Chittagong; and the steamers would 
return to Goalundo and Narayanganj the following morning.21  The overlaying of 
river-steamers and railways spurred the growth of Chandpur as a jute mart: by 1910, 
there were seven European and two Indian firms operating jute presses in the town.22  
The Assam Bengal Railway also led to the growth of Akhaura, a town equally 
served by the railway and the Titas, a tributary of the Meghna.  In 1901 it was 
reported that Akhaura was “coming into importance as the railway station for 
Brahmanbaria subdivision” and by 1908, jute presses had been established in the 
town.23  In April 1910, a branch-line of the ABR from Akhaura to Ashuganj on the 
banks of the Meghna and opposite the important jute mart of Bhairab Bazaar was 
opened.  Akhaura became the railway junction town of eastern Bengal, connecting 
Tippera’s jute tracts to Narayanganj and to Calcutta.  In 1937, the King George VI 
Railway Bridge across the river Meghna – connecting the Ashuganj and Bhairab 
Bazaar stations – was opened to traffic.  The Assam Bengal Railway was now directly 
connected to the Dacca section of the Eastern Bengal Railway, and to the 
hinterland’s premiere jute emporium, Narayanganj.  By the time the railway bridge 
                                                        
21 BLC, Vol. III, 1921, p. 321 
22 Webster, J.E., Bengal District Gazetteer, Tippera, Calcutta 1910, p. 55.  In 1947, after partition, the only 
hydraulic baling presses in the newly created territory of East Pakistan were in Narayanganj and Chandpur.   
23 Census of India, 1901, Volume 6, Part 1, p. 31; W.W. Hunter, et. al. , Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 23, 
Oxford, 1908 p. 384 
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opened, a series of significant jute trading stations had emerged along the ABR’s 
tracks, notably in Chandpur, Akhaura, Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj.   
The overlaying of different transport infrastructures and the enormous 
growth in the jute trade in the late nineteenth century led to distinctive patterns of 
small-town growth in the jute hinterland.  While certain jute marts were physically 
larger and dealt with greater quantities of fibre – notably Narayanganj and to a lesser 
degree Chandpur and Sirajganj – the overall pattern was one of diffusion, as 
purchasing agencies were established deeper inside the hinterland.  Diffusion resulted 
from increasing competition amongst jute purchasers.  As the Narayanganj Chamber 
of Commerce wrote to the Government of Bengal in 1916, “With increasing 
competition [Narayanganj] balers went further afield and established buying stations 
in smaller places in the interior.”24  The NCC referred solely to large European jute 
baling firms, who according to an estimate in the Capital operated at least 500 
purchasing stations in eastern Bengal.25  The hinterland trade, however, was 
dominated by indigenous jute merchants known as mahajans rather than European 
purchasing agencies.  The majority of mahajans were Marwaris from Rajasthan and 
there were some Bengalis Hindus, particularly from the Saha caste.  Like the 
European balers, mahajans also went “further afield” as the volume of trade increased 
and competition intensified.  Marwari traders were usually the first to begin 
operations in towns just opened by railway lines or steamer connections and they 
dominated the jute trade in towns along the Northern Bengal State Railway, in 
Rangpur, Domar, and Haldibari.                                                           
24 From Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce to Commissioner, Dacca Division, 6th July, 1916, in GoB, 
Agri Dept, September 1916, Proc A, Agri, Agri, List 14, Bundle 30, NAB 
25 “The Jute Trade in Bengal,” Capital, 6th May 1915, reprinted in GoB, Agri Dept, Sept. 1916, NAB 
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Another aspect of the growth of mofussil market-towns during the late 
nineteenth century was the establishment of kutcha baling presses – hand-powered 
screws that would pack jute into bales of about five maunds or 200 kilograms.  In the 
1870s, Calcutta received almost solely “hanked” or “drummed” jute – “stricks of 
fibre” that had been “rolled into the shape of a drum and tied with three strings.”26  
By the early 1900, almost all of Calcutta’s imports of jute from eastern Bengal arrived 
kutcha baled.  Narayanganj had the largest number of kutcha presses in the delta and 
there were also pressing facilities in smaller jute marts throughout the hinterland.  
Further, Marwari merchants (and a few Bengali traders) moved into the kutcha baling 
trade during the late nineteenth century.  In the early years of the jute trade, baling 
was a preserve of European capital; by 1900, the majority of jute-baling firms were 
Marwari concerns.27  Between 1870 and 1900, kutcha baling had transformed from a 
primarily metropolitan and European to a mostly mofussil and mostly Indian 
business.   
Mofussil or upcountry market towns provided the settings for encounters 
between farias and beparis – village-level petty traders – and mahajans or balers’ agents.  
The mahajan operated either on his own account or on the account of a jute baling 
firm and either owned warehouses, or rented one from an aratdar – literally 
warehouse owner.  Balers’ agents, on the other hand, were salaried employees of 
Calcutta or Narayaganj-based baling firms.  These mostly Bengali men were 
appointed in either the Calcutta headquarters or Narayanganj offices of jute baling 
                                                        
26 Burnett, George, The Jute-Growing Districts and Markets of India with Notes of a Tour, 1872-73, (Reprinted 
from the Dundee Advertiser), Dundee, 1873, p. 10 
27 Timberg, The Marwaris: From Traders to Industrialists, Delhi: 1978, p. 57 
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firms for a monthly wage to conduct the firms’ purchases in a mofussil market.28  A 
1915 article in the Capital, the mouthpiece of Calcutta jute interests, complained that 
“purchasing Babus” augmented their incomes by cheating their white bosses. The 
“theft,” the Capital claimed, amounted to more 4,000 rupees per purchasing agent.29  
The balers’ agent, as the Registrar of Cooperative Societies argued in 1927, was in 
fact another intermediary trader between farm and factory instead of simply the 
balers’ representative “as his salary is not fixed on the principle that it represents the 
whole of his remuneration.”30 
Farias and beparis were village-level jute traders, often peasant households with 
larger landholdings who had invested accumulated capital from cultivation into 
trading jute.  The district officer in Jalpaiguri, in northern Bengal, described “the 
paikars … [as] generally well-to-do Muhammadans of this district.”31  According to 
the Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce “beparis were generally the large boat owners 
of their villages.”32  Farias and beparis were familiar and local individuals: J.M. Mitra, 
Registrar of the Co-operative Societies of Bengal, described farias and beparis as 
“familiar figures in the village.  The faria is usually a resident of the village and is well 
known to the cultivators.”33   
                                                        
28 In 1915, they were paid 25 to 30 rupees per month, according to an article in the Capital. “The Jute 
Trade in Bengal,” Capital, 6th May 1915, reprinted in GoB, Agri Dept, Sept. 1916, NAB.   
29 “The Jute Trade in Bengal,” Capital, 6th May 1915, reprinted in GoB, Agri Dept, Sept. 1916, NAB.   
30 “A Note by Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bengal, on Marketing of Agriculture Produce” in 
Agriculture and Industries, Agriculture, March 1927, List #14, Bundle #24, NAB 
31 Collector of Jalpaiguri to Divisional Commissioner, Rajshahi, 20th June 1916, in Agriculture Dept, 
Agriculture Branch, Proc A, List 14, Bundle 30, NAB. 
32 Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce to Commissioner, Dacca, 6th July1916, ibid. 
33 J.M. Mitra, Registrar, Co-op Societies, Bengal, to Rev. Dept, GoB, 19th July 1916, ibid. 
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At the start of the jute season, in July and August, farias and beparis rowed their 
country boats between peasant homesteads and rural hats buying up jute to fill the 
hold of their boats.  Once their boat was filled to capacity, the bepari would row it to 
the nearest riverine market town and usually sell their entire cargo to a particular 
mahajan.  Beparis operated either on their own accounts, or on advances from a more 
substantial merchant in nearby market towns.  Mahajan’s advanced money to beparis 
on the “condition … that the latter must bring to the mahajans all the jute they can get 
from the raiyat.  The money is not realized from season to season, but is allowed to 
be in the hands of the beparis, one bepari sometimes having an advance of Rs. 5,000 or 
Rs. 10,000, and occasionally no less than Rs. 20,000.”34  In other words, advance 
contracts were meant to secure the mahajan’s supplies of fibre, not squeeze profits 
out of beparis by specifying sales prices or by extracting interest payments.   
The transaction often took place in “floating bazaars,” where the mahajans’ 
and agents’ boats maneuvered through a throng of beparis’ jute-laden boats.  
Negotiations were conducted through dalals or brokers representing the faria.  The 
buyer would be given a sample of the fibre and prices would then be negotiated.  In 
many hinterland bazaars, dalals and the mahajans would bargain in silence and in secret, 
drawing the Bengali character for numbers as prices on each other’s palms, which 
were hidden under cloth.  If an agreement was reached, the dalal would hand the 
mahajan a sample, and the mahajan’s assistant would record the agreement and the 
faria’s particulars.  The faria would return to the mahajan’s or aratdar’s warehouse with 
his entire boat-load of jute, where quality would be usually disputed and prices 
                                                        
34 Chaudhuri, Jute in Bengal, p. 77 
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renegotiated.  Jute would be weighed out – though the purchasers’ maund was often 
more than the standard 40 kg.  Further, a variety of deductions in weight and/or 
price would be charged to the bepari.  The mahajan’s workers would then make up 
drums of jute – by doubling up and rolling together a maund of jute stricks and trying 
the whole together with rope.  Jute would be transported to Calcutta and mofussil 
baling presses in these one-maund drums. 
 Colonial capitalists viewed these hinterland transactions with intermingled 
fascination and anxiety.  The teeming masses of jute-laden beparis’ boats along river-
banks and the hustle of floating bazaars as buyers’ boats made their way through the 
crowd was the stuff of the colonial exotic – a traveller’s fantasy of India.  At the same 
time, the hinterland market was a murky space, where inscrutable natives operated in 
indecipherable and potentially dangerous ways.  What was taking place underneath 
the cloth?  What exactly was a maund?  What were the charges and deductions made 
in transactions?  While drawn by the exotic, the travellers’ gaze could not penetrate 
through the activity and felt that important things were being concealed from their 
sight.  Managers of British jute baling and manufacturing firms were particularly 
fascinated by the system of hand signals in negotiating prices.  The silent negotiations 
and the hidden hands captured British anxieties about impenetrable and 
indecipherable mofussil markets. Below, I cite two instances of colonial capital’s 
anxieties of hinterland transactions traders, the first from 1873 and the second from 
1915.   
In the winter of 1872-73, George Burnett, a Dundee “jute expert” who had 
recently arrived in Calcutta to assist in establishing the Champdany jute mills, 
undertook a tour of the jute-growing districts.  The account of his tour was published 
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in the pages of the Dundee Advertiser and re-printed as a pamphlet titled The Jute-
Growing Districts and Markets of India.  Burnett’s descriptions of jute transactions in 
Sirajganj combined the travellers’ gaze – “the floating bazaar is an interesting and 
amusing scene” – with capitalist anxieties.  His account dwells at length on how hand 
signals keep the seller and onlookers ignorant of prices, on how variable weights and 
the array of charges and deductions inflate the prices paid by mills, and how the 
mahajan’s drums “serves only to conceal the defects” and “renders … the trade … 
liable to the deception arising from concealed defects.”35   
Since Burnett’s tour of Sirajganj, the volume of jute traded in hinterland 
markets increased tremendously, hinterland markets were diffused throughout the 
delta, and balers dispatched paid employees to conduct operations in remote 
purchasing stations.  This expansion had not allayed colonial capital’s anxieties.  In 
May 1915, an article titled “The Jute Trade in Bengal: Methods of Business” was 
published in Capital, the mouthpiece of Calcutta’s British jute interests.  The article 
focused on the “purchasing Babu,” who “at the most moderate estimate of robbery” 
was stealing 4,000 rupees from his European bosses.  In the Capital’s portrait, the 
“purchasing Babu” was knowledgeable about the hinterland markets’ arcane ways and 
could manipulate weights and qualities against the interests of their European bosses 
in Calcutta.  In the article’s account of the transaction the bepari had the upper hand 
in transactions with the purchasing babu.  As an imaginary balers’ agents tells the 
author of the article, “present day Beparis very shrewd; if weighman weigh excess, he 
catch scale and stop if, and if I do “teri beri” he come with big bamboo to smash my 
head!  He rough Mahomedan, I poor dal bhat Bengali Babu, what I do to him?”                                                          
35 Burnett, George, The Jute-Growing Districts and Markets of India with Notes of a Tour, 1872-73, (Reprinted 
from the Dundee Advertiser), Dundee, 1873, pp. 8-9 
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Unable to do “teri beri” with “rough” Muslim bepari, the “cunning native purchasers” 
cheated their European bosses – by short-weighting them and misreporting 
purchasing prices.  As the imaginary Babu informs the author: “Sahib in my hand, I 
no in Sahib hand! He not know Bengali man.  We can buy and sell Sahib, his father, 
grandfather, and his fourteen generations, and he not understand how!”36   
Jute manufacturers depended on peasant smallholders and indigenous 
capitalists in the deltaic markets to deliver their raw materials in sufficient quantities, 
of suitable qualities, and at remunerative prices.  Manufacturers’ anxieties about jute 
cultivation and trade in the hinterland increased as capital was poured into jute mills 
in Dundee, Calcutta, continental Europe, and the USA.  Would cultivators be able to 
meet the increased consumption of the mills?  Would the quality of fibre deteriorate, 
driving up production costs and decreasing the value of the manufactured product?  
Would cultivators and middlemen drive up prices of raw materials, cutting down on 
mills’ profitability or allowing jute-substitutes into the market?  Anxious about the 
impenetrable and indecipherable hinterland and the wiles of cunning indigenous 
intermediaries, colonial capitalists turned to the colonial state.  
 
THE STATE 
The massive rise in the jute trade during the late nineteenth century took place 
concurrently with the increased penetration of the colonial government and its 
institutions in the jute-producing hinterland.  In addition to the facilities of the jute 
                                                        
36 “The Jute Trade in Bengal,” Capital, 6th May 1915, reprinted in GoB, Agri Dept, Sept. 1916, NAB.   
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trade, mofussil towns housed branches of the colonial state – their built structures 
and their personnel.  The colonial administration manifested itself through hierarchy 
of administrative towns – the district headquarters, sub-divisional towns, and police 
stations.  While police stations, or thanas, merely accommodated a constabulary force 
of the colonial police, district and sub-divisional towns included full complements of 
the state’s law and order and revenue extraction institutions – courthouses, police 
stations, jails and the offices of land administration and revenue departments.  These 
towns also accommodated the colonial “man on the spot” – district 
magistrates/collectors and sub-divisional officers, autocratic figures who had wide-
ranging powers to govern portions of the hinterland.  Railway development and river-
steamer services also led to an expansion of the state into the hinterland.  River-port 
and railway towns housed railway administration, ticketing offices, and the railway 
and river police.  
Administrative and market mofussil towns did not, however, always overlap.  
The most important jute towns were not located in district headquarters, but in 
subdivisional headquarters – Narayanganj was a subdivisional town under Dacca, 
Sirajganj in Pabna, Chandpur in Tippera, and Madaripur in Faridpur.  Significantly, 
the colonial government created the new subdivision of Narayanganj in 1882, only 
after the town had already emerged as a significant centre of the jute trade.37  Some of 
the most important jute towns were not even sub-divisional headquarters – Akhaura’s 
sub-divisional headquarter was Brahmanbaria and Domar’s was Nilphamari.  
Akhaura and Domar housed only railway offices and railway police, rather than the 
usual compliment of colonial services that were located in Brahmanbaria and                                                         
37 Report on the State of Police in the Lower Provinces, 1882, Calcutta: 1883 p. 4 
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Nilphamari.38  The attempt to combine state institutions and trade facilities in 
Goalundo failed spectacularly, as the entire town was washed away in floods within 
five years of its establishment.  After the flood, sub-divisional and railway officers 
were moved inland to the town of Rajbari, and Goalundo became a “wandering 
terminus.”  In 1908, Rajbari had a Deputy-Magistrate Collector (who combined 
judicial and revenue collection responsibilities), two Munsiffs (the lowest level judicial 
officer in the colonial government) and a jail accommodating up to 58 prisoners – 
though the subdivision was still called Goalundo.39   
The growth in mofussil towns during the late nineteenth century was not only 
driven by the growing facilities and built-up capital of the jute trade, but also by the 
expansion and diffusion of state administration into the delta.  Perhaps the most 
visible manifestations of the colonial state penetration in the mofussil were 
courthouses and police stations.  In the previous chapter, I argued that the expansion 
of colonial judiciary into the delta during the late nineteenth century was driven by 
peasant households’ consumption of legal services, financed by revenues from jute 
sales.  These courts were also used by indigenous capitalists in hinterland markets, 
though European jute capitalists tended to stay away, preferring to fight legal battles 
over hinterland transactions in metropolitan courts in Calcutta, rather than the 
district courts in the mofussil.  When proposals to partition the administration of 
Bengal were floated in 1903, colonial jute capitalists supported the scheme with the 
                                                        
38 In 1907, Akhaura was made into a Union, the lowest unit of local government..  Akhaura Union was 
more of a village than small-town institution – its membership was drawn from surrounding villages and 
the Board had no permanent structures in the town.  Report on the Administration of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
1906-07, Shillong: 1908, p. 35 
39 W.W. Hunter, et. al., The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XII, Oxford: 1908, p. 279 
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caveat that Calcutta High Court would retain jurisdiction over the partitioned 
province.   
In addition to legal institutions, the state penetrated the hinterland through its 
police force.  The Indian Police Commission of 1860 created an administrative 
structure for a mofussil police force, with a District Superintendent in charge of the 
district; an Inspector over a several police stations, and the Head Daroga in charge of 
a police station.40  The colonial police force was augmented steadily over the 
remainder of the nineteenth century, with the establishment of new police stations 
and the creation of a railway and – more modest – river police.  The mofussil police 
force was thoroughly incapable of preventing or investigating crime.  As David 
Washbrook has argued about late nineteenth century India: “the essential 
development of an efficient and centrally-disciplined police force, to protect ‘legal’ 
rights, safeguard the emancipation of the individual from community constraint and 
impose the rule of law, was neglected.”41  Washbrook goes on to argue that the 
modernization of the police took place in the early twentieth century and was 
primarily directed at suppressing the anti-colonial nationalist movement rather than in 
preventing crime.   
The delta was a difficult place to police.  The Commissioner of Dacca division 
complained in 1882 that “resignations” were frequent as police work was “distasteful 
and hard” and policemen “see in the towns of Dacca and Naraingunge men of the 
laboring classes earning a good deal more than they do.”42  In 1884, constables in                                                         
40 Report of the Indian Police Commission, London: 1905, p. 11 
41 Washbrook, David, “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” MAS, 15(3), 1981, p. 677  
42 Report on the State of the Police in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, 1882, Calcutta: 1883, p. 6 
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Noakhali and Tipperah districts complained that “the beats are … unduly large, 
which is another way of saying that the municipalities are unsuited to police as being 
too rural.”  The Commissioner of Dacca reported in the same year that it was 
difficult to police the EBR terminus at Goalundo, “where the so-called town 
stretches over six square miles of country. … In the collections of scattered hamlets, 
of which Bengal municipalities generally consist, real watch and ward is impossible, 
and the police can do little more than report crime and keep order.”43  Piracy on the 
delta’s extensive waterways was similarly difficult to investigate.  E.C. Ryland, 
Assistant Inspector General of Police, Railways and River, described river dacoities: 
“these occurences take place on dark nights, on big rivers and people have no idea in 
what direction the dacoits have gone after the occurrence.”44  
Surprisingly, the inadequacies of the colonial government’s provisions of 
security in the delta did not disturb colonial jute capital.  During the jute season 
between July and October, millions of rupees in cash were disbursed throughout the 
hinterland’s market towns.  European jute capitalists had provided for their own 
security: they employed private armed guards to protect their property in mofussil 
towns.  Though instances of petty theft abounded, there were few instances of armed 
robberies of the mofussil facilities of jute traders.  Further, jute-capitalists steam-
powered craft were immune from river pirates, as they could outrun dacoits’ oar and 
                                                        
43 Report on the State of the Police in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, 1884, Calcutta: 1885, pp. 4-5 
44 Crime on Navigable Waterways”, Com & Ind, Com & Trade, 10/11, Part B, Nov., 1906, NAI 
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sail-powered boats.  The largest jute purchasing firms employed expensive 
motorboats to distribute cash amongst its hinterland purchasers.45   
Armed robberies on river-ways affected smaller traders relying on country 
craft – the farias and beparis – much more than it did larger capitalist concerns that 
organized their own security and provided their own motor-boats.  In meetings with 
business interests to discuss an expanded river police scheme in 1905 and 1906, the 
colonial government found European jute traders vaguely supportive but somewhat 
indifferent.46  Colonial capitalists felt that the government was “over-reaching,” and 
urged a less ambitious and expensive scheme.  Responding to the seeming apathy of 
Calcutta jute capitalists, E.C. Ryland found it necessary to impress upon his audience 
that “there is a great deal of crime [on waterways]… which does not come to the 
knowledge of people in Calcutta, and in which you are perhaps not, therefore, much 
interested, but it seriously affects the poorer classes … They suffer to a great extent.  
To us perhaps they would be small sums, to them they are fortunes.”47   
Colonial capitalists did not lobby the government for provisions of law and 
order in the mofussil, for the judicial and police services to enforce contracts and 
protect private property, however defined.  Instead, they asked the government to 
intervene in peasant production and hinterland trade.  The lasting legacy of colonial                                                         
45 Messrs. David and Company used a motor-boat costing over 100,000 rupees to distribute cash amongst 
its out-agencies. P.C. Bramley, District Superintendent of Police (Benares), 1st September, 1905, “Crime on 
Navigable Waterways”, Com & Ind, Com & Trade, 10/11, Part B, Nov., 1906, NAI 
46 In 1911, the post-partition government of Eastern Bengal and Assam created a special river police force 
to patrol the major water-ways of Bengal – the highways of the Jamuna, Padma and Meghna and also 
smaller rivers like the Gorai, Dhaleswari, Surma, Buriganga, Titas and Gumti that served as the delta’s 
trade routes. Constitution of a “general police district” to be controlled by the Eastern Bengal and Assam river police, 
Home, Police-A, 181-182, March, 1912, NAI.  The river-police was, however, unsatisfactory and river 
dacoities continued unabated - in between 1912 and 1920, only about 22 cases of river dacoities were on 
average annually reported to the river police.  BLC, Vol. III, 1921, p. 223 
47 E.C. Ryland, October 15, 1906, “Crime on Navigable Waterways”, Com & Ind, Com & Trade, 10/11, 
Part B, Nov., 1906, NAI 
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jute capital with regard to state formation in the hinterland was neither the delta’s 
legal system (a product of peasant consumption of legal services) nor its police force 
(oriented towards suppressing anti-colonial nationalist movements).  Instead, it was in 
the government agencies that forecast the probable outturn of jute and worked to 
“improve” peasant production in order to increase output and alleviate quality.  The 
state’s developmental role vis-à-vis peasant production in the Bengal hinterland was, I 
will argue, an outcome of colonial jute capital lobbying the colonial government to 
improve quality and increase production of the fibre.   
  
*   *   * 
 
Upon his return to Calcutta from the mofussil in the winter of 1873, George Burnett 
wrote a memorandum to George Campbell, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.  
Burnett’s memorandum consisted of a program for “foster[ing] … the jute 
industry.”48  His primary concern was with peasant production, which he 
characterized as careless and lazy.  In Burnett’s narrative of jute, Bengal’s cultivators 
had done nothing to “improve” the plant since finding it growing wild in the delta.  
Jute cultivators were unintelligent and unthinking and produced poor quality and 
low-yielding jute plants.  Burnett recommended that the colonial government set up 
“model” farms to devise and disseminate best production methods amongst 
cultivators.   Burnett was also scathingly critical of the multitude of charges and the 
irregularity of weights used in hinterland transactions.  Arguing that such practices ate                                                         
48 Burnett, George, The Jute-Growing Districts and Markets of India with Notes of a Tour, 1872-73, (Reprinted 
from the Dundee Advertiser), Dundee, 1873, p. 16 
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into manufacturers’ profits and denied cultivators a fair price for their produce, 
Burnett urged the state to “endeavor to eliminate middlemen.” Third, Burnett was 
concerned about price instability.  At the opening of the 1871 jute season in July, 
prices had risen sharply before falling again in November causing, according to 
Burnett, significant losses to jute manufacturing.  Burnett suggested that the 
government publish forecasts of jute acreage and yield in order to reduce price 
instabilities arising from uncertainties about the size of the forthcoming crop.  The 
“energetic and intelligent” collector in Dacca had assured Burnett that the 
government would be able to provide a reasonably accurate forecast.49   
Colonial jute capitalists lobbied the government to intervene into jute 
cultivation and trade in the hinterland throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Capitalists urged the government to improve the plant and its 
cultivation, provide crop forecasts, extend jute acreage, regulate hinterland markets, 
and to fix quality grades.  In 1874, jute spinners in Dunkirk urged the Government of 
India for “attention [to] … three special points, viz., the establishment of a 
Government scale of marks or brands, the frequent change of seed and greater care 
in the preparation of jute for the market.”50  In October 1885, the Dundee Chamber 
of Commerce lobbied the Government of Bengal to furnish “statistics of the 
probable outturn of the jute crop … between the seasons of sowing and reaping.”51  
The Calcutta Baled Jute Association (an association of raw jute exporters) the 
Dundee Jute Importers’ Association petitioned the government to “improve” peasant                                                         
49 ibid. pp. 16-17. 
50 From the India Office in London to the Governor General of India in Council, 26/11/1874, Report 
drawn up by the Vice-Counsel at Dunkirk on the Jute Trade of that place, Revenue and Agriculture, Fibres and Silk, 
January, 1875, Nos. 1/3 
51 “Crop Reports: Notes and Orders, 20th January, 1894, Agricultural Bundle, April 1894, NAB 
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cultivation so as to ensure better quality fibre.52  Between 1906 and 1914, as global 
jute manufacturing capacity rose sharply, a variety of international jute interests 
lobbied the colonial government to oversee the extension of jute cultivation so as to 
avoid shortfalls in supplies to the growing numbers of mills across the world.53  In 
their lobbying to improve quality and quantity of peasant production, jute capitalists 
characterized jute cultivators as Burnett had done – as lazy, careless, and 
unresponsive to markets.   
The government was generally responsive to capitalists’ demands to intervene 
in peasant production.  Burnett’s 1873 memorandum was received sympathetically by 
Campbell, the Lieutenant-Governor.  Burnett’s programme of “fostering the jute 
trade” fit in with Campbell’s theory of “positive government,” characterized by Peter 
Robb as a form of liberal developmentalism.54  Upon receiving Burnett’s 
memorandum, Campbell issued an “Official Note” on jute, expressing his desire for 
information about “Bengal’s greatest commercial staple … where and how it is 
grown; from what plants; what are the qualities and varieties; how it is prepared for 
the market; how brought to market; and through what hands it passes, &c., &c.”  
More complete information about jute cultivation and trade in the hinterland would, 
Cambell argued, underpin a programme of positive government in the hinterland, as 
the state took on measures to “improve” cultivation and trade in the hinterland.                                                          
52 Report on the extension of Jute Cultivation in India by Mr. R.S. Finlow, Jute specialist to the 
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Revenue and Agriculture, Agriculture, January 1907, Proc. A, 
Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 22. 
53 The Dundee Chamber of Commerce, the European Jute Association, the American Trade Consul in 
India, and the Indian Jute Mills Association, in addition to individual businessmen, particularly Marcus 
Koch in Calcutta, wrote a series of letters to the Government urging special measures to increase the 
cultivation of jute.   
54 Robb, Peter, “Law and Agrarian Society in India: The Case of Bihar and the Nineteenth Century 
Tenancy Debate,” MAS, 22(2), 1988, pp. 319-354 
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“The Americans are actively prosecuting the experimental growth of Jute,” Campbell 
said, “while we are, as a Government, doing nothing to extend it.”  He wanted to 
know “whether the quality of the fibre can be improved by careful preparation, and 
what are the best processes for its preparation.” He also stated that “the necessities of 
the Jute trade must have a very great influence on all our plans for roads, railways, 
and canals.”55  
Campbell also acted promptly on Burnett’s recommendation to establish 
experimental jute farms in the interior of the jute tracts.  Just four days after receiving 
Burnett’s memorandum, Campbell’s office sent a letter to the Commissioner of 
Dacca Division informing him of “the desires of His Honor ... to see a farm 
established in this division for the experimental cultivation of jute and preparation of 
the fibre for market.”56  By the 4th of February, D.R. Lyall, the Collector of Dacca 
described by George Burnett as “energetic and intelligent,” had selected a plot of 
eighty bighas near the Dacca cantonment and had estimated a budget for establishing 
an experimental jute farm there.57   The project was approved in less than a week and 
1000 rupees were sanctioned for initial expenses and 3,336 rupees for working 
expenses.58  
By the early twentieth century, the state was actively implementing two of 
Burnett’s three recommendations – publishing crop forecasts and improving the                                                         
55 Campbell’s note, January 23, 1872, Agriculture Department, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 
14, Bundle 4, NAB 
56 A. Abercrombie, Commissioner of Dacca, to General Department, GoB, 8th February, 1873, Agriculture 
Department, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
57 D.R. Lyall, Collector of Dacca, to Commissioner of Dacca, 4th February, 1873, Agriculture Department, 
GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
58 H.J.S. Cotton, Asst. Secy to GoB, to Commissioner of Dacca, 13th February, 1873, Agriculture 
Department, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 4, NAB 
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quality and yield of the jute plant.  In 1885, the government of Bengal created an 
Agricultural Department with the primary purpose of “collect[ing] and embody[ing] 
in convenient forms of the statistics of vital, agricultural and economic facts” and 
bring about “the general improvement of Indian agriculture with a view to increasing 
the food-supply and general resources of the people.”59  These functions had been 
recommended by the Famine Commissioners’ report of 1880, which had focused on 
forecasting food shortages and increasing food supply. The Agricultural Department 
of Bengal was a product of devastating famines in southern and western India during 
the late 1870s, and particularly of the colonial government’s face-saving measures in 
response to the moral crisis created by famine.60   
Given the origins of the Agricultural Department as a famine-prevention 
institution, it is ironic that the department focused its energies on commercial fibre 
rather than subsistence grain.  They did so, however, at the behest of colonial capital.  
In October 1885, the Dundee Chamber of Commerce requested the government of 
Bengal to publish forecasts of the probable jute crop sometime between its sowing 
and reaping.  The Government of Bengal responded promptly and positively, stating 
that they would pilot a scheme for the “collection and publication of information 
regarding the area sown with jute and the prospects of the crop as it approaches 
maturity.”61  The provincial governments’ decision met with approval from the                                                         
59 GoB to GoI, proposing the establishment of an Agricultural Dept in Bengal, 1st June, 1883; in 
Agricultural Deparmtent, May 1885, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 9, NAB 
60 The Famine Commission and the much celebrated Famine Code was the colonial government’s 
response to the devastating famines of the late 1870s and early 1880s in southern and western India.  
These famines had led to the dominant theme of Indian nationalist thought in the late nineteenth century – 
the poverty debate.  In the nationalist framing of the debate, the very legitimacy of empire rested on the 
question: had British rule impoverished India?   
61 GoB to GoI, proposing the establishment of an Agricultural Dept in Bengal, 1st June, 1883; in 
Agricultural Deparmtent, May 1885, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 8, NAB 
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central government “The Governor-General in Council concurs with His Honor the 
Lieutenant Governor … that attempts to prepare crop estimates should in the first 
instance be confined to jute.”62  In 1887, the provincial government proudly noted its 
service to Scottish jute manufacturing: “Mr. Finucane [the Director of Agriculture] 
was able, in response to a call from the Secretary of State, to make to the satisfaction 
of the Dundee Chamber of Commerce, a forecast of the outturn of this year’s 
crop.”63   
The department produced its first rice forecast in 1891, but even after that, 
considerably greater departmental resources would be devoted to forecasting the 
outturn of fibre rather than grain.  As department officials admitted in 1894, “these 
forecasts are not particularly intended to indicate the approach of famine” and “were 
intended to supply information to the commercial public.”64  The department’s jute 
forecast had become an international event, reported in the commercial pages of 
newspapers and magazines in London, Dundee, New York, Hamburg, Paris and so 
forth.  The publication of the forecast would have an immediate effect on jute prices.  
The forecast was based on nothing more scientific than colonial district and sub-
divisional officers’ “guesses” as to probable acreage and output of jute.  As the 
forecast came to play an increasingly important role in markets, its lack of accuracy 
came in for sharper criticisms.   
                                                        
62 C.S. Bayley, Under-Secy, GoI, to Secy, GoB, 9th June, 1886, GoB, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 
14, Bundle 9, NAB 
63 From P. Nolan, Offg. Secy to GoB, to Rev and Agri Dept, GoI, 1st December 1886, GoB, Proc A, Agri 
Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 9, NAB 
64 “Notes and Orders,” T.W.R., Feb 14, 1894, GoB, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 14, NAB 
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In October 1903, the Dundee Jute Importers’ Association and in December, 
1903 the Syndicate of the Jute Industry, Paris wrote to the colonial state complaining 
about the unreliability of forecasts and discrepancies between initial and final 
forecasts.65  Dundee complained, “the forecasts … instead of being reliable guides, 
have proved misleading and have caused considerable loss to those interested.”66  In 
response, the department introduced a new scheme for estimating the probable 
outturn of jute in 1913, where information was provided by village panchayats, 
proclaiming it a “great improvement over the old system of guess work.”67  However, 
the Panchayat’s figures were never crosschecked and the system proved equally faulty.  
During the 1910s and 1920s, a variety of schemes for forecasting were tried out, 
usually in consultation with Calcutta and international jute capitalists.   None of these 
schemes would prove satisfactory, and traders ultimately came to disregard 
government forecasts and rely on their own estimates instead. 
The department’s attempts to bring about “the general improvement of 
Indian agriculture with a view to increasing the food-supply” also – even more 
remarkably – focused on fibre rather than grain.  The department had decided early 
to leave “even … the introduction of the most promising improvements” to a later 
date when “a very much more intimate and thorough acquaintance with the 
agricultural facts and circumstances… [had] been obtained.”68  In 1902, they finally 
                                                        
65 Forecasts issued by the Government of Bengal of the jute crop of 1903, Revenue and Agriculture, 
Agriculture, 10-13, Part A, 1904, NAI 
66 Dundee Chamber of Commerce to Dept of Rev & Agri, GoI, October 19th, 1903, ibid. 
67 Proceedings of a meeting held on the 28th November to discuss various questions affecting the jute trade, 
Agriculture Dept, GoB, March, 1914, Proc. A, Agri Dept, List 14, Bundle 27, NAB 
68 From E.C. Buck, Secy to GoI, to Secy, Rev & Agri Dept, GoB, 15th July, 1885, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri 
Branch, List 14, Bundle 9, NAB 
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commenced on a programme of scientific agriculture based out of agricultural 
research stations throughout the jute hinterland.  This programme focused on jute, 
and the department conducted investigations into different varieties of jute in Bengal, 
collecting sample seeds.   In 1905, R.S. Finlow was appointed as the Agricultural 
Department’s first jute expert.69  R.S. Finlow served as Fibre Expert for more than a 
decade, before becoming Director of Agriculture, in which position he served into 
the 1930s.  Under Finlow’s leadership, the department attempted to improve jute 
yields and to extend jute cultivation into new parts of British India – primarily 
through producing better quality seeds and distributing them amongst farmers.   
These activities were carried out at the behest of colonial capitalists and their 
concerns during the early 1900s, as global jute manufacturing capacity rose, that 
demand would outstrip the supply of fibre.  These concerns were global.  In 1905, 
the American consul in Bombay wrote, “The jute producing districts at present are 
restricted in the provinces of Bengal and eastern Bengal, and it is said that these will 
soon have reached the limit of their productive power, and that they will be utterly 
unable to keep pace with the enormous increase demanded.”70 In June 1914, the 
Indian Jute Mills Association sounded the warnings of a commodity famine: 
“Extensive additions to the consuming power, both in India and elsewhere, will come 
into play during the next few months, and unless material increases take place next 
                                                        
69 Creation of the post of a specialist in jute and indigo for the Bengal Agricultural Department and the 
appointment to it of Mr. R.S. Finlow, Revenue and Agriculture, Agriculture, 1-5, Part A, August, 1905, 
NAI 
70 Department of Commerce and Labour, USA, Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, May 1907, p. 209 
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year in both acreage and yield, it will be impossible for consumers to secure their 
requirements of the raw material.”71   
Robert Finlow admitted the validity of capitalists’ concerns that demand was 
outstripping supply in a 1906 note: “although it would appear that the area under jute 
cultivation and the weight of fibre produced are expanding considerably year by year, 
yet it also seems equally certain that the demand for the fibre is outstripping the 
supply.”72  The solution, Finlow and his department decided, was to extending jute 
cultivation to other parts of British India where jute was not grown.  This was a 
priority task for the Department of Agriculture.  The Inspector General of 
Agriculture stated in September 1906: “the most important work of the year has been 
the investigation of the possibilities of the extension of jute cultivation into other parts of 
India.”73  R.S. Finlow also advocated seed development and improved agricultural 
practices – particularly fertilization with manure – to increase yields.74  
Under Finlow’s leadership, the Agricultural Department commenced on an 
intensive examination of jute varieties from across Bengal, and even developed their 
own seeds that they claimed provided better yields.  The department established 
“seed multiplication farms” and distributed these seeds amongst cultivators.  Between 
1918 and 1926, the government sold between 1,000 and 2,000 maunds of seed 
                                                        
71 H.M. Haywood, Secretary, IJMA, to Secy, Rev. Dept., GoB, 25th September, 1913, Proc. A, Agri Dept, 
Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 27, NAB 
72 Report on the extension of Jute Cultivation in India by Mr. R.S. Finlow, Jute specialist to the 
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Revenue and Agriculture, Agriculture, January 1907, 14-16, 
Part A, NAI 
73 ibid. 
74 “Suggestions made by Robert S. Finlow, Fibre Expert, for increasing the output of Jute from India,” 20th 
January, 1914, Agriculture Department, June 1914, Proc A, Agri Dept, Agri Branch, List 14, Bundle 28, 
NAB 
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annually to jute cultivators.  Given the annual seed requirements of jute cultivators, 
this was a miniscule quantity.  But seed multiplication and distribution was useful in 
extending jute cultivation to other parts of British India.  In 1926, the Agricultural 
Department received funding from the London Jute Association – Rs. 20,000 
annually for five years – to distribute seeds in parts of Bengal, Bihar and Assam 
where jute was not grown.  M. Azizul Huque, the representative of Nadia, a non-jute 
growing province in western Bengal where the department’s seed distribution 
program was particularly intensive, complained in March 1930: “the Fibre Expert is 
entirely devoting himself to jute experimentation.  They are always trying to produce 
jute where cultivators cannot possibly take to jute owing to the conditions of the 
soil.”75  
 In carrying out these programmes of jute forecasting, agricultural research, 
seed production and distribution, the agricultural department considerably increased 
its presence in the delta and its mofussil towns.  The extension of the agricultural 
department into the agrarian hinterland is an important phenomenon in the history 
of state formation in the delta.  The agricultural departments presence in the 
countryside increased sharply during the twentieth century.  In the 1920s, the 
department came to employ a full-time staff charged with estimating forecasts for 
output.  From 1942 onwards, jute cultivators were individually licensed to grow fixed 
quantities of fibre through the department’s agencies in the mofussil.  Much later, in 
the 1960s, the department was charged with diffusing green revolution technologies 
of rice production amongst cultivators.  During the twentieth century, the                                                         
75 The details of jute sales and the government’s agreement with the London Jute Association are from a 
speech in the Legislative Council by Azizul Huque in March 1930.  Huque accuses the department of 
acting in the interests of foreign capital to increase jute output and lower its price.  BLC, Vol. XXXIV, No. 
3, pp. 558-559 
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Agricultural Department was a focal point in state interactions with the peasantry in 
the jute hinterland.   
 
POLITICS 
The tremendous growth in jute cultivation and trade during the late nineteenth 
century led to a particular configuration of the spaces of metropolitan Calcutta, the 
agrarian hinterland and mofussil towns.  The circulations of ever-increasing volumes 
of jute between the delta’s farms and Calcutta’s factories and seaport had carved out 
this spatial configuration.  These relationships were also constituted by the spatial 
practices of colonial administration, as branches of the colonial state were established 
in district and sub-divisional towns.  In 1905, during a period of high prices and rapid 
increases in jute cultivation and trade, the government partitioned the province of 
Bengal – separating the administration of the hinterland from that of the metropolis. 
 Curzon’s spatial rearrangement of the Bengal administration was informed by 
the configurations of hinterland and metropolis that had been wrought by the 
circulations of jute.  The plan was not merely a cynical ploy to divide and rule South 
Asia’s Hindus and Muslims, as has been alleged by Indian nationalist historiography.  
It was also a well thought out territorial plan.  The new province of Eastern Bengal 
and Assam was comprised of the jute tracts of the delta and the tea plantations of the 
hills, and was provided with a more proximate provincial capital in Dacca and a more 
“natural” outlet to the sea through Chittagong.76  Curzon’s plan was an attempt to 
                                                        
76 The idea that Chittagong was a natural outlet for the delta’s produce had been floated since the 1870s, 
and was premised on the north to south flow of the Brahmaputra and the Meghna, and the easier river 
route from Narayanganj to Chittagong.   
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solve the rising administrative burden on metropolitan Calcutta as the scale of state 
operations and functions in the deltaic hinterland expanded.  The government’s oft-
repeated explanation for partition was that Bengal was too large a province to be 
under a single administration.  Further, partition was a developmental plan for the 
under-developed hinterland – an attempt to increase and improve state 
administration, revenue collection, enforcement of law and order, extraction of 
resources, and transportation infrastructure in the relatively “backward” delta.  
Economically and administratively, the spatial re-arrangement of the administration 
of Bengal made sense to Curzon and his colleagues. 
 Opposition to the partition focused on preserving Calcutta’s position as the 
delta’s metropolis.  When the government announced its plans to partition Bengal in 
1903, a flurry of petitions poured in from eastern Bengal protesting the separation of 
hinterland from metropolis.  For the petitioners, partition implied the severance of 
ties with a well-developed metropolis that served as the seat of commerce, culture, 
and administration for eastern Bengal.  The “loss of Calcutta,” as many petitioners 
pointed out, would lead to economic dislocation and civilizational decline – the latter 
exacerbated by its attachment to Assam, seen as “uncivilized” and home to 
“savages.”77  Petitioners wrote at length about Calcutta’s civilizing effect on the 
backward hinterland, due to Calcutta’s Bengali literary scene, headquarters of 
government administration, education system, and opportunities for middle-class 
careers.  As a memorial from Noakhali argued, their district’s connections with 
Calcutta had enabled “the most backward district in Bengal  … to steadily work up to                                                         
77 The petitioners attitudes towards Assam are telling of Bengali cultural chauvinism.  As Rajanikanta Ray 
from Iswargunge wrote in a petition dated January 14, 1904, “being associated with the Assamese, who are 
savages .. we shall be subjected to endless miseries by their evil company.” Petition from the residents of certain 
districts of Eastern Bengal protesting against the proposed partition of Bengal, Home Public, 193/215 Part B, April, 
1904 
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the high ideal set up by other enlightened parts of Bengal.”  The petitioners feared 
that the transfer to Assam, “a backward province with a lower form of administration” 
would destroy Noakhali’s civilizational progress.78   
 These concerns about civilizational decline from the loss of Calcutta were 
accompanied by fears of economic dislocation from the loss of Calcutta as seat of 
commerce.  In the eyes of the petitioners, the hinterland had prospered from its 
material connections with this great “Metropolis of India,” to use a phrase from a 
memorial from Fatehpur, Mymensingh.  Opponents of partition feared that the 
severance of commercial ties with Calcutta would impoverish Bengal.  Mahim 
Chandra Bhaumik from Mymensingh wrote:  “Calcutta is a great centre of commerce, 
where people of almost every country in the world are making large profits by the 
import and export of goods.  No other place in Bengal or Assam can be so 
convenient to a trader or offer so lucrative a market to him as Calcutta.  On its 
transfer to Assam, East Bengal will lose its commercial prosperity.”79  
 Eastern Bengal’s traders and zamindars were among the most vocal and active 
opponents of partition.  Many of them had invested considerable sums of money in 
Calcutta, particularly in Hatkhola bazaar, the largest wholesale jute market in the 
metropolis.  In a December 1905 report, the government noted: “the most ardent 
workers in spreading the agitation [against partition] from Calcutta were the brothers 
of the Roy family of Bhagyakul, who in addition to being land-owners in Dacca have 
                                                        
78 Petitioners from Noakhali, n.d., ibid. 
79 Mahim Chadra Bhaumik, Gayhata, Mymensingh January 17, 1904, ibid. 
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large trade interests, particularly in jute.”80  The Bhagyakul Roys operated a steamer 
service between eastern Bengal and Calcutta and had considerable investments in 
Hatkhola bazaar.  Sita Nath Roy was president of the Congress-affiliated Bengal 
National Chamber of Commerce and wrote and spoke at length against the partition 
proposal.  The petitions received by the colonial government from eastern Bengal 
pleaded the case for Dhaka and Mymensingh traders and their investments in 
Calcutta.  The following petition from Sahadevpur in Tangail was emblematic of an 
oft-repeated concern: 
In Calcutta, a very large number of merchants from Dacca and Mymensingh 
carry on trade in which they have made large investments.  They have built 
houses in Calcutta by spending lakhs of rupees.  If they are compelled to 
remove all these from Calcutta to Chittagong, they will have to undergo very 
heavy loss.  …  All the jute is sent to Calcutta.  But if they are to send the jute 
to Chittagong, their expenses will be much greater and their profits will be 
greatly reduced.81 
 
While eastern Bengal’s hinterland jute traders, led by the Roy family of 
Bhagyakul, wholeheartedly opposed Curzon’s spatial rearrangement of the province, 
European jute capital lent his partition plans conditional support.  The Indian Jute 
Mills Association did not think that partition would affect their mills’ supplies of raw 
material: “the bulk of the crop will be attracted to Calcutta, regardless of any re-
arrangement, or re-distribution, of the provinces in which it is grown.”82   The Bengal                                                         
80 “Report on the Agitation against the Partition of Bengal”, 17th December, 1903, in State of Affairs in 
Eastern Bengal and Assam and Bengal in connection with the partition and the swadeshi movement, Home, Public-A, 
Nos. 169-186, June 1906, NAI 
81 Petition from the residents of certain districts of Eastern Bengal protesting against the proposed 
partition of Bengal, Home Public, 193/215 Part B, April, 1904, NAI 
82 From the IJMA to the BCC, January 29th, 1904, Representation from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
and the European and Ango-Indian Defence Association regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court, 
Calcutta over the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Home, Public, nos.19-23, Part A, October 
1905, NAI 
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Chamber of Commerce noted that a simple administrative partition would not lead to 
a diversion of trade: “trade will always follow the cheaper route, regardless of the 
jurisdiction under which it is carried on.”83  The BCC offered the partition plan 
conditional support.  First, they said they would oppose state subsidies to divert trade 
away from Calcutta to Chittagong: “[the BCC] would strongly deprecate any attempt 
to force trade in the direction of Chittagong by the expenditure of State revenues in 
creating and maintaining what would be distinctly unfair competition between the 
Assam-Bengal Railway and the existing means of communication both by rail and 
river between the jute and tea districts and Calcutta.”84  Second, the BCC insisted that 
the Calcutta High Court should continue to maintain juridical authority over the 
newly created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam.  They refused to fight their 
legal battles in the hinterland.  The second of these objections was more serious.  
“The Bengal Chamber of Commerce,” the government concluded, “saw no objection 
from a commercial point of view to the transfer … but strongly objected to the 
proposals generally without a guarantee that the jurisdiction of the High Court over 
the transferred districts would not be interfered with in the slightest degree.”85  
Curzon readily provided the Chamber its guarantee.   
Curzon’s 1905 partition of Bengal and the opposition to it was informed by 
spatial ideas about the relationship between the eastern Bengal hinterland and 
                                                        
83 From the BCC to the Judicial Dept, GoB, March 19th, 1904, in Representation from the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce and the European and Ango-Indian Defence Association regarding the jurisdiction 
of the High Court, Calcutta over the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Home, Public, nos.19-23, 
Part A, October 1905, NAI 
84 From the BCC to the Judicial Dept, GoB, March 19th, 1904, ibid. 
85 “Report on the Agitation against the Partition of Bengal,” February 8, 1906, in State of Affairs in Eastern 
Bengal and Assam and Bengal in connection with the partition and the swadeshi movement, Home, Public-A, Nos. 169-
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metropolitan Calcutta.  While the colonial government talked up plans of developing 
Dhaka and Chittagong and providing better government services in the hinterland, 
opponents of partition in eastern Bengal spoke of the “loss of Calcutta.”  The 
hinterland’s connections with metropolitan Calcutta, anti-partition petitioners argued, 
had provided commercial prosperity and civilization to the backward delta, and 
severing that connection would bring about impoverishment and cultural 
“degeneration.”   Supporters and detractors of Curzon’s partition did not distinguish 
mofussil towns from the rest of the hinterland; eastern Bengal’s small-towns and 
villages were not differentiated in arguments about the positive or negative effects of 
partition.  The only exceptions were Dhaka, which was to be catapulted from district 
town to provincial capital, and Chittagong, which was to be developed as a seaport.  
The importance of the mofussil in the partition of 1905 was not as a conceptual spatial 
category, but as the stage for the anti-partition Swadeshi movements, as the meeting 
place between metropolitan nationalists and eastern Bengal’s peasant masses.  
 
*   *   * 
 
The mofussil was a crucial element in the spatial practices of nationalist politics, 
particularly in attempts to mobilize peasant masses into the Swadeshi movement.  
The attempt to mobilize the countryside was conducted from the metropolis and 
took place through the mofussil.  The Swadeshi movement arrived in eastern Bengal 
in the persons of metropolitan politicians, who undertook whistle-stop tours of the 
jute tracts on railways and steamers, stopping to address public meetings in mofussil 
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towns along railtracks and waterways.   Between 1906 and 1909, Swadeshi leaders like 
Bipin Chandra Pal, Aurobindo Ghosh and Abdullah Rasul undertook extensive tours 
of eastern Bengal, stopping to speak in towns like Chandpur, Brahmanbaria, 
Narayanganj, Sirajganj and so forth.86  In 1906, before their eventual falling apart, Pal 
and Ghosh undertook a joint-tour of eastern Bengal.  During the course of the 
Swadeshi movement, over 500 meetings were organized in eastern Bengal’s mofussil 
towns protesting partition and promoting Swadeshi.  The colonial government kept 
close watch on these meetings, and were fearful of the oratory powers of nationalist 
leaders – particularly of Bipin Chandra Pal. Audiences attended these meetings not 
just to listen to oratory, but also to see or catch a glimpse – do darshan – of famous 
figures.  As Nolini Kanta Gupta, accompanied Aurobindo Ghosh on a tour of Assam 
and Eastern Bengal in 1909 and reported that “village folks … came in crowds just to 
hear him [Ghosh] speak and have his darshan.”87   As the Inspector General of Police 
noted in January 1905, “the strength of feeling in the Mufassil and the progress of the 
Swadeshi movement varied considerably … The determining influences were 
probably the attitude of the local zamindars and visits to the towns of certain leading 
agitators.”88   
Nationalists’ speaking tours were successful in mobilizing support amongst 
mostly-Hindu salaried professionals in mofussil towns, schoolmasters, pleaders and                                                         
86 During the non-cooperation/khilafat movement, Gandhi undertook much more extensive whistlestop 
tours on railways across the length and breadth of India, firmly establishing the space of the mofussil as a 
meeting point of metropolitan anti-colonial nationalism and peasant politics.  See Amin, Shahid, “Gandhi 
as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-22,” Subaltern Studies III, Delhi: 1984, pp. 1-61. 
87 Nolini Kanta Gupta, Smritir Pata, cited in Rishabchand, Sri Aurobindo: His Life Unique, Pondicherry: Sri 
Aurobindo Ashram, 1981, p.328. 
88 Statement of the Inspector General of Police, January 12, 1905, in State of Affairs in Eastern Bengal and 
Assam and Bengal in connection with the partition and the swadeshi movement, Home, Public-A, Nos. 169-186, June 
1906. Emphasis added. 
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mukhtears, doctors, zamindari amlas, clerks and so forth.  Mofussil towns housed a 
small but growing population of the professional salaried middle-classes and this 
group formed the core of Swadeshi support in the deltaic hinterland.  Many of them 
had recently arrived from Calcutta or other parts of Bengal.  In 1907, the 
Mymensingh Magistrate-Collector, L.C. Clarke reported that Swadeshi activists in 
Jamalpur consisted of “the less permanent Hindu residents of the town, I mean 
pleaders, doctors and zamindars’ servants who have only been here a few years or 
less.”  He further stated that the “more permanent residents … have no sympathy 
with the ‘Bande Mataram walas’ as they call them.”89  Mostly-Hindu mofussil 
townsmen were at the front line of the Swadeshi movement, occasionally sharing the 
platform with visiting nationalist politicians.90  While investigating picketing at the 
Nangalband fair, the Collector of Dacca, met with local Swadeshi leaders – a doctor 
and a pleader of Narayanganj and a pleader from Narshingdi.91   
 In the previous chapter, I described clashes in Nangalband mela in Jamalpur 
town and Mogra Hat in Brahmanbaria subdivision between mostly-Hindu Swadeshi 
activists and mostly-Muslim jute cultivators over the boycott of imported goods in 
the hinterland’s hats and fairs.  In this chapter, I will return to the events in Jamalpur 
town, following the clashes between mostly-Hindu Swadeshi activists and mostly-
Muslim stall-owners and consumers at the fair on 22nd April, 1907.  On the 21st and                                                         
89 Tour Diary of Mr. L.C. Clarke, Magistrate Collector of Mymensingh, April-May 1907, in Hindu-
Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, July 
1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI. 
90 Jugdish Chandra Roy, a pleader in Pabna, was credited by the IG of police with giving a “fillip” to the 
movement, by claiming in a public meeting that “English sugar was purified with the blood and bones of 
cows – and added to that, later, pigs.”  Statement of the Inspector General of Police, January 12, 1905, in 
State of Affairs in Eastern Bengal and Assam and Bengal in connection with the partition and the swadeshi movement, 
Home, Public-A, Nos. 169-186, June 1906 
91 Copy of Mr. B.C. Allen’s diary, dated 21st April, 1907, in Hindu-Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District 
in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, July 1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI. 
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22nd April, 1907, Swadeshi volunteers – consisting largely of students – attempted to 
prevent the sale of European goods at the fair.  On the afternoon of the 22nd, after 
students’ persuasion had failed, “some two hundred zamindari servants, pleaders, 
mukhtears, and volunteers, with lathis, with an elephant, marched around the and 
entered the Mela shouting Bande Mataram.”  They attacked stalls and destroyed 
“European toys and sweetmeats and scattered some Liverpool salt.”  The mostly-
Muslim visitors and shop-keepers at the fair attacked the volunteers, chasing them 
along the streets of Jamalpur, chasing them to the river, the railway station, and to the 
Durga temple, where an image for the Janmasthami festival was defaced. 
 This incident, as I argued in the previous chapter, was a manifestation of the 
politics of market-based consumption in the delta.  Subsequent events in Jamalpur 
town after the “hangama” of April 21st, was a clash between the mostly-Hindu town 
and the mostly-Muslim countryside.  Jamalpur was a sub-divisional headquarter and 
on the Mymensingh-Jamalpur-Jagannathganj railway line, connecting Mymensingh 
district to the Jagannathganj steamer station on the Brahmaputra.  By eastern 
Bengal’s standards, it was a fairly large town, with a population in 1901 of 17,965 
people. The town was, however dwarfed by the surrounding countryside: the 
population of Jamalpur thana was 282,000 and of the entire subdivision, 673,000.92  
 On the following evening, fearful of reprisals against fellow-Muslims and an 
attack on the towns mosque in retaliation of the defacement of the image at the 
Durgabari, Muslim cultivators from the surrounding countryside laid siege to the 
town, in a calculated show of strength.   “Muhammadans of the outskirts and of the 
other side of the river … assembled in considerable numbers on the opposite bank of                                                         
92 Census of India, 1901, Vol. 6, p. 71 
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the river and some crossed: others collected from the railway side.  They shouted for 
a long time, but finally were reassured and dispersed.”93  Tensions between mostly-
Hindu townsmen and mostly-Muslim villagers however continued to simmer.  On 
the night of the 27th April, at around 9:30 pm, a group of young Hindu men, 
including a mukhtear’s son and the son of the superintendent of a nearby zamindar’s 
cutcherry, shot at another group of men.  The reasons behind the shooting were 
unclear to M.A. Luffman, the police superintendent at Jamalpur, but Genda Sheikh, a 
Muslim, was hit in the thigh.  Luffman described what followed: “the news that a 
Muhammadan had been shot spread like wildfire and the Muhammadans from the 
surrounding country began to pour into the town in large numbers.”94   
 During the following days, Muslims from the surrounding villages wandered 
the streets of Jamalpur ostensibly providing support for their co-religionists in the 
town.  The Dhaka Commissioner, R. Nathan, wrote on May 2: “at first there were a 
good many Muhammadans from outside the town, and they tended to collect in 
groups.  I made the leaders tell them that they must go away, and during the past 
three days the streets have been quite normal.”  Nathan also reported that the town 
had been emptied of the mostly-Hindu middle-class Swadeshi activists – “the 
majority of the Hindus of the Pleader, zemindari amla and bhadra log classes have left 
the place.”95  As the events in Jamalpur demonstrated, the religious categories of 
                                                        
93 R. Nathan, Collector of Dacca, 24th April, 1907, in Hindu-Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District in 
Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, July 1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI. 
94 M.A. Luffman, Officiating Superintendent of Police, to District Magistrate, Mymensingh 2nd May, 1907 
in Hindu-Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, 
July 1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI.  
95 R. Nathan, Commissioner, Dacca Division, to LeMesurier, Chief Secy, GoEB, 2nd May, 1907, in Hindu-
Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, July 
1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI.  
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Hindu and Muslim, the class categories of bhadralok and peasant, and the spatial 
categories of town and countryside all overlapped and, further, came into conflict 
over the Swadeshi boycott program. 
 The Jamalpur incident was reported in sharply communal terms by the 
Calcutta nationalist press.  A Mymensingh journalist of the Hitabadi sent out a 
telegram to Calcutta describing events:  “Hindus menaced by 1000 Muhammadans, 
shops all closed and town absolutely deserted.  Anarchy and lawlessness prevail.  
Magistrate and District Superintendent of Police are there; but are doing nothing, and 
appear to be egging on the rioters.  Hindus leaving by every train.  200 respectable 
females left packed in cattle trucks, soiling their clothes and the platform, a pitiable 
spectacle.”96  Jamalpur was the epitome of the metropolitan nationalist’s failure to 
generate support in the mostly-Muslim countryside through mostly-Hindu mofussil 
political activists.   
 The Nangalband clashes were immediately preceded by the Bengal Provincial 
Conference in Mymensingh, Jamalpur’s district headquarters.  In sharp contrast to 
the portrayal of the events at Jamalpur, the nationalist press celebrated the 
Mymensingh Provincial Conference as an all-too rare moment of Hindu-Muslim and 
zamindar-ryot unity.  The presence of Muslim landlords and cultivators on a 
nationalist Congress stage was especially celebrated, particularly during those times of 
heightened religious conflict.  A.K. Ghaznavi, a prominent Muslim landlord from 
Tangail, chaired the meeting and three jute cultivators – Sheikh Nazer-udddin, Sheikh 
Azim and Sheikh Yokubali – addressed the meeting.  As the nationalist press proudly                                                         
96 “Mr. Garlick’s report, Mymensingh, April 29th,” in Hindu-Muhammadan Riots in Mymensingh District in 
Eastern Bengal and Assam, Proc-A, Home Dept, Political, July 1907, Nos. 6-16, NAI. 
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noted, the Hindus, Muslims, zamindars and ryots shared a common platform at the 
Mymensingh conference.   
 The platform did bring together the over-lapping categories of peasant and 
middle-class, Muslim and Hindu, and countryside and city.  Bhupendranath Basu, a 
Calcutta-based Congress politician, with no social or familial connections to 
Mymensingh district, presided over the meeting.  Radharaman Kar, a Calcutta jute 
baler and member of the Calcutta Baled Jute Association, moved a resolution 
opposing government legislation to prevent the watering of jute – it was feared such 
legislation would lead to the legal harassment of peasant producers and village-traders.  
Sheikh Nazer-udddin, Sheikh Azim and Sheikh Yokubali spoke in support of Kar’s 
motion.  The official report on the meeting does not reproduce their actual 
statements, but makes the following observation: “Their [the cultivator’s] rustic 
speeches made great impression upon the vast audience.  The simplicity with which 
they refuted the accusations of mixing water and sand surprised the whole audience.  
Their speeches were a magnificent success.  None ever expected such simplicity of 
eloquence.”97  This, then, was how metropolitan nationalists imagined peasant 
participation in the nationalist movement: the peaceful, reasonable and possibly even 
“eloquent” participation of “rural rustics,” in rehearsed and orchestrated mofussil 
events, presided over by metropolitan political and economic interests.  
During the Swadeshi movement, the mofussil provided the stage for 
metropolitan nationalists to mobilize peasant masses.  The mostly-Hindu mofussil 
middle-classes who constituted the frontline of the movement, as Aurobindo Ghosh 
wrote in 1910, “always waited for an intellectual initiative and sanction from the                                                         
97 ibid. p. 44 
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leaders in Calcutta.”  For Ghosh, this was because the “greater independence” and 
“higher organization of life, resources, activity in this great centre of humanity” made 
it a vibrant centre of higher intellectual thought.  “Calcutta is to Bengal what Paris is 
to France,” wrote Ghosh, “it is from Calcutta that Bengal takes its opinions, its 
inspirations, its leaders, its tone, its programme of action.”98   
 Calcutta’s intellectual and political dominance over mofussil towns was 
challenged after World War I, as the mofussil emerged as a significant centre of 
political thought and action.  The numbers of mofussil middle-classes increased and 
their religious composition altered, as educated Muslims, with close family and social 
ties to the surrounding countryside took up professional employment in the 
hinterland towns.  Far from being under the thrall of metropolitan culture, this 
mofussil middle-class developed a distinctive political culture, challenging the 
intellectual supremacy of Calcutta.  The emergence of a distinctive mofussil political 
culture during the 1920s took place against the backdrop of agrarian immiseration.  
Unlike the prosperous boom years of the 1900s, the post-WWI years was a period of 
impoverishment, as fluctuating commodity markets, rising debt burdens and 
fragmenting landholdings drove more and more peasant households into penury.  In 
the next chapter, I examine the emergence of a distinctively mofussil politics of jute 
during the 1920s and 1930s. 
                                                        
98 Karmayogin, No. 27, January 8, 1910.   
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Chapter 3 
 
The Poetry of Jute:  
Mofussil Muslim Politics of Agrarian Immiseration, 1919 to 1936 
 
 
The sharp reversal in terms of trade between jute and consumer goods during and 
after World War I began a rapid, lengthy, and thorough process of agrarian 
immiseration in the jute hinterland.  The prolonged commodity boom of 1906 to 
1913 was brought to a close by the outbreak of WWI, when jute prices collapses just 
as cultivators were bringing fibres into market.  Throughout the war years, markets 
were unfavourable to jute cultivators leading to hunger, increasing indebtedness and, 
in many cases, loss of arable lands.  The process of immiseration continued through 
the twenties, a period of volatile prices and rising indebtedness, and was completed in 
the 1930s, the depression decade marked by persistently low commodity prices and 
ruptured credit relations.  By the 1930s, the shiny tin roofs that had marked 
nineteenth-century prosperity had lost their lustre, and appeared as ruins of former 
wealth dotting the countryside.  The survey and settlement report of Rangpur (1930-
38) noted that in  “the principal jute area [to the south-east of the district, along the 
Brahmaputra] ... the country is open evincing by its large tin-roofed homesteads and 
orchards of graceful betel-nut palms, evidence of past prosperity.”1 
Agrarian immiseration was accompanied by a period of intellectual creativity 
and political activity in the hinterland.  Peasant impoverishment was the most 
discussed issue in the intellectual milieus of the hinterland during the 1920s.  The 
post-WWI period witnessed an explosion of literary production in the delta and a 
                                                        
1 Rangpur SSR, 1930-38, p. 4 (emphasis added) 
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large body of pamphlets poems addressing agrarian immiseration, its causes, and 
remedies were published out of mofussil towns.2   As I argue in this chapter, these 
published texts indicate the emergence of distinctively Muslim mofussil economic 
discourse of peasant poverty.  The historiography of Bengal has tended to portray 
Muslim politics in the jute hinterland in terms of “communal,” a nationalist pejorative 
used to devalue all forms of Islamic politics.3  Historians have focused on 
“communal riots,” episodes of Hindu-Muslim violence that occurred with increasing 
intensity and frequency during and after the 1920s, notably in Pabna in 1926, in 
Dacca in 1930, in Kishoreganj in 1930, and in Noakhali and Tippera in 1946. More 
careful research, such as Sugata Bose’s detailed analysis of the 1930 Kishoreganj riots, 
have shown that strains in the social relations of agrarian production during this era 
of immiseration led to these clashes between mostly-Muslim cultivators and mostly-
Hindu moneylenders, traders and rentiers.4  In addition to the material contexts of 
immiseration, I argue that these episodes of peasant violence need to be understood 
in terms of prevailing ideas and thoughts, especially Muslim economic discourses of 
peasant impoverishment.  
Tajul Islam Hashmi, in his important work on the “communalization of class 
relations” in Bengal, has argued that an alliance of Muslim upper-peasantry, Muslim 
                                                        
2 The catalogs of Bengali language publications in the British Library and the National Library in Kolkata 
indicate a sudden increase in output in printing presses in towns like Mymensingh, Rangpur, Comilla, 
Bogra, Faridpur and Dacca.  Arguably, this may merely be the result of increased colonial surveillance of 
the printed materials in the hinterland, but I would argue that the circles of authorship and readership in 
the towns had grown, and a new mofussil Muslim middle-class – with origins in the countryside – had 
begun to participate in it.   
3 For a critique of communalism as an analytical concept, see Jalal, Ayesha, “Exploding Communalism: 
The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia,” in Bose and Jalal (ed.) Nationalism, Democracy and 
Development: State and Politics in India, Delhi, 1997. 
4 Bose, Sugata, “The Roots of ‘Communal’ Violence in Rural Bengal: A Study of the Kishoreganj Riots, 
1930,” MAS, 16(3), 1982.   Also, Partha Chatterjee’s “Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 
1926-1935,” Subaltern Studies, Vol. I, 1982 looks at the class dimensions of riots in Pabna in 1926.   
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landlords and members of the Bengali-speaking ulama “communalized” cultivators, 
that is, instructed them to place religious identity above class identity.5  
“Communalization,” I argue, is a misrepresentation of a rich and nuanced body of 
ideas that constituted a distinctively Muslim economic discourse of agrarian 
immiseration.  In this chapter, I investigate how a section of mofussil Muslim 
intellectuals, who had origins in the countryside’s peasant economy and had joined 
the ranks of the small-town middle-class in the 1910s and 1920s, thought about jute 
cultivation, peasant impoverishment, and Islam.  Their ideas were not “communal” in 
the pejorative sense nor were they Islamic just because the authors were Muslim.  
Their economic discourses were Muslim, I argue, because they identified poverty was 
a specifically Muslim issue, their agendas of peasant reform were informed by ideas 
of Islam as a world religion emphasizing capital accumulation and the ethical conduct 
of livelihoods, and their depiction of agrarian relations of production focused on the 
oppression of Muslims by non-Muslims.   
I examine this Muslim mofussil discourse through the literature of peasant 
impoverishment produced out of the hinterland’s small-town print and publishing 
industry during the 1920s.  I focus on two kinds of texts – first, didactic texts 
instructing peasants into more sustainable and Islamic livelihood practices and, 
second, policy texts advocating for legislative reforms of tenancy laws and credit 
markets.  Texts of Muslim peasant self-reform were influenced by Gandhian ideas of 
sacrifice, self-denial and self-sufficiency, but were substantially different.  First, they 
recommended not disengagement from markets but savvier market operations and, 
                                                        
5 Hashmi, Tajul Islam, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-
1947, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992.  For a more focused analysis of “communalization” during the 
1920s, see Hashmi’s article, “The Communalization of Class Struggle: East Bengal peasantry, 1923-1929,” 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1988, 25(1), 
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second, they grounded peasant reform in an understanding of Islam as the ethical 
conduct of livelihoods.  Texts of legislative reforms were not grounded in the praja 
movement of the 1900s – a movement of occupancy ryots’ rights seeking to enhance 
their rights with respect to zamindars.  Such texts were about liberating Muslims 
from the oppression of non-Muslims.   
Gandhian ideas of Swadesh and Swaraj played an important role in the 
emergence of a Muslim economic discourse, especially during the Khilafat and Non-
cooperation campaigns of 1920 to 1922. While the Swadeshi movement had notably 
failed to gain support amongst mostly-Muslim jute cultivators in a period of booming 
markets, the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements succeeded during the era of 
agrarian immiseration.  I will argue that one of the more important and less 
appreciated legacies of the Khilafat movement was in politicizing a generation of 
idealistic, educated young men in the mofussil towns – of educating them in 
Gandhian economic ideas of Swadeshi and Swaraj and in practices and modes of 
engaging with the peasantry. Khilafat activists in eastern Bengal would go on to play 
important roles in intellectual life in the hinterland and representative and legislative 
politics in the metropolis.  While the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movement 
provided impetus to intellectual and political life in the delta, it did not determine the 
content of mofussil economic ideas of peasant poverty and impoverishment.  
Though deeply influenced by nationalist economic ideas – particularly Gandhian 
reformulations of Swadeshi ideas – mofussil economic discourses were distinctively 
Muslim and specific to the jute hinterland.  
Partha Chatterjee has argued that the mofussil Muslim print literature provide 
indexes of peasant’s growing “anger,” “distrust” and “resentment” of moneylenders 
and traders in the jute tracts.  According to Chatterjee, the texts contain an “entire 
  126 
complex of feelings against feudal authority [that is, zamindars] and commercial 
exploitation [that, is traders and moneylenders].”  This “complex of feelings” was 
“transformed ideologically into political action against the enemies of a peasant 
community united by religion.”6  Contrary to Chatterjee, I argue that these texts 
contain the ideas of a mofussil intelligentsia rather than expressions of peasant 
consciousness.  These texts were not transformed into spectacular episodes of 
peasant violence, but into the more mundane arenas of hinterland politics – the 
processes of electoral, legislative and representative politics.  
The 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms introduced electoral politics into the 
delta.  It carved the jute tracts into political constituencies, with separate Hindu and 
Muslim electorates and a very limited franchise – less than 3% of the population.  
These rural constituencies voted in 68 (33 of them Muslim) of the 139 members of 
the Bengal Legislative Council.  Elected representatives’ actual legislative powers were 
highly constrained: the most powerful state institutions – finance and political, for 
instance – were reserved for unelected colonial officials.  Despite these limitations, 
the introduction of representative and legislative politics was an important 
development in the political history of the jute tracts.  For the first time, the 
hinterland sent its “representatives” to the metropolis, and the powerless legislature 
provided a soapbox for some of the most vocal mofussil intellectuals.  The final 
section in this chapter looks at mofussil voices in the metropolitan legislature, and 
how a section of mofussil Muslim politicians came to be identified with peasant 
interests. 
                                                        
6 Chatterjee, Partha, “Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-1935,” Subaltern Studies, Vol. I, 
1982, pp. 27-30.   
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A further round of reforms in 1935 extended the franchise, increased the 
powers of the elected provincial government, and gave Muslims a larger proportion 
of seats – through the “communal award” as it was known.  While the 1919 reforms 
merely allowed for a distinctively mofussil politics to be heard on the floor of the 
Calcutta legislature, the 1935 reforms led to what Joya Chatterji has described as the 
“emergence of the mofussil” in Bengal’s provincial politics.7  The spectacular victory 
of the Krishak Praja Party (KPP) in elections in 1936 in rural Bengal’s 
“Muhammadan constituencies” over the more established Muslim League was 
achieved on a pro-peasant campaign promising land to the plough (langol jar jomi tar), 
rice and daal for everyone (shobar jonno daal bhat), and abolishing outstanding debt.  
The KPP’s electoral victory was nothing less than the hinterland’s conquest of the 
metropolis.  I argue that this conquest was short-lived in the next chapter, where I 
look at the elected government’s failed attempts to control jute prices in the years 
leading up to the Great Bengal Famine of 1942-43.  Before turning to the mofussil 
discourses of peasant impoverishment, I will describe the processes of immiseration 
that were set in motion during and after WWI.   
 
 
IMMISERATION  
Agrarian immiseration was driven by a combination of factors that converged at the 
outbreak of WWI: fragmenting landholdings, deteriorating ecological conditions, 
uncertain, unfavourable, and rigged produce markets, and exploitative credit markets. 
The hinterland population had grown rapidly during the late nineteenth century and                                                         
7 Chatterji, Joya, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  See especially Chapter 2 titled “The Emergence of the Mofussil in Bengal Politics,” 
pp. 55-102 
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early twentieth centuries and the limits of cultivation had been reached by the 1900s.  
Peasant landholdings fragmented, as Muslim inheritance laws stipulated the division 
of property amongst children.  In 1929-30, the average landholding of “occupancy 
ryots” paying cash rents varied from just over 1 acre in Pabna to about 2.8 acres in 
Mymensingh.  Sharecroppers paying produce rents had much smaller lands – 
estimated at less than an acre in Mymensingh and Tippera (see Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Average Landholdings in Jute-growing districts, 1929-308 
District Average Landholdings 
Dacca 1.52 acres 
Mymensingh 2.79 acres when rent is paid in cash 
0.86 acres when rent is paid in produce                       
Faridpur 1.39 acres 
Tippera 2.03 acres when rent is paid in cash 
0.86 acres when rent is paid in produce 
Pabna 1.09 acres 
Bogra 2.05 acres 
 
Most cultivators’ landholdings were less than the averages tabulated above.  In 
Mymensingh in 1919, 60% of farmers cultivated about 2 acres on average and were 
considered “subsistence ryots,” 36% cultivated 5 acres on average and 4% cultivated 
12 acres.9  In the jute-growing Pabna subdivision during the 1920s, 36% of 
cultivators held less than an acre, 20% had holdings of between 1 and 2 acres and 
12.5% had holdings of between 2 and 3 acres.10  In both Sirajganj and Pabna, about 
half of all cultivators had less than one acre of land. The author of Pabna and Bogra 
settlement report noted, “This condition of land tenure is uneconomic.  Even in the 
most fertile tracts, a holding of 3 bighas, of which about ¼ has to be deducted for the 
                                                        
8 Report Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, p. 27 
9 Mymensingh SSR, 1910-1919, p. 25 
10 Pabna SSR, p. 35 
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homestead site, will not suffice to keep a cultivator with his family in the barest 
necessities of life.  In order to exist he has to take a few extra bighas in barga, or to 
undertake a little labour such as carting jute to market.”11  
As landholdings fragmented, the acreage of land devoted to jute increased. 
Jute acreage increased from a low of 2.6 million acres in 1921-22 to a high of 3.7 
million acres in 1929-30, against an average acreage of about 2.9 million acres 
between 1909 and 1913.12  The increase in acreage came at the expense of aus or 
autumn rice and reflected the market-based subsistence strategies pursued by 
cultivators on small plots of land.  Unable to raise sufficient subsistence grain for the 
household, cultivators produced jute and purchased grain from sales of jute.  As D. 
Macpherson noted regarding Pabna district in the 1920s: “The cultivator grows 
sufficient paddy to last for 8-10 months and trust to the profit from the jute to 
provide him with food for the remaining months.”13  Based on his personal 
experience in his home constituency of Tippera, Indu Bhushan Dutta stated on the 
floor of the Bengal Legislative Council that “not more than 25 per cent of the 
agriculturists can grow sufficient rice for their own consumption.  The rest of the 
people have to buy, even if for a few months of the year.”14 
In their attempt to eke out a living from fragmenting landholdings, cultivators 
deepened their dependence on global markets to deliver households’ simple 
subsistence needs.  Unfortunately, global commodity markets turned sharply against 
jute cultivators during and after WWI.   As Table 3.2 demonstrates, jute prices were                                                         
11 D. Macpherson, Pabna and Bogra SSR, p. 35 
12 IJMA, Report of the Committee 1949, Calcutta, 1950, pp. 99-100, cited in Goswami, Omkar, Industry, Trade 
and Peasant Society, p. 116 
13 Pabna and Bogra SSR, p. 35 
14 BLC, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 188 
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extremely volatile during the 1920s, rising after WWI, falling sharply during 1920 
and ’21, rising again in 1922, before falling in 1923, rising again and reaching a peak 
in 1925 and 1926.  Prices dropped steeply in 1930 and remained depressed at 
unrenumerative and very low levels throughout the 1930s, and only recovered 
towards the end of the decade with the outbreak of World War II.  For the entirety 
of the 1930s and for periods during the 1920s jute prices were too low to cover the 
costs of cultivation.15  
Jute prices were not only uncertain from year, but also fluctuated within the 
year.  Prices were generally low in the beginning of the season, when cultivators had 
to sell off at least a portion of their crop in order to meet their immediate cash needs.  
As the Indian Chamber of Commerce testified to the Banking Enquiry Committee in 
early 1930, “The jute market is always dull in the months of September, October and 
November … It is only after the first rush is over that the arrivals of jute in the 
mofussil are to some extent affected by the prices ruling in the market.”16  Further, it 
was a widely held that jute markets were rigged against cultivators, as buyers acted as 
cartels to influence prices.  Narayan Chandra Ghosh, SDO of Netrokona in 
Mymensingh district, informed the Banking Committee that “It sometimes appears 
that the agents of firms and companies, dealing in the export trade, stop buying of 
jute whenever there is a tendency towards increase in the buying rate.”17  Members of 
the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce also alleged that buyers manipulated 
quality grades – by eliminating higher qualities so they had to be sold under lower 
                                                        
15 Goswami, Omkar, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern India, 1900-1947, Delhi, 
Oxford University Press, 1991 
16 BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I, p. 346 
17 BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I, p. 210 
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grades – and this caused the loss of several crore rupees to the Bengal’s jute 
cultivators.18 
 
Table 3.2:  Index of prices in Bengal (1914=100)19 
Year Rice Jute  
All 
Commodities 
 
1917 n.a. 65 145 
1918 n.a. 75 178 
1919 n.a. 115 196 
1920 166 104 201 
1921 144 83 178 
1922 125 110 176 
1923 112 90 172 
1924 104 102 173 
1925 147 154 159 
1926 133 120 148 
1927 144 93 148 
1928 141 100 145 
1929 114 95 141 
1930 105 63 116 
1931 71 49 96 
1932 58 45 91 
1933 57 41 87 
1934 63 39 89 
1935 62 50 91 
1936 71 50 91 
1937 67 56 92 
1938 69 48 95 
1939 75 51 96 
 
Further, buyers of raw jute – particularly the Calcutta jute mills – had gained 
control over prices paid to cultivators and petty traders lower down the commodity 
chain during World War I.  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
jute exporters had expanded their purchasing and baling operations deep into the 
                                                        
18 BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I, p. 375 
19 Compiled in Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p. 84 
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hinterland (see Chapter 2).  Second, WWI had witnessed a considerable expansion in 
Calcutta’s jute manufacturing capacity, transforming the IJMA – which aspired to 
behave like a cartel by controlling output, wages and prices of raw materials – into 
the single largest consumer of the delta’s fibre.  Third, and perhaps most significantly, 
diminished landholdings and reduced aus rice production meant that cultivators could 
no longer hold on to fibres in the hope of better prices.  They had to sell their 
produce almost immediately to pay off rents, service debt and purchase subsistence 
grains.   
Under these transformed market conditions, cultivators could not benefit 
even during years of high jute prices.  Instead, the benefit of high prices accrued to 
traders and middlemen with the financial wherewithal to hold on to jute.  It was 
widely reported that relatively higher prices in 1926 had benefited wealthier 
inhabitants of the agrarian delta rather than the direct producers of the fibre.  As the 
Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce reported to the Banking Enquiry Committee, 
“the middlemen or wealthier inhabitants of the village do all the holding of jute for 
better prices by financing the raiyat during the period for which the jute is held, and 
this has become more prevalent since 1926 when they made fabulous profits and put 
up corrugated iron sheds all over the country in order to store up their holdings, 
thereby minimizing the risk of fibre.”20  The Agent of the Imperial Bank in Dacca 
similarly reported that, “The wealthier inhabitants, not necessarily cultivators, in the 
interior however are increasingly inclined to speculate and buy under the market price 
from their own raiyats if they are zamindars .  Numbers of the latter classes made 
fortunes during the high price year – 1926.”21                                                           
20 BPBEC, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 396 
21 BPBEC, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 398 
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Jute cultivators not only had to contend with unfavourable, uncertain, and 
rigged commodity jute markets – they were also confronted with a rapidly 
deteriorating ecology.  The inhabitants of eastern Bengal had enjoyed a healthy and 
productive ecology of land and water, mainly because the drainage of the delta was 
unobstructed.  However, two factors combined to block the delta’s natural north-to-
south drainage during the early twentieth century, leading to more frequent and 
devastating floods and epidemics of water-borne diseases: first, high railway 
embankments with insufficient openings for the passage of water and, second, an 
invasive weed – the water hyacinth, dubbed the “lilac killer” – which choked the 
delta’s arteries.22  
The two railway lines that were responsible for perhaps the greatest damage in 
the Bengal delta were the Sara-Sirajganj railway line in northern Bengal, opened in 
1918 and the Akhaura-Ashuganj line on the Assam Bengal Railway, opened in 1915.   
The important jute-growing areas of Brahmanbaria subdivision in Tippera and along 
the banks of the Jamuna river in northern Bengal were particularly flood-prone 
during the 1910s and 1920s.  Serious floods occurred in Brahmanbaria in 1915/16, 
the year the Akhaura-Ashuganj railway line opened, leading to “real famine” 
according to the Survey and Settlement Report for Tippera.  Floods recurred in 
Brahmanbaria 1919, 1924 and then again in 1929.  Floods had occurred in Tippera 
prior to railway construction but, according to the Tippera Survey and Settlement 
Report of 1919, “it seems that … they [floods] have been more frequent and violent 
than ever before.”23  According to official estimates, the floods of 1929 affected 
                                                        
22 Iqbal, Iftekhar, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State, and Social Change, 1840-1943, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010 
23 SSR Tippera, p. 37 
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250,000 people, 50,000 of them severely, and covered over 250 square miles. 
Ashrafuddin Chaudhuri, the member of the BLC from Brahmanbaria, alleged that 
floods had caused famine and starvation deaths.  P.C. Mitter, representing the 
government, responded that deaths had not been due to starvation but disease.24  In 
addition to frequent and devastating floods, there was a permanent decline in 
productivity in many areas abutting the railways, where high embankments caused 
water to pool and stagnate.  In the low-lying areas in eastern Brahmanbaria “the 
cultivators seem to have lost much of the winter rice crops every year since the 
railway embankment on the Branch Line to Asuganj was completed.”25 
The poor drainage of the delta led not only to loss of crops, but also to water-
borne epidemics – previously unknown in the relatively healthy active delta of eastern 
Bengal.  Disease and death constituted yet another external shock to peasant 
households that increased in frequency during the 1910s and 1920s.  Ihtesham Kazi 
has illustrated how the construction of railways was followed, often immediately, by 
the outbreak of malaria epidemics in the eastern Bengal districts of Pabna, 
Mymensingh and Tippera and he has convincingly argued that stagnant pools of 
water, due to high railway embankments, provided fertile breeding grounds for 
malaria-bearing mosquitoes.26  The Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner of 
Bengal for 1922 calculated that the prevalence of malaria In Eastern Bengal had more 
than doubled in the previous decade.27  Kala-azar, or black fever, was another water-
                                                        
24 Response of P.C. Mitter to Ashrafuddin Chaudhuri, Bengal Legislative Council, Vol. XXXIV, No.2, p. 
89 
25 SSR Tippera, p. 7 
26 Kazi, Ihtesham, A Historical Study of Malaria in Bengal, 1860-1920, Dhaka, 2004, pp. 154-157 
27 Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner for Bengal for the Year 1922, Calcutta, 1923, p. 61, cited in Kazi, 
Ihtesham, A Historical Study of Malaria in Bengal, 1860-1920, Dhaka, 2004, p. 132 
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borne disease that took on the epidemic proportions in the period.  An investigation 
by the Public Health Department in 1919 found that 54% of surveyed villages in 
Mymensingh, 30% in Dacca, and 15% in Tippera had cases of kala-azar.28  In 
addition to malaria and kala-azar, epidemics of small pox and cholera were reported 
from throughout the delta.   
“More railways, more malaria” became a common saying in Bengal.  
Legislators in the Bengal Council frequently attributed epidemics to high railway 
embankments.  In 1926, Emdadul Huq – the member from Tippera – informed the 
council that, ““it is a well known fact that in Bengal the high railway embankments 
and water hyacinth have jointly contributed to spread malaria and kala-azar by 
interfering with the natural drainage and choking up all the bils and canals.”29  In 
March 1930, Tamizuddin Khan, a member from Faridpur, spoke poignantly of the 
destruction wrought by water-borne epidemics in eastern Bengal: “the areas which 
were once flourishing and prosperous and teeming with a smiling population are now 
de-populated hot-beds of malaria and other disease.”30   
For peasant households who experienced floods, disease, and market shocks, 
there was only one safety net and that came at a high price – emergency loans from 
moneylenders.  Farmers who with a favourable climate and commodity markets make 
a bare subsistence living would be pushed into debt in unfavourable years.   As 
climate and market shocks increased in frequency and intensity after WWI, levels of 
debt rose rapidly.  The sharp increase in indebtedness was, in the words of the 
Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, “a mark of distress.”  The authors of the                                                         
28 BLC, Vol. X, 1922, p. 51 
29 BLC, Vol. XX, 1926, p. 211 
30 BLC, Vol. XXXIV, Calcutta, 1930, p. 192 
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report argued “there is a kind of poverty, which while not amounting to insolvency, 
nevertheless makes for precarious and uncertain living.  It is this latter class of 
poverty, which is the real cause of indebtedness among agriculturists in Bengal.”31  
Debt was incurred as a regular part of peasant production, particularly in the 
case of jute cultivation where hired labour was paid in cash rather than food-grain.  
Cultivators borrowed cash in April and May to hire labour to thin and weed jute 
fields and then again in July and August to harvest and prepare the crop. Around the 
same time, cultivators would be running out of their stores of grain, and would be 
forced to purchase subsistence food from markets.  Interest rates rose sharply during 
those months.  In Munshiganj subdivision in Dacca district, monthly interest rates on 
“petty loans” were at their lowest between November and January – 3 per cent per 
month – and then steadily rose from February, and interest rates up to 16% per 
month were charged during May and June, just before the jute and aus harvests.32  
Interest rates were correlated not only with the financial requirements of peasant 
production, but also the availability of liquid cash in the delta.  Interest rates were 
lowest during the jute and aman harvests because cash would flow into the delta to 
pay for fibre and grain during these months.   
                                                        
31 BPBEC, Vol. I, pp. 73-74 
32 Evidence of S. Basu, SDO Munshiganj, to the BPBEC.  Basu provided the following table of variation in 
interest rates, BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I, 1929-1930, p. 194 
 General Loans 
(Monthly interest rates) 
Petty loans 
(Monthly interest 
rates) 
Agrahayan 2% 3% 
Paush 2% 3% 
Magh 2% 3% 
Phalgoon 3% 4% 
Chaitra 5% 6% 
Baishakh 6% 7% 
Jaishtha 7 to 8% Anything upto 16% 
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Debt was also incurred during market shocks and ecological disasters.  
Peasant households took loans to tide them over emergencies - if crops failed due to 
floods or drought, plough cattle died, household members fell sick or died, prices of 
their produce fell, or of their consumer goods rose.  As the frequency of such 
incidents multiplied during and after WWI, so did levels of peasant indebtedness.  
Emaduddin Ahmed, Chairman of the Rajshahi District Board testified to the Royal 
Commission on Agriculture in 1926 that “the highly lowering down of the prices of 
jute” was one of the causes of agricultural indebtedness.33  M. Fariduddin, Khas 
Mahal Officer in Faridpur testified to the Banking Enquiry Committee in 1929: 
“when they [cultivators] do not get a good harvest they have to incur debts to meet 
their ordinary wants.”34 
Interest rates on these “distress” loans were much higher.  In his evidence to 
the Banking Enquiry Committee, Bhabesh Chandra Roy, SDO of Naogaon in 
Rajshahi, reported that interest rates varied proportionately according to the “urgent 
necessity of the borrower.”  Umesh Chandra Chakladar, Vice-Chairman of the 
Mymensingh District Board, said that interest rates rose according to the “exigencies 
of the borrower.”  Further, Chakladar reported that if the monsoon rains failed or 
were delayed, “credit is invariably dear in every quarter.”35  Mohammad Khayer Ali’s 
long poem about the floods in North Bengal in 1922, Bonya Kahini (Flood Event) was 
especially critical of moneylenders who taking advantage of the situation raised their 
interest rates too high: “A few moneylenders take advantage/and increase interest 
                                                        
33 RCA, Vol. 4, p. 558.   
34 BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I, p. 217  
35 BPBEC, Vol. II, Part I,  Evidence of Bhabesh Chandra Roy, SDO, Naogaon, p. 187; Evidence of 
Umesh Chandra Chakladar, Vice-Chairman, Mymensingh District Board, p. 282 
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rates very high … All the mahajans of the country/They are sucking the blood of 
farmers.”36  Moneylenders were not, however, simply taking cynical advantage of 
their borrowers’ desperation – though undoubtedly many were.  Ecological and 
market shocks led to a sharp increase in the demand for loans across the board, and 
consequently drove up interest rates. 
Economic volatility and ecological shocks led to a massive increase in peasant 
indebtedness during the 1920s.  For the most part, peasant households obtained 
loans from professional moneylenders – mahajans who combined moneylending with 
rent-collection or trading.37  Dadans, or produce loans in exchange for standing crops 
increased in frequency during and after WWI.38  Professional moneylenders – trader-
mahajans and talukdar-mahajans – however, were not generally interested in taking 
over rights to peasant lands, but preferred to keep them in debt bondage with regular 
payments of interest on existing loans.  There were, however, increasing incidents of 
cultivators converted into sharecroppers, or bargadars.  Muazzam Hossain, Deputy 
Collector in Mymensingh testified to the Banking Enquiry Committee in 1926 that in 
the eastern parts of the district “a very large proportion of the raiyats … now work as 
bargadars.”39  B.B. Dutt testified that in Brahmanbaria, the jute-growing subdivision 
of Tippera, “good farmers were being converted into bargadars.”40   
                                                        
36 “Kono kono mahajan shujog bujhia/shudder har otyadhik diyechhe bariya … Desher je shomosto achhe 
mahajan/Krishaker rokto shob korichhe shoshon.” Ali, Md. Khayer, Bonya Kahini, Calcutta, 1922.   
37 Sugata Bose distinguishes between “talukdar-mahjans” and “trader-mahajans,” the former group being 
the largest by far in Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
38 See Chapter 1 
39 BPBEC, Vol. 2. ,p. 237 
40 BPBEC, Vol. 2., p. 534 
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The great depression and prolonged low prices of agricultural produce hit the 
land-poor and indebted peasantry of the jute tracts hard.  The 1930 jute season 
opened with a sharp drop in prices.  Prices of fibre fell from close to Rs. 9 per maund 
on average between 1926 and 1929 to about Rs. 3 per maund.  Unlike previous price 
falls, jute prices did not recover until the outbreak of WWII: for the entire 1930s 
average prices were almost half that of the 1920s.41  Rice prices fell sharply in 1931 
and did not recover until the beginning of WWII.  On average, the price of rice 
during the 1930s was about half the average of the 1920s.  This prolonged depression 
in prices was devastating for the delta’s market-dependent jute and rice cultivators.   
Omkar Goswami has calculated that permanently-settled, occupancy ryots 
with three acres of land – far more than the average landholding in the delta – were 
simply not able to make ends meet during the 1930s.42  The Survey and Settlement 
Report on Rangpur presented several peasant household budgets from the decade.  A 
family with six acres of land in possession was living just “above starvation”, earning 
Rs. 150 from the produce of land.  “In normal times,” the report noted, “it should be 
reasonably prosperous.”  A family with almost thirteen acres of land was living in 
“comfort,” but as the report noted hardly in luxury: “[their] expenditure is all in 
necessities.”  This family “would be normally prosperous but has been badly hit by 
the slump in price of jute.”43   
In times of difficulty, peasant households usually turned to moneylenders.  
However, the depression had resulted in the drying up of cash flows from overseas 
                                                        
41 Goswami, Industry, Trade, and Peasant Society, pp. 153-154 
42 Goswami, Omkar, “Agriculture in Slump: The Peasant Economy of East and North Bengal in the 1930s,” 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 21, 1984, p. 351 
43 Rangpur SSR, pp. 20-22 
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commodity purchasers, and this led to a liquidity crisis in the countryside.  Not only 
were moneylenders unwilling to advance further loans, but they were also trying to 
recoup outstanding debt.  The mahajans were divesting from the countryside in 
droves. Unable to obtain emergency loans, peasant smallholders sold off whatever 
valuables that they possessed and, ultimately, arable lands.  The 1930s witnessed an 
astounding rise in sales of land, even as land prices tumbled. Former peasant 
proprietors were converted into under-tenants, sharecroppers, or agricultural wage 
labour. 
 
 
KHILAFAT 
The Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements launched by Gandhi and the Ali 
brothers in 1920 accompanied the onset of agrarian immiseration.  The sharp fall in 
jute prices and the relatively high terms of trade between jute and rice between 1920 
and 1922 hit the market-subsistent jute cultivators of eastern Bengal particularly hard.  
According to Omkar Goswami’s calculations peasants holding three acres of land 
would have a real surplus of negative 16 rupees in 1921-22.   Most cultivators held far 
less than three acres.  In February 1921, when rice prices rose to new highs, the 
delta’s subsistence jute cultivators were hit hard.44  Kishori Mohan Chaudhuri 
(Rajshahi) informed the legislature that the vast majority of cultivators “were in 
difficulty, not being able to get a market for their jute, and the result was that they 
were on the brink of starvation, which was partly due, I think, to the shortage of 
                                                        
44 Tarit Bhushan Roy stated in the Legislative Council that “the prevailing prices of balam and dakshini rice 
[local varieties beyond the reach of poor peasants] are universally higher than what they were at season 
time in the last 12 years,” BLC Vol, I, No. 1, p. 29 
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food-grains.”45  Indu Bhushan Dutta (Tippera) spoke in agreement “for the last few 
years, the prices [of rice] have reached the extraordinary limit of Rs. 9 to Rs. 10 per 
maund at this season of the year.  The agriculturists who has to pay this price for his 
staple food cannot bless the system which causes this high price and spells utter 
ruination for him and his like.”46   
While the Swadeshi movement failed to generate support amongst the delta’s 
cultivators during a period of favourable global commodity markets, the Khilafat 
movement was enormously successful during this period of unfavourable markets.  
In May 1921, there was a strike by servants of Europeans in the jute-trading, railway 
junction town, Akhaura, after the European employee of a jute-purchasing agency 
slapped an “insolent khitmagar.”  In June 1921, simultaneous strikes of transport 
workers at river-ports and railway towns in East Bengal brought the region’s 
transport system to a halt.  In November 1921, peasants in Pabna and Bogra opposed 
the government’s survey and settlement operations.  In January 1922, the colonial 
government received reports of the non-payments of chaukidari taxes and zamindari 
or jotedari rents, refusals to obey magistrate’s orders and the open defiance of 
government authority from throughout Bengal.  Between January and March, 1922, 
the colonial government lost authority over large tracts of the Bengal delta, as 
cultivators refused to pay taxes and rents or allow policemen to enter their villages.  
Violent clashes took place between contingents of armed police, Khilafat and Swaraj 
activists and villagers in Brahmanbaria in Tippera and Nilphamari in Rangpur.  The 
movement affected every district in Bengal except Murshidabad, but was most active 
                                                        
45 BLC, Vol I, No. 2, p. 184 
46 BLC, Vol I, No. 2, p. 206 
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in Tippera, Noakhali and Chittagong in the east and southeast and Rangpur, Pabna 
and Bogra in the north, where there was a complete breakdown of civil authority.47 
Colonial authority was restored in these regions between March and April 
1922, after Gandhi brought the movement to an end.  The peasant movement in 
Bengal’s jute tracts, as in other part of South Asia, died down well before Mustafa 
Kemal officially abolished the Caliphate in March 1924.  By 1923, Naeem Qureishi 
has argued, “the Khilafat movement had come to be confined to academic 
discussions and unproductive resolutions.”48  The colonial government’s official 
narrative of the movement emphasized the economic backdrop and deprecated the 
ideological appeal of Gandhi and the nationalist leadership.  P.C. Bamford, the 
Deputy Director of the Government of India’s Intelligence Bureau, in his 1924 
account of the movement wrote: “The success which attended the Non-co-operation 
and Khilafat movements in India is undoubtedly attributable to the Great War, for 
neither agitation could have attained the dimensions which it did but for the 
economic pressure to which the people were subjected in consequence of the 
prolonged and wide-spread hostilities.”49  In Bengal, Bamford states that the success 
of the movement was primarily due to its no-tax and no-rent movement, and the 
promise that there would be no rents in Swaraj: “when the economic pinch was so 
severe and the listener so ignorant and gullible, it need be no matter for surprise that 
                                                        
47 Ray, Rajat, “Masses in Politics: the Non-Cooperation Movement in Bengal, 1920-1922“ IESHR, 11(4), 
1974, pp. 343-410 provides a detailed description of various forms of peasant political action during the 
Khilafat movement. 
48 Qureishi, Naeem M., Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924, Boston, 
Brill, 1999, p.343 
49 Bamford, P.C., Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement, Delhi, Government of India Press, 
1925 p. xii 
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the propaganda proved effective.”50  Bamford noted, seemingly triumphantly, that the 
movement came to a stop with improved harvests and market conditions: “There is 
… no greater proof of the hollowness of these agitations than the manner in which 
they succumbed to improved economic conditions.” 
Bamford’s materialist reading of the peasant movements willfully disregarded 
the conceptual content of the ideas of Swaraj and Khilafat.  The popularity of the 
khilafat cause in South Asia has been ascribed to the “pan-Islamist” sentiments – the 
colonial term used to describe a global Muslim threat to the British Empire.  In 
Bengal, World War I had tested Bengali Muslim loyalties by pitting the Khalifa of 
Mecca, the Ottoman Sultan, against the British Empire, and many of them sided with 
the Khilafat.  Nirad Chaudhuri described an incident from “when Britain declared 
war against Turkey in November 1914, a mullah hoisted the Turkish flag in a field 
near Kishorganj and proclaimed it as the Caliph’s territory.  He was, of course, 
promptly arrested.”51  The Survey and Settlement Report of Bogra in 1921 noted that 
during the movement “the cultivators talked glibly of Kemal Pasha, the king of the 
Hedjaz, and political trials.”52 Abul Mansur Ahmed’s memoirs of his childhood in 
Mymensingh provide an example of lived pan-Islamism in the deltaic jute tracts.  
Ahmed came from a well-to-do and devout Muslim family in Dhanikhola village, 
south of Mymensingh town, and his forefathers had participated in Sayyid Ahmed of 
Rai Bareilly’s jihad against the British Empire in the 1820s.53  Abul Mansur Ahmed                                                         
50 Bamford, P.C., pp. 59-60 
51 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, Thy Hand Great Anarch!, India 1921-1952, Reading, Mass: 1987, p. 37 
52 Pabna and Bogra SSR, p. 93 
53 Curiously, Ahmed’s autobiography does not discuss the economic livelihoods of his family.  It appears 
most likely that they held larger holdings that were cultivated by sharecroppers or wage-labourers, though 
such figures do not make an appearance in his text.  Ahmed, Abul Mansur, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash 
Bochor, Dhaka, 1998. 
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described how Italy’s attack on Libya and the Ottoman Empire  – on “our Khalifa” – 
in 1911 angered him.  Subsequently, he supported Germany against Britain in WWI 
but because he believed the Kaiser was Muslim – a belief that was only confirmed by 
the Ottoman Empire joining the war on the German side.  Ahmed recounts how he 
felt that Britain’s victory in the Great War only proved to him “that the Muslims have 
no greater enemy than the English.”54   
Scattered pieces of evidence also suggest that peasant participation in the 
Khilafat movement was informed by a millennial and utopian reading of Swaraj.  
Gandhi’s proclamation that Swaraj would be achieved within the year was taken at 
face value, and the delta’s resident believed that the British Raj’s end was nigh.  This 
belief in imminent and impending Swaraj informed the specific forms of peasant 
political action: the non-payment of taxes and rents, the refusal to obey magistrates’ 
orders, and the resistance of armed contingents of colonial police.  During resistance 
to the survey and settlement operations in Bogra in November 1921, it was reported 
that, “there was wild talk of Swaraj and rumours were current of the impending or 
accomplished abdication of the Sarkar.”  Further, villagers refused food or shelter to 
government surveyors as “in the hats, word had gone round that those who assisted 
the amins or sold them food would be boycotted and excluded from Swaraj when 
Swaraj was obtained.”55  P.C. Bamford, the Deputy Director of the Government of 
India’s Intelligence Bureau, reported that in Bengal, “the peasantry were also led to 
                                                        
54 Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor, p. 23 
55 Pabna and Bogra SSR, pp. 93-94 
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believe that under a Swaraj government, which was to come into being in 1922, the 
payment of rent and revenue would be no longer required of them.”56   
The impending end of the British Raj informed the Bengal peasantry’s willful 
disregard of the colonial state’s authority – arguably the defining feature of the 
peasant movement in Bengal between January and March 1922.  When Gandhi called 
an abrupt halt to the movement in February 1922, the idea of Swaraj lost its 
millenarian edge.  Contrary to Bamford’s assertions, the abrupt end to the movement 
did not coincide with a sudden reversal in global markets.  Neither did the peasantry 
simply heed Gandhi’s command to halt the movement. Instead, Gandhi’s cry of halt 
was a broken pledge that extinguished the millenarian vision of an impending Swaraj 
and rendered resistance to state authority meaningless.  As the end of the sarkar was 
no longer imminent, peasants resumed paying taxes and obeying state authority. 
A more lasting influence of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements 
was in politicizing a generation of educated and idealistic young men in the delta’s 
mofussil towns.  Abul Mansur Ahmed, whose support for the “Muslim” Kaiser was 
discussed earlier, joined the Khilafat movement after sitting his B.A. exams in Dacca 
College, returning to his village of Dhanikhola in Mymensingh to work as a volunteer.  
Ahmed was not, however, only moved by extra-territorial loyalties; he was also deeply 
influenced by Gandhi.  He took out a subscription to Young India in 1920, while a 
student at Dacca College, and read it with “deep concentration and utter admiration.  
His [Gandhi’s] writings had a huge influence on my thinking.  In my later life, I have 
not been able to get over this influence.”57  Gandhi was a very important figure for 
                                                        
56 Bamford, P.C., Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement, Delhi, Government of India Press, 
1925, pp. 59-60 
57 Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor, p. 26 
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educated young men who volunteered for the movement.  Ahmed probably 
appreciated Gandhi’s wholehearted support of the “just and reasonable” khilafat 
cause, but he and other young volunteers were also deeply influenced by Gandhi’s 
reformulation of Swadeshi economic ideas.58 
In the pages of Young India, Gandhi repeated and reiterated his firm 
conviction that Swadeshi, or economic self-reliance, was an essential prerequisite for 
Swaraj.  Gandhi imbued Swadeshi ideas with the spiritual virtues of self-denial, self-
sacrifice, and self-reliance.  It meant more than the boycott of consumption of 
imported goods, but also abstaining from producing for British consumers.  In a 
Swaraj pamphlet published in Bogra in 1921, Sureshchandra Dasgupta urged 
cultivators to “stop trading with the English, and handing our homes over to them.  
Instead, keep our things in our own hands.”   In the Bengal, jute emerged as the 
symbol of peasants’ dependence on colonial markets, the opposite of the spinning 
wheel, the Gandhian symbol of economic self-sufficiency.  Swaraj and Khilafat 
volunteers launched an “anti-jute campaign,” and according to Bamford, “cultivators 
who persisted in growing this crop on occasions found that it had been willfully 
destroyed by Non-co-operators.”59  In one instance in Noakhali, during the summer 
of 1920, volunteers played football on a field they had just cleared of the standing 
jute crop.  
Swaraj and Khilafat activists did a lot more in pursuit of peasant self-reliance 
than destroying standing jute crops.  They responded enthusiastically to Gandhi’s 
“back to the villages appeal,” and set up committees throughout the hinterland to 
                                                        
58 Young India, July, 1920, Quoted in Bose, Sugata “Nation, Reason and Religion: India’s Independence in 
International Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly, 1-7 August, 1998. 
59 Bamford, p. 57 
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engage in the urgent tasks of rural renewal.  These tasks appeared especially urgent in 
the context of rapid rural immiseration.  In a non-cooperation pamphlet published in 
Bogra in 1921, Sureshchandra Dasgupta described villages as places of despair and 
destruction, where “we have no food in our stomachs, clothes on our backs, homes 
over our heads, medicines for our diseases, education, joy in our souls or, in the end 
relief, in our deaths.”60  Dasgupta urged educated, motivated, and idealistic young 
men to return to villages and devote themselves to rural renewal, inspiring other 
young men and taking the advice of elders.  He asked these idealistic young men to 
form “village societies,” organize panchayats (arbitration councils) of respected elders, 
encourage the cultivation of cotton, and introduce spinning wheels into every home.  
These are exactly the tasks that Abul Mansur Ahmed and his comrades set 
about as Khilafat volunteers in the village of Dhanikhola.  They set up a palli samaj 
(village society) covering Dhanikhola and neighbouring villages, raised and managed 
funds, set up a high school and a technical school to teach weaving and spinning, 
established arbitration facilities for disputes, and distributed cotton seeds and 
encouraged cotton cultivation.  Popular support for the movement was evident in the 
enthusiasm with which people donated grain or small sums of cash to the volunteers.  
Ahmed’s village did not experience violent conflict with armed police and the general 
breakdown of colonial authority as in parts of Rangpur and Tippera.  Instead, 
Mymensingh’s main experience of the movement consisted of a group of idealistic 
young men setting up the educational, juridical, and economic institutions designed to 
restore the viability of agrarian livelihoods. 
                                                        
60 Dasgupta, Sureshchandra, Gramer Katha (On the Village), Bogra, 1921, p. 2 
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Gandhi’s sudden halt brought an end to this kind of developmental work by 
Swaraj and Khilafat activists. Abul Mansur Ahmed writes: “Our enthusiasm did not 
last more than a year.  Swaraj had not come within the year, as Gandhi promised.  
And then he withdrew civil disobedience [sharbojonin ain omanno] because of the 
hangama [troubles] at Chauri Chaura.”  With the decline in enthusiasm, the young 
volunteers began to experience difficulties: students were leaving their alternative 
school and rejoining the government school, they were unable to sell their cloth or 
pay salaries to weaving and spinning instructors, and villagers gradually stopped 
donating grain or money to the movement.61   
 While the movement itself came to a stop, it had a lasting influence in the 
hinterland – specifically, as it politicized a generation of young idealistic men and 
educated them in Gandhian economic discourses and practices.  Arguably, the 
movement also lit the spark that led to the burst of intellectual and creative 
production during the 1920s.  Poems, songs, and pamphlets were integral to the 
movement.  Abul Mansur Ahmed and his comrades would wander the village roads 
at night, after a hard day’s work, singing “Swadesh and Khilafat songs” at the top of 
their voices.62  Muhammad Abdul Hakim Ruhani, from Chandpur, the important 
jute-trading town in Tippera wrote poems urging Muslims to join Hindus in ousting 
the British; celebrating the achievements of Islam and calling for a global 
brotherhood of Muslims; rejoicing in the rise of a global anti-colonial movement led 
by “Gandhi, Lenin and Zaghlul (Pasha);” and urging the adoption of the charka.63    
                                                        
61 Abul Mansur Ahmed, pp. 28-29 
62 ibid., p. 24 
63 A collection of Ruhani’s Khilafat and Non-cooperation poems was published in 1924 in Dhaka, Ruhani 
Shongit Mala, Dhaka, 1924  Ruhani wrote poems celebrating Islam across history and the globe, the global 
anti-colonial movement led by “Gandhi, Lenin and Zaghlul (Pasha), and the charkah.  He wrote several 
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Nirad Chaudhuri describes a visit from “elderly uncle” from “an out-of-the-way 
village” during the movement, who “besides being the village squire was also a poet 
and composer.”  He performed a song he had composed to Gandhi: “Who is that is 
blowing his horn, and from which high peak, to pierce the heart in this manner?”64  
The years following the Khilafat movement witnessed a burst of literary 
output out of the hinterland’s small-town print and publishing industry, especially of 
texts concerning agrarian immiseration, its causes and remedies.  The mofussil 
literature of peasant impoverishment shared the Swadeshi critiques of jute cultivators’ 
market-based livelihoods, but differed in several important respects.  First, while 
Swadeshi preached self-reliance and self-sufficiency as spiritual and national goals 
worthy in themselves, the mofussil thinkers attempted to instruct cultivators into 
becoming cleverer market operators, capable of adjusted production and 
consumption according to the state of commodity markets.  Second, the hinterland’s 
economic discourses were shaped by an interpretation of Islam as a worldly religion 
concerned with the ethical conduct of livelihoods.  Third, mofussil economic ideas 
were informed by social relations of agrarian production in the delta, particularly 
between mostly-Muslim cultivators and mostly-Hindu zamindars and moneylenders.   
I now turn to the production of a distinctively mofussil economic discourse during 
the 1920s, in the aftermath of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movement.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
poems – “Dak,” “Obhoy-bani,” and “Jaago” – urging Muslims to join Hindus in ousting the British.  He 
also wrote a poem urging Muslims to take up business and trade. 
64 This is Nirad Chaudhuri’s translation.  The original was: “Ke phukichhe singa,/Kon tunga 
sringe,/Emana marma bhediye.”  Thy Hand Great Anarch, p. 12 
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MOFUSSIL INTELLIGENTSIA 
 
Agrarian immiseration was the burning intellectual and political issue of the period in 
the hinterland.  Narratives of peasant households losing their possessions through 
debt, disease, hunger, rent, and dispossession and being forced into the jungles of 
Assam in search of livelihood were standard tropes in mofussil texts of agrarian 
immiseration.  These texts, I will argue, constituted a distinctively mofussil economic 
discourse of impoverishment, that was influenced but certainly not determined by 
nationalist economic ideas emanating from the metropolis.  In the following sections, 
I focus on two literary genres that dominated mofussil discourses on agrarian 
immiseration – the political pamphlet and the boyan, a form of spoken poetry 
consisting of rhyming couplets of even beat.    
Before proceeding on to these pamphlets and boyans, I wish to briefly discuss 
the production of these texts out of the mofussil context.   Pamphlets and boyans 
were products of a mofussil intellectual milieu and the spaces they inhabited in the 
delta’s small-towns and villages.  This milieu was composed of the miniscule educated 
minority of the delta. The mofussil intelligentsia was drawn from the households of 
wealthier peasants, jotedars, zamindars, traders, and mahajans, who had obtained a 
colonial education in district headquarter towns.  The formally educated minority 
worked as salaried professionals in these towns  – lawyers, schoolteachers, doctors, 
clerks in government or private agencies.  While mofussil professionals were 
overwhelmingly Hindu, there were an increasing number of Muslims, who had 
origins in the surrounding countryside and retained strong connections to the villages 
– an outcome of the consumption of education by the wealthiest jute cultivating 
households during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
  151 
 This mofussil middle-class constituted circles of readership and authorship of 
the small-town print and publishing industry of the delta – they were the mofussil 
intelligentsia.  Though quite small, this mofussil intelligentsia was able to sustain local 
newspapers published in hinterland towns.  The circulation figures of these small-
town newspapers varied from a few hundred to a few thousand, 200 in the case of 
Praja Bandhu in Brahmanbaria to 2,828 for the Faridpur Hitoishini (Table 3.3) 
 
Table 3.3: Circulation of Local Newspapers in Eastern Bengal65 
Town Newspaper Title Circulation 
Faridpur The Sonjoy 1,104 
Faridpur Hitoishini 2,828 
Dacca Dacca Prakash 1,521 
Noakhali Noakhali Sammilan unkown 
Comilla Tippera Hitaishini 800 
Brahmanbaria Praja Bandhu 200 
Chandpur Naba Banga 465 
Pabna and Bogra The Pabna-Bogra Hitaishi 1,100 
Suraj 1,200 
Mymensingh Charu Mihir 1,500 
 
 
Agrarian immiseration was the burning issue of the day for the mofussil 
intelligentsia.  In his foreword to Shah Abdul Hamid’s Krishak Bilap (Peasant 
Extinction), Mymensingh, 1922, Sheikh Bashiruddin Ahmed of Banduldia writes, 
“The Bengal peasant’s sorrows and difficulties (dukkho durdosha) have been discussed 
in civil society (shudhi shamaj) for some time. But no one could have thought that the 
last moment of their lives (jibon lila) would come so soon, no one could have foreseen 
                                                        
65 BLC, Vol. IX, 1922, p.  172.  It should be noted that when Indu Bhushan Dutta, the member from 
Tippera, asked if these figures had been verified, the local government minister responded that he did not 
know.   
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that.”66   Similarly, in his preface to Abul Hossain’s Bangla’r Bolshi (Bengal’s Bolsheviks, 
Dacca, 1926), Muhammad Fazlul Karim Mullick – a zamindar in Dacca district – 
wrote that the book will “benefit those who are engaging themselves in serving the 
country (desh) or wish to think about the real condition (bastobik obostha) of the 
nation.”67   In other words, these texts were seen as contributions to a mofussil 
intellectual circle – shudhi shamaj – concerned with peasant poverty and rural 
regeneration.   
In addition to circles of readership and authorship, the mofussil intellectual 
milieu was also composed of patronage networks, which financed the printing and 
distribution costs of these texts.  Wealthy notables from the hinterland – often 
zamindars and wealthier townsmen – patronized mofussil authors.  In exchange for 
finance, patrons were usually eulogized in the texts.  For example, the second, 
enlarged, and illustrated version of Adarsha Krishak published in 1922 was financed 
partly by the Mymensingh District Board and the book was dedicated with “great 
respect and sincere gratitude” to Khan Bahadur Maulvi Syed Ahmed Chowdhury, a 
zamindar in Perduar and the first Chairman of the Mymensingh District Board.68  
Ashrafuddin Ahmed’s boyan, Muslim Bani (Comilla, 1927), was partially financed by 
Munshi Keramat Ali, the patron of the school in Laksham, Noakhali, where Ahmed 
taught.69  Networks of patronage that led to the publication of these texts were, 
sometimes, more complex.  The story of how Md. Khayer Ali’s boyan about the                                                         
66 Hamid, Shah Abdul, Krishak Bilap, Mymensing ,1922 
67 Abul Hossain, Banglar Bolshi, Dacca, 1926.   At the time of publication of this pamphlet, Abul Hussain 
was a lecturer at Dacca University but the essays in the book were written in the early 1920s when he was 
still a student.  Fazlul Karim was a landlord in Dacca, who had purchased the estate of Haturia – 60 miles 
from Dacca city - in 1919.   
68 Hai, A.F.M., Adarsha Krishak, Mymensingh: 1922, p. ii 
69 Ashrafuddin Ahmed, Moslem Bani, Comilla, 1927, p. 1.   
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floods in north Bengal in 1921 written in Shingra thana, Natore, came to be 
published in Calcutta indicates just how complex and extended these patronage 
works could be.   
  Khayer Ali introduces himself as a resident of Shingra thana in Natore district.   
He thanks two friends – Mafizuddin Mian and Mohammad Shoyebuddin Mian – for 
encouraging him to write about the floods in a rural idiom (“gramyo bhasha”).  A 
“Hindu bhadralok that I cannot name” provided some financial assistance and 
encouragement.  Then, Shubodh Chandra Majumdar – an “open-minded (udar-
prokriti) and enthusiastic (uthshaho-purno) young man” – sent him to Bogra to enquire 
into publishing the poem, where he found a press that would print the poem for a 
payment of a 180 rupees.  The publication was, in the end, made possible by a “god-
like great man” (debota shodrishho mahapurush) – who also refused to be named – who 
undertook the entire cost of the publication and even funded the poet’s visit to 
Calcutta.70 
 Occupying a position in-between the hinterland and the metropolis, these 
mofussil texts and their authors faced in both directions – towards cultivators in the 
countryside and towards metropolitan state institutions in Calcutta.  Texts addressed 
to cultivators consisted of didactic poems and pamphlets that held peasants 
responsible for their poverty and urged them to work harder, forego consumption, 
become savvier market operators, and – in some cases – become better Muslims.  
The second group of texts concerned legislative and representative politics, and were 
produced in the contexts of elections, colonial legislation, and the hinterland’s 
representation in the metropolis.   Below, I look at didactic texts written at cultivators                                                         
70 Ali, Md. Khayer, Bonya Kahini, Calcutta, 1922, pp. ii-iii   
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and, following that, I look at the printed materials of representative and legislative 
politics from the deltaic hinterland.   
 
 
REFORMING (MUSLIM) CULTIVATORS 
The primary question faced by mofussil intellectuals was how to restore the viability 
of market-based agrarian livelihoods.  One solution was to reform peasant 
production: for peasant households to work harder, reduce consumption, and 
produce commodities according to prevailing market prices.  In proposing this 
solution, mofussil intellectuals wrote didactic texts instructing cultivators to reform 
their livelihood practices.  Perhaps the most widely circulated, glossiest, and 
celebrated didactic text produced out of the mofussil during the 1920s was A.F.M. 
Abdul Hai’s pamphlet Adarsha Krishak or Ideal Peasant.  The first edition was 
published in 1920 in Mymensingh, and the second, expanded illustration replete with 
illustrations for “the benefit of illiterate cultivators” was published in 1922.  In his 
introduction, to Krishak Bilap (Mymensing, 1922) Shah Abdul Hamid acknowledged 
Adarsha Krishak as the Bengal peasant’s “buker dhon,” or heart-wealth.71    
 Hai states that he has written Adarsha Krishak to “advise peasants on the way 
out of poverty” and has presented vignettes of ideal peasant life as examples to be 
emulated.  The first such ideal farmer is Osman.  Osman is characterized by hard and 
constant work, a man who says “I will do first and then if I have time, I will advice 
other people to do the same.”  At the end of a hard days’ work in the fields he 
returns home to tend the chili plants and betel vines, spin cloth, make his own 
                                                        
71 Shah Abdul Hamid, Krishak Bilap, Banduldia: 1921, p. ii. 
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furniture, and dig a pond, scooping out earth bit by bit.  With hard work and 
abstinence (Osman does not smoke the hookah), he has managed to not just survive 
but prosper.  Osman is the counter-example to the general Bengal peasantry: 
 
 Hey Bengal’s illiterate peasant brothers, it was just the other day that 
you had used money from jute sales to build tin houses, borrowed 500 rupees 
to dig a large pond, borrowed money to pay for the wedding of your adored, 
piece-of-your-liver son … but today almost all of you are taking your families 
into the jungles of Assam.  Shame, shame shame, (chhi: chhi: chhi:), weren’t you 
the brave warriors who had won this country. 
 Know for certain that no one has defeated you; you have defeated 
yourselves.  Greed, cupidity, materialism and ignorance (lobh, mouho, maya o 
murkhota) are your eternal enemies.72 
 
 The second vignette is of an ideal farm called Shahbagh, where 2.5 acres of 
land supported rice, jute, a vegetable garden growing potatoes, chilis, garlic, onions, 
peas, tobacco and all kinds of vegetables, betel-nuts and vines, fruit trees, climbers 
that produce gourd and beans, and ducks, chickens, pigeons and goats.  The third 
vignette is of a farmer who has two tamarind trees in his house and supplements his 
income by making tamarind chutney and selling that in town.  The fourth vignette is 
of a zamindar returning from fishing – having caught a large carp or rui – and 
running into two boys returning from market, one having purchased a gourd and the 
other having bought koi fish, a kind of small perch.  The zamindar’s lectures the 
children on abstaining from purchasing such goods from market.   
 Hai’s pamphlet concludes with a 21-point programme for freedom, or mukti.  
The first of these points was about balancing household expenditure: “Every peasant 
will keep accounts of revenue and expenditure and will completely desist from all 
wasteful expenditure.”  The 21-point programme consisted reforming peasant                                                         
72 Hai, Adorsho Krishak, p. 33 
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production and consumption: farmers should keep aside enough land to grow paddy; 
they should plant cotton, sugar-cane, date-palms, betel-vines, and tobacco; they 
should not visit markets empty-handed but with some goods to sell; they should 
avoid litigation; they must not sell their land and use cash earnings to buy more land; 
they should not buy fish but catch their own fish; they should make their own 
umbrellas from bamboo, rather than purchase expensive imported umbrellas for 5 or 
6 rupees at market-places; and so forth.  In other words, the mofussil programme of 
peasant reform consisted of reducing market consumption by working harder to 
produce household necessities – a la Osman.  
 Adarsha Krishak does not provide a discussion of Islam, other than noting that 
Osman was pious as well as hardworking – he sang the call to prayers in the village 
mosque in between bouts of labour.  Islam was hardly invoked in depictions of ideal 
peasants or farms and piety was not part of Hai’s 21-point programme.  Hai’s text 
does, however, conform to an Islamic understanding of peasant immiseration and its 
remedies.  As I argue below, Islamic discourses of agrarian immiseration emphasized 
diligence, honesty, abstinence, and fairness as the religious ideals in the day-to-day 
conduct of market-based peasant livelihoods.  Despite this emphasis on Islam as an 
ethical basis for peasant production and consumption, Islamic and non-Islamic 
narratives of agrarian immiseration showed the same concatenation of forces at work 
– commodity markets, frivolous consumption, indebtedness, and dispossession.  I 
now turn to the main genre of peasant advice literature in the mofussil during the 
1920s – the boyan. 
 As a form of spoken poetry of rhyming couplets of even beat – meant to be 
recited aloud in public spaces – the boyan was particularly suited for the didactic 
purposes of instructing cultivators.  A series of boyans focused on agrarian 
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immiseration and jute cultivation were published in the delta’ small towns during the 
1920s.  Some of these boyans are so similar as to constitute almost the same poem, 
and shared the same stock phrases and couplets.  I would argue that the following 
poems can almost be read as the same poem: Abed Ali Mian’s Kali Chitra (Rangpur, 
1918) and Desh Shanti, (Rangpur, 1925), Kedaresvar Bandopadhyay’s Nabajug (Tangail, 
1922), Srinath Sarkar’s Desher Kotha, (Rangpur, 1922), Haripad Bandhopadhyay’s 
Desher Katha (Faridpur, 1927), Nagendrakumar De’s Bogra’r Kahini (Bogra, 1927), and 
Mahendranath Gun’s Pat Kahini, (Nilphamari, 1929).   
 These boyans constitute what may be called a non-Islamic discourse on jute, 
narrating how commodity and credit markets caused immiseration and instructing 
cultivators in the secular arts of savvy market operations.  For another group of poets, 
however, production and exchange were decidedly religious activities and 
impoverishment was a specifically Muslim issue.  I have included a Muslim poet, 
Abed Ali Mian, in the “non-Islamic” group because my division is not based on the 
religion of the author, but on narratives of peasant immiseration that were based on 
understandings of Islam.  The Islamic boyans that I discuss subsequently include Md. 
Akram Ali’s Keno Lok Gorib Hoy or Why People are Poor (Tippera, 1917), Abdul Aziz’s 
Najat (Noakhali, 1923), Ashrafuddin Ahmed’s Muslim Bani (Tippera, 1927), Abul 
Mohsen Mohammad Asghar Hossain’s Kalamal Haq ba Hok Katha (Sirajganj, 1932).  
Asghar Hossain’s Haq Katha (True Words) signals Muslim-ness not only by using 
Arabic word in the title (Haq), but also by having the book open to the right, like an 
Arabic book.   
 The boyans – whether Islamic or not – presented remarkably similar narratives 
of peasant pauperization through commodity markets and indebtedness.  They begin 
with graphic descriptions of peasant poverty.  Nagendrakumar De writes: “Half dead, 
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and wearing nothing but a loin cloth/Can’t get food, the loincloth wrapped body is 
skin and bones.”73  Impoverishment, the poets argued, was the cultivators’ fault.  
Cultivators chose to cultivate excessive quantities of jute and to rely on jute earnings 
to finance market-based livelihoods.  The poets offer stinging critique of jute 
cultivators’ market-dependent livelihoods and their consumption of market goods, 
addressing cultivators directly and accusing them of sowing jute out of greed (lobh) 
and stupidity (buddhinashok).  Haripod Bandopadhyay’s Desh’er Kotha states: “What 
have you done this time, krishak buddhinashok/Out of greed you sowed jute and now 
you sit and wonder why.74 Almost all of the poems take advantage of the rhyme 
chasha (farmer) and buddhinasha (lacking intelligence), or krishak and buddhinashok.  The 
following lines are from Abed Ali Mian’s Kali Chitra:  
Why did you sow much jute, chasha? 
This time you have drowned the country in jute, orey buddhinasha. 
I have been telling you won’t get returns, you didn’t listen krishokjona 
You lost rice by sowing jute, orey buddhinasha75 
 
The critique of market-oriented production was accompanied by a stinging 
critique of market-based consumption.  In these poets’ narratives, the primary driver 
of debt was frivolous and extravagant consumption: the rapidity with which 
cultivators blew their jute earnings on weddings, fancy clothes, toys, and haircuts and 
then fell into debt when they ran out of money to purchase rice.  Abed Ali Mian 
writes, in a standard trope that recurs in many of the poems: “With money from jute                                                         
73 “Adha mora kore chhara lengti obotar/pete bhat mile na lengti tena osthhi chormo shar,” 
Nagendrakumar De, Bogra’r Kahini, Bogra, 1927, p. 3 
74 “Ebar krishak buddhinashok ki koriley bhai/lobhey poriye pat buniye ekhon bhabchho boshe tai.” 
Bandopadhyay, Haripad, Desher Kotha, Faridpur, 1926 
75 “Eto paat dili ken tui chasha/Ebar pater chashey desh dubali orey buddhinasha/Boltey achhi dor hobey 
na, shunli na to krishokjona/Pat diye dhan harali, orey buddhinasha.”  Mian, Abed Ali, Kali Chitra, 
Rangpur: 1918, p. 3 
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sales/you have colorful weddings.”76  Frivolous consumption was frequently put 
down to babu-giri, the attempt to appear like middle-class babus rather than good, 
honest, down to earth farmers.  Several poets focus on cultivators’ “Albert cuts”, a 
distinctive hairstyle with a side-parting named for Prince Albert, Victoria’s grandson, 
who had toured India in 1889-90.  Mahendranath Gun wrote:  
 
Reddening your lips with paan and your hair with henna 
Albert cut with a slanted parting and fragrant oils 
You sit dressed as a full Babu 
And all the work is done by coolies from the west.77   
 
These poets criticized not only frivolous expenditure, but also subsistence 
consumption from markets.  Cultivators had forsaken subsistence rice cultivation out 
of greed, and were now forced to depend on markets for foods.  The following lines 
were repeated in both Abed Ali and Haripad Bandopadhyay’s poems: “Cultivating for 
twelve months and buying food for thirteen/Tell me, how many cultivators like that 
do you know in this country.”78  A recurring image was of jute cultivators forced to 
consume the inedible plant.  Abed Ali Mian writes: “You didn’t understand/Abed 
does not speak false/Mark my words in the end you will have to eat jute stalks.”79  
Nagendrakumar De is even more colourful: “You cultivate so much yet you don’t fill 
                                                        
76 “Pat bechi taka niya/rongo tamashay kori biya,” Abed Ali Mian Kali Chitra, 1918, p. 3 
77 Paan kheye thhot rangiye kolop diye chuley/Tera sheete Albert kete gondhoraj toiley./Ful babuti shejey 
tora thhakish boshiya./Kaaj korey shob pashchim hotey kuli ashiya.” Gun, Mahendranath, Pat Kahini, 
Nilphamari, 1929, p. 2 
78 “Baro mash abad kori tero mash khao kine/bolo dekhi she shob krishak deshe kojon chiney.” Haripad 
Bandopadhyay,Desher Katha, p. 8 
79 “Bujhli na tui bura’r beta/Abed’er kothha naiko jhuta/Khete hobe pat’er gora thhik janish mor bhasha.” 
Abed Ali Mian, Kali Chitra, Rangpur, p. 6 
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your stomachs, what will you eat?/ We will eat jute-seed rice and the jute-plant will 
give ghee.”80   
 These poems locate peasant pauperization in the operations of markets and 
prevailing prices of peasant produce and articles of consumption which drove 
peasant households into indebtedness.81  The focus on markets and commodity 
prices is most explicit in Haripad Bandopdhyay’s Desher Kotha, whose lines often read 
like a running ticker of prices of articles of consumption – rice, hilsa fish, salt, and 
cloth –and production – jute, sesame, mustard, tobacco, and garden vegetables.  The 
poets also focus on the unpredictability of jute prices.  Jute markets promise high 
prices and profits but in the end fail to deliver according to expectations.  Abed Ali 
Mian writes in Kali Chitra: 
What you got last year 
You won’t this year 
That year’s monsoons fulfilled your wishes 
You hoped to take home money 
That hope will be empty 
You will be ruined and you will be caught in debt.82   
  
 The villains of the marketplace are wily Marwari jute purchasers.  The 
enormous wealth amassed by Marwari jute traders was a common theme for these 
poets: “The Marwari comes from Bikaner/Empty-handed, turbaned with a lota in his 
hands/Within ten years his safe can’t contain his wealth/They have become 
                                                        
80 “Eto abad kore pet na bhore aar khaibo ki/pater bichir bhat khaibo gachhe hobe ghee” Nagendra 
Kumar De, Bogra Kahini, p. 2 
81 As I argued earlier in the chapter, debt was a regular feature of jute cultivation and debt was often 
incurred during periods of ecological and market crises.   
82 Goto shale peyechho jaha/E shale hobe na taha/Oi shaler borshar jonno mitechhe toder asha/Mone 
korechho nibo taka/She asha tor jabe phaka/Pochisher powa hobe tor, riney porbi thhasha,” Abed Ali 
Mian, Kali Chitra, Rangpur, p. 5 
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millionaires in Bikaner.”83  Marwari jute traders were generally referred to as “rokto-
shoshok” or bloodsuckers, who had enriched themselves by impoverishing 
cultivators.  The following verses are in both Abed Ali and Haripad Bandopadhyay’s 
poems: 
 
You take takas and takas in loans and hire labour to grow your jute  
Marwaris sit at home and offer a price of five takas 
They make mountains out of molehills, who understands them 
They sit on their beds, their stomachs weighing down on your shoulders.84   
 
Another cause of immiseration through expenditure was litigousness.  The 
poets decry “gramya daladali,” village factionalization that leads to frequent and 
expensive lawsuits.  Much like frivolous expenditure, drive peasant households into 
debt and poverty.  Haripad Bandopadhyay describes a lawsuit over a small plot of 
land, leading to litigation and ultimately enriching lawyers who build mansions in the 
mofussil towns.85  
The solution to impoverishment lay in market-savviness, in being cleverer 
market operators.  The poets urge cultivators to reduce market consumption by 
forsaking luxuries, producing household necessities, and by being clever in choosing 
the right mix of crops to produce judging by prevailing commodity prices.  The poets 
instruct cultivators in how to become savvier market operators.  Abed Ali Mian 
advises cultivators to stay away from jute for one year:  
                                                        
83 “Marwari gari chori ashe bikani hoitey/Khali hatey pagri mathha lota kore hatey.” Gun, Mahendranath, 
Pat Kahini, Nilphamari, 1929, p. 6 
84 “Taka taka mojur niya niran kulan kam/Marwarira ghore boshe pach take dey tham/Tiley tara talk ore 
ke bujhite pare/Thhake tara goditey boshey petta tomar ghare.” 
85 Bandopadhyay, Desher Katha, pp. 10-11 
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So I tell you there is still time if you want to do well 
Sit for a year and do not go to the jute fields 
The following year that jute will be forty takas 
Tell me then where will sorrow remain.86   
 
Similarly, Kedaresvar Bandopadhyay urges cultivators to grow more rice and less jute 
and to demand thirty rupees a maund for the jute they offered to market.87  Haripad 
Bandopadhyay lists out the relatively high prices of other crops, urging cultivators to 
grow those instead of jute:  
 
Sesame is four annas a sher, ten takas a maund 
You leave that behind and try to repay the mahajan with jute 
Tobacco is now selling for twenty-five takas a maund 
Leaving that behind you sow jute and sit and wonder 
Sow less jute in your fields 
Grow potatoes, ginger, tobacco, your desires will be fulfilled.”88   
 
This was a non-Islamic discourse on agrarian immiseration that located 
impoverishment in commodity markets and aimed to instruct cultivators in the 
secular arts of savvy market operations.  But production and exchange, as another set 
of poets maintained, were religious practices that were informed, or should have been 
informed, by Islamic ethics.  Similar to secular narratives of immiseration, Islamic 
economic discourses emphasized the role of commodity markets, frivolous 
expenditure, and litigiousness as the drivers of peasant poverty.  Narratives of Muslim 
                                                        
86 “Tai boli bhai achhe shomoy jodi bhalo chao/Ek bochhor boshe thhako paater khete na jao/Shei paat 
porer shale chollish taka hobe/bolo dekhi.” Abed Ali Mian, Kali Chitra, p. 12 
87 “Dhanyer abaad koro, pat kicchu dao/She pater proti mon tringsho mudra chao”, Kedaresvar 
Bandopadhyay, Nabajug, p. 8 
88 “Tiler sher chari anna, dosh taka tar maun/Sheshob krishi chhere diye pate shodh koribi 
mahajan/Tamak ekhon pochish taka maun bikri hoi deshe/Ta chhariya koshta diye bhabchho boshe 
boshe/Khetro poti koro he goti olpo pater chash/Alu ada tamak lagao mitiye jabe ash.”  Haripad 
Bandopadhyay, Desher Katha, p. 6 
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immiseration are distinct from non-Islamic narratives in that they identify poverty as 
specifically Muslim and the processes of immiseration as arising from failures in 
practicing Islam as a worldly religion. 
 Abdul Aziz begins his poem Najat (Noakhali, 1922) with the couplet: 
“Looking at Muslims today/Hai hai, my heart explodes.”89  Abdul Aziz proceeds to 
ask and answer: Who are the beggars? Muslims. Who lose their lands and homes 
through debt? Muslims. Whose households are depleted by malaria, cholera, small-
pox, kala-azar, and plague?  Again, Muslims.  Aziz bemoans the decline of a once 
proud race that had taught the world civilization (shobbhota) but is now widely 
addressed as uncivilized (oshobbho).  Having identified poverty as a Muslim issue, Aziz 
seeks to explain how the processes of immiseration were also specifically Muslim.  He 
argues that there were five causes of impoverishment – which constitute five sections 
of the long poem.  First, he faults Muslims for a loss of iman or faith, which manifests 
in Muslims not practicing their religion.  Second, Aziz blames impoverishment on a 
lack of unity (ekota) amongst Muslims, which results in village factionalism (gramya 
daladali), litigation, and the additional sin of lying. Third, Aziz argues that Muslims 
aversion to business and trade has led to immiseration, and emphasizes that 
commerce and the accumulation of capital is “halal,” or permitted in Islam.   Fourth, 
Aziz states that Muslims are impoverished by frivolous expenditure – a thoroughly 
un-Islamic activity: “Those who spend unnecessarily/Are the Devil’s brother.”90  
Fifth, the lack of education amongst Muslims keeps them below that of other races – 
specifically Hindus.   
                                                        
89 “Mussalman goney aaj dekhiya/ Hai Hai bukta jai fatiya,” Aziz, Abdul, Najat, Noakhali, 1922, p. 1 
90 “Behuda khoroch jeba korilo/Shoitaner bhai shei hoilo”, ibid., p. 8 
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 Aziz’s program constitutes a program of personal reform through the practice 
of Islamic virtues and ethics in the day-to-day conduct of livelihoods.  For Aziz, 
ebadat or prayer was not only about the prescribed motions of namaaz, but also in the 
worldly affairs of livelihoods: 
Listen all Mussalmans to this truth,  
All of a Mussalman’s works are prayer. 
Business, trade and sharecropping 
These are nothing but prayer (ebadat).91 
 
Mofussil Muslim intellectuals often portrayed Islam in terms of the everyday conduct 
of Muslims in household and commercial affairs.  Abdur Rahim’s boyan Nurul Islam or 
The Light of Islam (Dacca, 1924) describes the prevailing era of immiseration as kali kal, 
the dark ages, marked by sin (pap), the inability to distinguish right and wrong, and 
faithlessness.  Rahim’s book consists of five boyans depicting the un-Islamic lives led 
by the hinterland’s Muslims.  He locates “un-Islam” in two spheres – production and 
commerce and the peasant household.  The first boyan is about a Muslim cultivator 
cheating a fellow Muslim cultivator after falling into debt and ultimately swearing a lie 
with his hand on the Koran in the village arbitration; the second is the story of a 
boatman who steals part of a cargo of delicious mangos entrusted to him, selling a 
portion at a bepari’s river-dock; the third, about wayward, irreligious sons spoilt by 
their rich, indulgent fathers; the fourth about irreligious, wives who are out of purdah 
(beparda) and bad-tempered (bod mejaji); and the fifth about an extravagant wedding 
that leads to an unsuccessful marriage.  In each of these instances, good and bad 
Islamic practice is located in the day-to-day conduct of lives and livelihoods.  
                                                        
91 “Shuno bhai Mussalman ek hakikat/Mussalmaner shob kam ebadat./Babsha, banijya, adi karbar/Ebadat 
bina kichhu nahi aar.” ibid., p. 2 
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From this perspective of Islam as the ethics of everyday livelihood practices, 
jute markets were particularly un-Islamic.  Asghar Hussain’s Haq Katha (Sirajganj, 
1933) was published out of one of the largest jute towns’ of Bengal, and 
unsurprisingly Hussain provides a detailed account of jute transactions.  Hussain 
writes: “In jute all I see is theft/Look and see for yourselves, men and women.”92 He 
then proceeds to narrate a long list of thefts that take place in jute cultivation and 
trade: the theft of seeds from a neighbour’s field, the theft of a few strands of fibre to 
buy a cigarette in the market, the beparis theft when weighing small lots of peasant 
produce, the graders’ bribe in assessing quality, the theft in prices by dalals at the 
market, and the theft on rails and steamers.  Jute was a dishonest trade and 
participation in that trade was un-Islamic and, hence, impoverishing: 
The price of everything is revealed openly, 
But with jute the hand is under the cloth. 
When jute is sold you are cheated, 
Judge for yourself see how stupid you are.93   
  
Ultimately, both Islamic and non-Islamic poems of agrarian immiseration 
provided similar narratives of impoverishment through market dependence, frivolous 
consumption, litigiousness and indebtedness.  Both Islamic and non-Islamic poets 
preached reforms in cultivators’ engagements with commodity markets.  While one 
group instructed cultivators to become savvier market operators, producing 
according to prevailing commodity prices, the other urged cultivators to conduct 
                                                        
92“Koshta’s majhetey bhai shudhu dekhi churi/Kheyal koriya bujho joto noro nari” Asghar Hussain, Haq 
Kotha, Sirajganj, 1933, p. 18 
93 “Shokol chizer dor prokashiya bole/Paat Becha kaley haat kaporer toley/ Paat becha shesh holey dey 
torey roka/Bichar koriya dekho tumi koto boka” Asghar Hussain, Haq Kotha, Sirajganj, 1933, p. 19 
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their worldly activities according to Islamic ethics – to be hardworking, diligent, 
honest, and fair.  In both instances, this meant reducing the cultivation of jute, 
diversifying production, forgoing consumption, working harder, being honest, 
avoiding factionalism, and so forth.  More significant differences emerged between 
Hindu and Muslim mofussil intellectuals over legislative reforms of tenancy laws and 
credit markets.   
 
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
Shah Abdul Hamid’s Krishak Bilap or Peasant Extinction (Mymensingh, 1922) is a very 
different text than the didactic boyans discussed above.  Hamid’s text focuses on the 
state legislation of factor markets, rather than peasant self-reform.  He locates the 
beginnings of pauperization, as this thesis has done, to World War I and the 
disjuncture of rice and jute prices: “The price of rice rose from four takas a maund to 
seventeen takas and the price of jute, the Bengal peasant’s only source of wealth, fell 
to fourteen annas a maund.  As a result they simply could not survive out of the cash 
from jute sales.”94  He then narrates tales of impoverishment through indebtedness, 
hunger, floods and epidemics, indebtedness, dispossession, and ultimately flight to 
the “jungles of Assam.”   
Unlike the didactic texts discussed previously, Hamid advocated legislative 
solutions rather than instructing peasants to reform their livelihoods.  While Hamid 
recognized that a complex of factors worked in conjunction to impoverish cultivators, 
he identifies “Bengal’s uncompassionate, usurious moneylenders” as the primary                                                         
94 Shah, Krishak Bilap, p. 27 
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villain of the countryside.  The unscrupulous mahajan took advantage of cultivators’ 
distress by charging usurious interest rates and were currently dispossessing 
cultivators of their lands.  Hamid proposes legislating maximum rates of interest and 
that the return of peasant’s lands that had been sold on default.  He also advocates 
legislation of land tenure: cultivators’ rights to buy and sell land, the revision of land-
tax to lower rates, and making rent payable in two installments.  Hamid urged 
zamindars and mahajans to support such legislation as, in their absence, the Bengal 
peasantry would become extinct – and landlords and moneylenders would lose their 
sources of livelihood.   
Hamid’s text does not invoke Islam or make much of the fact that peasants 
were Muslim and zamindars and mahajans were Hindu.  In fact, he leans in the 
opposite direction – making much of the entry of Muslim jotedars into the 
moneylending business.  However, his mofussil readers would have immediately 
recognized Krishak Bilap as a Muslim text.  The politics of tenancy reforms had its 
roots in the praja movement, which began in the early 1900s and consisted of 
demands for enhanced tenancy rights for Muslim occupancy ryots vis-à-vis their 
Hindu zamindars.  Abul Mansur Ahmed dates the beginnings of the movement to a 
conference in Kamariar Char in Jamalpur in 1914.  This meeting was addressed by 
the leading mofussil Muslim intellectuals of the day – rising political stars of the 
hinterland, such as A.K. Fazlul Haq from Barisal and members of the ulama like 
Maniruzzaman Islamabadi, born in a village in Chittagong.  During the conference, 
speakers spoke against the oppression of zamindars, for the abolition of abwabs or 
payments in addition to rent, the right to buy and sell land at will, and the right to full 
  168 
use of their land and its resources, such as cutting trees, digging ponds, and so 
forth.95   
 The praja movement was not only about greater rights to the land and its 
resources, but also to demand for respectful treatment from Hindu zamindars.  Abul 
Mansur Ahmed’s remembrances of his childhood in rural Mymensingh are replete 
with stories of the struggle of his well to do and proud Muslim family’s to gain 
respect from their Hindu zamindar and his amlas.  As a child, Ahmed was particularly 
piqued at the fact that zamindari amlas referred to even older members of Muslim 
peasant families – murubbis – in the informal and disrespectful tui.  Ahmed even 
claims to have organized a praja conference in 1908, as a 9-year old boy, in his 
Mymensingh village, sending out invitations to various mosques, on “behalf of 
Dhanikhala’s ordinary prajas,” on torn out pieces of paper from his school notebook.  
The meeting resulted in a set of demands, including the provision of chairs for 
Muslim villagers in the zamindar’s cutcherry and the abolition of abwabs from Muslim 
cultivators for Hindu festivals.96   
 The politics of tenancy reform took on urgency with the onset of peasant 
impoverishment.  In Shah Abdul Hamid’s pen, praja demands were transformed into 
a question of the very existence of the Bengal peasantry.  Additionally, the movement 
took on the advocacy of credit market reforms in recognition of the sharply increased 
rates of interest.  Several political pamphlets authored by mofussil Muslims presented 
lists of ryots’ demands, which invariably included: the right to buy and sell land 
without paying fees, the rights to cut trees or dig ponds on the land, protection from                                                         
95 Ahmed, Abul Mansur, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor, p. 23 
96 ibid., pp. 10-12 
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zamindari oppression, the abolition of abwabs, limits to rates of interests, protection 
of land from alienation by moneylenders, the dissolution of outstanding debts, and so 
forth.97  Even though these texts do not always explicitly invoke Islam, their mofussil 
readers would have immediately recognized these arguments as Muslim.  The 
categories of religion and class had become so closely identified that arguing for 
peasants or against zamindars and mahajans was, in the eyes of contemporaries, the 
equivalent of arguing for Muslims or against Hindus.   
 The poetry of the jute tracts from the 1920s is replete with citations of Hindu 
zamindars, traders and moneylenders exploiting Muslim cultivators.  The exploitation 
of Muslim cultivators by “bijatis” or “other communities” was a dominant theme in 
the poetry of the 1920s.  Abbas Ali Nazir (Dacca, 1920) writes: “I think … of the 
great zamindar, Who does not recite the name of Allah even once in a month.  The 
raja, the zamindar, and their amla suck the praja like jackals and dogs.”98  The Muslim 
poets’ imperative to cultivators to go into business and commerce was to reverse the 
tide of exploitation.  Abdul Aziz (Noakhali, 1925) wrote: “Look other communities 
do business, and loot our money.”99  Aziz further urges Muslims to buy goods from 
Muslim shopkeepers, stating: “Remember, always buy from a Mussalman.  When you 
buy from a bijati’s shop, he will spend that money to worship his Shiva and Kali and 
Durga.  For a saving of two or four pice, do not disregard Islam.”100  In addition to                                                         
97 For example, the secretary of a ryot association association of Faridpur, Nazir-uddin Ahmed’s open 
letter to the Governor of Bengal, published in Calcutta in 1921 contained a long list of peasant demands, 
highlighting reforms of land and credit.  Ahmed, Nazir-uddin, Banglar Governor Bahadur Shomipe Abedon 
Nibedoner Khola Chithhi, Calcutta, 1921.   
98 Abbas Ali Nazir, Kali Fakirer Khela o Alimnagarer Nasihat, Dacca, 1920, cited in Chatterjee, Partha, 
“Agrarian Relations and Communalism,” p. 27 
99 “Dekho bhinno jati babosha koriya/amaderi taka nei lutiya.”  Abdul Aziz, Najat, p. 12 
100  Cited in Hashmi, Taj, “The Communalization of Class Struggle: East Bengal peasantry, 1923-1929,” 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1988, 25(1), p. 174 
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Hindu zamindars and traders, the oppression of lawyers was also identified as 
specifically Hindu.  Ashrafuddin Ahmed (Tippera, 1927) writes: “The Hindu lawyer 
babu, if he ever gets you, kicks you in the ass.”101  The image of a complex of non-
Muslim or bijati oppressors exploiting the Muslim peasantry was deeply entrenched in 
the mofussil worldview.   
The politics of agrarian relations of production in the delta were always and 
already religious politics– even if religion was not explicitly invoked.  Bengal’s Hindus 
also perceived land and credit reforms as specifically Muslim and, hence not national, 
issues.  Hindu nationalists saw state-promoted reforms of agrarian political economy 
– the Tenancy Amendment Bill, introduced in 1923, and the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in 1926 – as methods of colonial “divide and rule,” of buying Muslim 
support by conceding Muslim demands.102  Further, Hindu politicians feared that 
tenancy and credit reforms would erode their economic and political power in the 
countryside.  As the Amrita Bazaar Patrika noted in April 1927 about the proposed 
Tenancy Bill: “Muhammadan peasants will try to take advantage of this opportunity 
to place the zamindars in a tight corner.”103 
Historians have identified bitter debates in the legislative council over the 
Tenancy Amendment Act in 1928 as a key moment in the divergence of Hindu and 
Muslim politics during the 1920s.104   In the debates, mofussil Muslim members like                                                         
101 “Hindu ukil babu, pailey kobu, pondo mari dey boshi.”  Ashrafuddin Ahmed, Moslem Bani, Tippera, 
1927, p. 8 
102 Hashmi, “Communalization of Class Struggle,” pp. 176-177  
103 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 5 April 1927, cited in Hashmi, ibid., p. 176 
104 See, for example, Chatterjee, Partha, “Agrarian Relations and Politics in Bengal: Some Considerations 
on the Making of the Tenancy Act Amendment 1928,” Occasional Paper 30, Centre for Studies in Social 
Sciences, Calcutta, 1980.   
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Tamizuddin Khan (Faridpur), Nurul Haq Chaudhuri (Noakhali), Asimuddin Ahmed 
(Tippera), Muhammad Ismail (Mymensingh), Muazzam Ali Khan (Pabna), 
Kasiruddin Ahmed (Rangpur), Nausher Ali (Jessore), Nurul Haq Chaudhuri 
(Noakhali), Azizul Haque (Nadia), and Ekramul Haque (Murshidabad) proposed and 
voted en bloc series of amendments to enhance raiyat, under-raiyat and sharecropper 
rights to land vis-à-vis landlords. They encountered a unified Hindu opposition, led 
by members of the Congress and including all the Hindu representatives from the 
jute tracts.  Mofussil Muslim members were voted down and the Act did not 
significantly enhance cultivators’ property rights, though it did grant the right to 
alienate peasant lands.  The acrimonious tenancy debates led eighteen Muslim 
members to form a loose parliamentary group to champion tenancy rights, known as 
the Bengal Praja Party, which would subsequently transform into the Krishak Praja 
Party.  The Praja party emerged as a champion of agrarian factor market reforms.  In 
the 1936 elections the campaign pledge of liberating cultivators from landlord and 
moneylender exploitation saw them secure a spectacular electoral victory over the 
Muslim League in the hinterland’s rural constituencies.  Mostly-Muslim jute 
cultivators’ politics should not be seen purely in terms of spectacular episodes of 
peasant violence, but also in the everyday forms of electoral, representative and 
legislative politics that lay behind the peasant populist movement of the Krishak Praja 
Party. 
 
THE LEGISLATURE 
While falling far short of nationalist expectations, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
of 1919 introduced the processes of electoral, representative and legislative politics 
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into the jute hinterland.  Even though entirely toothless, the legislature provided a 
platform for mofussil voices to speak in representation of the jute hinterland.  In the 
very first budget session of the reformed council, mofussil members spoke out 
against the neglect of the hinterland.  Emaduddin Ahmed from Rajshahi stated: “I, 
being a mufassal member, turn over the pages of the Budget to see what provision 
has been made for mufassal towns and villages in the way of improving education, 
sanitation and medical relief; and I am forced to say that I turn over page after page 
only to be disappointed.”105  Wasimuddin Ahmed from Pabna also spoke for the 
mofussil: “The people in the mufassal pay the major portion of the first revenue of 
the province, and they are the people who contribute largely towards the export duty 
on jute and stamps which items go to swell the financial revenue of the province, and 
Government should provide largely for the material prosperity and the health of 
those people.”106   During budget discussions in 1927, Mohammad Sadeque of 
Noakhali protested against expenditures of the Calcutta Improvement Trust:  
This year Rs. 1,50,000 have been budgeted for the Calcutta Improvement 
Trust.  The funds for its operation are mainly derived from the terminus tax 
and jute cess, both of which come from the resources of the country.  It is a 
matter of great wonder that the civilized government of the twentieth century 
should tax the jute growers of Bengal, who live in the swamps of Eastern 
Bengal wrecking with malaria, kala-azar and every form of epidemic, underfed, 
underclothed, scarcely able to find a glass of pure drinking water within 20 
miles of their cottage, to rear palaces in Calcutta and to pave the streets of the 
city with dust-proof-tar-macadam.107 
 
Members from the mofussil could and did agree on certain pieces of 
legislation that favoured the hinterland.  Indu Bhushan Dutt from Tippera moved a                                                         
105 BLC, Vol, I, No. 4, p. 113 
106 ibid., p. 121 
107 BLC, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1927, p. 72 
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resolution in 1921 recommending that “the Government to take steps to circulate in 
Bengali, to all the union boards, municipalities, and co-operative societies in Bengal, 
weekly statements of the price of jute, cotton, oilseeds and other country produce, 
prevailing in the foreign importing markets.”108  Dutt argued that lack of information 
about markets for global commodities was “one of the numerous causes of scarcity in 
India” and that “it is the duty of Government to supply the cultivator with accurate 
information as to what price his produce is getting in the foreign markets.”   Mofussil 
members across the board supported Dutt; in the words of Shah Abdur Rauf of 
Rangpur they saw in the proposal a means of "protecting these illiterate people from 
being duped by middlemen, who make a large profit out of the labours of these poor 
agriculturists.”109  Haridhan Dutt, a member from Calcutta, opposed the bill on the 
grounds that the money on circulating this information to illiterate cultivators would 
be better spent on educating them to read, but he carefully noted: “coming here as a 
representative of this city [Calcutta], I am very loath to do anything or to take any 
step that might offend our mufassal friends.”110  The resolution was passed with a 
large margin, with Haridhan Dutt’s “mufassal friends” voting in block against 
metropolitan representatives.  Indu Bhushan Dutt was not surprised: “I am glad that 
I have got the support of the mufassal members; that was only natural.”111 
However, the mofussil members split along Hindu and Muslim lines when it 
came to discussions of tenancy reform.   Muslim legislators’ focus on agrarian factor 
markets enabled them to claim the mantle of peasant leadership in Bengal politics                                                         
108 BLC, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 117 
109 ibid., p. 121 
110 ibid., p. 122 
111 ibid. p. 126 
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from mofussil Hindu members.  In the aftermath of the Great Depression and the 
accompanying credit crisis, the legislative council shifted its focus to credit market 
reforms.  In August 1933, Azizul Huque moved the Bengal Moneylenders Bill which 
intended to set maximum interest rates and provide for the retrospective 
recalculation of debts based on these lower rates.  In November 1935, Khwaja 
Nizamuddin on behalf of the government moved the Bengal Agricultural Debtors 
Bill, a bill introduced by the central government into all of British India’s provinces, 
proposing to establish Debt Conciliation Boards to reach settlements on outstanding 
loans.112   
Hindu mofussil members doggedly opposed both pieces of legislation.  With 
regard to the Moneylenders Bill, a section of Congress-aligned mofussil Hindu 
members argued for limitations on the geographic scope of the act, stricter 
definitions of who is a moneylender, and to raise the ceiling on interest rates.  
Similarly, in discussions on the Agricultural Debtors Bill, Congress-aligned politicians 
attempted to set limits on how low debts could be re-settled or how long repayment 
of the newly-negotiated debt could be delayed.  In both debates, Muslim mofussil 
members positioned themselves on the side of debtors and in sync with the popular 
demand for factor reforms.  Discussions on tenancy reform in 1928 and credit 
reforms in 1933 and 1935, allowed Muslim mofussil members to burnish pro-peasant 
and Muslim credentials and depict the Congress as a party of zamindars, 
moneylenders, and traders – that is, of Hindu exploiters. 
 
                                                        
112 The Bill was based on the recommendations of the Bengal Board of Economic Enquiry and an 
experiment with debt reconciliation in Chandpur.  In Chandpur, 39 debt conciliation boards dealt with 
1,996 cases, and awarded 244,795 rupees to creditors against a total claimed debt of Rs. 506,234, BLC, Vol. 
XLVI, No. 2, p. 495 
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*   *   * 
 
The Government of India Act of 1935 extended the franchise and empowered 
provincial governments, even while centralizing more powers at the centre.  The 
“communal award” created 117 reserved seats for Muslims, 78 general seats, and 10 
reserved seats for the depressed classes in an assembly out of a total 250 seats.  Of 
the 117 Muslim constituencies, 111 were rural and of the 78 general, 66 were rural.  
The campaign to capture provincial power in Bengal was conducted in the 
countryside.   Under the leadership of A.K. Fazlul Huq, mofussil Muslim legislators 
and politicians broke away from the Nikhil Bangla Praja Samiti and formed the 
Krishak Praja Party.  Joya Chatterji describes the leadership of the KPP – Fazlul Huq, 
Abul Mansur Ahmed, Abdul Majid, Shamsuddin Ahmed, Tamizuddin Khan, Shah 
Abdul Hamid and Nausher Ali – as “men [who] had acquired some education and 
had made their careers in mofussil towns, while retaining the cultural mannerisms of 
the country-side.”113   
 This grouping of mofussil Muslim politicians focused their campaign on 
tenancy and credit reforms.  At a conference in Dacca in April 1936, the KPP 
announced its fourteen-point campaign platform.  They promised to abolish 
zamindari without compensation, to reduce rents, to provide for agricultural credit, to 
enact legislation to protect cultivators from tenants.  Of the fourteen demands, three 
related to the tenancy reforms and four to credit market reforms.  In addition to land 
and credit reforms, the KPP promised irrigation, health-care, primary education, 
provincial autonomy, reductions in administrative expenditure and the release of 
                                                        
113 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, p. 74 
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political prisoners.  The KPP’s campaign did not focus on Islam, unlike their Muslim 
League rivals in the hinterlands’ Muslim constituencies.  They did not need to invoke 
Islam – their politics of agrarian factor markets were recognizably a part of Muslim 
politics.  The campaign of “rice and daal for everyone,” “the land belongs to the 
tiller,” and the abolition of debt was enormously successful amongst eastern Bengal’s 
mostly-Muslim cultivators, and the KPP trounced the Muslim League in Bengal’s 
rural Muslim constituencies.  In the next chapter, I look at how this avowedly pro-
peasant political party struggled to reverse the course of agrarian imisseration under 
colonial conditions.  
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Chapter 4 
The Politics of Jute Prices:  
The state, commodity markets, and the Bengal Famine,  
1930 to 1944 
 
In 1943 and 1944, around 3 million people died in Bengal from starvation and 
hunger-related causes.1   The jute tracts of eastern and northern Bengal were hit 
hardest by famine.  The most immediate cause of famine was a sharp rise in the price 
of rice in late 1942 and early 1943.  Rice prices began to rise in November 1942, from 
Rs. 8/8/-  a maund and reached about Rs. 12/8/- in early January.2  Between January 
and March 1943, rice prices rose steeply across Bengal, increasing from Rs. 12/4/- to 
Rs. 31/- in Faridpur and from Rs. 9/8/- to Rs. 25/- in Tippera.3  Hunger was most 
acute between March and November 1943, but famine mortality continued into 1944, 
as starvation, disease and government mismanagement of post-famine food 
distribution programs took their full toll. 
Death and destitution was highest amongst landless agricultural labourers and 
amongst individuals who earned cash incomes from trades and crafts – fishermen, 
barbers, etc.  The delta’s subsistence jute cultivators were also severely affected by 
rising rice prices, as the price of jute did not rise nearly as rapidly as that of rice.4   On                                                         
1 Amartya Sen puts the figure at 2.7 to 3 million and Paul Greenough at between 3.2 and 3.8 million.   
2 FIC, p. 28 
3 FIC, p. 40 
4 The Famine Inquiry Commission Report of 1945 and Mahalanobis, et. al.’s statistical study of the “After-
effects of the Bengal Famine of 1943” - the two most thorough investigations into the famine in the 1940s 
– does not mention of jute.  As Sugata Bose has remarked, Amartya Sen’s pioneering study of the Bengal 
famine does not consider terms of trade between rice and jute, though he does look at exchanges between 
rice and wheat, mustard-oil, cloth, bamboo umbrellas, milk, fish and haircuts.  Bose has argued that this 
strange neglect of the region’s most significant cash crop in the scholarly literature means that “there is no 
explanation of the ways in which the famine affected the whole spectrum of the poor in the Bengal 
countryside.”  Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 94. 
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July 21, 1942, at the opening of the jute season, Calcutta jute mills were paying Rs. 
6/8/- per maund for the lowest quality jute and Rs. 9/8/- for better qualities.  
Cultivators in the mofussil were most likely receiving between Rs. 5 and 5/8/- per 
maund for their jute – barely sufficient to cover costs of cultivation.  In November 
1942, when news of Britain’s victories over Germany in North Africa reached 
Calcutta, prices rose by about Rs. 1/8/- per maund across the board.  By May 1943, 
prices were greater than Rs. 14 and Rs. 17 depending on quality and continuing to 
rising.  In June, the Indian Jute Mills Association put a stop to the increase in jute 
prices by setting maximum prices at Rs. 14 and Rs. 16/8 for bottoms and mediums.5  
Jute prices had doubled between July 1942 and May 1943, while Calcutta rice prices 
had almost quadrupled from Rs. 8 in July 1942 to Rs. 30/10/- in mid May, 1943.  
More significantly, however, for subsistence jute cultivators the rise in fibre prices 
occurred too late.  The bulk of the delta’s cultivators would have already sold their 
jute at the very low prices prevailing at the opening of the 1943 season.6  Jute 
cultivators’ meager earnings from jute sales from prices prevailing between July and 
October 1942 could not finance purchases of subsistence grain between March and 
May 1943.   
High rice prices had affected small agriculturists very differently than it had 
landless labourers and poorer occupational categories.  As P.C. Mahalanobis and his 
colleagues argue, based on a sample survey of the after-effects of famine conducted 
in 1945, people living by agriculture or a combination of agriculture and labour                                                         
5 As I will show later in the chapter, the IJMA was able to act as a cartel and set jute prices during the War 
as their mills consumed about 70% of Bengal’s raw jute.   
6 H.S.M Ishaque, Director of Rural Reconstruction and Chief Controller of Jute Regulation noted in March 
or April 1943 that the improvement in jute prices had benefitted middlemen rather than cultivators.  
Quoted in Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal, pp. 91-92.   
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suffered from “economic deterioration” rather than “destitution.”  Small cultivators 
without sufficient grain for household subsistence certainly suffered hunger and 
deprivation of a magnitude not experienced in Bengal since the late eighteenth 
century.  Cultivators did not have recourse to high interest loans as they had in 
previous times of distress - the moneylender had departed agrarian Bengal, driven out 
by debt settlement boards established in large numbers after 1937.  Subsistence jute 
cultivators sold their limited assets and their cultivable lands in a desperate attempt to 
purchase subsistence grain.  Mahalanobis has estimated that between April 1943 and 
April 1944, about 920,000 families sold arable lands, out of whom 260,000 sold all 
their lands.  670,000 families mortgaged arable land, out of whom about 103,000 also 
sold some of their land.7  The incidence of land-sales was greatest amongst cultivators 
with smaller landholdings, that is, amongst subsistence jute cultivators (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Peasant families’ sales of land, April 1943 to April 19448 
(percentages out of total number of peasants families in each landholding category) 
 
 
Sold all arable land Sold part arable land 
 
Less than 2 acres 240,000 (6.1%) 300,000 (7.4%) 
Between 2 and 5 acres 20,000 (1.2%) 250,000 (15.3%) 
More than 5 acres 4,000 (0.4%) 110,000 (12.5%) 
 
 Another, less tragic, fatality of the famine was the image and reputation of 
Bengal’s populist Chief Minister, A.K. Fazlul Haq.  Fazlul Haq and his Krishak Praja 
Party had come to power in the 1936 elections on a campaign pledge of rice and dal                                                         
7 Mahalanobis, p. 339 
8 Compiled from Mahalanobis, pp. 339-340 
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for everyone.  As early as 1940, Fazlul Haq and his government were being attacked 
for failing to provide for everyone’s dal bhat.  In a remarkable speech in the assembly, 
Haq disavowed the popular election slogan: “What I said in the manifesto was this: 
‘the problem of dal bhat is the problem to-day.’  That does not mean I have got dal 
bhat in my house … which anybody can come and eat … If there was anyone who 
believed that I would give dal bhat to five crores of people he must be a fool.  Not 
only that, he must be living in a fool’s paradise.”9  Even before the famine struck, 
Fazlul Haq’s reputation as the champion of the peasantry had been challenged.  As 
Atul Krishna Ghose announced in September 1941, “a large section of the people in 
Bengal have lost their confidence in Mr. A.K. Fazlul Haq.  He knows it, I know it, 
and everybody knows it … The people who once adored Maulvi A.K. Fazlul Haq … 
have now lost their confidence in him.”10 
Famine was the deathblow to the political reputation of an already 
beleaguered Chief Minister.   In March 1943, John Herbert, Bengal’s autocratic 
imperial governor, forced Haq’s resignation on grounds of incompetence and loss of 
legitimacy. Just prior to his forced resignation, Haq had delivered a forceful speech 
condemning the Governor and the colonial bureaucracy for the impending 
humanitarian crisis and the hugely unpopular boat-denial and rice-denial policies of 
the government.  In early 1942, after the Japanese invasion of Burma, the 
government seized boats that could carry ten or more passengers and procured rice 
in coastal districts - to deny food-stocks and transportation to an invading Japanese 
army from across the Bay of Bengal.  In speeches after his forced resignation, Haq                                                         
9 An exasperated Nalikshya Sanyal, the party whip of the opposition Congress, blurted out, “This is just 
like you!”, BLA, 9th Session, 1940 Calcutta, p. 187 
10 BLA, LX, No. 4, 1941, p. 73 
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pinned the blame for famine on the colonial Governor and the “whims and caprices 
of hardened bureaucrats to many of whom autocratic ideals are bound up with the 
very breath of their lives.”11 
Without absolving or assigning blame and responsibility for causing famine, it 
is worth remembering that the root cause of the famine was the unequal rise in 
commodity prices during World War II and the worsening exchange between rice 
and other commodities – especially labour.  One way of thinking about the state’s 
“failure” in famine is, therefore, to consider the government’s role in commodity 
markets, and its ability or lack thereof to influence commodity prices.  In this chapter, 
I will look at ideas and practices of government intervention into jute markets and 
regulation of jute prices during the depression years of the 1930s and the turbulent 
years of World War II.   
The sharp drop in commodity prices in the great depression had sparked 
considerable global debate on what governments could and should do to control 
commodity prices.  In Bengal, the discussion focused on jute, the “life-blood of 
Bengal’s economy.”  In the next section, I will look at various ideas of government 
intervention into jute markets between 1930 and 1936, prior to the political reforms 
of Government of India Act.  The Montagu-Chelmsford era provincial government’s 
sole measure was a “voluntary restriction scheme” – a government-run propaganda 
campaign to persuade cultivators to produce less jute.  Nationalists of all stripes 
pilloried the provincial government for its lack of action.  A wide variety of schemes 
of government involvement in the jute trade were aired by various stripes of 
politicians in Bengal.  The critique of government’s inaction constituted a nationalist                                                         
11 BLA, LXV, 1943, p. 46 
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vision of a more pro-active state, actively intervening in markets for the good of the 
nation and the nation’s peasants.  
 In 1937, A.K. Fazlul Haq’s Krishak Praja-Muslim League coalition 
government came to power, following a populist campaign promising reforms in land 
tenure and credit markets, higher prices in produce markets, and rice and dal for 
everyone.  The second section of this chapter looks at measures taken by the new 
government to influence jute prices.  The peasant populist government was slow in 
turning its attention to jute prices, focusing their initial energies on establishing debt 
settlement boards and wiping clean cultivators’ debt burdens. The government only 
turned its attention to jute produce markets when prices slumped at the opening of 
the 1939 jute season in July.  Government intervention was almost immediately 
followed by the beginnings of WWII, with Britain declaring war on Germany on 
September 1939.  The government’s attempts to “stabilize” jute prices took place 
against the backdrop of extreme market turbulence driven by war-related events.  
Under the leadership of the H.S. Suhrawardy, Commerce and Labour Minister from 
1937 to 1941, the government attempted to influence spot-prices in the hinterland by 
setting minimum and maximum prices in futures markets, to create bull runs by 
issuing press communiqués, and by persuading or cajoling the IJMA to agree to 
minimum prices and purchase schedules.  Under the leadership of the Tamizuddin 
Khan, Agriculture Minister from 1939 to 1941, the government tried to influence 
prices by reducing supply – through the compulsory restriction of jute acreage.  
These measures failed to establish government control over the price of jute. 
 Before turning to a detailed account of ideas and practices of state 
intervention in jute markets, I will briefly sketch equally failed attempts to regulate 
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rice prices just before and during the 1943 famine.  Rice prices began to rise from 
May 1942 after the Japanese invasion of Burma, an important source of grain for 
Bengal.  In June, the Government of Bengal issued an order fixing maximum 
wholesale prices of medium and coarse rice in Calcutta markets at Rs. 5/12/- per 
maund.  The prevailing theory was that hinterland prices were determined by 
metropolitan prices and that “breaking the Calcutta market” was key to setting prices.  
Maximum prices drove stocks underground, as traders held back stocks, dealt in 
black markets, or exported rice out of Bengal. The last factor led the government to 
ban all exports of rice except under permit in July 1942.  As stocks of rice ran low in 
Calcutta, the government distributed the “denial rice” it had procured from coastal 
districts in case of a Japanese invasion through controlled shops at maximum prices.  
Despite these measures, prices of rice did not fall to the stipulated minimum and 
government fought shy of enforcing its rules: “district officers were instructed not to 
enforce the control prices except in cases of gross profiteering.”12   
  The alarming rise in rice prices in November and December 1942, once again 
forced government action.  The government’s primary concern was to feed 
metropolitan Calcutta without driving up rice prices.  In order to do so, the 
government setup a procurement scheme.  On December 22nd 1942, District Officers 
in Rajshahi Division were instructed to purchase 4,700 tons of rice at maximum 
prices.  Air raids over Calcutta in late 1942 led to a sense of panic, and the 
government adopted a more ambitious procurement scheme to ensure that the 
metropolis would be fed.  When the scheme was abandoned on January 9, 1943, the 
government had managed to procure only 2,800 tons.  Under the new scheme,                                                         
12 FIC, p. 29 
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private grain-dealing agencies were appointed to purchase 11,021 maunds of rice and 
16,532 tons of paddy at prescribed ceiling prices.  The agents were warned that their 
licenses would be cancelled if they were found to be trading at higher than those 
prices.  Rice was still not forthcoming.  Between January 10 and February 17, when 
the scheme was abandoned, agents had procured only about 2,200 tons.  The 
government then decided to purchase grain on its own account, through a 
Foodgrains Purchasing Officer.  The government too failed to procure any 
meaningful quantity of rice – about 3,000 tons between February 18 and March 11.   
 At government’s ceiling prices rice was simply not forthcoming.  In its 
determination to feed the metropolis, the government reversed its price policies – 
they would remove maximum price restrictions and allow prices to rise in the hope 
that rice would begin to flow into Calcutta.  On March 11, 1943, the provincial 
government announced “No Price Control in Wholesale Rice and Paddy markets.”  
District officers were instructed to purchase up to 20,000 maunds of rice in the first 
three days irrespective of price, and to report all subsequent offers to the Foodgrains 
Purchasing Officer.  Prices rose sharply in Calcutta markets from Rs. 15/- per maund 
on March 3 to Rs. 30/10/- on May 17.   High prices did the trick – grain was released 
and Calcutta was fed.  The countryside, however, starved.  The famine was thus 
preceded by the government’s failure to regulate rice prices.  Later in this chapter, I 
will provide a more detailed account of similarly disastrous attempts by the 
government to regulate jute prices in the years leading up to the famine.  Before that, 
I will discuss the range of ideas and schemes of state intervention in commodity 
markets in the aftermath of the great depression.   
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IDEAS OF STATE INTERVENTION, 1930-36 
One of the most widely discussed topics in Bengal, in the aftermath of the great 
depression, was what governments should and could do to raise the prices of fibre?  
The Montagu-Chemsford era government was not, however, willing to take any 
substantive measures.  Their main response to the depression was fiscal retrenchment 
– cutting down expenditure in line with the sharp falls in government revenue from 
the various jute-related taxes and from peasants’ non-payment of rents.  The sharpest 
cuts were in the so-called nation-building departments – agriculture, irrigation, and 
local government.   On the other hand, in the face of Congress’s Civil Disobedience 
Program and rising revolutionary terrorism – highlighted by the daring Chittagong 
armoury raid in April 1930 – the cash-strapped colonial government increased 
expenditure on police and prisons.  Far from offering material assistance to those 
affected – aside from token disbursements of small loans to a handful – the colonial 
government retrenched.  
Anti-colonial nationalists seized upon the colonial government’s inaction at 
the onset of the depression.  K.G.M. Faroqui, the Agriculture Minister and a 
prominent Muslim zamindar with landholdings spread over several districts of 
eastern Bengal, was singled out for particular criticism.  Naresh Chandra Sengupta, a 
representative from Mymeningh and the leader of the Congress-affiliated Peasants 
and Workers Party, castigated Faroqui for “sit[ting] tight in his cool Himalayan home” 
while the “great crisis … made people frantic with fear.”13  In discussing the 
depression era budget of 1931-32, Hassan Ali, the member from Dinajpur, asked the 
following rhetorical questions: “Have the Government … ever thought of the poor                                                         
13 BLC, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1931, Calcutta, p. 692 
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agriculturists of Bengal?  Have they ever given any thought over the controlling of 
prices of jute?  Have the Government … ever bothered themselves about how to 
organize the rice market so that the poor cultivators might not have fallen a hopeless 
victim to such a serious slump in commodity prices?  The answer is ‘No.’”14   
The solitary measure undertaken by government to raise jute prices was a 
scheme of voluntary restriction – a state-sponsored propaganda campaign urging 
cultivators in the delta to sow less jute.  This was risk-free government action on the 
cheap and fell far short of the much more comprehensive state interventions 
championed by anti-colonial nationalists.   And even then the state’s voluntary 
restriction campaign was slow to get underway.  In the March and April 1931 sowing 
season, it was limited to distributing just three pamphlets – two urging a reduction in 
the area under jute and the third suggesting sugarcane as an alternative to jute – in the 
delta’s jute tracts.15  The reduction in acreage in 1931 – by almost 50% - was almost 
certainly due to the disastrous collapse in prices in 1930 rather than the three 
pamphlets, but this did not stop K.G.M. Faroqui from proclaiming that the 
government’s campaign was successful.  However, as acreage steadied and prices 
stagnated in following years, it became difficult to continue claiming success. 
The provincial government responded by intensifying its propaganda scheme.  
During the sowing seasons – March and April – of each year during the 1930s, the 
government conducted an intensive anti-jute propaganda campaign in the delta’s jute 
tracts.  In March 1935, Faroqui informed the Legislative Council that 1,084 officials                                                         
14 ibid., p. 154 
15 BLC, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1931, p. 175 
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and 40,384 non-officials had participated in anti-jute propaganda.16  District-level 
administrations competed with each other over the success of their restriction 
programmes.17  Government ministers and prominent provincial politicians – men 
like Faroqui and Azizul Huque, Minister of Education – toured the jute tracts 
extensively and spoke to cultivators on the need to reduce cultivation.18  Further, 
state propaganda message was spread through a wider variety of media than just 
printed leaflets.  In 1934 Jute Commission recommended the use of ““wireless, 
cinema and magic lanterns” in anti-jute propaganda.19  Government distributed 
posters with captions like: “Intelligence is the gift of God.  Utilize properly and you 
will get plenty.  If you cultivate like a fool you will have to suffer afterwards” and 
“Who is the fool who says wealth comes in abundance by cultivating Jute.  Did 
people die of starvation when there was no cultivation of Jute in our land?”20  These 
captions show the affinity between government propaganda and the anti-jute boyans 
discussed in the previous chapter.  “Restrictionism,” which emerged as an 
international economic concept in the aftermath of the depression, took its particular 
form in Bengal from well-established and local anti-jute discourse. 
                                                        
16 BLC, Vol. XLV, No. 1, 1935, p. 432 
17 The Collector of Tipperah took particular pride in the success of the restriction program in his district, 
as he noted in a circular distributed during the sowing season of 1934.  Enclosed in, Thomas, Duff & Co, 
Calcutta, to Mr. Batchelor, Thomas Duff & Co., 17th February, 1936, MS/86/V/7/2, DUA. 
18 In a lunch meeting at the Calcutta Club with Sir Alexander Murray, a Director of Thomas Duff & Co 
visiting from Dundee, Education Minister Azizul Huque announced his “determined object of doing all he 
can to influence the ryot to curtail sowings.” rom Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Batchelor, Thomas 
Duff & Co., 30th March, 1936, MS/86/V/7/2, DUA. 
19 Jute Commission Report, 1934. 9 
20 Enclosed in from Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., 11th March, 1937, 
MS/86/V/7/3, DUA 
  188 
Intensive propaganda failed to raise jute prices.  Jute production did not 
decrease below that of 1931 levels and, in fact increased in 1933, as jute prices 
stabilized around Rs. 5 per maund.  While still barely profitable, jute was a more 
paying cash crop than rice and, despite the state’s championing of alternative cash-
crops, the low-lying alluvial floodplains that formed most of the jute tracts were not 
suitable for sugar-cane or tobacco.  More significantly, reducing output was unlikely 
to raise prices. Jute mills had taken advantage of the unusually low prices of 1931-32 
to build up enormous stocks of jute, and could stay away from markets for extended 
periods.  In 1935, after four consecutive years of propaganda and persistently low 
fibre prices, K.G.M. Faroqui admitted to the legislature that restriction was not 
affecting futures market prices: “It is well known that there are speculative elements 
in the jute market which affect prices.  It is not possible to point to a particular cause 
or causes which might have led to this weakness in the market, nor can one foretell 
whether this is only temporary or not.”21   
The failures of voluntary restriction led to the proposal of alternative 
government measures to raise jute prices.  The most widely voiced alternative was 
compulsory restriction – setting acreage quotas for individual peasant households and 
punishing them if they exceeded set quotas.  In February 1931, as the provincial 
government commenced its leaflet programme for voluntary restriction, Naresh 
Chandra Sengupta moved the Bengal Jute Bill (II) in the legislative council.  The son 
of a District Magistrate from Tangail in East Bengal, Sengupta was a graduate of 
                                                        
21 BLC, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, 1935, p. 339 
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Presidency College, a successful lawyer, and a prominent Bengali novelist.22  He was 
also the founder-chairperson of the Congress-affiliated Peasants’ and Workers’ Party.  
The Bengal Jute Bill (II) was a watered-down version of Bengal Jute Bill (I) which 
never made it on to the floor of the legislative council for discussion as it required the 
Governor-General’s approval.  Bill (I) provided for compulsory restriction by 
legislation and required approval; Bill (II) merely empowered Union Boards to 
specify actual quantities of land to be sowed by each individual cultivator.  Aggregate 
quantities of jute to be cultivated in Bengal would be set by a committee of experts 
who would forecast likely demand for the fibre, and those numbers would be 
translated into precise targets for each union.  Though significantly diluted from its 
original version, the Bengal Jute Bill (II) was consistent with Sengupta’s broader 
economic vision – total state control over jute cultivation and trade. 
Sengupta’s political opponents included the mofussil Muslim members of the 
Council Praja Party, particularly Azizul Huque and Tamizuddin Khan.  They opposed 
Sengupta’s scheme on grounds that “Union Boards had not yet reached that standard 
of efficiency.”23  As the government’s propaganda campaign failed to reduce acreage, 
the popularity for compulsory restriction schemes increased.  In a December 1934 
speech opposing compulsory restriction on the grounds that “at the present state of 
development of union boards … there is a danger of the law being abused, and poor 
people being oppressed,” Tamizuddin Khan admitted that “opinion gradually has 
grown in the country in favour of restriction.”24  While registering his opposition to                                                         
22 Sengupta was the chairman of the All-India Association of Progressive Writers formed in 1936 to 
condole the death of Maxim Gorky and, like the more celebrated Urdu progressive writers, was accused of 
indecency and immorality for his depictions of sexuality in a short story, “Thandidi.”   
23 BLC, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 1931, p. 320 
24 BLC, Vol. XLIV, No. 1, 1934, p. 81 
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compulsory restriction in the report of the jute committee, Azizul Huque admitted 
that: “mofussil opinion … is almost unanimously and emphatically in favour of such 
restriction by legislation.”25  By 1935 with persistently low jute prices, Tamizuddin 
Khan admitted that compulsory restriction could be required in the future.26  
Restriction, however, was not the only policy option on the table.  In October, 
1930, in a conference of metropolitan capital organized by the Bengal National 
Chamber of Commerce, Nalini Ranjan Sarkar proposed two forms of state 
intervention – voluntary restriction and a permanent, state-owned entity to regulate 
and intervene in markets.  Originally from Mymensingh, Sarkar was one of the “big 
five” of the Bengal Congress, a self-made businessman who had made a fortune in 
insurance, and president of the BNCC.  Sarkar proposed a scheme of “intensive and 
extensive propaganda so as to bring home to the cultivators the need for growing 
only a limited quantity of jute government.”  He was against compulsory restriction 
on the grounds that “the smallness of the holdings, the number of cultivators, the 
wide area of jute cultivation” made state-enforced production quotas impossible.  
The colonial government took up this scheme of voluntary restriction quite readily 
but ignored the second part of Sarkar’s proposals, which were much more ambitious, 
interventionist and potentially costly.   
Sarkar proposed the creation of an “Institute for the Permanent Defence of 
Jute.”27  Sarkar’s Institute would be financed by a tax on jute, and would perform 
                                                        
25 ibid., p. 187 
26 BLC, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 1935, p. 344 
27 Sarkar modeled his institute after the identically named Institute for the Permanent Defense of Coffee in 
Brazil.  The idea of a Jute Institute had precedence.  The Royal Commission on Agriculture had proposed 
the creation of a jute committee focusing on cultivation and marketing in 1926.  In March 1930, Khetter 
Mohan Roy spoke in the legislative council about the need for a  “permanent machinery to initiate 
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three primary functions: first, own and operate warehouses to enable cultivators to 
stock jute; second, advance credit to farmers against their stocks of jute; and, third, 
disseminate information about the state of commodity markets amongst cultivators 
and implement the voluntary restriction programme.   In addition, Sarkar argued that 
the Institute should purchase jute in open markets to reduce stocks and support 
prices.  He also advocated the injection of liquidity into the cash-starved agrarian 
economy.  Sarkar recommended large-scale short-term loans to be immediately 
disbursed amongst cultivators to tide them through difficult times.  Sarkar repeated 
his arguments for injections of liquidity into the agricultural economy, though the 
government was clearly unwilling to undertake such programmes.   In a quarterly 
meeting of the BNCC in August 1931, Sarkar said:  “The provision of adequate loans 
to the agriculturists and those dependent on agriculture should be made, even if it 
entails an expansion of currency.”28   
Faced with widespread criticisms for its failures to raise jute prices, the 
colonial government responded with the classic ploy of bureaucratic delay: they 
established a committee to investigate the jute trade and propose legislative solutions.  
The terms of reference of the committee was to consider regulating the cultivation of 
jute, the marketing of the fibre, the scope and constitution of a Jute Committee, the 
threat of substitutes to jute, and the possibilities of other uses of the fibre to expand 
markets.  The committee included five representatives of various chambers of 
commerce, three representatives from the legislative council, four civil servants from 
the colonial government, and a professor of economics from Presidency College.                                                                                                                                                                
measures to improve and develop the growing and marketing and manufacture of jute and to control its 
production according to the needs of the world market.”  BLC, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1930, p. 119.  
28 “Second Quarterly General Meeting,” Journal of the BNCC, p. 73 
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The thirteen members could not agree on a course of action and produced a 
bewildering array of reports and minutes of dissents.   
The committee produced three different reports.  Government officials, 
British representatives from the BCC and IJMA, and the economics professor wrote 
the majority report, though the Indian signatories – J.C. Sinha, the lone academic and 
Arshad Ali and G.S. Dutt, members of the Indian Civil Service– wrote notes of 
dissent.  The representatives of the BNCC, Indian Chamber of Commerce and 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce and two of three MLCs signed the minority report.  
Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta wrote a minute of dissent from the minority report.  
Finally, M. Azizul Huque, Minister of Education at the time, individually authored a 
second minority report. 
The majority report, which constituted the official viewpoint, advocated 
minimal state intervention into jute markets, declaring itself against any “attack on the 
time-honoured freedom of the raiyat to cultivate his land as he likes.”29  The majority 
authors, however, disagreed on the question of legislating the jute trade.  The British 
members of the majority were against legislation intervention in any aspect of the jute 
trade, while the Indian members (J.C. Sinha, G.S. Dutt, and M. Arshad Ali, the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies) advocated legislation to fix quality grades for 
loose jute, establish state-operated “regulated jute markets” in the hinterland, and 
regulate jute futures markets in Calcutta.  In a separate minute of dissent, G.S. Dutt 
argued for the creation of “Village Associations” that would carry out developmental 
                                                        
29 ibid., pp. 8-9 
  193 
activities in agriculture, trade, education, sanitation and health in localities.30  Dutt 
was a development-minded ICS officer who had actively interested in rural 
regeneration during his postings during the late 1910s and early twenties in Birbhum, 
Bankura and Mymensingh.  It is interesting that Dutt’s “Village Associations,” which 
had its sources in the non-cooperation period and Gandhi’s “back to villages” appeal, 
found space in the minute of dissent of the majority report.   
The minority report did not recommend compulsory restriction by legislation 
and only differed from the majority view of colonial officials and British trade in 
stating that legislation should be resorted to if propaganda schemes failed.   They did 
differ from the majority in recommending a wide range of legislative interventions in 
product markets – abolishing extra charges in hinterland markets, standardizing 
quality, establishing regulated markets in the delta, standardizing weights, and 
regulating futures markets.  The authors of the minority report also advocated a 
scheme to establish licensed warehouses throughout Bengal, which would provide 
advances to cultivators against their stored jute.  Licensed warehouses, they argued, 
would enable cultivators to hold on to their fibre by providing storage space and 
credit facilities.  In his dissent, N.C. Sen Gupta disagreed with his colleagues on two 
“fundamental points.”  First, he urged for compulsory restriction of jute cultivation 
through legislation and, second, he advocated a concerted state effort to run the 
“entire jute business on co-operative lines.”31   
                                                        
30 Dutt models his Village Associations on Sir F.A. Nicholson’s, a senior official in the Madras 
Government during the late nineteenth century, descriptions of agricultural associations in Japan in Note on 
Agriculture in Japan, Madras Government Press, 1907.  
31 Ibid., p. 174 
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Azizul Huque’s individually-authored second minority report was brief and 
did not offer any substantially different policy points from the minority report.  
Huque supported voluntary restriction and was in favour of regulating the very same 
aspects of jute markets as the minority report – standardizing quality, abolishing extra 
payments, establishing regulated markets, regulating futures markets, and so forth.  It 
is possible that Huque, as both a minister of the government and a leading 
personality in the Council Praja Party, found himself in a politically untenable 
position.  Should he put his signature with the colonial government, the villains of the 
piece who were not willing abandon laissez-faire for the sake of cultivators?  Or 
should he join the supporters of the Congress, his political opponents that Huque, 
along with others, had quite successfully portrayed as anti-peasant and anti-Muslim?  
Instead, he attempted to strike out a third path, different from the colonial 
government and Congress nationalists.  While his policy positions were substantially 
the same as that of the Congress-affiliated first minority report, Huque tried to stake 
out a difference through constant referral to “mofussil opinion” rather than technical 
expertise.  For example, proposing the regulation of futures markets, Huque stated: 
“Whatever may be the nature or theoretical and economic explanation in favour of 
Fatka market, I have been struck by the unanimity of mufassal opinion of all shades 
that Fatka is causing unnecessary fluctuations in what would have otherwise been a 
fairly steady market.”32  Unfortunately, due to illness as he claimed, Huque was 
unable to fully flesh out an alternative policy stance and, in the end, could only 
                                                        
32 ibid., p. 190 
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register that he was “unable to agree with the recommendations either of the majority 
or of the minority reports.”33 
The array of majority and minority reports and minutes of dissent amongst 
the jute committee did not nearly exhaust the full range of policy options that were 
being discussed in Bengal.  The terms of reference of the committee – restriction, 
legislating product markets, and the constitution of a permanent jute institute – 
excluded the state interventions envisioned by the Congress-led anti-colonial 
nationalist movement.  The jute committee could not, for instance, consider the 
manufacturing sector, even as criticism grew louder that manufacturers were 
depressing prices for their own benefits.  In March 1933, as the Jute Committee was 
being formed, Shanti Shekhareswar Ray urged the commission “to examine to what 
extent the present attitude of the jute mills is a contributory cause to the low level of 
the prices of jute.”34  
The accusation that jute mills were acting as a cartel to control fibre prices 
informed Satyendra Kumar De’s proposal, in February 1936, to fix minimum prices 
of jute and rice through legislation.  Proposing this measure in the Council, De 
argued that theories of demand and supply are “academic” in Bengal, where “the 
buyers of our agricultural products combine themselves to reduce the prices of our 
agricultural crops.”  He went on to state the “formidable power of the millowners of 
jute and their unholy combinations to undersell the jute cultivators is a palpable fact.  
They are the real terror.  Everybody knows it.”35  The policy did not pass, but it did                                                         
33 ibid., p. 181 
34 BLC, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1933, p. 667 
35 BLC, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, 1936, p. 44 
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split the mofussil Muslim vote.  Opponents of the Bill, which included Tamizuddin 
Khan and Abul Kasem, argued that the motion was not “practicable,” – that is, 
government lacked the capacity to implement minimum prices.  Supporters of the 
Bill, including Emaduddin Ahmed, Hassan Ali, Rajibuddin Tarafdar, urged that 
action was necessary and were clearly keen to take on colonial capital.   
Naresh Chandra Sengupta supported the bill, but he described it as a tinkering 
measure whereas what was required was the “wholesale reorganization of the rural 
economy.”36  In Bengal, as in other parts of India, the Depression had informed a 
growing nationalist economic vision of state-planned and directed economies.  Under 
the leadership of its young left, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, the 
Congress formally endorsed state planning as its economic ideology.  In speeches to 
the BNCC’s quarterly general meetings, Nalini Ranjan Sarkar constantly reminded his 
audience of the “special strength might have been imparted to the country if only her 
economic destiny were entrusted to the control of a national Government.”  Sarkar 
drew particular inspiration from the “bold, constructive scheme of a ten years’ 
programme in China … envisaging a steady development of the mining, metallurgical, 
textile and chemical industries, credit organization and shipping of the country.”37  A 
contingent of Congress aligned politicians in the Bengal legislature, with Naresh 
Chandra Sengupta as its loudest and most insistent voice, proposed measures for the 
“economic organization” of peasant cultivation and nationalizing raw jute trade – that 
is, for centrally planned agricultural production and state purchases of the entire jute 
crop.  
                                                        
36 ibid., p. 50 
37 “Second Quarterly General Meeting,” Journal of the BNCC, p. 88 
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Mofussil Muslim members, as argued in the previous chapter, had focused 
their political energies on agrarian factor markets rather than produce markets.  
Unlike the Congress, the Krishak Praja Party had not formulated coherent plans for 
controlling jute prices.  This did not, however, prevent members of the Krishak Praja 
Party from making eloquent promises of higher jute prices while campaigning in the 
1936 elections.  When the KPP and the Muslim League formed a coalition 
government with A.K. Fazlul Haq as chief minister in 1937, they inherited a 
depression-wracked economy, an incoherent economic discourse of state 
intervention to fix prices, and heightened expectations arising from their peasant 
populist campaign.   Further, the new government depended on the votes of the 
European contingent of the assembly to remain in power.  Fazlul Haq had excluded 
the KPP stalwarts who had fought a largely victorious campaign over their Muslim 
League rivals.  With respect to economic policy-making, Muslim Leaguers, zamindari 
families, and former Congress members held the most important ministries:  Nalini 
Ranjan Sarkar was Finance Minister, Khwaja Habibullah, the Nawab of Dacca, was 
Minister of Agriculture and Industry, and H.S. Suhrawardy was Mnister of Commerce 
and Labour.  At the very beginning of his premiership, Haq thus alienated the 
mofussil Muslim politicians who propelled him to power.   Formed out of inherently 
unstable parliamentary coalitions, faced with an economic crisis of unprecedented 
magnitude, and without clear ideas about how to revive the economy, the new 
government was in for a torrid time.   
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In 1937, Nalini Ranjan Sarkar presented the first budget of the representative 
provincial government.  The budget was heavily criticized for not deviating from the 
policies of the Montagu-Chelmsford period.  The Congress member Narendra 
Chandra Datta criticized the lack of “any national programme or progressive 
planning which the electorate naturally expected.”  Datta and his Congress colleagues 
urged the government to take on the economic programme of the Congress party 
and compared the Bengal government unfavourably with Congress ministries in 
other provinces of British India.  The new government was not spared the criticisms 
of its own members, particularly from dissident Krishak Praja Party members.  Ataur 
Rahman stated: “Although I am sitting physically behind the Government benches, 
my heart is on the other side to fight with the Ministry over the question of the 
budget.”  Rahman agreed that there was “no indication of a change in policy [in the 
budget.]”  Humayun Kabir, an Oxford-educated philosophy professor, literateur, and 
member of the Krishak Praja Party, focused his criticism on the government’s jute 
policy, or lack thereof.  He said: “With regard to jute, I do not find any provisions for 
remedial measures for the agriculturists.”38  Kabir suggested legislating minimum 
prices, researching alternative uses to raise demand, and long-term measures such as 
state provision of credit to cultivators, the elimination of middlemen, and the 
exclusion of all but legitimate trade from futures markets.   
Throughout 1937 and 1938, the government had to field a barrage of 
questions and criticisms from the opposition Congress and from dissident Krishak 
Praja members about their lack of intervention in product markets.  What was A.K. 
Fazlul Haq’s government doing, Lalit Chandra Das demanded to know in 1938, “to                                                         
38 Council Debates, BLC, Sitting of both Chambers of the Legislature, Vol. II, 1937, p. 184 
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show that the Government is alive to the great importance of jute crop in the 
economic sphere of Bengal and to the urgent necessity of keeping the interests of the 
jute growers in the forefront?”39  The new cabinet was indeed slow to take up 
measures to address jute prices.  In the first two years they concentrate their efforts in 
agricultural factor markets – that is, land and credit – rather than produce markets.  
The government gave effect to the Bengal Moneylender’s Bill with gusto: within a 
year of its formation the new government had established debt conciliation boards in 
3,000 villages.  They were also far more responsive and pro-peasant with regards to 
rent payments and tenurial rights.  As Jnanabrata Bhattacharyya has shown, between 
1937 and 1939, the government conceded demands for fresh cadastral surveys, 
tenants’ rights, and rent reduction in the Hajang tracts of northern Mymensing, 
“attesting to the … existence of pro-peasant forces within the newly constituted 
provincial ministry.”40  In September 1939, the manager of the Thomas Duff group 
of jute mills in Calcutta wrote to the company’s directors in Dundee concerned that 
cultivators “may hold on to a portion of the crop, particularly when Government, 
from a political point of view, nowadays are much more lenient in regard to granting 
extension for payment of taxes.”41 
As the provincial ministry’s critics and some more recent historians, such as 
Omkar Goswami and Donald Stewart have argued, the government shied away from 
intervening in product markets as some ministers had material and financial interests 
in jute.  Nalini Ranjan Sarkar held “substantial jute shares,” and “half a dozen                                                         
39 This particular question was asked by Lalit Chandra Das, BLA, Vol. II, No. 1, 1938, Calcutta, p. 54. 
Similar questions were asked by Kamini Kumar Dutta in the same session, p. 78-79. 
40 Bhattacharya, Jnanabrata, “An Examination of Leadership Entry in Bengal Peasant Revolts, 1937-1947,” 
Journal of Asian Studies, 37(4), August 1978, p. 613 
41 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., September 30, 1939 
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ministers depended on jute mill futures.”42  The prominent jute magnate Edward 
Benthall gloated privately: “what a wonderful position we have with the Government.  
In fact, if we work things rightly I believe they would adopt any policy we liked to 
press on them.”43  H.S. Suhrawardy, the Commerce and Labour Minister, is one of 
the villains in Stewart’s account.  Suhrawardy was the leading Muslim League 
politician in metropolitan Calcutta, and had organized unions of Muslim jute mill 
workers. .  Upon becoming labour minister he directly propositioned the IJMA for 
funds to support his unions “against the activities of the ‘red’ unions,” promising that 
“no one would know.”44  Under Suhrawardy’s stewardship, the government extended 
support to the IJMA in restricting output amongst the mills – the IJMA was 
struggling to restrict output because of mills outside the association were refusing to 
comply.  In September 1938, in an unsolicited act of assistance to the IJMA, the 
government issued an ordinance restricting jute mills to a forty-five hour workweek.  
This cozy relationship between a peasant populist government and European 
jute manufacturing interests did not last.  When the cabinet finally turned its attention 
to jute prices in July and August 1939, the relationship between jute mills and Fazlul 
Haq’s cabinet soured.  When prices tumbled in the beginning of the 1939 jute season, 
the provincial government finally changed tack from the Montagu-Chelmsford era 
policies of voluntary restriction to a new policy of price stabilization.  In a press 
communiqué issued on August 12, the government formally announced price 
stabilization as a policy goal.  The government declared its intention to implement a 
                                                        
42 Stewart, Donald, p. 119 
43 Quoted in Stewart, p. 120 
44 Stewart, p. 119 
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compulsory restriction scheme, to investigate measures to regulate futures markets, 
and committed to “stabiliz[ing] jute prices.”  Although openly hostile to state 
intervention into markets, the IJMA did not issue an official statement.  Instead, they 
decided, according to G.M. Garrie, IJMA Chairman and general manager of the 
Thomas, Duff & Company mills, “to say nothing … at the present time. … It is true 
that the European vote against the Government would put them out of power, and 
what is the alternative that faces us?  – a Congress Government who are openly 
antagonistic towards European interests and who have just as openly stated that they 
would not hesitate to discriminate against us.”45  Instead of official statements, IJMA 
members wrote scathing criticisms of government intervention into markets in the 
pages of Capital and The Statesman.   
Between 1939 and 1942, the provincial government of Bengal and the Indian 
Jute Mills Association clashed frequently over stabilizing prices.  Far from the 
intimate relationship described by Stewart, the relationship between the provincial 
government was increasingly antagonistic.  In the narrative of European-owned jute 
manufacturing, the cold affairs of business had been clouded over by political 
passions and peasant populism.  The views of G.M. Garrie, manager of the Thomas 
Duff group of mills, are representative of the views of the British jute manufacturing 
sector: 
There is no question or doubt that the Local Government cannot see past the 
interests of the ryot and they are showing no concern for the manufacturing 
side of the trade, the shippers and eventual consumers.  It is perfectly obvious 
that what they are doing is by way of implementing platform promises and 
justification of political ambition.  It does seem wrong that such a state of 
affairs should have come about and that an industry such as ours should be                                                         
45 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., August 15, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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liable to be upset at the whim of Ministers who have no practical knowledge 
of the trade they are interfering with to the extent they are.46   
 
The provincial government, however, embarked on price stabilization during 
a particularly turbulent period in jute markets.  Britain declared war on Germany on 
September 10 1939, barely a month after the provincial government’s August 12 
press communiqué. Jute markets responded immediately, with prices soaring in 
expectation of heavy war requirements of jute.  Over the following years, jute prices 
fluctuated wildly, buffeted by war-related events, news, and rumours.  Varying 
expectations of the extent of Britain and the allies’ war requirements of jute 
manufactures drove prices both up and down.  News from the war-front of victories 
and defeats caused markets to fall or rise spectacularly.  The arrival of war closer to 
home, with the Japanese invasion of Burma, caused transport and coal shortages 
which, in turn, affected prices.  The provincial government’s attempts to stabilize 
prices during wartime turbulence were tragically unsuccessful.  Though jute prices 
had increased during the war period, the price of rice rose far more sharply.  The 
worsening terms of trade between jute and rice severely affected the viability of jute 
cultivating households’ market-base subsistence livelihoods.  In the winter of 1942-43, 
hunger, starvation and death stalked the delta’s jute tracts.   
 
 
 
                                                        
46 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., January 30, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA.  
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1939-40 
The government intervened in jute markets when fibre prices tumbled at the opening 
of the 1939 season, mere weeks before Britain declared war on Germany in 
September.  On the morning of August 8, 1939, the Indian Jute Mills’ Association 
president, chairman and vice-chairman was summoned to a “full meeting of the 
Bengal cabinet.”   The director of Thomas Duff & Company and serving Chairman 
of the IJMA noted to his directors in Dundee, “the whole discussion centred round 
the sharp decline that has taken place in the price of raw jute and we had been asked 
to attend to have a frank discussion on the subject and offer Government whatever 
suggestions or advice we could.”47   The IJMA representatives blamed the fall in 
prices on futures markets speculation, particularly “the arrival in this market of one of 
the big Bombay bullion speculators,” and urged for the abolition of the fatka market.   
The government refused to close futures markets.  Instead they suggested 
fixing a minimum price for futures trades, suggesting Rs. 35 per 5 maund kutcha bale.  
The provincial government consistently refused to close futures markets over the 
following years, arguing that such markets were useful to traders, provided a 
barometer for cultivators in gauging demand, and ensured that the Calcutta mills did 
not have a monopoly over fibre.  Moreover, the government attempted to control 
spot prices in hinterland markets by setting minimum and maximum prices in futures 
trades.  During the meeting with the IJMA, the government also stated their intention 
to compulsorily restrict jute acreage.  A compulsory jute restriction bill was presented 
in the legislative assembly in December 1939 then February 1940, though in both 
instances the government withdrew the bill.  The 1941 crop was the first instance of a                                                         
47 Thomas Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, August 9, 1939, in MS/86/V/7/7, DUA.  
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compulsorily restricted crop in the delta.   Third, and much to the alarm of jute mills, 
the cabinet raised the possibility of fixing prices of raw jute. A.K. Fazlul Haq – who 
according to Barrie – was “not really au fait with the position and indeed some of his 
other colleagues were in a similar position” – put the costs of cultivation at 5 rupees a 
maund and Rs. 7 per maund (35 per bale) as a possible minimum price.  This policy 
was not followed through either, as the government had no mechanisms of 
implementing minimum prices – by effectively policing all jute transactions or by 
making purchases on their own account.  Lastly, the government hinted at yet 
another price stabilization strategy – mandating the IJMA mills’ jute purchasing 
policy.  Suhrawardy informed the IJMA that he was “very anxious that the 
association should do its best to get members to buy the bulk of their requirements 
during July/October, when the ryot was disposing of the main portion of his 
holdings.”48  Over the following years, Suhrawardy would repeatedly try to persuade, 
threaten, or cajole the IJMA into adopting certain purchase policies with a view to 
stabilizing prices.   
As was clear from the meeting between the Cabinet and the IJMA, the 
provincial government had plenty of ideas about how to stabilize prices but nothing 
like a comprehensive and well-formulated plan.  The government tried out these 
ideas over following years with, as I will argue, limited success.  On August 21, 1939, 
the government promulgated an ordinance setting the minimum price of raw jute in 
futures markets at Rs. 36 per bale. The ordinance was accompanied by a vigorous 
propaganda campaign in the countryside urging cultivators to hold on to their fibre 
until prices rose.  This campaign of leaflets, public meetings, and announcements                                                         
48 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., August 9, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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through the beating of drums was significantly more intensive than past government 
propaganda efforts at voluntary restriction.   As the managers of Duff noted, this 
program was not:  
a passing phase and one which might have been on a parity with the 
propaganda employed under the voluntary restriction schemes of the past.  
The Government are spreading their net upcountry very thoroughly and 
efficiently and are constantly urging the cultivator by beat of drum not to sell 
his jute at the present time, and reports to hand indicate that even threats are 
being held out to any cultivators who do not pay heed to Government’s 
recommendations.49   
 
M. David & Co., one of the largest raw jute traders in Bengal, received reports 
of government propaganda activities from their agencies in hinterland markets in late 
August, 1939.  From Elashin in Mymensingh, it was reported that “Cultivators have 
been advised to hold on to stocks and not to sell under 7 Rs. local, otherwise they 
might be penalized by Government.”  From Goalundo, it was reported that “Anti-
Selling Propaganda is going on on an extensive scale.  Even at the smallest hats, men 
deputed by the Union Boards are present.  By the beating of drums they attract 
attention and then strongly advise cultivators not to sell below Rs. 7 per md in 80 
sicca weight.”   In Chandpur, it was reported that “picketing is being resorted to at 
various hauts by Moslem Associations” to prevent cultivators from selling their jute.  
The government also made much of their ordinance fixing minimum prices in futures 
markets.  In Goalunda, “all the Bengali newspapers had printed in large letters that 
the Government had brought into force an Ordinance forbidding the sale or 
purchase of “kutcha” jute below Rs. 36 per bale.”  The David & Co representative in 
                                                        
49 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co, August 22, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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Goalundo complained that the papers had not specified that the act referred to 
futures markets, “caus[ing] a great deal of misunderstanding in the mofussil.”50 
The provincial government traded on the considerably reputation of the 
iconic chief minister, A.K. Fazlul Haq, in persuading cultivators to hold back their 
jute.  This populist leader had been voted in on a tide of peasant support, and Haq 
personally undertook the responsibility of raising jute prices.  A pamphlet published 
by the Public Institute in Choumohani, Noakhali stated:  “the Chief Minister, Hon. 
Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huque is trying to increase the price of jute and has requested the 
cultivators not to sell their jute at a reduced rate, as the price of jute will go higher.  
So, it is evident that the price of jute must go higher.”  This, I would argue, was a 
momentous announcement: an elected government had taken direct responsibility for 
commodity prices.   Merchants and mill-owners were not, however, convinced that 
the propaganda campaign would work: “Opinion upcountry is divided as to whether 
the effect of this propaganda will last, as it is generally recognized that the ryots are 
not in a financial position to hold back crop they have harvested.”51   
Before the cultivators’ ability to hold back the crop could be seriously tested, 
Britain declared war on Germany, changing the complexion of markets entirely.  The 
following day, the 11th, the IJMA leadership made an urgent trip to Simla to meet 
with the central government with regard to wartime requirements of jute – looms 
were unsealed, workweek of 45 hours decided, and Britain placed an immediate order 
for 60 million sandbags.  Raw jute prices in future and spot markets rose sharply, as                                                         
50 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., September 5, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
51 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co, August 22, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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speculation of the empire’s war requirements of jute goods ran wild.  Concerned by 
sharp price rises, Garrie and W.A.M. Walker, vice-chairman of the IJMA, met with 
Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy asking them to either close futures markets or to set 
maximum prices in futures trades.  They refused, stating that “they had pledged 
themselves to get as much as they could for the ryot and that politically they would 
stand the risk of being put out of office if they were any party to restricting the full 
advantage the ryot might get from present circumstances.”52  Unable to gain any 
concessions from the provincial government, the IJMA mills decided to agree upon a 
maximum price for their members.  On September 12, the IJMA mills decided a 
maximum price of between Rs. 8/4/- to Rs. 9/8/- per maund, depending on the 
quality of jute.  The IJMA mills consumed about 70% of Bengal’s jute – a sufficient 
proportion to effectively act as a cartel and decide prices by agreement. 
The “gentlemanly agreement” was decried in nationalist quarters as an 
“unholy agreement” or an “ungentlemanly agreement amongst gentlemen.”  Garrie’s 
fear that the price agreement would “blacken our faced in the eyes of nearly all 
sections outside the mills” was realized.53  The maximum price agreement was also 
difficult to maintain, as speculators predicting a long drawn out war and high wartime 
requirements of jute goods created a spectacular bull run in futures markets. Despite 
such difficulties, the provincial government estimated that mills managed to purchase 
                                                        
52 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., September 11, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
53 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 7, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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between 4.5 million and 5 million bales within their maximum prices between 
September and the beginning of November 1939.54   
 On 3rd of November, Suhrawardy wrote to the IJMA strongly criticizing the 
gentleman’s agreement.  He described the standstill in jute markets as a “a tug-of-war 
between a highly organized group of purchasers with infinite resources, and an 
unorganized group of sellers whose daily requirements compel them to part with 
their jute at any price they can get.”  Suhrawardy warned of government intervention, 
as “it is not possible for Government to watch this unequal tug-of-war idly and I shall 
be compelled to take steps to end this unequal contest.”  He urged the mills to take 
action before “you drive me to this course,” and he recommended that they either 
substantially raise maximum prices or rescind the agreement.  Suhrawardy does not 
specify what actions he would take – quite possibly, he himself did not know: “I do 
not feel called upon to disclose what steps I propose to take to come to the rescue of 
the cultivators in case you decline to accept either of my suggestions.”55   
On the 7th of November, a two and a half hour meeting took place between 
A.K. Fazlul Haq, Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy and the IJMA Chairman.  G.M. 
Garrie’s description of the meeting reveals the intimate yet antagonistic relationship 
that had developed between the new government and the jute mills.  On the one 
hand, the ministers were committed to raising prices for cultivators and, on the other, 
they were dependent on the jute mills and the European votes in the legislature to 
                                                        
54 This was the figure given by A.K. Fazlul Haq in a meeting with the IJMA on November 6, 1939.  From 
Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 7, 1939, MS/86/V/7/7, 
DUA 
55 Letter from Suhrawardy to P.S. MacDonald, Secy, IJMA, 3rd November, 1939.  Enclosed in From 
Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 7, 1939, MS/86/V/7/7, 
DUA 
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stay in power.  The ministry brought up the fears of a Congress government and 
asked that the mills “should not embarrass them in the legislature or outside as being 
in league with the mills against the cultivator.”   They used a combination of 
economic logic (rise in prices of manufactured goods, the considerable purchases by 
mills at maximum prices or lower), threats (strikes in jute mills, the possibility of a 
Congress government), and promises (legislating a larger crop the following year, 
discontinuing propaganda) to persuade the jute mills to rescind the agreement.   
The IJMA mills rescinded their agreement on maximum prices.  The end of 
the so-called “gentlemanly agreement” was followed by immediate and sharp rise in 
the prices in hinterland jute markets.  On November 14 1939, Garrie reported to the 
Dundee managers, “Upcountry markets have ruled strong and excited since mills’ 
maximum prices were rescinded last Tuesday (November 7).  Encouraged by a strong 
Futures market here, prices at all upcountry centres soared daily.”56  Prices offered 
for medium grade jute was Rs. 18/8/- per maund, almost double the IJMA maximum 
of Rs. 9/8/-.  Rescission had been followed with the news that the British 
government had placed an order for 500 million sandbags for the war.  Prices shot up 
dramatically and reached Rs. 26/- per maund in futures markets.57   
 The government’s concern with abysmally low prices in the beginning of 
August had transformed into concerns about the spectacular rise by November.   In                                                         
56 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 14, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
57 Garrie complained to his managers in Dundee that the government had leaked information to its two 
most important supporters, Ispahani and Adamjee (about whom more later).  He said, “although I have no 
definite proof, I am inclined to agree that there is a leakage of information in regard to Government orders 
for Sandbags, and it is common talk here that both Ispahani and Adamjee have the ear of certain cabinet 
ministers as these two parties were certainly operating on an unusual scale a day or two before receipt of 
the last order for 500 million.” Further, “Birla as usual is credited with getting the information 24 hours in 
advance of me.”  From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 14, 
1939, MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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November 21, 1939, Garrie reported that he “had a long talk yesterday afternoon 
with Suhrawardy and he is genuinely worried about the extent to which prices for raw 
materials have risen.”58  Suhrawardy was, he later claimed, worried about a 
speculative bubble that was destined to burst. “The prices in the speculative market 
rose as high as Rs. 26/- [per maund],” he wrote to Jeremy Raisman the central 
finance minister almost exactly a year later, “without any support from the world 
market and it was quite clear that the market was heading for a crash.”59  
Concerned by the expanding speculative bubble, Suhrawardy struck an oral 
agreement with the IJMA: the mills should suspend all purchases for a few days in 
order to lower prices.  If prices fell, he promised that the government would fix 
maximum prices in the raw jute futures market.  Legislation to prevent the rise in 
prices in futures markets was precisely the state intervention that the mills had been 
demanding for so long.  The mills complied and prices duly fell.  Suhrawardy did not, 
however, follow through on his end of the bargain.  Speaking with Garrie, 
Suhrawardy “admitted making the promise and stated that he himself wished to fix a 
maximum, he told me that he was unable to get other members of the Cabinet to 
agree and therefore he was unable to do anything further in the matter.”60   
Garrie and the IJMA were bitterly disappointed.  “Badly let down,” they 
complained to the central government about government interference in the industry.  
In a meeting with the “big guns from Delhi” – Central Commerce Minister, Sir                                                         
58 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 21, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
59 H.S. Suhrawardy to Jeremy Raisman, Finance Member, GoI, September 1, 1940, in Education, Health, 
and Lands, Agriculture, 68-40/40A, 1940, NAI 
60 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., November 28, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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Ramaswamy Mudaliar, the Economic Advisor, Dr. Gregory, and Director General of 
Supply, Mr. Dow – on November 25th or 26th, 1939, Garrie complained that “trade is 
being seriously interfered with and has become a happy playground for the speculator 
by the constant rumours that Ministers are buying in Fatka or selling in Fatka, that 
they are going to fix maximum prices or that they are not going to fix these, or that 
they are going to do this or that.”61  Garrie’s complaint was that government action 
was driven by their “determination to implement platform promises and improve, if 
possible, their political position …[and] they had no concern with the repercussions 
that might take place on the other side of the trade.”   
While the mills accused the government of meddling with markets out of 
peasant populism, the opposition parties in the legislature accused the government of 
corruption.  In December 1939, in response to the Agriculture Minister Tamizuddin 
Khan’s statement about a bill for compulsory jute restriction, Nalinakshya Sanyal, the 
Chief Whip of the Congress in the legislative assembly, publicly accused members of 
the Cabinet of deliberately manipulating prices in futures markets: “The method of 
issuing communiqué after communiqué upsetting the position of the market has been 
going on in a scandalous manner.”  He further stated that he could name the 
merchants who had transacted in futures markets on behalf of the ministers.  Sanyal 
did not name names – of either ministers or merchants – but when Tamizuddin 
Khan tried to repudiate the allegations Sanyal said, “we know that you have not made 
any money.”62   
                                                        
61 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, November 29, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
62 BLA, XLV-3, 6th Session, 1939, pp. 314-315 
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Sanyal’s public accusation was carried in the Calcutta dailies, and Garrie 
reported to his Dundee that these accusations were “the chief topic of week.”63 On 
December 28, 1939, Garrie met with the Viceroy who asked him point blank about 
“the various rumours that were being circulated in connection with operations of 
Local Ministers in the Futures markets and about the allegations that were being laid 
at their door.  He told me I could speak perfectly frankly and I did so.”  Garrie’s 
response was diplomatic.  On the one hand, he accused the Congress of “circulat[ing] 
ugly rumours” and, at the same time, said that the Ministers could have “done much 
to allay the suspicion if they had … curbed the violent speculation that was going on.”  
Interestingly, the Viceroy was more concerned with the “good name” and “possible 
embarrassment” of the Ministers than he was about the “moral aspect in such 
transactions.”64   
Accusations of government corruption only grew over the following months, 
as the government continued on this tack of influencing prices through 
communiqués and rumours of possible state action.   Such accusations were leveled 
not only by the cabinet’s political opponents but also by European trade interests.  At 
a conference in Darjeeling on May 4, 1940, between the government and jute-related 
trade associations, J.E. Ordish, of M. David & Company, one of the largest jute 
purchasing agencies and president of the European Mofussil Balers Association, said:  
“They [members of his association] had suffered much by chaotic movements of 
markets resulting from unheralded Government communiqués and Press 
Announcements in the past, and they had certainly mistrusted the motive of                                                         
63 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, December 26, 1939, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
64 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., December 28, 1939, MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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Government on more than one occasion in the past jute season.”65  I do not have the 
evidence to evaluate these accusations of corruption through manipulating prices in 
futures markets but, as I will argue, Suhrawardy – one of the chief accused – tried to 
justify the government’s actions by claiming that he was trying to create bull runs in 
the futures market for the benefit of cultivators. 
In the beginning of 1940, jute prices had begun to decline as the speculative 
bubble about expectations of wartime jute requirements began to deflate.  In January 
1940, the delivery period for the government’s order for 500 million sandbags was 
extended – a signal that war requirements of jute was going to be less than anticipated.  
As prices began to fall, the government considered its options as to how to support 
prices for the coming jute season.  The cabinet appeared divided over the one policy 
option on the table – a compulsory restriction scheme.  Suhrawardy was willing to 
allow an unrestricted crop if the jute mills could guarantee that prices did not fall 
below Rs. 7 or Rs. 8 per maund.  On the other hand, Nazimuddin, Tamizuddin Khan 
(the new minister of agriculture) and Khwaja Habibullah, the Nawab of Dacca were 
pushing hard for compulsory restriction.66   
The restriction scheme was brought up for approval in the assembly in 
February, 1940.  It was opposed by both political opponents in the legislative 
assembly and by powerful jute manufacturing and trading interests in Calcutta.  
Nalinaksha Sanyal argued in the legislative assembly that Britain’s war requirements 
of jute was likely to drive prices up and asked government to delay compulsory                                                         
65 “Burder’s Note,” enclosed in from Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundeee, 
May 21, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
66 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co, February 6, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/7, DUA 
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restriction until they had a more accurate statistics regarding the jute crop.67  W.A.M. 
Walker, the IJMA representative in the Assembly, expressed surprise that “for once 
perhaps” he was “fully” in agreement with Sanyal and the Provincial Congress.68  
Privately, the IJMA warned the provincial government of the dangers of restriction 
during war: “they would never be able to justify their position if there happened to be 
a shortage and the British and Allied Governments were clamouring for war 
requirements which the Mills, because of that shortage, were unable to turn out.”   
Garrie stated to the ministers that the IJMA “consider[ed] it a shocking state of 
affairs that political ambition should cloud the issue of war requirements” 69  
Through February and March, the government issued a series of press 
communiqués stating that they intended to restrict jute acreage for the following year.  
To A.K. Fazlul Haq’s disappointment, prices continued to fall despite these public 
statements of intent.70  Markets had not taken the restriction scheme seriously.  The 
sowing season would begin in a month – in March – and the government had clearly 
not gathered sufficient information nor built up the necessary administrative 
structures to regulate jute sowings of several million peasant households.  As Garrie 
noted, “I feel that this latest move [restriction of jute acreage] is more in the nature of 
political “eye-wash” and the Government are not really serious about actual 
restriction.”71  The government withdrew its restriction scheme for the coming jute                                                         
67 BLA, Vol LVI, No. 2, 1940, p. 243 
68 BLA, Vol LVI, No. 2, 1940, p. 245 
69 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co, February 6, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
70 Garrie reported to the Dundee directors that “the Chief Minister told me that he was very disappointed 
that, following Government’s announcement of restriction, the market actually went down.” From 
Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co, February 6, 1940 MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
71 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., February 13, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
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season and, instead, focused on collecting output statistics to form the basis for 
restriction in the future.  As prices continued to fall, Suhrawardy privately expressed 
the cabinet’s disappointment to the IJMA:  “one or two of his colleagues [Garrie 
reported] feel that the mills have let the Ministry down, inasmuch as it was through 
their representations that restriction was dropped for the current season and that 
Government, therefore, looked to the mills to support the jute market in return.”72   
Facing the prospect of low prices and a large crop at the opening of the 1940 
season, the government called an emergency meeting of the various Bengal trade 
associations in Darjeeling in May.  The invitation stated “great concern [about] the 
lower prices which are now being offered for the new crop,” and they desired to 
“consult all those interested in the jute trade to ascertain their views on what steps 
may be taken to secure a price … which is justified by the world conditions which 
prevail today.”73  Representatives of the various jute-related trade associations in 
Bengal met in the summer capital: the IJMA, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce, the Marwari Association, the Bengal National 
Chamber of Commerce, the East India Jute Association, the Calcutta Baled Jute 
Shippers Association, the European Mofussil Balers’ Association, the Indian 
Chamber of Commerce, the Calcutta Baled Jute Association, the Jute Balers’ 
Association, the Calcutta Jute Fabric Shippers Association, the Bengal Jute Dealers’ 
Association, the Calcutta Jute Dealers’ Association, and the Calcutta Jute Exchange.  
According to Garrie, who did not attend, “practically all who attended at Darjeeling 
                                                        
72 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Mr. Mason, Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, April 12, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
73 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, April 30, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, 
DUA 
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returned with the feeling that the Conference was more or less a farce from start to 
finish.”74   
The Chief Minister opened the conference with a speech promising a balance 
between realizing a profitable price for cultivators without raising the price of the 
manufactured goods to levels encouraging substitutes.  Tamizuddin Khan, the 
Agriculture Minister, made it clear that the government would not hesitate to bring in 
minimum prices if jute prices dropped any lower.  After the Chief Minister and 
Agricultural Minister’s opening remarks, representatives of the numerous trade 
associations stood up one by one to make their statements.  In his report of the 
meeting, Sir John Henry Burder of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce said that the 
associations had split up along “racial lines.”  The European-dominated Chambers of 
Commerce opposed any government intervention on trade.  The Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce, closely allied with the ruling Ministry, and associations representing 
futures exchanges and traders, supported the government.  Lastly, associations 
aligned with the opposition Congress - the Indian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, the Marwari Association, and the Calcutta 
Jute Dealers Association – were opposed to fixing price, but thought that a “scheme 
to protect ryots should be put in place.”  The IJMA presented government 
interventions in jute markets as an existential threat to the jute manufacturing sector.  
W.A.M. Walker of the IJMA said: “We cannot … remain silent and see Government 
destroying the fabric which it has taken so many years to build up.”75  
                                                        
74 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, May 14, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, 
DUA 
75 “Remarks made by the Chairman of the IJMA at the Darjeeling Conference,” enclosed in From Thomas, 
Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., May 14, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
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The government’s main supporters were the Muslim Chamber of Commerce 
and interests representing futures exchanges and traders - the East India Jute 
Association, the Calcutta Jute Exchange and the Marwari Chamber.  The Muslim 
Chamber of Commerce launched a frontal attack on the jute mills.  M.M. Ispahani of 
the Muslim Chamber, and one of the largest shippers of jute fabrics and fibre from 
Calcutta, stated that given the large forthcoming crop, government had to do take 
action to – in Ispahani’s words – “force the hands of the Mills.”  If the mills were not 
responsive to such pressure – that is, they “employ[ed] obstructive methods” – the 
Government “should be prepared to fix the minimum prices and maintain them by 
purchase of jute.” Sir Adamjee Hajee Dawood, who like Ispahani was a prominent 
manufactured and raw jute shipper and a member of the Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce spoke in Hindustani.  From what Burder understood, “he accused the 
Jute Mills of artificially depressing prices by issuing Bogus Delivery Orders.”76 The 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce, and particularly Ispahani and Adamjee, were closely 
allied with the Muslim League and were socially and politically close to the two 
Muslim League ministers – Suhrawardy and Nazimuddin.  
If not farce, the Darjeeling Conference was certainly political theatre.  It was a 
show put on by the government to force jute mills – particularly the IJMA mills – to 
purchase jute at higher prices.  If the IJMA did not comply, the government would be 
forced to take some sort of unspecified action to fix minimum prices in the market.                                                                                                                                                                
 
76 All of the associations who spoke out in favour of fixing minimum prices spoke strongly against the 
mills.  H.P. Bagaria, whose association represented futures dealers, described mills as “enemies of the royts 
and instanced the ‘unholy Gentleman’s Agreement.’” “Burder’s Description of the meeting in Darjeeling 
from May 4-5, with all trade interests invited to Darjeeling,” enclosed in from Thomas, Duff & Co, 
Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., May 21, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
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Suhrawardy stated the bargain of higher prices for no intervention plainly in his 
closing remarks:  “He said that if the price of jute was maintained and the 
agriculturist got a fair price then Government would not intervene.  He said that if 
Mills would guarantee buying at prices comparable with the prices they got for their 
goods he would admit it was fair.”  Tamizuddin Khan closed the conference, stating 
that he was disappointed that the trade associations had offered no concrete 
suggestions and that he would wait a fortnight for any suggestions – “if they received 
nothing they would act on their own.”    
The government threat was clearly unspecified, beyond some measure to 
enforce minimum prices.  How would government do this?  Will they simply fix 
prices in futures markets, as they had done earlier – a policy whose efficacy had not 
really been verified, given the rapid rise in prices after the Ordinance.  It was unclear 
whether the government actually had a scheme, as the following exchange between 
Suhrawardy, Walker and Ordish demonstrates:  
Walker: Have you got a scheme? 
Suhrawardy: We shall prepare it. 
Walker: Then you have not got it. 
Suhrawardy: We have, but it is a Cabinet secret. 
Ordish: Have you taken any advice of any outside body on it? 
Suhrawardy: That would be improper. 
Ordish: Does anyone outside the Cabinet know about it? 
Suhrawardy: (Doubtfully) No.  (Brightly) But they may have some idea by 
intelligent anticipation.77 
 
1940-41 
The Darjeeling “farce” was not followed by any concrete action.  In the absence of a 
“comprehensive scheme”, the government was pushed into a kneejerk response                                                         
77 “Burder’s Note,” enclosed in from Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundeee, 
May 21, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
  219 
when news about Germany over-running western Europe reached Calcutta jute 
markets in the second half of May 1940.  Markets become “panicky” and, on May 18, 
a Saturday, “prices in all speculative markets literally tumbled down.”  The 
government responded immediately – that very Saturday –with an ordinance fixing 
maximum and minimum prices for raw jute and jute goods in futures markets: prices 
from raw jute were set at a minimum of Rs. 60 per bale and maximum of Rs. 90 and 
prices for Hessians at a minimum of Rs. 13 per yard and maximum at Rs. 21.  Even 
strident critics of government intervention admitted that “the promulgation [of the 
ordinance]… under conditions such as obtained on Saturday was … only to be 
expected.”  The ordinance had an immediate though brief effect in supporting jute 
goods markets.  The USA, the largest purchaser of Calcutta jute manufactures, 
entered the market at minimum prices, believing that the minimum represented a 
floor below which prices could not fall.  On the other hand, raw jute prices steadied 
but transactions came to a standstill, with traders waiting on the government’s next 
move. 
Then, in the beginning of June, news that Germany had over-run Belgium 
and Holland and the fall of Paris was imminent hit Calcutta jute markets.  Raw jute 
and hessian futures tumbled and futures transactions were suspended.  Garrie 
described the reaction of jute markets to war news in a note on June 4, 1940:  
It must be many years since Calcutta experienced conditions such as obtained 
in all markets during the past week … when the capitulation of Belgium 
became known.  Alarming rumours there were in plenty so much so that the 
Commissioner of the Calcutta Police came out with a warning that the 
dissemination of news, true or untrue, likely to cause panic, would be 
punishable by heavy fines.  Despite this, prices kept literally tumbling down 
and by Thursday [May 30] both the Jute and Hessian Fatka markets were 
temporarily suspended, as already 9 Porters [Hessians] were available at Rs. 11 
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[per yard] and while Firsts [top quality raw jute] had been done at Rs. 50 [per 
bale].78 
 
The closing of the futures market was a blow to the government – an end to 
all plans to control hinterland spot prices through Calcutta futures prices.  The 
government responded immediately by issuing yet another press communiqué stating 
that they would take up all offers of the old crop at Rs. 60 per bale.  Though 
ambitious on paper, the provincial government lacked the financial resources to 
affect prices through open market operations: in the end, they purchased just 50,000 
bales of jute for Rs. 3 million, at Rs. 60 per bale.  As the government struggled to put 
together a scheme to support prices, it tried its best to create the impression of 
impending action.   There was considerable “talk in the market” that government 
would fix minimum prices for raw jute within the next few weeks.  Amongst jute 
mills, there was very real anxiety about what steps the government might take.  As 
Burder indicated in a letter to Walker, the Government of Bengal “are genuinely 
anxious about the position from the economic point of view of the cultivator,” “are 
unlikely to think that discretion is the better part of valour” and “not always prepared 
to concede to reason.”  Given British capitals’ anxieties about a deranged pro-peasant 
government with a flair for the spectacular, the IJMA decided to make an offer.79 
In early June 1940, the association’s mills proposed to government that they 
would pay minimum prices for raw jute, varying from Rs. 7/8 and Rs. 8/8 per maund 
depending on quality, and also prices for jute goods.  The IJMA’s offer was not                                                         
78 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, June 4, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, 
DUA 
79 From Mr. Burder, Messrs Barry & Co., to Mr. Walker, Chairman, IJMA, June 3, 1940, enclosed in From 
Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., June 11, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
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motivated solely by their fears of unilateral government action – prices of jute goods 
had nosedived and the IJMA was looking to guarantee profits.  On July 2 1940, the 
government and the IJMA came to an agreement regarding the minimum prices of 
raw jute and jute goods.  The IJMA would pay between Rs. 7 and Rs. 9 per maund 
for raw jute and receive between Rs. 12 and Rs. 32 for different grades of finished 
jute goods.  The deal was to last till December, when the IJMA would reconsider the 
position and government refrain from intervening in markets.   
The IJMA mills occasionally broke the agreement.  As G.M. Garrie noted on 
July 16, 1940: “reports current during the week indicate that certain mills are “sailing 
close to the wind” in their operations, and one purchase in particular by Kettlewells is 
not regarded by us as being transacted strictly in accordance with the spirit of the 
agreement.”  Further, jute sellers were eager to sell at prices below the minimum: “if 
given any encouragement, I feel business with these sellers might be possible under 
the fixed limits.”80  Bound by their minimum price agreement, mills held back from 
purchasing jute.  During July and August 1940, the government had to plead several 
times with the mills to increase their purchases.   G.D. Birla, Gandhi’s close associate, 
IJMA member, and one of the most important figures in the jute sector, Garrie 
reported: “is very short of jute and has all along been against not only the minimum 
price arrangement but having anything to do with Government. … Birla would do 
anything to have the present Government unseated in favour of Congress, so we 
must regard his actions at their face value.”81 
                                                        
80 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., July 16, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
81 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., September 10, 1940, MS/86/V/7/8, DUA 
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Prices continued to tumble in the hinterland, with mills either flouting 
minimum prices or holding out from purchasing till the price agreement collapsed. In 
July and August 1940, at the opening of the new season, jute was selling at below Rs. 
5 per maund in hinterland hats throughout Bengal.82  The benefits of the price 
agreement, as its critics alleged, were entirely derived by middlemen.  Cultivators 
desperate to sell jute for subsistence accepted low prices offered by middlemen, 
middlemen in turn sold jute to the mills at agreement prices – or, if possible, at even 
below agreement prices.  In August 1940, a theatrical and public post-mortem of 
government’s failures to affect prices through futures markets took place in the 
legislative assembly.  Jalaluddin Hashemy, a dissident member of the Krishak Praja 
Party, and Nalinaksha Sanyal of the Congress moved a resolution criticizing the 
Ordinance of May 14.  In criticizing government actions over the past year, Hashemy 
said: “I am pained to say that the Government do not know their own mind.  Either 
they have no well-thought of and scientific plan ... or they are doing it [ordinances, 
communiqués] to help the IJMA … the department concerned is either fool or knave 
or both – I cannot use a stronger term.”83  Surendranath Biswas criticized the entire 
policy of fixing hinterland spot prices through ordinances regarding futures markets: 
“I ask the Hon’ble Ministers were they not aware that … violent fluctuations of 
prices in futures markets were highly detrimental to the interests of jute growers?”84 
Nalinaksha Sanyal reprised his argument about government corruption, and 
this time he did not hold back from naming names.  “I do not insinuate anything,” 
                                                        
82 BLA, Vo. LVII, No. 2, 8th Session, 1940, p. 22 
83 BLA, Vol. LVII, No. 3, 1940, p. 237 
84 BLA, Vol. LVII, No. 3, 1940, p. 239 
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Sanyal said, but his speech was an extraordinary accusation of insider trading, and he 
outright accused ministers of “manipulating the market in connivance with, and for 
the benefit of, a Mr. Ram Chandra Daga.”  Ram Chandra Daga, Sanyal alleged, 
received special benefits: “It is very strange that when a particular person anticipates 
[price trends], and when that person, as a result of his clever anticipation is faced with 
serious losses, another anticipatory measure comes forward.”  Daga’s closeness to 
government was further evidenced by the fact that he wrote letters to the market 
from M.A. Ispahani’s offices.  Further, Daga had gone bankrupt and his Hessian 
liabilities were taken up Ispahani’s firms.85 
After this round of recriminations and accusations, Suhrawardy stood up to 
defend his record and the government’s efforts to stabilize prices.  He said that the 
May ordinance had worked – it had put a floor in the market and brought in 
international business for jute.  The present fall was caused by the course of the war 
in Europe, factors beyond the control of the provincial government – “events 
overtook us.”  He celebrated the government deal with the mills, arguing that without 
such an agreement prices would have dropped even further.  And, he even defended 
his relationship with Ram Chandra Daga, arguing that government actions would 
always support either bulls or bears, and he would rather support the bulls who keep 
prices up.  Daga, however, could not maintain a bull position in the face of falling 
markets: “Unfortunately,” Suhrawardy said, “the man he [Sanyal] referred to could 
not maintain his position long enough, his business collapsed and he became 
bankrupt.”86 
                                                        
85 BLA, Vol. LVII, No. 3, 1940, pp. 254-55 
86 BLA, Vol. LVII, No. 3, 1940, pp. 266-268 
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Despite Suhrawardy’s public protestations, the deal with the IJMA was not 
working.  On September 1, 1940, Suhrawardy wrote to the Jeremy Raisman, the 
central finance minister in Delhi begging for a loan of 150 million rupees to finance 
large-scale government purchases of jute.  He wrote about the government’s 
responsibility to cultivators: “we will not be permitted to lie back and absolve 
ourselves from the responsibility of seeing that the agriculturist is not ruined.”87  
Under Suhrawardy’s 150 million rupee scheme, the provincial government would 
purchase 3 million bales from the current crop and reduce production severely for 
the following two years under a compulsory restriction scheme.  The loan would be 
repaid in two to three years, by selling jute after prices rose due to restriction.  The 
loan was refused, but the exchange between Suhrawardy and Raisman reads very 
much like a post-mortem – private instead of the public grilling of the Legislative 
Assembly – on the provincial government’s failed efforts at price stabilization. 
Suhrawardy’s letter to Raisman was a strong defense of his government’s and 
his personal actions to stabilize jute prices during the previous year; in fact, a spirited 
defense of his government’s attempts to control prices through ordinances, 
communiqués and rumours of unspecified government interventions.  It was due to 
the August 1939 Ordinance, Suhrawardy claimed, that “demand was stimulated, the 
price of jute and of the manufactured commodity rose, the propaganda of an 
excessive crop was abandoned and the price in Futures Markets was more or less 
steady at Rs. 45/-.”88  He admitted that not imposing compulsory restriction was a 
mistake, but he explained that they were forced to withdraw the bill due to                                                         
87 H.S. Suhrawardy to Jeremy Raisman, Finance Member, GoI, September 1, 1940, in Education, Health, 
and Lands, Agriculture, 68-40/40A, 1940, NAI 
88 H.S. Suhrawardy to Jeremy Raisman, Finance Member, GoI, September 1, 1940, in Education, Health, 
and Lands, Agriculture, 68-40/40A, 1940, NAI 
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opposition from within the party, the Congress and jute manufacturers.  Suhrawardy 
defended his actions when prices fell during May and June 1940, arguing that his 
government had convinced markets of government’s intentions to act and had, 
thereby, forced the IJMA to enter into a price agreement: 
The market took the view that we were in earnest regarding our policy of 
maintaining a fair level of prices and that we were determined to carry out our 
policy whether the market cooperated or not, and that we would do so by 
means of legislation or other executive action.  The market which had 
hitherto not cooperated with us came to an agreement with the Government 
[the agreement with the IJMA].89 
 
Raisman wrote back stating that the government had only itself to blame for 
provoking peasants to sow a larger crop than the market could handle by its 
misguided attempts to increase prices.  “The general impression,” Raisman wrote, “is 
that the Government of Bengal’s concern was to maintain the price of jute as high as 
possible for as long as possible … [and] it seems not unreasonable to attribute the 
excessive sowings in the current year to a general expectation of high prices … 
aroused by the policy of the Bengal government.”  Further, Raisman was led to 
believe that opposition to restriction was informed by the “general belief that such a 
policy … would not stand the slightest chance of success in the face of the stimulus 
offered by the high level of jute prices which it was known the Govenrment desired 
to maintain.”90  In other words, the fault lay with the Bengal government and its 
misguided attempts to raise jute prices – very different from the criticisms of political 
opponents in the legislative assembly. 
                                                        
89 ibid. 
90 Jeremy Raisman to H.S. Suhrawardy, April 10, 1940, in Education, Health, and Lands, Agriculture, 68-
40/40A, 1940, NAI 
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 With the closure of the futures markets and the government of India’s refusal 
of a loan, the control of jute prices passed on to the mills, and their willingness to 
adhere to their minimum price agreement with the provincial government.  The 
government continually threatened “measures which might in the end be to the 
disadvantage of the mills,” but the mills were well aware that the provincial 
government could not carry through on such threats.91  Far from cooperating with 
the government, the IJMA unilaterally revised their minimum price agreement – in 
fact, basically abrogated it.  The new price schedule not only lowered prices across 
the board, they created a new bottom grade - “Low Bottoms.”  Prices for low 
bottoms, which would most certainly determine prices for most unassorted peasant 
produce, were as low as Rs. 4/8/- per maund.  The IJMA implemented the revised 
schedule despite government entreaties to “defer” and “reconsider,” and went as far 
as to state outright that they would not bow to government requests to purchase 
definite quantities of jute within certain timeframes.92  
 The provincial government repeated its plea for assistance to the central 
government, highlighting the intransigence of the mills to follow through on their 
agreements.  The central government organized a conference in Delhi, in early 
December 1940, involving the Government of Bengal and the IJMA, to hammer out 
a new jute agreement.  The purpose of the conference was to strong-arm the 
association mills to a purchase program of specified quantities, timeframes and prices.  
                                                        
91 Stevens, the Special Jute Officer appointed by the government, conveyed this message to Garrie of 
Thomas Duff.  From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, October 29, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/9, DUA 
92 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, November 19, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/9, DUA 
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On the day of his departure to Delhi, December 2, 1940, Suhrawardy continued his 
game of bluff in the Legislative Assembly: 
We are going [to Delhi] in a spirit of co-operation.  The Government of India 
feel that the industry itself is so well organized that it can come to the rescue 
of jute-growers.  If the industry fails to do so, and if all the pressure that we 
bring to bear upon the Government of India and the jute industry fails, we 
shall have to take steps.  What those steps are I am not prepared to disclose. 
… I believe it is realized that there are weapons in our armoury with which we 
will be able to cope with the situation.93 
 
At the conference, the Government of Bengal demanded was that the mills 
purchase 5 million bales by April 15th, 1941, stick to the original price agreement or 
fix the prices of Low Bottoms at Rs. 5 per maund (instead of Rs. 4/8/-).  The mills 
agreed to purchase 3.75 million bales up to 15th April and a further 750,000 bales by 
30th June – at the beginning of the new season.  They could purchase according to 
their revised price agreement, but purchases of Low Bottoms would not count to the 
total – tellingly, the category of Low Bottoms virtually vanished after the agreement 
came into effect.  The only reason that the IJMA came to the bargaining table was 
that the Government of India had threatened that it would provide the loan of Rs. 
150 million to finance the provincial governments’ jute purchase scheme.  The 
Chairman of the IJMA informed his members that they had to agree to a purchase 
proposal because of the alternatives: “all things considered, this [the purchase 
agreement] is to be preferred to Government effecting purchases through Marwari 
sellers.”94 
                                                         
93 BLA, Vol. LVII, No. 8, 1940, p.256  
94 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, December 10, 1940, 
MS/86/V/7/9, DUA 
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1941-42, 1942-43, and famine 
More importantly, the provincial government for the first time adopted a compulsory 
restriction scheme, restricting sowings to 1/3rd of the previous year’s acreage.  
Through a combination of compulsory restriction and reduced sowings due to very 
low prices, jute output was reduced substantially the following year. According to 
estimates by mofussil jute balers, the 1941 acreage was less than half that of 1940.95  
The 1941 jute season opened well for the cultivator.  In August and September 1941, 
jute prices ranged from Rs. 10/8/- to Rs. 16/8/- in Calcutta markets.  Perhaps for 
the first time in two years, the government could proclaim success in price 
stabilization. In a pamphlet distributed throughout the jute tracts, titled Instructions to 
Jute Growers, the government “proclaim[ed] with very great pleasure that their hopeful 
efforts and cooperation of jute cultivators and their law abidedness had not been in 
vain.  At present it may be safely expected that … Government efforts to maintain 
permanently high price of Jute for jute cultivators will be successful.”96   
The cabinet could not relish this success in providing a good jute price in the 
1941 season for long.  The relationship between A.K. Fazlul Haq and the Muslim 
League had deteriorated, and Haq was ejected from the Muslim League in late 1941.  
The Muslim League, which following the defections of KPP dissidents, was virtually 
the sole party propping up Haq’s government withdrew its support and the Cabinet 
collapsed.  In December 1941, Haq managed to cobble together a new coalition 
                                                        
95 Sims, Landales, and Rallis estimated the 1941 acreage at 6 annas (or 6/16th of 1940 acreage), Davids 
estimated 7.5 annas, and Sinclair Murray 6.5 annas.  From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff 
& Co., May 27, 1941, MS/86/V/7/9, DUA 
96 Enclosed in from Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, September 16, 1941, , 
MS/86/V/7/10, DUA 
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cabinet – drawing support from a range of political platforms but excluding the 
Muslim League.  Haq’s chief ally was to be Sarat Chandra Bose, except Bose was 
arrested.  His senior coalition partner then became Shyamaprasad Mukherjee, the 
leader of the Hindu Mahasabha.  The Shyama-Haq ministry lasted from December 
1941 to March 1943, when John Arthur Herbert, the Governor of Bengal, dismissed 
the Cabinet on grounds of incompetence. 
The new cabinet was formed as World War II arrived at Bengal’s doorstep, 
and war expenditure was causing rapid inflation.  Confronted by rising raw materials 
prices, the jute mills were determined to substantially increase acreage for the 
following year.  At a meeting on September 23, 1941, the IJMA suggested ¾ the 1940 
crop as the acreage for 1942.  That was more than double the 1941 crop.  In 
December 1941, the IJMA wrote to the central government urging strongly for an 
acreage at ¾ of 1940 as “it was imperative for Mills to have ample stocks … in order 
to cope with war orders.”  The IJMA was backed up by Bemis Bags, the largest US 
importer of jute goods, who also pressed the central government for a ¾ acreage.97  
In the end, under pressure from the central government Fazlul Haq’s new cabinet 
agreed to fix jute acreage at 2/3rd the 1940 level.  The Government of India, Haq 
assured the Assembly, had guaranteed that there would be demand for Bengal’s 
increased jute and promised that if jute prices fell below a certain level they would 
“come to our rescue and help us to the utmost possible limit.”98   
As prices fell in March 1942, the provincial government made a belated effort 
to revise restriction downwards to half the 1940 acreage.  This late attempt at a                                                         
97 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, November 18, 1941, 
MS/86/V/7/9, DUA 
98 BLA, Vol. LXII, No. 2, 1942, p. 71 
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downward revision failed.  By mid-May mofussil jute agencies were estimating a crop 
of more than the stipulated 2/3rd acreage.  The manager of Thomas Duff reported 
with glee: “The crop has … got an excellent start and … there ought to be plenty of 
jute next season.”99  At the opening of the 1942 season jute prices were much lower 
than they had been in 1941.  Calcutta jute mills were paying Rs. 6/8/- per maund for 
Bottoms and Rs. 9/8/- for Mediums in July 1942 as against Rs. 9/8/- Bottoms and 
Rs. 11/8/- Mediums in July 1941.  Under attack in the legislative assembly for failing 
to prevent the fall in prices, Haq admitted to missing Suhrawardy’s expertise on jute: 
“he really turned out to be a jute expert and it was really pleasant to find that even 
those who were in the market or who were experts in the Government of India could 
not cross swords with my friend, Mr. Suhrawardy, without admitting that he knows 
practically all that is necessary to know for dealing with the problem of jute.”100  
 The rise in jute prices from November 1942 had come too late to benefit the 
poorest jute cultivators who had already sold their stocks of jute.  Further, the 
astronomical rise in rice prices dwarfed that of jute, and the worsening terms of 
exchange between the commodities had tragic consequences for the delta’s 
subsistence jute cultivators.   As hunger and starvation swept through eastern 
Bengal’s jute tracts in the winter and spring of 1942-3, the IJMA’s concerns were 
solely about the rise in prices of jute.  In a period of unprecedented rise in rice prices, 
where the very survival of market-based subsistence jute cultivators was at stake, the 
IJMA looked to set a maximum limit to jute prices.  Control over jute prices had 
completely passed out of the hands of the Government of Bengal and into those of                                                         
99 From Thomas, Duff & Co, Calcutta, to Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, May 19, 1942, MS/86/V/7/9, 
DUA 
100 BLA, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 1942, p. 41 
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the IJMA and the Government of India.  The Government of India had appointed 
G.M. Garrie Acting Adviser on Jute Supplies, his main task being to ensure the 
supply of manufactured jute goods to the USA.  The USA, in turn, had imposed 
maximum price limits on imported jute goods. Further, the USA had decided to place 
a blanket order for jute - 700 million yards of Hessian to be delivered between June 
1943 and January 1944 at the US ceiling prices.  The mills complained that they could 
not supply the USA jute goods at prevailing and rising prices.101  The IJMA’s 
maximum price agreement was, to say the least, callous.  In a gesture at charity, the 
IJMA decided to contribute in September 1943 Rs. 5 per loom for the “relief of 
distress in Bengal.”  
 
END OF PEASANT POPULISM 
The famine was the deathblow to A.K. Fazlul Haq’s political reputation and image.  
Conditions that led to three million people dying of starvation and hunger-related 
causes had emerged under the watch of the man who had promised rice and daal for 
everyone, who used to be considered the champion of the Bengal peasantry.   His 
governments had notably failed to support jute prices and were powerless to prevent 
spiraling rice prices in the winter and spring of 1942-3 or to persuade the IJMA to 
remove its maximum prices in 1943.  Admittedly, his government’s attempts to 
regulate prices between 1939 and 1943 seemed misguided.  Perhaps even, as his 
political opponents alleged, they were corrupt.  The government’s attempts to set 
                                                        
101 In a letter from Andrew Yule & Co, to G.M. Farrie, Acting Adviser on Jute Supplies to the 
Government of India, Yule & Co stated that they could make profits at prices ranging from Rs. 14 to Rs. 
19 per maund for raw jute, “at current prices they make a loss of Rs. 8 per ton, and current costs of jute are 
rising.”  
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prices in hinterland spot markets by manipulating futures markets were always 
doomed to fail.  Persuading, cajoling and bullying jute mills to agreeing to minimum 
prices was a high-risk strategy.  Once the government lost its only bargaining chips – 
the threat of concrete action against manufacturing interests – mills were free to 
determine prices in their interests, rather than that of cultivators.  As the failure to 
bargain for reduced jute acreage in 1942 demonstrated, Haq and his colleagues were 
poor negotiators against the IJMA and the central Government of India.  
Fazlul Haq’s failures, however, do have to be placed in a colonial context, in 
the very limited powers and resources of the provincial government created by the 
1935 Government of India Act.  Fazlul Haq’s governments lacked the authority or 
the resources to take meaningful and concerted measures to set commodity prices.  
In speeches after his forced resignation, Haq tried to absolve himself and his cabinet 
from responsibility for the famine by claiming that real authority resided with the 
colonial bureaucracy: “The Ministers have been given a mockery of authority, and the 
steel frame of the Imperial Services still remain intact, dominating the entire 
administration and casting somber shadows over the activities of Ministers.”102   
 Regardless of the constraints under which he had operated, the 1943 famine 
destroyed Fazlul Haq’s image as the champion of the Bengal peasantry.  His loss of 
legitimacy left a void in Bengal’s representative and electoral politics. Who would 
claim the support and votes of the Bengal peasantry?  After 1943, the Muslim League, 
under the leadership of the Suhrawardy-Abul Hashim faction and with the assistance 
of mofussil Muslim politicians who had abandoned the Krishak Praja Party, built up                                                         
102 BLA, Vol. LXV, 1943, pp. 45-46 
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its organization and infrastructure in the rural hinterland.  More significantly, as I 
discuss in the following chapter, the League propagated an idea of Pakistan as 
peasant utopia – where social and economic relations were governed by Islamic 
morality, cultivators received a fair price for their produce, and no one starved.  The 
vision of Pakistan as peasant utopia found fertile ground in post-famine delta.  
Bengal’s mostly Muslim-cultivators voted in overwhelming numbers for the Muslim 
League in 1946 elections, which the League had converted into a referendum on 
Pakistan.  The Krishak Praja Party virtually disappeared. 
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Chapter 5 
 Sovereignty and Fibre: Post-partition Pakistan and Jute, 1947 to 1954 
 
On August 14 and 15, 1947, just as cultivators were bringing their jute crop into 
market, the post-colonial nation-states of Pakistan and India came into existence.   A 
4,000-kilometre line carved out the Bengal delta and incorporated it into the territory 
of Pakistan.  East Pakistan produced 75% of the world’s jute, but more than 90% of 
that produce was dispatched westward, across the delta and over partition lines, to 
Calcutta, now part of India.  Calcutta was the undisputed metropolis of Bengal jute.  
Mills to the north of the city, along the banks of the Hooghly, consumed more than 
half the annual produce; most of the hydraulic presses that compressed fibres into 
bales for export were in Calcutta; and jute was exported through the docks and jetties 
of Calcutta’s seaport.  Barely 10% of the region’s jute was exported through the 
woefully underdeveloped port in Chittagong – the only seaport in East Pakistan.  
Partition and independence had separated the jute tracts from its industrial and 
commercial centre; East Pakistan was a hinterland without a metropolis.   
Jute was also produced to the north and east of East Pakistan, in Cooch 
Behar, Assam, and Tripura.  In 1945-46, Assam produced 1.5 million bales, Cooch 
Behar 36,000 bales and Tripura 25,000 bales.1  In order to reach Calcutta, jute from 
these regions had to cross partition lines twice – once into Pakistan and then out of 
Pakistan into India.   Further, there were Indian enclaves in Pakistan and Pakistani 
enclaves in India, particularly along the border between Cooch Behar and Rangpur in 
                                                        
1 Vakil, C.N. (ed.) Economic Consequences of Divided India: A Study of the Economy of India and Pakistan, Bombay: 
1950, p. 264 
  235 
north Bengal – 74 Pakistani enclaves were located within India, and 123 Indian 
enclaves in Pakistan.2  These enclaves included the astounding example of the world’s 
only counter-counter enclave – a portion of India, surrounded by Pakistan, 
surrounded by India, surrounded by Pakistan.  The transport of jute out of these 
enclaves into Calcutta also necessitated multiple crossings of freshly drawn boundary 
lines. 
The partition of Bengal also cut across established internal trade routes of the 
region.  The Calcutta-Goalundo railway line was split in two – a portion in India, 
running from Calcutta to the border with East Pakistan in Jessore and a portion in 
East Pakistan from the Jessore border to Goalundo.  The northern Bengal railway 
was cut into three between West Bengal, East Pakistan, and Assam.  The Assam 
Bengal Railway was severed in two, a length in Assam running to the border with 
Sylhet and a second length running from the Sylhet/Assam border to Chittagong 
port.  Partition lines also divided the steamer route between East Bengal and Calcutta 
passing through the Sundarbans, the vast mangrove jungle at the mouths of the 
Ganges. 
 This arbitrary line through the mud and water of the delta, which not only 
carved out new nation-states but also severed the jute tracts from their primary 
market, could not have come at a worse time.  August was the beginning of the jute 
season, when approximately five million peasant households were about to bring 
fibres produced on about two million acres of land onto market.  Trade, however, 
was not disrupted.  In the British haste to depart India, there was no time to work out 
                                                        
2 Schendel, Willem Van, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia, London: Anthem, 2005, 
p. 23 
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a trade and payments agreement between India and Pakistan.  The two states agreed 
to a “standstill agreement,” whereby neither would interfere with bilateral trade until 
a more comprehensive agreement could be worked out.  In the months immediately 
following partition, trade between the hinterland and the metropolis continued as 
before: jute prices barely registered a blip and more jute was transported to 
metropolitan Calcutta than in the previous pre-partition year.   
 This situation would not last.  The post-colonial nation-states of India and 
Pakistan would assert their sovereignty over flows of commodities, capital and people 
across their territorial limits.  In doing so, they would imbue arbitrary partition lines 
with meaning.  In this chapter, I will look at the post-colonial Pakistani state’s 
attempts to monitor, police, regulate, and tax the production and circulation of fibre 
within the jute hinterland.  Post-colonial states strived to assert sovereignty over fibre 
in a larger attempt to establish post-colonial nations as a modern, territorial and 
national economy.  In pursuit of this project, the Pakistani government established 
customs offices, regulated currency exchanges, monitored the “national loyalties” of 
jute traders and merchants, and kick-started a jute baling and milling industry in the 
Bengal delta.  Economic activities that subverted the post-colonial nation-state’s 
sovereignty over fibre was criminalized as smuggling or black-marketeering and 
punished harshly.  
 Jute cultivators and traders in East Pakistan experienced the state’s efforts to 
assert sovereignty over fibre as harassment and oppression.  The delta’s mostly-
Muslim jute cultivators had enthusiastically supported Pakistan in the years leading up 
to partition.  They voted in overwhelming numbers for the Muslim League in the 
provincial elections of 1946, which the League contested as a referendum on Pakistan.  
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They celebrated the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947 with much fanfare.  The 
Bengal peasantry did not, however, necessarily subscribe to an idea of Pakistan as a 
territorially bounded national economy; instead, they saw in Pakistan the promise of 
peasant economic emancipation.3  Pakistan was envisioned as a place where hunger 
did not rear its ugly head, the state was not oppressive, landlords and moneylenders 
did not siphon away earnings, and cultivators received fair prices for their produce.  
However, as the post-colonial Pakistani state attempted to give meaning to their 
territorial limits, assert control over flows of jute – in other words, create a modern, 
national economy – it became a source of harassment.  Far from the embodiment of 
a peasant utopia, the Pakistani state became an entity to be avoided and evaded. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I look at two ideas of Pakistan that 
coexisted in eastern Bengal in the years leading up to partition:  Pakistan as the 
promise of Muslim peasantry’s economic emancipation and Pakistan as a territorial 
and national economy, with resources and revenues capable of supporting a modern 
nation-state with all its trappings.  The two ideas coexisted prior to partition and the 
actual formation of the state but came increasingly into conflict after 1947, 
particularly as the post-colonial state attempted to create a national economy.   In the 
second section, I examine how the central Pakistani state asserted territorial and 
national sovereignty over fibre: first, by policing flows of jute across its territorial 
limits and, second, by monitoring the nationality and loyalty of firms engaged in the 
                                                        
3 Taj-ul Islam Hashmi argues that elite Muslims in Bengal convinced cultivators that Pakistan would be a 
land of plenty, free from exploitation of Hindu zamindars and moneylenders.  In his phrase, Pakistan 
carried the promise of “peasant utopia”: Hashmi, Taj ul-Islam, Pakistan as Peasant Utopia: The 
Communalization of Class Politics in Bengal: 1920-1947, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.  Ahmed Kamal has 
argued that the peasant vision of Pakistan included not only economic emancipation, but also the promise 
of a society founded on a peasant moral economy, rather than state laws and law enforcement agencies.  
Kamal, Ahmed, “A Land of Eternal Eid: Independence, People and Politics in East Bengal,” The Dhaka 
University Studies, 46(1), 1989. 
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jute trade.  The delta’s citizenry experienced the post-colonial state’s interventions 
into jute as harassment and oppression, and they responded with evasion and 
avoidance.  In the third section of this chapter, I look at the dynamic of harassment 
and evasion that took place at every level of the jute commodity chain, from 
substantial jute exporters down to impoverished jute cultivators.  The final section of 
the chapter examines how provincial politicians in East Bengal contested the 
Karachi-based central government’s assumption of revenue and power over jute.  In 
contesting sovereignty over fibre, however, provincial politicians continued to 
operate in the paradigm of the modern nation-state with territorial and national 
sovereignty over the production and flows of commodities within its borders.   
 
PAKISTAN 
 
During the years leading up to partition and independence, there were many ideas of 
Pakistan.  In Ayesha Jalal’s formulation, South Asia’s Muslims negotiated their 
territorial Indian identity with their extra-territorial Muslim identity in a variety of 
ways.4  In this section, I will look at two imaginings of Pakistan that co-existed in 
Bengal during the years leading up to partition.  First, Pakistan represented the 
promise of Muslim peasants’ economic emancipation, a post-famine peasant utopia 
where cultivators were not exploited by landlords and moneylenders, received fair 
prices for their produce, and did not experience hunger.   Second, Pakistan was 
conceived as a territorial national economy, containing within its borders the 
                                                        
4 Jalal, Ayesha, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850, New York: 
Routledge, 2000 
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resources and revenue to create and maintain a modern nation-state with all of its 
institutional trappings.  Jute figured prominently in both these imaginings: in the 
former, as an integral component of peasant livelihoods and, in the latter, as a 
national resource. 
Pakistan as Peasant Economic Emancipation 
The Muslim League contested the 1946 provincial elections across India, the first 
since 1936, as a referendum on Pakistan – to vote for or against the Muslim League 
was to vote for or against Pakistan.  Their electoral success in reserved Muslim 
constituencies was in sharp contrast to the failures of 1936 and demonstrated the 
popularity of the Pakistan cause.  The idea of Pakistan was, however, construed 
differently in electoral campaigns in different provinces.  As David Gilmartin has 
argued, in the Punjab elections, Muslim League candidates portrayed Pakistan as a 
place of “Muslim unity and moral order.”5  In agrarian Bengal, on the other hand, the 
Muslim League promoted Pakistan as the land of peasant utopia, carrying the 
promise of the post-famine Muslim peasantry’s economic emancipation.   
Muslim League candidates contested the 1946 elections inBengal on slogans 
like “Land Belongs to the Plough,” “Abolish Zamindari Without Compensation,”  
“Labourers will be Owners,” and “Pakistan for Peasants and Labourers.”6  In a 
public meeting in Calcutta in December, 1945, Suhrawardy informed his audience, 
“[Pakistan] will mean raising the standards of living for the poor, the oppressed and 
the neglected; more food, wealth, resources, work, better living conditions and more                                                         
5 Gilmartin, David, “A Magnificent Gift: Muslim Nationalism and the Election Process in Colonial Punjab,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(3), July 1998, pp. 415-436 
6 Abul Mansur Ahmed provides a first-hand account of the 1946 election campaign in his autobiography, 
Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor, p. 248 
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joy and happiness for the common people; opportunities for all and the 
establishment of a reign of truth and justice, of tolerance and fair play.”7  The Muslim 
League’s electoral success in 1946 in Bengal was partly due to its ability to align the 
Pakistan cause with the praja movement in East Bengal and occupy the space of 
Muslim peasant politics vacated by the Krishak Praja Party.  H.S. Suhrawardy and 
Abul Hashim, the so-called left-wing of the League, had taken over the leadership of 
the party, displacing a coalition of Muslim zamindars and capitalists, led by Khwaja 
Nazimuddin from the Dacca Nawab family, and M.M. Ispahani, one of the largest 
raw jute and jute fabric exporters in Calcutta.8  The leaders built up the League’s 
organization in the deltaic hinterland, absorbing disaffected members of the Krishak 
Praja Party.  The KPP had virtually ceased to exist as a political force, as its rank and 
file members in the hinterland left the party in droves and joined the Muslim League.  
In contesting the 1946 elections the Muslim League adopted the slogans and 
symbols of the praja movement.  In an editorial in the Millat just prior to the 1946 
elections, Abul Mansur Ahmed wrote: “today the Muslim League is the carrier and 
conductor (dharok ebong bahok) of the krishak praja movement.”  The League had 
incorporated the praja cause into the idea of Pakistan: as Ahmed argued, “the Praja 
movement has been fully realized in the Pakistan movement.”  In the idea of Pakistan, 
Ahmed saw the combination of two promises: “Muslim unity (shonghoti) and the 
economic freedom of the masses (jonoshadaroner arthik mukti).”  “Pakistan will be the 
ordinary people’s (jonoshadharon) state, where zamindars and the rich will have no                                                         
7 Quoted in Rashid, Haron-or, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengali Muslim League and Muslim Politics, 1936-
1947, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987, p. 206 
8 Haron-or-Rashid and Taj-ul –Islam Hashemi provide political accounts of the contest for the Muslim 
League leadership between Suhrawardy/Hashim faction against Nazimuddin/Ispahani group during the 
early 1940s.  Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, and Hashmi, Pakistan as Peasant Utopia.  
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place,” Ahmed stated, “the Pakistan demand is a symbol of Muslim mass aspiration 
(gono-akangkha).”  Pakistan’s promise of economic emancipation, Ahmed argued, 
extended to all of India’s oppressed: “Pakistan’s message is of the right to self-
determination (atmo-niyontron); it may have been uttered by Muslims, but it is the 
demand of all of India’s oppressed people’s (nirjatito jati).  It is true that Bengal’s praja 
movement was started solely by Muslims, but the movement is that of all of Bengal’s 
oppressed masses.”9  
This peasant-oriented and praja-inflected vision of Pakistan was framed in the 
context of a post-famine society.  The 1943 famine (panchasher monnontor) figured 
prominently in the pages of the Millat during 1946 and 1947.  In articles on abolishing 
zamindari, guaranteeing food security, or bolstering jute prices, the Millat repeatedly 
evoked the horrors of famine, fresh in the memories of its readers. An October 1946 
article “Granary of the past Bengal – Yet people die starving here” urged for 
concerted measures to grow more food and for controlled distribution of food to 
combat any repeats of the horrors of 1943.  The author of the article, Hashimuddin 
Ahmed, wrote of the lingering effects of famine on Bengal’s society: “The 1943 
famine has ripped apart and emptied our political, social and economic lives (rashtriyo, 
shamaji, o arthanaitik jibon).  Three years later, we still feel the effects of the famine 
with every step.”10   Panchasher Monnontor was also evoked in arguing for the “absolute 
necessity” of abolishing zamindari.  The abolition of zamindari was the central plank 
of the praja movement and was at the core of the pro-peasant idea of Pakistan 
articulated in the pages of Millat.  An editorial from July 4, 1946 argued: “it is clear 
                                                        
9 Ahmed, Abul Mansur, “Banglay Muslim Rajnitir Potobhumi o Porichoy,” Millat, 1946.   
10 “Prachyer gola-ghor Bangla – othhocho ekhane na khaiya manush morey,” Millat, October 2, 1946, p. 3 
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that the 1943 famine would not have taken this terrible form if zamindari law did not 
prevail over this country.”11   
The villainy of colonial capital, particularly of jute mill-owners, also figured 
prominently in the pages of the Millat.  When jute prices began to rise once more at 
the opening of the 1946 jute season, the IJMA pressured the central and provincial 
governments to maintain wartime controls over fibre prices.  In July 1946, an article 
titled “Jute cultivators are on their way to the graveyard and profiteers are scheming” 
argued that “farias, mahajans, and mill owners are playing games with the life and 
death of jute cultivators.”  The primary villains of the piece were “white jute 
millowners” (shetango mill-malik), who cheated cultivators of a “just price” (nyajyo 
mulya) and impoverished them while enriching themselves.12  Pakistan, hence, was not 
only the promise of peasant economic emancipation, but also of freedom from 
shamrajyobadi-pujibadi, or imperialist-capitalism. 
This pro-peasant, anti-imperialist Pakistan, at least in the eyes of the League’s 
leaders, depended upon their control over a strong state, capable of ensuring food 
security, just prices for produce, and taking on the landlords, moneylenders, and 
traders who exploited cultivators.   Such a state would be dependent upon its 
territorial and national economy, to provide the revenues and resources for ambitious 
post-colonial projects of state and nation formation.  For Pakistan’s promoters, the 
partitioned hinterland of East Bengal fell far short of such a territorial economy.  In 
June 1947, in an interview with the United Press of India after the Muslim League                                                         
11 “Jamidari Pratha’r Bilupti,” Millat, July 4, 1946, p. 2 
12 The villainy of the shetango mill-malik was a dominant theme in the pages of the Millat, particularly after 
the IJMA moved to extend war-time controls during the opening of the 1946 season.  See, for example,  
“Pat’er Bajar,” Millat, 10 Ashwin, 1354, and “Fatka bajarer je potobhumikay patchashider rokto biki-kini 
hoiya thhaey,” Millat, 4 Paush, 1353,  
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accepted Mountbatten’s partition proposal, Abul Hashim warned of the new nation’s 
dangerous reliance on jute and its probable future as a colonized economy of the 
United States of America, the new imperial power: 
Eastern Pakistan will be mainly reliant on jute.  This is probably the most 
densely populated region in the entire world.  … At anytime, artificial jute 
might be invented and, if that happens, it will be a disaster for jute cultivation 
… In this situation, Eastern Pakistan will probably develop as a good market 
for American manufactured goods.  America might give us loans and we will 
have to buy American cigarettes and other goods to repay those loans.13 
   
Pakistan as territorial, national economy 
Pakistan’s promoters in Bengal imagined a greater East Pakistan, consisting not only 
of the entirety of Bengal but also all of Assam and, for some, parts of Bihar and 
Orissa.  In 1944, members of the Bengal Muslim League mooted two very similar 
proposals for a greater East Pakistan.  In an internal Muslim League memorandum, 
Raghib Ahsan proposed a scheme titled a  “Confederacy of East Pakistan and 
Adibasistan.”14  In Ahsan’s scheme, East Pakistan would include all of Bengal and 
Assam and would form a confederation with Adibasistan, composed of adjoining 
“tribal” areas of Bihar. Simultaneously, Mujibur Rehman Khan, president of the 
Eastern Pakistan Renaissance Society in Calcutta, published a pamphlet titled Eastern 
Pakistan: Its Population, Delimitation and Economics.15   Similar to Ahsan, Khan proposed 
a greater East Pakistan comprised of the entirety of Bengal and Assam, though he did 
not discuss the formation of an “Adibasistan.”                                                           
13 “British porikolpona keno grihito hoilo,” Millat, June 13, 1947, p. 1 
14 I have not seen original text and have, instead relied mostly on discussions of the text in secondary 
literature, especially in Haron-or-Rashid’s The Foreshadoing of Bangladesh, pp. 169-171 
15 Mujibur Rehman Khan, Eastern Pakistan: Its Population, Delimitation, and Economics, East Pakistan 
Renaissance Society, Calcutta: 1944 
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Rehman and Ahsan justified this expansive Eastern Pakistan not on the 
grounds of Muslim majority – though Rehman juggled numbers – but on the notion 
of a national economic territory capable of supporting a modern and modernizing 
state.  As Ahsan stated, “it is one thing to constitute a separate province within the 
orbit of an Empire … and it is quite a different thing to constitute a separate, 
sovereign and independent state, responsible for its own defense, internal and 
external security, financial solvency and economic self-sufficiency.”16  Assam was 
included not because it had a Muslim majority – it did not – but because of its 
cultivable lands and mineral resources.  As Khan said, “Eastern Pakistan must have 
sufficient land for its large population and Assam will give it full scope for expansion 
and because Assam has abundant forest and natural resources such as coal, petroleum, 
etc, East Pakistan must include Assam to be financially and economically strong.”17   
The plan to partition Bengal according to Hindu and Muslim-majority 
districts was a blow to these aspirations of a strong nation-state based on a resource-
rich territory.  A viable modern nation-state created and maintained out of this 
territory’s resources was unimaginable to contemporaries who described the delta as 
an “overcrowded rural slum.”   A territorial and national economy comprised solely 
of eastern Bengal – and shorn of metropolitan Calcutta, the jute mills along the 
Hooghly, western Bengal’s mineral reserves, and outlets for emigration to Assam – 
was widely considered unviable.  In a conference of provincial governors, it was 
stated that “economically [East Bengal] could not survive as all the coal mines, the 
minerals and the factories are in western Bengal, so are the jute processing mills with 
                                                        
16 Quoted in Rashid, Harun, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, p. 169 
17 Mujibur Rehman Khan, Eastern Pakistan: Its Population, Delimitation, and Economics, p. 8 
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two exceptions.”18   In 1943, O.H.K. Spate, a geographer at the London School of 
Economics, wrote gloomily about the economic prospects of “Bangistan” composed 
solely of the delta’s jute tracts:  “If partition left this metropolis [Calcutta] out of 
Bangistan, the economic situation of the remnant state would not be enviable – a 
small territory suffering from severe agrarian overcrowding, cut off from the sources 
of power and raw materials on which Bengal's industries have flourished, and by the 
very communal hypothesis to which it owed its existence unable to seek relief in 
emigration.”19 
The movement to partition Bengal - the “Banga-bhanga andalon” – was 
condemned in the Millat in the months preceding partition.  Articles in the Millat 
alleged that the Banga-bhanga andolon was a plot by “imperialist-capitalists” hatched in 
conspiracy with their Congress allies.  This plot would maintain imperialist-capitalists’ 
“control and ownership” (sholo anna malikana) over the wealth they had built up in 
Calcutta and its environs over two centuries of exploiting Bengali peasants and 
workers.20  By denying the Muslim and peasant state of Pakistan control over 
industrial and commercial Calcutta, partition would enable the continued exploitation 
of imperialist capitalists after the formal end of British Empire.  Partition was the last 
ploy by Islam’s global enemy – the British Empire – to keep Muslims impoverished 
and powerless, a deathblow to the aspirations of Muslim economic emancipation.21  
Articles in the Millat alleged that the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha were 
                                                        
18 “Ninth Miscellaneous Meeting,” in Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol. X, 1981, pp. 261-64,  
19 Spate, O.H.K. “Geographical Aspects of Pakistan Considered,” The Geographical Journal, 102(3), 
September 1943, p. 129  
20 “Bongo-bhongo andolon,” Millat, April 11, 1947 
21 “Matlabajerai Bongo-Bhonger Awaj Tulechhey,”  Millat, May 16, 1947, p. 1.   
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playing into imperialist capitalist hands; in their desire to build a “caste-Hindu Raj” in 
western Bengal, they were ensuring the continuance of imperialist domination.   
Bengali Muslim leaders mounted a last-ditch attempt to avert partition by 
proposing a united independent Bengal.  Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim joined with 
Sarat Chandra Bose, who rebelled against the Congress high command, to propose a 
United Independent Bengal.  Suhrawardy argued that Bengal was indivisible because 
of its “economic integrity, mutual reliance and the necessity of creating a strong 
workable state.”22  Jinnah gave the scheme his tacit support, as he considered a 
partitioned Bengal useless: “If Bengal remains united … I should be delighted.  What 
is the use of Bengal without Calcutta; they had much better to remain united and 
independent.  I am sure they would be on friendly terms with us.”23   
The British desire to depart India as quickly as possible prevented alternatives 
to partition from coming to fruition.  On June 4, 1947, Mountbatten announced that 
if Muslim League wished for Pakistan, they would have to accept the partition of 
Bengal and the Punjab.  The following issue of the Millat ran an editorial titled 
“Crippled Pakistan” (Pongu Pakistan), echoing Jinnah’s famous quote of a “maimed, 
mutilated, and moth-eaten” Pakistan.24  “According to the British government’s 
announcement, Bengal will be partitioned (dikhondito),” the editorial announced, “and 
of this partitioned Bengal, the wealthiest, most advanced, and resource-rich portion 
will be snatched away from Bengali Muslim hands and given to a few self-interested 
                                                        
22 Cited in Haron-or-Rashid, Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, p. 231 
23 “Record of an interview between Jinnah and Mountbatten, 26 April, 1947,” Transfer of Power, Vol. X, pp. 
451-454. 
24 Jinnah’s quote is from September 1944 when, in talks with the Gandhi, he rejected C. Rajagopalachari’s 
formula of dividing India into Muslim and Hindu majority districts.   
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friends of the British.”  The partition plan was, the editorial alleged, was intended to 
“squeeze Bengal’s Muslims into one corner of Bengal and to crush them to death.”  
The “crippled (pongu) Pakistan” would be an economic disaster with a bleak future; 
partition was a “fearsome cloud over the lives Bengali Muslims.”25   
Despite their misgivings, the Bengal Muslim League accepted Mountbatten’s 
partition plan.  Upon their return to Calcutta, the provincial Muslim League 
announced preparations for partition.  Suhrawardy, whose political base was in 
metropolitan Calcutta, reportedly starting scouting out a new constituency in Jessore.  
The Dacca Medical College, it was announced, would serve as government 
headquarters until new buildings were erected.  Private individuals were barred from 
acquiring land in parts of Chittagong town that was to be set aside for the expansion 
of the port.26  The mood in the Bengal Muslim League was, however, gloomy.  As 
Abul Hashim stated, they had accepted partition not out of “satisfaction and hope 
but out of fear and helplessness.”27 
 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The creation of the crippled, or the maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten, Pakistan on 
August 14, 1947, was celebrated with much fanfare in East Bengal – now Pakistan.  
In the new provincial capital of Dacca, gates were erected, buildings decorated, 
processions brought out, and flags of the new nation raised.  Celebrations also took 
                                                        
25 “Pongu Pakistan,” Millat, June 6, 1947, p. 2 
26 “League Council British ghoshona maniya loilen,” Millat, June 13, 1947, p. 1 
27 “British porikolpona keno grihito hoilo,” Millat, June 13, 1947, p. 1 
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place in mofussil towns such as Barisal, Sylhet, and Rajshahi and in rural parts of 
Mymensingh and Tipperah.28  Probhash Chandra Lahiry, a Congress politician in 
Rajshahi and participant in the celebrations, in 1964 remembered that on “every face 
of the vast population … [showed] signs of radiant glow of fulfillment of a long 
cherished desire of winning freedom.”29  Concerns about the viability of the 
territorial economy were put aside, as tens of thousands celebrated the inauguration 
of a new nation and its promise of freedom from exploitation, oppression, and 
hunger.   
 While newly created citizens celebrated the nation for its promise of 
economic emancipation, the newly created state grappled with the exigencies of state 
building and modernization – a task that many considered impossible given the new 
nation’s territorial inheritance.30   However, the bureaucrats and politicians who had 
taken control of government were optimistic.  O.H.K. Spate noted in January of 
1948: “Morally, to judge from many conversations with young Muslim officials 
flocking into Western Pakistan there is a good spirit among them – a realization of 
the enormous difficulties, the shortages of resources and of technical cadres, but a 
determination to tackle them resolutely.”31  While many thought that post-colonial 
Pakistan would not even be able to survive, much less thrive, bureaucrats in the new 
                                                        
28 Ahmed Kamal, State against Nation, pp. 11-14 provides an account of the celebrations with which the new 
state was inaugurated. 
29 Provash Chandra Lahiry, India Partitioned and Minorities in Pakistan, Calcutta, 1964, p. 1 
30 The unequal share of the spoils of partition between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s underdeveloped 
territorial inheritance made it doubtful whether the state would be able to financially sustain itself, much 
less undertake the tasks of state and nation-building.  Jalal, Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of 
Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 details the uneven 
distribution of the spoils of partition and the difficulties under which the new state labored.   
31 Spate, O.H.K., “The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan,” Geographical Review, 38(1), January 
1948, p. 29 
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capital of Karachi announced a program of rapid industrialization and economic 
modernization, in order to bring “improvements in the standard of life of the people 
… by harnessing, to the maximum extent possible, the forces and treasures of nature 
in the service of people by providing gainful and legitimate employment and by 
assuring freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and a more equitable 
distribution of wealth.”32  
 Post-colonial state-builders’ optimism stemmed in part from the Bengal 
delta’s jute.  In August 1948, exactly a year after partition, the Pakistani government’s 
Publicity Department issued a pamphlet titled The Golden Fibre.  The pamphlet 
celebrated eastern Bengal’s “virtual monopoly” over jute, and “practical monopoly” 
over “finer varieties of jute.” cultivation of this important global commodity.  Pre-
partition fears of economic unviability were reversed: “the emergence of Pakistan as a 
separate sovereign state has substantially altered the position of India … While 
Pakistan has emerged with 80% of the world’s jute and 100% of the best varieties of 
the fibre, India has only about 18 to 20% of the jute fibre which is quite insufficient 
to feed her mills which number more than a hundred.”33  The pamphlet proceeded to 
outline Pakistan’s plans in the expansion of baling capacity, Chittagong port’s cargo 
handling facilities, and in kick-starting a jute manufacturing industry in East Bengal.  
The Bengal delta’s jute was Pakistan’s “golden fibre,” a national resource that would 
support the new nation’s economy and finance ambitious industrialization and 
economic modernization programmes.  
                                                        
32 Fazlur Rahman, Industrial Development in Pakistan, Karachi, October 1948, p. 8 
33 Hayat, Aslam The Golden Fibre, Karachi: Dept of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of 
Pakistan, 1950, p. 9 
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 Pakistan’s national economy was critically dependent on primary commodity 
exports, especially those of jute and cotton and, to a lesser extent, of tea and hides 
and skins.  Export duties on primary commodities contributed the lion’s share of 
state revenue and, even more significantly, brought in foreign currency.  The post-
colonial state building project relied on foreign hard currency to finance imports of 
capital goods, military stores, and consumer goods.  Pakistan benefited from high 
global commodity prices in the years following 1947, particularly during the Korean 
War commodity boom of 1950-51.34  The high prices of its chief commodity exports 
enabled Pakistan to maintain a favourable balance of trade position and to finance 
economic and industrial development while maintaining a liberal trade regime.  A 
pamphlet celebrating the first five years’ of Pakistan in 1952 stated: “a favourable 
balance of trade position … has, of course, been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s 
economy.”35  The Commerce Minister, Fazlur Rahman, underscored Pakistan’s 
reliance on jute and cotton in a broadcast on Radio Pakistan in February 1952: 
Immediately after partition it was realized that Pakistan’s internal economy as 
well as the external financial position will depend almost entirely upon the 
two major cash crops of jute and cotton.  All our defense stores, capital 
equipment, materials required for industrial consumption and essential 
consumer goods had to be paid for out of our earnings of foreign exchange 
from the exports of jute and cotton… the export duties on jute and cotton … 
constitute the single biggest source of internal revenue of the Central and 
Provincial Governments.  In fact the entire fabric of Pakistan’s economy is 
woven with these two fibres.36 
  
                                                        
34 The value of Pakistan’s exports in 1950-51 was $406 million as opposed to $171 million in 1949-50.  
Talbot, Ian, Pakistan: A Modern History, London: C. Hurst, 2009, p. 137 
35 Just a Peep at Pakistan, New York: Consulate General of Pakistan, 1953, p. 20 
36 “Jute Bargaining Factor with Bharat: Rahman on steps taken to sell more,” Dawn, August 28, 1952, in 
MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR.  
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 This Pakistani national economy did not, however, simply come into 
existence with the creation of the nation on August 14, 1947.  The Pakistani state 
deliberately and actively weaved the “fabric of Pakistan’s economy” out of its 
territorial inheritance.   The project of transforming commodities of empire into 
national resources entailed the assertion of territorial and national sovereignty over 
commodities.  The state policed flows of jute across territorial boundaries, monitored 
jute transactions, and taxed cultivators, traders, and manufacturers.  They erected 
customs offices, created and staffed government institutions, established processes of 
documentation and inspection.  In the following sections, I look at two aspects of the 
post-colonial state’s assertion of sovereignty over the former commodity of empire: 
policing and controlling flows of jute across territorial borders and monitoring and 
regulating the national loyalties of jute traders.    
 
Territorial Sovereignty 
On October 13, 1947, after two months of unobstructed flows of jute between East 
Bengal and Calcutta, the Government of Pakistan wrote to their counterparts in India 
complaining that they were not receiving their legitimate share of the export duty on 
jute.37  The Pakistani government pointed out the injustice that “India is likely to 
receive over 90% of the jute revenue, although only 27% of the jute is grown in that 
Dominion.”  They proposed that Pakistan should receive “at least 75% of the export 
duty on 5.9 million bales” as its legitimate share.  The Government of India 
prevaricated in their response, arguing that any agreement on jute would have to                                                         
37 “Aide-Memoire,” From High Commissioner of Pakistan in India to Finance Minister, GoI, October 13, 
1947 in Ministry of External Affairs, OSV Branch, File No. 9-5/47-OSV, NAI. 
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await a comprehensive trade and payments agreement.  They stated that it would 
“scarcely be fair to question its equity isolating any particular source of revenue … in 
regard to which one party may feel that it had any special claim.”38  
The newly created Pakistani government desperately needed revenue, and was 
not willing to forego the export duty.  On November 13, 1947, Liaqat Ali Khan, the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, wrote directly to Jawaharlal Nehru announcing that, “in 
the interests of their revenue my Government now feel compelled most reluctantly to 
charge export duty on jute leaving borders of East Bengal both by sea and land.”  
This was a momentous announcement: for the first time since its creation, Pakistan 
was to enforce arbitrarily drawn partition lines.  Significantly, the decision to assert 
sovereignty over flows of fibre across its territory was driven by concerns of national 
economy – specifically, the desire for state revenue. 
The Pakistani government hurriedly setup customs check-posts and appointed 
land-customs officers in thirteen key jute-trading towns, located on rail and steamer 
routes connecting the delta to Calcutta.  The Central Board of Revenue in Karachi 
announced that “customs on raw jute exported from the Dominion of Pakistan by 
land” would be collected at river-ports like Chandpur, Narayanjganj, Sirajganj, 
Munshiganj, Dacca and railway towns like Sarishabari, Hajiganj, Bera, and Ishwardi.  
In these towns, the government hurriedly setup customs offices, appointed customs 
officials, and distributed the forms, receipts and the paperwork involved in customs 
collections. None of these towns were located on the physical border, which was still 
not demarcated.  The government found it easier to police jute bulked on steamer 
                                                        
38 “Aide-Memoire,” from Secy, Ministry of Finance, GoI, to High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, 
October 20, 1947 in  Ministry of External Affairs, OSV Branch, File No. 9-5/47-OSV, NAI. 
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flats and railway wagons in jute-trading towns, rather than smaller quantities loaded 
on country-boats and ox-carts along its borders.  I will return to smuggling and the 
beparis and farias who moved jute-laden ox-carts and country-boats across Bengal’s 
porous borders later in this chapter, when I discuss the dynamic of harassment and 
evasion in state-citizen relations. 
In September 1948, when the governments of India and Pakistan signed a 
trade and payments agreement, Pakistan’s jute export duty remained in place.  The 
two governments specified their requirements of essential commodities from each 
other.  India wanted 5.5 million bales of raw jute and 900,000 bales of raw cotton 
from Pakistan; Pakistan wanted 3.4 million tons of coal, 400,000 bales of cotton cloth 
and yarn, and 50,000 tons of jute manufactures from India.  This trade would take 
place at “free” or market prices, between private merchants and traders.  Under a 
separate payments agreement, the governments also agreed that Pakistani and Indian 
rupees should be of equal value, and balances of payments up to 150 million rupees 
should be settled in local currencies, the next 150 million rupees above it in “free 
sterling,” and the remainder in “blocked sterling.”    
The two governments taxed a variety of commodities in mutual trade, despite 
agreeing that “saving regard to economic considerations, both Dominions should try 
to reduce the number of commodities which when moving from one Dominion to 
the other shall be subject to an import or export duty.”39  Customs duties formed a 
significant proportion of pre-partition India’s state revenue, and revenue-hungry 
post-colonial governments were not willing to forego revenue from their mutual 
trade.  India imposed duties on exports of cotton and jute manufactures and Pakistan                                                         
39 “Report on Trade,” Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Jute Branch, 28-Pak(15)/52, NAI 
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on exports of raw cotton and jute.  The two governments levied duties on 
commodities traded exclusively across Bengal’s partition lines – Pakistan on exports 
of fish and bamboo to India, and their Indian counterparts on imports of raw 
tobacco.40  
Post-colonial Pakistan and India’s efforts to impose territorial sovereignty 
over their economies were also informed by their desire for economic independence 
and autonomy.  Both governments pursued plans to reduce their dependence on each 
other – India on Pakistan for raw materials and food-grains, Pakistan on India for 
markets for its agricultural produce.  Pakistan tried to build up East Bengal’s jute 
baling, manufacturing, and shipping capacities so as to displace flows of jute from 
Calcutta.  The Indian government tried to increase jute cultivation within its borders, 
with some success: India’s output of raw jute increased from 1.6 million bales in 
1946-47, to 2 million in 1947-48 and 2.8 million in 1948-49.41  The provincial 
governments of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa distributed jute seeds and 
provided advice and technical assistance to cultivators to encourage them to grow 
jute.  India also announced the construction of the Assam Link railway, a single-track 
narrow gauge railway line connecting Calcutta with jute and tea-tracts in Cooch Behar, 
Assam, and Tripura without passing through Pakistan.   
When the two governments’ met to extend the trade and payments agreement 
in May 1949, Pakistan’s trade surplus with India – the result of high commodity 
prices – emerged as the major issue.  Under the terms of the payments agreement,                                                         
40 Summary of meeting between Ghulam Ahmed, Finance Minister Pakistan and Commerce Minister, 
India, April 8, 1949 in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/Economic Committee of the Cabinet, 15, 27, 
ECC(49), NAI.   
41 “Estimates of Abolition of Control,” in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/Economic Committee of 
the Cabinet, File No. 6/1/ECC/50, NAI 
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Pakistan’s surplus with India did not translate into hard currency, pound sterling or 
US dollars, but into Indian rupees that could only be used to purchase goods from 
India.  When Indian and Pakistani trade delegates met at Karachi, the Pakistan State 
Bank was holding close to 140 million Indian rupees that it was unable to spend on 
anything but imports from India.  The Pakistani trade negotiators insisted that 
Pakistan’s holdings of Indian rupees should be settled in free sterling before a new 
payments agreement could be negotiated.42  They demanded that subsequent 
payments agreements, trade balances should be payable in sterling.  The Indian 
delegation responded: “India was not in a position to take on unlimited liability for 
payment in current sterling.”43   
Each government held the other responsible for the trade imbalance.  Abdul 
Qadir, leading the Pakistani delegation, argued “India was not selling goods to 
Pakistan although the latter was very anxious to purchase.”  B.K. Nehru leadings the 
Indians said “India was keen to sell goods to Pakistan but the latter was not keen to 
buy.”  The main issue was over Pakistan’s purchases of cotton cloth from India – 
Pakistan was importing the bulk of their cloth from Japan because, Pakistani 
delegates claimed, Indian cloth was more expensive and of poorer quality.  Neither 
side budged during the first round of negotiations, and they decided to reconvene in 
June.  In the second round of negotiations, the dispute was resolved in India’s favour: 
balance of payments up to 150 million rupees would still be settled in local currencies.  
The Indian delegation argued that Pakistan did not push for a new payments 
agreement as they forecast a much reduced trade surplus with India.  Jute prices were                                                         
42 “Detailed Record of the Inter-Dominion Discussions Held at Karachi on the 23rd May, 1949”, in 
Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15, 27 ECC(49), NAI 
43 “Detailed Record of the Inter-Dominion Discussions Held at Karachi on the 23rd May, 1949”, in 
Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15, 27 ECC(49), NAI 
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falling and India’s increased domestic production meant that they required less 
Pakistan jute.   
The Indian government’s “victory” at these trade negotiations was, however, 
short-lived.  The second India-Pakistan trade agreement came into effect on 
September 1, 1949.  Little over two weeks later, all official trade between Pakistan 
and India came to an abrupt halt.  On September 19, following the devaluation of the 
British pound, India devalued its rupee and Pakistan did not.  The exchange rate 
stood at 144 Indian rupees for a 100 Pakistani rupees.  India refused to honour the 
new Pakistani rupee and official Indo-Pak trade came to an abrupt standstill.  Official 
trade resumed in April 1950, when the two governments signed new and much 
limited trade agreement.  The devaluation crisis and trade stoppage of 1949 and 1950, 
rather than the political partition of 1947, rent asunder the formerly united economic 
space of British India.   
The devaluation crisis finally severed the jute commodity chain linking the 
deltaic hinterland and metropolitan Calcutta.  In the aftermath of the crisis, both 
India and Pakistan stepped up efforts to reduce their dependency on the other.  As 
India increased domestic jute cultivation and Pakistan expanded manufacturing 
capacity, the two formerly complementary economies began to compete with each 
other for international markets for jute manufactures.  During the 1950s, the two 
governments openly discriminated against the other, engaging in frequent economic 
warfare.  The Pakistan government imposed a License Duty payable only on sales of 
jute to India, and imposed higher export duties on exports of kutcha bales, only sold 
to India.  India, for its part, imposed a surcharge on exports of coal to energy-starved 
Pakistan.  When the Indian trade delegation accused their Pakistani counterparts of 
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discrimination in raw jute exports in July, 1952, the Pakistani delegates countered that, 
“this was, in fact, not an act of discrimination, but merely a matter of their 
commercial policy calculated to help the sale of raw jute … India, having progressed 
towards self-sufficiency in raw jute, could only consume a small part of the raw jute 
which Pakistan had to sell.  Therefore, Pakistan had no option but to offer jute to 
India’s competitors at cheaper prices so that the latter could stand in competition 
with India in the American market.”44  
 
National Loyalties 
In addition to asserting territorial sovereignty over flows of jute across borderlines, 
the Pakistani government tried to police the national loyalties of traders and 
corporations engaged in the jute trade.  The development discourse of the post-
colonial Pakistani state envisioned private capitalists as the state’s development 
partners, cooperating with the state in the ambitious projects of nation and state 
building.  The post-colonial state looked to private entrepreneurs to invest much-
needed capital in kick-starting a jute-manufacturing sector in East Pakistan – in 
erecting mill-buildings, and importing machinery.   In return, the state gave these 
privileged firms access to cheap credit, public contracts, privileged information, and 
policy-making.  The close partnership of state and capital in carrying out an ambitious 
industrialization program meant that the state was anxious about the national loyalties 
of capital – fearful of the flight of capital and the possible sabotage of Pakistan’s 
budding national economy by “foreign” capitalists.                                                         
44 “Note for the Economic Committee of the Cabinet – Indo Pakistan Trade Agreement,” July 23, 1952, in 
Ministry of Com & Ind, Jute Branch, 28-Pak (15)/52 
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The Marwari and Hindu traders who dominated Bengal’s hinterland jute trade 
were particularly suspicious in the government’s eyes.  The trope of “Indian Big 
Business” conspiring to sabotage East Pakistan was a dominant theme during the 
post-partition years.  In July 1949, An editorial in Dawn, a Karachi-based daily and 
official mouth-piece of the Pakistan government, blamed the fall of jute prices at the 
start of the season on the operations of Indian Big Business.  They pointed the finger 
of blame at “big Marwari business interests in Dacca and other places who, acting as 
the agents of jute manufacturers in India, are engaged in speculation in jute crops in 
order to force down prices.”  The Dawn urged the government to take the issue head-
on, “with prompt and energetic action” instead of “shilly-shallying.”  “Tendering 
advice to the Big Business in India is as futile as preaching the gospel to an angry 
bison.”45  The fear of Marwari and Hindu businesses serving Indian interests and 
actively trying to undermine the Pakistani economy persisted throughout the 1950s.  
It was out of such concerns, that the Pakistani government sought to monitor and 
regulate the national loyalties and activities of jute traders.   
In April 1949, the East Bengal legislature passed the “Jute Dealers’ 
Registration Act.”  Ostensibly meant to standardize weights and measures and 
prevent illegal exactions in hinterland markets, the central feature of the Act was to 
make it compulsory for all jute dealers to be registered.  The Act became a means of 
controlling the national loyalties of jute dealers, as merchants and corporations whose 
Pakistani loyalties were suspect – mainly because they were Hindu – were frequently 
denied licenses or had their licenses canceled.46   Marwari firms were also denied                                                         
45 Dawn, “Editorial: Jute Prices,” July 6, 1949, in MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
46 “Meeting of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet,” November 6, 1949, in Cabinet Secretariat 
(Economic Wing)/ Economic Committee of Cabinet, 6(II) ECC/50, NAI 
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access to state facilities and contracts.  During the devaluation crisis, in an attempt to 
shore up jute prices, the National Bank of Pakistan provided credit on easy terms to 
dealers to purchase fibre.  Only registered firms were eligible for state credit and, 
beyond that, the Pakistan Jute Board drew up lists of authorized buyers.  Only three 
Marwari firms were included in the list.47  While targeting Marwari and Hindu capital, 
the post-colonial Pakistani government sought to reassure European and American 
capital that their investments were safe.  However, as the India Pakistan British 
Association, the leading organization of British commercial interests in South Asia, 
commented in January 1958, in response to a government announcement that only 
firms 25% owned by Pakistani citizens would be registered as jute dealers: “the old 
pretext that it is the Marwaris the policy is aimed at and not other foreign interests is 
wearing a bit thin.”48  
While the Marwari and Hindu traders who had dominated the hinterland 
trade prior to partition were suspect, a group of Calcutta-based Muslim business 
families emerged as the state’s development partners – primarily, through investing 
capital into East Pakistan’s jute manufacturing.  Foremost amongst these firms were 
the Ispahani and Adamjee business families, prominent Calcutta-based jute exporters 
in pre-partition Bengal.  In the years preceding partition, the Ispahanis and Adamjees 
had been the Bengal Muslim League’s chief financiers and leading lights of the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce, a business association closely aligned with the 
League.  After partition, both families moved substantial capital into East Pakistan,                                                         
47 “Meeting of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet,” November 6, 1949, in Cabinet Secretariat 
(Economic Wing)/ Economic Committee of Cabinet, 6(II) ECC/50, NAI 
48 India Pakistan British Association, “Confidential Report on Pakistan for January 1958,” in Jute: Pakistan, 
1949-67, MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR.  In the face of strong opposition from western capital, this policy 
was subsequently abandoned.   
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particularly into its jute-manufacturing sector.  The Ispahanis took a leading role in 
East Pakistan’s economy and politics.  H.G. Smith, a Dundee jute businessman who 
visited Pakistan in late 1948, wrote: “M.M. Ispahani [the patriarch of the family] was 
in early after partition with ambitious plans as befitting a Moslem with the most 
influential Pakistan Government contacts.”49  
In the first months after partition, the Ispahanis had established three large 
warehouses in Chittagong – according to Smith, “of immense trading value” – and 
had imported second-hand machinery from Dundee to establish a 500-loom jute mill, 
also in Chittagong.  The Ispahanis plans were dwarfed by the ambitions of the 
Adamjees, who announced plans to build a 3,000-loom jute mill near Narayanganj: it 
would be largest mill in the world, displacing the Ludlow Jute Mills in Massachusetts.  
By February 1952, the Adamjees had installed 2,000 looms, of which 1,200 were in 
production.  Visiting the project site, G.A. Mason, one of the directors of the 
Thomas Duff mills in Calcutta wrote: “it is certainly a tremendous project and covers 
a vast area.”50  By the late 1950s, the Adamjee Mills were operating all 3,000 looms 
and employing 20,000 workers, and was the largest mill in the world.  It became the 
symbol of the statist enterprise of creating a modern and industrial economy in the 
agrarian delta.51  
                                                        
49 “H.G. Smith Travel Reports: reports from India and Eastern Pakistan, 1948 and 1954-56,” 
MS/86/XIX/7/8, Dundee University Archives.  
50 Walton, Calcutta to Kidd, Dundee, April 4, 1952 in “Correspondence of Directors while visiting mills in 
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51 Fittingly, the Adamjee jute mills was also the centre of labour unrest in the newly-industrialized region.  
The Adamjee mill riots of 1954 – which took the form of clashes between Bengali and Bihari labourers in 
the factory – resulted in about 300 deaths.  Park, Richard and Wheeler, Richard, “East Bengal Under 
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 In return for investing their capital and entrepreneurship into building East 
Pakistan’s industrial sector literally from scratch, these business families were granted 
close and privileged access to the colonial government.  M.M. Ispahani, the patriarch 
of the Ispahani family, emerged as one of the most prominent public figures in post-
colonial Pakistan.  M.M. Ispahani was a close adviser of the government, a long-
standing member of the Jute Board, and a founding-member of the Pakistan Jute 
Association.52  However, the post-colonial state felt compelled to impose its vision of 
territorial sovereignty on even these most Pakistani firms.  Prior to partition, the 
Adamjee and Ispahani businesses were headquartered in Calcutta and it did not make 
immediate sense to relocate headquarters from Calcutta to East Bengal.  In October, 
1953, the Jute Board complained to the Pakistan Jute Association that a “good deal 
of business in Pakistan jute was being done through firms in Calcutta and, in fact, 
supporting documents submitted with EPC [Export Control Procedure] forms were 
copies of telegrams [of jute orders] received at Calcutta.”  The Jute Board threatened 
that EPC forms would not be issued for businesses concluded through Calcutta.  The 
Association agreed in principle but asked for time to implement measures: their 
member firms had to make arrangements and build up their organizational capacity in 
order to finalize orders in their East Pakistan offices.  The PJA also expressed 
concerns about whether the East Pakistan Telegraph system could handle the volume 
of jute orders.  The Jute Board granted a temporary allowance of three months and 
                                                        
52 Ispahani was particularly close to the Jute Board, the government institution where control and authority 
was centralized.  He served as one of the three members of the Board since its formation in 1949, and was 
involved in its day to day operations.  52 In his evidence to the Agriculture Enquiry Committee, 
Chowdhury Afsar Ali, Member of the Jute Board stated that “Myself and Mr. Ispahani always attend daily 
[Jute Board meetings] and we dispose of the work so far as it lies within our authority.” “Proceedings of 
Sub-Committee III of the Agricultural Enquiry Committee held on 6/12/51 at the East Bengal Secretariat, 
Dacca at 10 AM” in Proceedings in East Bengal (including evidence on jute and tea), 1951, MSS Eur 
F235/360, IOR. 
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promised that the Posts and Telegraphs Department would “strengthen their 
organization to cope with the expected increase in traffic.”53   
 
*   *   * 
 
The delta’s jute traders, even those with strong pro-Pakistani credentials, experienced 
efforts to impose territorial and national sovereignty over fibe as bureaucratic 
harassment.  Members of the Pakistan Jute Association complained that steamers 
carrying jute from Narayanganj to Calcutta had to pass through six customs or police 
checks, and that the steamer journey takes 60% longer than it did in pre-partition 
days.  At each customs or police check, the shipment was stopped, inspected and the 
traders were harassed.54  Jute shippers’ exports were monitored through a complex 
system of documentation and inspections, that the PJA described as “cumbersome, 
complicated and time-consuming.”55   In 1954, B.A. Boldy, the President of the 
Pakistan Jute Association complained: “the export control procedure for jute which 
has been allowed to just grow since partition without a systematic overhaul, has 
become so unwieldy as to render it almost unworkable.”  He proceeded to detail the 
delays and difficulties involved in exporting jute through official channels: 
The procedure for obtaining State Bank permission to export through EPC 
forms, and obtaining export licenses from the Jute Board has become lengthy 
and unwieldy, it is still difficult to get the State Bank to allow remittances to 
buyers to their legitimate claims.  The Customs Department … are delaying                                                         
53 The Pakistan Jute Association, Annual Report for the year 1953-54, Narayanganj, 1954, p. 23 
54 The Pakistan Jute Association, Annual Report for the year 1953-54, Narayanganj: 1954, p. 10 
55 The Pakistan Jute Association, Annual Report for the year 1956-57, Narayanganj: 1957, p. 7 
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consignments where there is the slightest reason.  All these difficulties are … 
having effect on consumers of jute causing confusion and uncertainty not 
only within Pakistan but also in the trade and industry all over the world.56   
 
Jute firms responded to state harassment by falsifying paperwork: “under-
invoicing” and “grade manipulation” was rife in jute exports.  Firms under-reported 
the value of exports in official documents, claiming that smaller quantities and/or 
poorer quality of fibre than the actual consignment.  They then collected the 
difference between the officially reported value and the actually received value for 
themselves, denying the state the full amount of customs duties and hard currency.  
The state frequently took extraordinary measures in punishing firms suspected of 
falsifying papers.  In November 1954, the government cancelled the licenses of 
thirteen firms, stating in a press release that “they were forced to take this measure 
owing to the alarming proportions that malpractices in the jute trade, such as under-
invoicing, under-grading and registration of bogus contracts were assuming, resulting 
in loss of foreign exchange to the State and making it increasingly difficult for 
reputable shippers to carry on normal trade.”57  
Even such punitive measures did not put an end to practices of under-
invoicing and grade manipulation.  Avoidance, evasion and corruption was so 
widespread that, in May 1955, H.A. Luke, the Chairman of the Calcutta Jute Brokers 
and Dealers Association wrote to the Indian government not to protest Pakistani 
trade policy, because “if the Pakistani authorities rigorously enforced their rules about 
currency exchange and correct grading, India would have to pay more for Pakistani                                                         
56 The Pakistan Jute Association, Annual Report for the year 1953-54, Narayanganj: 1954, p. 13 
57 The Pakistan Jute Association, Annual Report for the Year, 1954-55, Narayanganj, 1955, p. 55 
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jute than she has done in the past.”58  He added, “If one takes the prices current in 
Pakistan, adds the cost of transport, insurance, export duty, etc. and converts into 
Indian currency at the Pakistani rate of exchange, it is obvious that Pakistani jute 
cannot be sold in India at the prices at which it is sold, unless there is undergrading 
or exchange manipulation or some such irregularity.”59  
This dynamic of harassment, evasion and punishment was not limited to 
merchants with means in the export trade, but extended down to petty traders and 
cultivators.  When the Jute Dealers Registration Act was floored in the Legislative 
Assembly, Mir Ahmed Ali, a member of the ruling Muslim League from a rural, jute-
growing constituency, asked that the Act exclude farias and beparis.  He said, “If the 
Act does not exclude those who do business with less money, who buy and sell less 
than 100 maunds of jute, these people will be oppressed (zuloom).  I am saying these 
few words so that these poor people are not made to suffer and the police don’t go 
after them … Please remember Pakistan is a country of the poor.”60  As I argue in 
the following section, farias, beparis, and cultivators were just as adept at evading the 
post-colonial state as the more substantial capitalists at the top of the commodity 
chain.  Far from the embodiment of peasant economic emancipation, post-colonial 
Pakistan was a source of harassment and oppression, an entity to be avoided and 
evaded.     
 
                                                        
58 “Note by Mr. H.A. Luke, Chairman, Calcutta Jute Brokers & Dealers Association,” in Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Jute (Pakistan) Section, File No. 28-Jute/55Pak, NAI.   
59 “Note by Mr. H.A. Luke, Chairman, Calcutta Jute Brokers & Dealers Association,” in Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Jute (Pakistan) Section, File No. 28-Jute/55Pak, NAI.   
60 EBLA, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 219 
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HARASSMENT, EVASION, AND PUNISHMENT 
When the devaluation of September 1949 put a stop to official trade between India 
and Pakistan, smuggling flourished.  According to jute traders’ estimates, 600,000 
bales of jute were smuggled out of Pakistan in the first months of the trade stoppage 
– that is, transported to India without paying any customs and by exchanging 
currencies on the black market.61  During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Indian and 
Pakistani Jute Mills Association included an estimate of the amount of jute smuggled 
out of Pakistan into India – these estimates ranged from 300,000 to 900,000 bales 
annually.  Smuggling took place along East Pakistan’s twisted and undemarcated 
border, on country-boats and ox-carts.  P. Das Gupta, the Government of India’s 
trade commissioner in Dacca, stated in a report on December, 1949: “On the Sylhet 
border, it would be quite true to say, that jute is smuggled into Assam and re-booked 
to Calcutta in bond through Pakistan.”62  Further, according to Das Gupta, the 
border districts of Khulna and Jessore in the southwest and close to Calcutta, “have 
gained some notoriety for smuggling to India.”63  Smuggling from Jessore and 
Khulna increased during the drier winter months, as waters receded and rural roads 
became usable by ox-carts.  On December 8, 1949, the Indian government reported 
that smuggling “was expected to increase in a few weeks time with the drying up of 
                                                        
61 “The Economic Situation in Pakistan: Anxiety over Jute and Cotton” February 15, 1950 in MSS Eur 
F158/580A, IOR. 
62 P. Das Gupta, Asst. Indian Govt, Trade Commissioner in Eastern Pak, Dacca to C.C. Desai, Secy, GoI, 
Commerce Ministry, 14 December, 1949, Cabinet Secretariat [Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
63 P. Das Gupta, Asst. Indian Govt, Trade Commissioner in Eastern Pak, Dacca to C.C. Desai, Secy, GoI, 
Commerce Ministry, 14 December, 1949, Cabinet Secretariat [Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
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the roadways which were at present impassable.  It was estimated that 2 to 3 lakhs 
bales in all would move into India by this means.”64   
These transactions in smuggled jute were financed by black-market currency 
exchanges.  The over-valuation of the Pakistani rupee, following Britain and India’s 
devaluation, had created a substantial black-market for the Pakistan rupee.  In these 
unofficial markets, the Pakistani rupee traded at well under its official value. Within a 
month of devaluation a “free market on a strictly cash basis in Indian and Pakistani 
currency had sprung up in Calcutta at rates varying from Rs. 100 to Rs. 115 (Indian) 
to Rs. 100 (Pakistan).”65  Rates for “Hundi transactions” – promisory notes – varied 
from Rs. 105 to Rs. 115 Indian to Rs. 100 Pakistan.  Currency black markets sprung 
up all along the East Pakistan-India border in order to finance the illicit trade 
between the regions.  In currency black markets in border areas the Pakistani rupee 
traded at par with the Indian rupee, and the value of the Pakistani rupee increased 
further from the border.  
The Pakistani government sought to crack down on smuggling.  Unofficial 
trade denied the Pakistani state export duties and foreign currency earnings and it 
weakened the Pakistani government’s bargaining position in trade negotiation with 
India.  Pakistan sought to put pressure on India by starving their jute mills of raw 
materials.  On their part, the Indian government sought to maintain flows of fibre 
and to remove barriers to smuggling.  In November 1949, Rajaram Rao, the Collector 
of Land Customs, informed the Indian government’s committee on Indo-Eastern                                                         
64 “Twelfth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” December 8, 
1949, in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
65 “Sixth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” October 27, 1949, 
in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
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Pakistan trade that “the only [Government of India] restriction in regard to jute 
smuggled into the Indian Union was insistence on the execution of a bond from the 
parties that sales would be made only to duly licensed purchasers.  The committee 
were inclined to the view that no restrictions of any kind should be placed on the 
flow of jute across the border from Pakistan into India.”66   
In response to increased smuggling, the Pakistani government intensified its 
surveillance of jute-laden steamers and railway wagons in East Pakistan’s market 
towns.  In November 1949, the steamer companies claimed that between 700,000 
and 800,000 maunds of raw jute loaded on to flats were being held up at Khulna.  
The Pakistani government refused to release flats without proof that payments for 
the jute, including that of export duties, had been made in Pakistani rupees at official 
exchange.  The steamer companies complained that it was difficult to provide these 
documents as the seized jute was made up of small consignments purchased in small 
trading towns scattered throughout the delta.67  The procedure was considered to be 
so “complex and difficult” that the Pakistani government never actually received a 
written request for the release of jute, though the IJMA sent several representatives 
to meet with Pakistani authorities, including Ghulam Faruque, the Chairman of the 
all-powerful Jute Board.68   
The government also seized consignments of “India to India” jute – that is 
jute from Assam, Tripura or Cooch Behar – traveling through its territory.  On                                                         
66 Tenth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” November 24, 
1949, in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
67 Eighth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” November 10, 
1949, in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
68 P. Das Gupta, Asst. Indian Gov Trade Comm in Eastern Pak, Dacca to C.C. Desai, Secy, GoI, 
Commerce Ministry, 14 December, 1949, in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, 
NAI 
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December 22, 1949, the Indian Government was informed that “24 flats loaded with 
3,45,116 mds (or 69,023 bales) of “India to India” jute were being held up at Khulna 
by the Pakistan authorities.  It was also reported that Pakistan proposed to appoint a 
Jute expert for inspecting every consignment with a view to determining whether the 
jute was of Indian or Pakistan origin.”69  The steamer companies responded by 
stopping loading jute for Calcutta in river-ports in Assam.  Jute was stuck in Tipperah, 
unable to find transport through Pakistan.  Pakistan’s barriers to the transit trade led 
to a rapid build up of raw jute in Tipperah and “some parties had found it worth their 
while to shift jute by air from Tipperah State to Calcutta.”70   
While the state found it much easier found it much easier to police jute 
bulked on railway wagons and steamer flats in market towns, they found it much 
more difficult to police the nation’s largely undemarcated borders.  The government 
attempted to control sales and movements of jute in border regions.  In November 
1949, the Jute Board appointed agents to buy up all jute within ten miles of Pakistan’s 
international boundary to prevent smuggling – the Ispahanis received the bulk of the 
contract. In subsequent years, the government intensified these controls.  In 1953, 
the provincial government of East Bengal assumed the power to ban jute cultivation 
outright in parts of East Bengal for “improved quality, to prevent smuggling, and to 
bring more money to cultivators.”71  In 1954, the government issued orders banning 
the movement of jute within five miles of the border, with only the Jute Board 
                                                        
69 “Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” December 
15, 1949, in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI 
70 “Fifth Meeting of the Committee Appointed to review Indo-Eastern Pakistan Trade,” October 20, 1949, 
in Cabinet Secretariat[Economic Wing]/ECC, 15(108)-P/49, NAI.  See also “Measures to move raw jute 
from Tipperah State,” in Com & Ind/Jute/12(24)-FTE/49, September 1950, NAI. 
71 EBLA, Vol. X, No. 1, 1953, p. 225 
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authorized to arrange for purchases of jute.  All of these measures were experienced 
as oppression and harassment for the delta’s citizenry.  In October, 1954, Probhash 
Chandra Lahiry, the Congress member from Rajshahi, complained that jute could not 
move “to the bazaars of the interior of the country” as the Jute Board had not, as yet, 
arranged for purchases of jute from those areas.72    
In addition to such measures, the government also stepped up its efforts to 
police its borders – primarily through the East Pakistan Rifles, reconstituted from the 
colonial Eastern Frontier Rifles.  In 1951, the EPR seized three jute-laden country 
boats at the Assam/Mymensingh border, near Kaliarchar thana.73  Later that year, the 
Officer-in-Charge of the Fulbari police station, at the Rangpur-Cooch Behar border, 
prevented a number of jute-laden ox-carts from going to India.  The Indian 
government alleged that about 6000 maunds of jute from an Indian enclave in East 
Pakistan could not be transported “on account of harassment caused at the Rangpur 
border to the cartmen carrying jute by the East Bengal Police of the Fulbari police 
station.”74   
These measures, however, were not sufficient to put an end to smuggling, and 
the increasingly desperate state adopted more and more draconian measures.  In 
February 1952, the civilian government called in the army – with “shoot-to-kill” 
orders – to put a stop to smuggling.  This measure was justified on the grounds of 
national security, the economic and existential threat posed by India.  In a speech in 
February 1952, Fazlur Rahman, Pakistan’s Commerce Minister argued that “Instead                                                         
72 EBLA, Vol, IX, No. 1, 1952, Dacca, 1954, p. 45 
73 Ministry of External Affairs, BL Branch, File No. R/52/19319/202, NAI 
74 From S.N. Chatterjee, Dept Secy, Govt of West Bengal to Depy Secy, Home (Political) Dept, Govt of 
East Bengal, 27th August, 1950, in Min of Com & Ind, Tariff (B) Branch, GoI, File No. 52(16)TB/53, NAI 
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of coming to an agreement with us,India is banking on smuggling jute from Pakistan. 
… this therefore has thrown a challenge to the integrity of our people and the 
efficiency of our administration … The issue is made one of national prestige and 
honour.”75 The India Pakistan British Association catalogued the draconian anti-
smuggling measures taken by the Pakistani state in 1952: 
The Government are certainly taking determined steps to stop the smuggling 
of jute which has undermined the strength of their bargaining power with 
India.  During the past two years, smuggled jute has done much to keep some 
of the Indian mills going.  The Army has been called in to help deal with 
smugglers and orders are practically on a “shoot at sight” basis.  The National 
Bank of Pakistan has advanced Rs 50 lakhs to the cooperative societies in 
East Pakistan and these societies, and some private firms, are to buy up all 
jute within five miles of the frontier.  After six weeks, even possession of jute 
within the five-mile belt will be an offence.76 
   
Even army intervention could not stop smuggling.  The government of 
Pakistan called in the army once again to prevent smuggling in late 1957 – the 
military’s anti-smuggling mission was appropriately titled “Operation Close Door.”  
Defending the decision to call in the army, then prime minister of the East Pakistan 
provincial government, Ataur Rahman Khan said, “I considered it [smuggling] to be a 
war.  It was one of the greatest menaces trying to strangulate East Pakistan.”77   The 
military’s anti-smuggling drive led to accusations on the floor of the East Pakistan 
Legislative Assembly of “indignities, harassment, physical assault inflicted upon 
licensed businessmen and traders and citizens holding responsible positions.”78                                                          
75 “Jute Bargaining Factor with Bharat: Rahman on steps taken to sell more,” Dawn, August 28, 1952, in 
MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
76 IPBA, “Confidential Report on Pakistan, August, 1952,” in MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
77 Ataur Rahman Khan, EPLA, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 17-19 March, 1958, p. 51 
78 Monoranjan Dhar, EPLA, Vol, XVIII, No. 1, 13-15 March, 1958, p. 20 
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Fazlul Quader Chowdhury defended the army in the Assembly, pointing to its 
success in preventing smuggling – the army had seized 50,000 maunds or 10,000 
bales of jute during the operation.  10,000 bales, however, was only a fraction of the 
several hundred thousand bales smuggled to India annually.  
*   *   * 
 
This dynamic of harassment, evasion and punishment extended further down the jute 
commodity chain, down to the primary producers.  In 1948, in a desperate attempt to 
raise revenue, the cash-strapped provincial government of East Bengal announced a 
tax of 1 rupee per acre on jute cultivation.  The provincial government of East Bengal 
had inherited the onerous and expensive task of regulating the acreage of jute by 
issuing licenses to individual jute cultivators.  In 1948, the Finance Ministry estimated 
that over 5 million licenses were to be issued at a total cost of 5.6 million rupees.  
They suggested, “the cultivators may perhaps pay a portion of the cost of the Jute 
Staff maintained for their benefit.”79  They estimated a license fee of 4 annas per 
quarter of acre of land sown with jute would provide the government with about 2 
million rupees.  At a meeting of the provincial government of East Bengal’s Council 
of Ministers, with the Prime Minister Nazimuddin presiding, it was decided to bring 
the Finance Ministry’s proposal into action by Ordinance, bypassing the legislature.80  
On February 26 1948, the government promulgated the Bengal Jute Regulation 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1948 stating that “no grower of jute … shall be granted a 
                                                        
79 “Memorandum – Finance Department,” in Jute Regulation Dept, Bundle 1, NAB.   
80 “Excerpt  from the minutes of proceedings of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 15th January, 
1948,” in Jute Regulation Department, Bundle 1, NAB.  
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license unless he applies in writing to the licensing officer … and that no such 
appliance shall be entertained unless it bears a court-fee stamp calculated at [four 
annas for every quarter acre of jute].”81 
The ordinance was renewed in 1949, again through promulgation bypassing 
the Legislative Assembly.  Jute regulation and the accompanying tax were extended to 
Sylhet district, formerly a part of Assam where jute cultivation had been unregulated 
prior to partition.  In February 1950, after two years of collecting license fees, a bill 
was finally introduced on the floor of the legislative assembly.  Tofazzal Ali, 
Agriculture Minister of the provincial government introduced the Bill, stating that “in 
the interests of the national economy that the cultivators should also pay a portion of 
the cost [of regulating acreage] in the shape of a jute license fee.”82  Tofazzal Ali did 
not think that the fee was excessive: “I, for one, hailing from a rural area of this 
province, having been in constant touch with the jute growers, make bold to submit 
that this fee will not be a burden on the growers to an extent that they will find 
difficult to bear.”83   
The jute license fee proved an extremely difficult tax to collect.  In between 
1948 and 1950, the government’s collection of license fees fell far below expectations.   
The Director of Agriculture wrote in September 1949 that “it now appears that a 
large sum on that account [of the Jute License fee] for both years [1948 and 1949] 
still remains unrealized.  In majority of cases this was due to the intentional defaults 
of the growers.”    In 1950, the Jute Regulation Department wrote a long note                                                         
81 “The Dacca Gazette, East Bengal Jute Regulation Amendment Ordinance, 1948,” in Jute Regulation 
Department, Bundle 1, NAB.   
82 EBLA, Vol. IV, No. 5, 1949, Dacca, 1949, p. 48 
83 EBLA, Vol. IV, No. 5, 1949, Dacca, 1949, p. 48 
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explaining why “the collection of license fees have been so far very unsatisfactory in 
most of the districts.”  The reasons offered by the Department were the exodus of 
Hindu growers and Hindu government employees, “economic distresss among the 
people,” the “scarcity of Pakistani small coins in Mufassal areas,” and the non-
disposal of prosecution cases against cultivators for not paying fees in the previous 
two years.   
The collection of the license fee was indeed an onerous task.  The distribution 
of 5 million licenses required a lot of paper, and paper was scarce in East Bengal.  In 
January 1949, S. Abdullah, the Director of Agriculture in East Bengal wrote that they 
would be delays in issuing licenses because “there is almost no chance of getting from 
the Government Press the Jute Regulation forms sent for printing.”84  Further, the 
administrative hierarchy of the new government was weak.  In April 1949, the 
Chairman of the Goalmari Jute Committee wrote to the Jute Regulation Department 
of the Government of East Bengal, stating that they had collected up to 60% of the 
license fee, and asked if the government would extend the allotted time period for 
collections.  The telegram stated that “partial collection … will create serious 
disturbances.”85  The Jute department wrote back somewhat irritably that the period 
had been extended till June, and there should be no confusion about full collection.   
The main problem with the collection of license fees was, however, that 
cultivators simply evaded and avoided them – they “intentionally” or “willfully” 
defaulted on payments.  The Jute Department felt that this was due to “some parties                                                         
84 S. Abdullah, Director of Agriculture, to Joint Secy, Dept of Agri & Co-op, GoEB, January 20, 1949, in 
Jute Regulation Department, Bundle 1, NAB.   
85 “Collection of Jute License Fees – Telegram from Chairman Goalmari Jute Committee, September 1949, 
Jute Regulation Dept, Bundle 1, NAB.   
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… making anti-propaganda against collection of jute license fees which as a result is 
badly suffering in certain areas.”86  “Anti-propaganda” was met with “counter-
propaganda.”  In April, 1949, the Directorate of Agriculture requested a 150 rupees 
to print and distribute propaganda leaflets in jute tracts in rural Bengal “to make 
counter-propaganda” – 100 rupees for Mymensingh and 50 rupees for other parts of 
Bengal.  The following year, the department requested 965 rupees for distribution of 
pamphlets throughout the delta.  The pamphlet distributed in Mymensingh, signed by 
the District Agricultural Officer and District Magistrate of Mymensingh, stated, “it is 
regrettable that in some place Pakistan’s bitter enemies (ghorotor shotru) are 
misinforming simple believing peasants (shorol, bishwashi chashigon), who are hesitating 
to pay the license fee.”87   
The pamphlets also announced punishments for cultivators who sowed jute 
without paying license fees, warning that failure to pay the license fee in time would 
result in six months imprisonment or a 350 rupees fine.  In the summer of 1949, the 
department prosecuted cultivators across the jute tracts for not paying the license fee.  
The government, however, was concerned that strict punishments would result in 
agrarian unrest.  In August, 1949, when touring the jute-growing sub-division of 
Gaibandha in Rangpur, “certain people complained” to the provincial Minister of 
Relief “that cases have been instituted against cultivators who did not pay ‘jute 
licence fee’, and in some cases the court has fined the accused.  The local grievance 
that it is a hardship on the part of the cultivators.”88  To prevent these grievances                                                         
86 S. Hedayatullah, Director of Agriculture, to Joint Secy, Dept of Agri & Co-op, GoEB, April 9, 1949, in 
Jute Regulation Dept, Bundle 1, NAB.   
87 “Joruri Ghoshona”, Jute Regulation Dept, Bundle 1, NAB.   
88 Note by Malik, August 20, 1949, Jute Regulation Dept, Bundle 1, NAB.   
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from boiling over into agrarian unrest, the government proposed that prosecutions 
would be withdrawn “in cases … in which the persons prosecuted pay up the license 
fee and apologise.”89  The Jute Department tasked with collecting license fees, 
however, felt that lenience would only encourage evasion.  The Director of 
Agriculture wrote that that the withdrawal of prosecution cases “likely result in 
serious consequences and regulation of jute cultivation would become meaningless 
and collection of license fees would in course of time be impossible … Once this is 
given out that the growers can get out of prosecution only by paying the licence fee it 
would be impossible to control such a large number of them.”90   
In an effort to put more pressure on cultivators to pay license fees, the 
Agricultural Directorate requested permission to prosecute cultivators under the 
Pubic Demands Recovery Act.  Under this act, the Department would be able to 
confiscate the cultivators’ property in punishment for non-payment of license fees.   
They “hoped that the mere fact of the grant of permission … would have a salutary 
effect on growers and it may not be necessary to have recourse to that procedure in 
large scale.”91  In the end, the government chose not to confiscate property, though 
the debate underlined the repressive tendencies of the post-colonial state as it set 
about realizing revenue from jute and the dynamics of harassment, evasion and 
punishment that characterized state and society relations throughout the jute 
commodity chain.  
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Far from the agent of peasant economic emancipation, the post-colonial 
Pakistani state was a source of harassment and oppression, an entity to be avoided 
and evaded. Ahmed Kamal has argued that in East Pakistan, during the years 
following independence and partition, the “state” turned against the “nation,” 
brutally suppressing peasant movements over sharecropper rights, water management, 
and food distribution.92   This violent oppression of its agrarian citizenry, Kamal 
argues, extinguished the aspiration of Pakistan as peasant utopia leading to the 
resounding electoral defeat of the Muslim League in 1954.93  While Kamal has 
focused on spectacular episodes of organized peasant protest and violent state 
suppression, I have charted the day-to-day dynamics of harassment and evasion in 
state and society relations.  The disillusionment with Pakistan also arose out of the 
government’s everyday harassment of jute cultivators and petty traders, as the post-
colonial state sought to extract revenue and exert authority over fibre. 
 
CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY 
In its attempts to impose sovereignty over jute, the central government concentrated 
political power over fibre in the central capital in Karachi.  The provincial 
government of East Pakistan contested the central government’s assumption of jute 
revenue and control and authority over fibre.  East Bengal’s politician’s claimed jute 
for the province.  Though they made this claim in the name of East Bengal’s                                                         
92 Kamal’s argument is an important corrective to the dominant narrative of Bangladeshi nationalism, 
demonstrating that the movement was not solely an urban and middle-class but had subaltern roots, 
particularly in the widespread political and economic discontent amongst East Bengal’s peasantry.   
93 The ruling Muslim Leauge was routed.  The United Front, a coalition of opposition parties, won 228 out 
of 304 seats, while the League managed only seven.   
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impoverished jute cultivators, provincial politicians did not put forward an alternative 
vision of the relationship of state and commodity, to the assertion state sovereignty 
over fibre and the harassment that it entailed.  Instead, they feuded with the central 
government over the distribution of jute revenue and government power over the 
production and circulation of fibre.  In this section, I look at the central and 
provincial governments’ contest over sovereignty over fibre from the creation of 
Pakistan to October 1958, when General Iskander Mirza declared martial law and 
forcibly resolved the contest over sovereignty and fibre in favour of the central 
government.      
The distribution of the Jute Export Duty was an early point of dissent 
between the central and the provincial.  Under the Niemeyer Award, pre-partition 
Bengal received 62.5% of the export duty, while the central government in Delhi the 
remaining 37.5%.  Although the award was continued after partition, the centre 
delayed in making payments to the province and was arbitrary in deciding how much 
the province should receive.  In 1948-49, the award was supposed to have provided 
east Bengal with close to 55 million rupees, but the centre unilaterally reduced 
Bengal’s award to 34 million rupees.94  Nurul Amin, the Muslim League’s Chief 
Minister in Bengal, complained bitterly that the centre had not granted the province 
its share of the jute export duty, and promised that “I will fight on and on till our 
Province’s claim is accepted.”95  Bengal’s politicians, even the ruling Muslim League, 
complained bitterly about the centre’s refusal to grant the province its share of jute 
revenue.  In 1951, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, the provincial Finance Minister                                                         
94 Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, East Bengal’s provincial finance minister between 1947 and 1949, speech at 
the Legislative Assembly on February 17, 1952.  EBLA, Vol. V., No. 1, 1951, Dacca, 1952, p.  438 
95 Hindustan Standard, March 20, 1949, quoted in Maron, Stanley, “The Problem of East Pakistan,” Pacific 
Affairs, 28(2), June 1955, p. 133 
  278 
between 1947 and 1949, claimed that the centre had denied East Bengal close to a 
billion rupees in Jute Export Duty between 1948 and 1951.  While the figure was an 
exaggeration, Chowdhury’s claim shows the depth of feeling regarding the centre’s 
appropriation of jute revenue.96   
The province’s complaints about its financial relationship with the centre were 
not limited to jute.  The central government balanced its budget by squeezing the 
provincial governments, which ran budget deficits even while cutting down on 
development and welfare programs.97  The provincial government complained at 
length about the centre taking the entirety of East Bengal’s income tax revenues and 
a share of its sales tax.  They were critical of the centre’s discontinuance of 
subventions to the province from the pre-partition years.  The government of 
undivided India used to subsidize half the cost of Grow More Food schemes in post-
famine Bengal – mostly small-scale irrigation and drainage projects in rural Bengal.  
Post-partition, the provincial government of East Bengal asked Karachi to continue 
these subsidies, estimated at 600,000 to 800,000 rupees annually, but as the Muslim 
League Minister Hassan Ali said in 1949, “I am sorry to say that [the centre] have not 
agreed to the proposal.”98  
 In addition to the distribution of revenue, East Pakistan’s political 
representatives protested the concentration of power and authority over jute in the 
central government, particularly in the Jute Board, the Karachi-based government 
                                                        
96 EBLA, Vol. V., No. 1, 1951, Dacca, 1952, p.  438 
97 Jalal, Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990.   It was symbolically important to balance the budget, as it 
demonstrated to the outside world that Pakistan was indeed a viable economy.   
98 EBLA,  Vol. III, No. 3, Dacca, 1949, p. 75 
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institution that had acquired absolute power over fibre.  The Jute Board was created 
in October 1949, in order to cope with the sudden disappearance of Pakistan’s jute 
markets after the devaluation crisis.  The Board was constituted of senior bureaucrats 
from the central government in Karachi and prominent jute traders.  M.M. Ispahani 
was a long-standing member of the Jute Board and closely involved in its day-to-day 
operations.  After its creation, the Jute Board assumed authority and control over all 
aspects of the jute trade: fixing prices, deciding acreage, regulating warehouses and 
baling presses, issuing export licenses, negotiating with overseas markets and so forth. 
As Afsar Ali Chowdhury, one of the members of the Jute Board, testified to the 
Agricultural Enquiry Committee in 1951: “The Board took the entire conrol of the 
marketing activities here.  It took control of the baling presses.  It took control of the 
godowns in which jute was kept.  The Government of India was reluctant to establish 
continued and normal trade relations with Pakistan and the Jute Board of necessity 
had to take the entire control of jute.”99  
East Bengal’s politicians, particularly members of the opposition in the 
Legislative Assembly, complained bitterly about the centre and the bureaucracy’s 
assumption of absolute authority over fibre through the Jute Board.  In March 1951 
Manoranjan Dhar, leader of the opposition Pakistan Congress in the East Bengal 
Assembly, stated that the provincial government had lost even the ability to speak 
about jute: “for the last two years we have been raising the question of jute, but the 
only answer that has been hurled at us is that the subject pertains to the Centre and, 
therefore, this House is not in a position to discuss anything about it.”100  In October                                                         
99 Evidence of Afsar Ali Chowdhury, Proceedings in East Bengal (including evidence on jute and tea), 1951, MSS 
Eur F235/360, IOR 
100 EBLA, Vol. V, No. 2, 1951, Dacca, 1953, p. 402 
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1952, Provash Chandra Lahiry argued to the House, “Even though jute is East 
Bengal’s wealth (shompod), the Jute Board is not under the control of the government 
of East Bengal.  It does not seem that this centrally controlled Jute Board was formed 
for the interest of Bengalis.”101 
Opposition politicians accused the Jute Board of acting in the interests of 
substantial capitalists, accusing them of manipulating prices, depressing prices at the 
start of the jute season when the fibre was in the hands of cultivators and then raising 
them once it had passed into the hands of merchants.  Anwara Khatun stated in the 
East Bengal Assembly in 1951: “When we see these activities of the Jute Board [price 
manipulation] one feels that Pakistan was not created for the poor, Pakistan was 
created for people like Ispahani.  Ispahani and his chelas have profited from the Jute 
Board.”102  Employees of the Jute Board were widely perceived to be corrupt, 
particularly in their handling of state credit to merchants and jute export regulations.  
Khairat Hossain said in the assembly that “giving the Jute Board the responsibility of 
jute purchases is like giving a thief the keys to the police thana.”103  
  Criticisms of the Jute Board increased in pitch and volume when the Korean 
War commodity boom came to a close in 1952.  In October 1952, at the height of the 
new jute season, Dhirendranath Datta, a Congress member from Tippera, moved a 
resolution to discuss the “serious situation created in East Bengal on account of 
abnormal fall in the price of jute.”104  Opposition members argued that the fall in 
                                                        
101 EBLA, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1952, Dacca 1954, p. 46 
102 EBLA, Vol. V, No. 1, 1951, Dacca, 1952, p. 380 
103 EBLA, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1951, Dacca, 1953, p. 130 
104 EBLA, Vol IX, No. 1, 1952, Dacca, 1954, p. 42 
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prices was due to the corruption and incompetence of the government, particularly 
the Jute Board.  Criticism of the Board was so widespread that many legislators felt it 
necessary to begin their speech by stating “much has been said about the 
mismanagement and corruption of the Jute Board,” before proceeding to detail their 
own observations.  
East Bengal’s politicians urged that the provincial government assume the 
“administration of jute from the centre.”105  Provincial control over jute and a greater 
share of jute revenue were major issues in the United Front’s electoral campaign in 
1954.  The Front was a coalition of opposition parties led by the most important 
Muslim Bengali politicians of the colonial era – A.K. Fazlul Haq and H.S. Suhrawardy.  
Their twenty-one point manifesto called for the recognition of Bangla as a state 
language of Pakistan, provincial autonomy in all spheres except foreign policy, 
defense and currency, and the nationalization of the jute trade. The third of 21 points 
in the manifesto promised: “To nationalize the jute trade, to make arrangements for 
securing fair price of jute to jute growers and to investigate into the jute-bungling 
during the Muslim League regime.”106  
The United Front decimated the Muslim League in the 1954 elections, 
emerging victorious in 228 out of 304 constituencies.  Despite their popular mandate, 
the United Front was unable to implement its goals of provincial autonomy and the 
nationalization of the jute sector.  The central government resorted to military coups, 
impositions of martial law, and the dismissal of elected provincial governments and 
retained Karachi’s control over jute.  The government formed on April 3, 1954 with                                                         
105 EBLA, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1952, Dhaka, 1954, p.  55 
106 Ghosh, Shyamali, The Awami League, 1949-1971, Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 283 
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A.K. Fazlul Haq as Chief Minister was dissolved on May 30, 1954.107  Between 1954 
and 1956, East Bengal was under “Governor’s rule,” with General Iskander Mirza 
holding absolute autocratic power and the centre maintaining its hold over the East 
Bengal’s jute.  
Parliamentary democracy returned to the province in September 1956, and the 
Awami League formed a government with Ataur Rahman Khan appointed Chief 
Minister.  Upon forming his cabinet, Ataur Rahman Khan announced that he would 
implement the 1954 election manifesto, including the nationalization of the jute trade.  
In March 1957, the provincial assembly passed the East Pakistan Jute Marketing 
Corporation Bill, creating a state-owned entity to carry out large-scale purchases and 
sales of jute in order to stabilize prices for growers.  The corporation was vigorously 
opposed by the central government and by Pakistani and international jute capitalists.  
In a statement, the PJA stated that the creation of a state-owned trading entity, in 
effect, nationalized Pakistan’s jute trade and would cause “economic and employment 
dislocation which … will jeopardize the basis economic structure of East 
Pakistan.”108  The India Pakistan British Association reported in its confidential 
report for July 1956: “The jute trade in East Pakistan is anything but sanguine about 
its future prospects at the hands of the Provincial Government and feels that year by 
                                                        
107 Haq was accused of treason because of statements about the unity of India made during a visit to 
Calcutta.  Further, he was accused of being unable to control labour troubles at the Adamjee Jute Mills and 
Chandrakona paper mills.  Barely a decade after being dismissed by the British Governor of Bengal in 1943, 
Fazlul Haq was once more unceremoniously thrown out of power by an unelected bureaucracy.   
108 Quoted in India Pakistan British Association, “Confidential Report on Pakistan for March, 1957” in 
Jute: Pakistan, 1949-67, MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
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year by dint of regulations and controls it is being forced into, not a strait-jacket, but 
a Procrustean bed.”109   
In its first full season of trading, the East Pakistan Jute Marketing 
Corporation found itself in financial difficulties: they were unable to dispose of large 
stocks of poor quality jute and reported enormous losses.  When international jute 
prices dropped at the opening of the 1958 season, the Corporation was on the verge 
of bankruptcy – unable to dispose crops from purchases in the previous season and 
unable to make a profit on prevailing prices at the opening of the new season.  In 
early October 1958, representatives of the East Pakistan government informed the 
National Economic Council in Karachi that unless the central government took 
immediate steps to “stop the rot in the jute industry the entire economy of the 
country would be ruined.”110   
The centre did step in, but not in the manner that the provincial government 
hoped.  On October 7, 1958, General Iskander Mirza declared martial law and 
appointed Ayub Khan, the central defense minister, Chief Martial Law Administrator.  
The provincial government was dissolved and its program of asserting provincial 
sovereignty over jute abandoned.  In December, the new military government 
dissolved the Jute Marketing Corporation’s Board of Directors on grounds of 
mismanagement, leading to heavy losses.  The bureaucrats who ran the Corporation 
were, however, absolved of blame and responsibility placed solely on provincial 
politicians.  The military government’s announcement stated: ““The main reasons for 
the losses incurred were irresponsible and undue control exercised at ministerial level                                                         
109 IPBA, ““Confidential Report on Pakistan for July 1958” in Jute: Pakistan, 1949-67, MSS Eur F158/580A, 
IOR. 
110 Reported in The Times, October 7, 1958.  In Jute: Pakistan, 1949-67, MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
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in relation to important commercial advice tendered by officers.”111  The military 
government placed the corporation under the control of Pakistan’s leading jute 
capitalists:  G.M. Adamjee was placed in charge of the purchase committee and Sadri 
Ispahani of the sales committee.112  Iskander Mirza’s 1958 coup had forcibly resolved 
the centre and province’s contest over sovereignty and jute in favour of the former, 
returning control over fibre to Karachi bureaucrats and prominent jute capitalists.   
 
*   *   * 
 
The centre and the province’s contest over sovereignty over fibre did not address the 
fundamental issue facing Pakistan and many other commodity-producing, post-
colonial nations.  The exigencies of building a modern nation-state out of 
commodities of the former empire often entailed the intensified regulation and 
policing of citizens attempting to eke out livelihoods by producing and trading these 
commodities.   Intensified state surveillance of economic activities frequently 
translated into the everyday harassment and oppression of its citizenry.  In East 
Pakistan’s jute tracts, the post-colonial project of transforming jute from a 
commodity of empire into a national resource led to widespread disillusionment with 
the aspirations of Pakistan and independence.  In contesting the central government’s 
assumption of sovereignty over fibre, East Bengal’s politicians did not provide a way 
                                                        
111 Reported in the Times, “East Pakistan Jute Board Dissolved,” December 29, 1958.  In Jute: Pakistan, 
1949-67, MSS Eur F158/580A, IOR. 
112 IPBA, “Confidential Report on Pakistan for December 1958,” in Jute: Pakistan, 1949-67, MSS Eur 
F158/580A, IOR. 
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out of this post-colonial predicament.  They continued to operate within the 
paradigm of the modern nation-state with absolute sovereignty over the production 
and circulation of commodities within its borders.   
The predicament of post-colonial state-formation was perhaps best illustrated 
in Ataur Rahman Khan description of an encounter with an elderly villager soon after 
independence in 1947, when widespread enthusiasm with Pakistan as peasant utopia 
was yet to be extinguished.  The elderly man asked Ataur Rahman Khan: “Now that 
Pakistan has been achieved, should there still be police, courts and Kutcheries, 
soldiers and sentries, jails and lockups?”  Khan replied, “Why not?  How could you 
protect the state without these institutions?”  With a sigh the old man replied, “then 
what kind of Pakistan have we got?  Change the name please.”113  Far from being 
abolished, these repressive institutions were actually strengthened by the Pakistani 
government as it attempted to capture and punish the smugglers, under-invoicers, 
grade manipulators, and tax evaders involved in jute cultivation and trade, and 
subverting the state’s attempts to assert sovereignty over fibre.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
113 Khan, Ataur Rahman, Shairacherar Dash Bochhor, Dhaka: 1970.  Quoted in Kamal, Ahmed, State Against 
Nation, p. 18 
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Conclusion 
 
Jute is no longer ubiquitous in global trade: containers, paper cartons, synthetic fibres, 
and grain elevators have replaced gunny sacks and hessian in packing and 
transporting the world’s commodities.  The decline of jute as a significant commodity 
of international trade took place gradually and over stages.  In the 1960s, the 
consumption of jute in the industrial west began to decline – though this was 
compensated for by rising consumption in developing economies.1  After the 1980s, 
the production of jute manufactures declined in absolute terms.  In 1991-92, the 
global production of jute manufactures was 2 million tons against 3.85 million tons in 
1978.2  More recently, jute production has staged a minor comeback as an eco-
friendly alternative to synthetics.  While it is too early to predict whether jute will re-
emerge as a significant global commodity, the possible revival of the fibre is widely 
discussed in Bangladesh, where jute occupies a prominent place in official, national 
memory.  
 In 1971, after a brutal 9-month civil war, East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan 
and became independent Bangladesh.  The Bangladesh movement was informed by 
the provincial East Pakistan government’s contest over sovereignty over jute and 
their continued attempts to wrest control over fibre and revenue generated by fibre                                                         
1 OECD nations’ consumption of jute goods declined from about 1 million tons in 1961 to 750,000 tons in 
1978 and that of developing countries rose from 1.4 million tons to 3 million tons.  The increase in 
consumption was most marked in China – from 270,000 tons to 1.1 million tons in the same period.  
Mahmood, Muhammad, and Williams, Ross, “The World Jute Market,” The Bangladesh Development Studies, 
9(4), August 1981, p. 2 
2 The figures for 1978 are from Mahmood, Muhammad, and Williams, Ross, “The World Jute Market,” 
The Bangladesh Development Studies, 9(4), August 1981 while that of 1991-92 are from the website of 
International Jute Study Group, at http://www.jute.org/statistics_03.htm (last accessed July 17, 2012).   
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away from the centre.  In 1966, the Awami League launched a popular campaign 
against Ayub Khan’s military regime in East Pakistan, on the basis of a six-point 
demand for provincial economic autonomy.  They urged for two separate but freely 
convertible currencies, complete control over taxation, and separate accounts for the 
foreign exchange earnings of the two wings.  One of the authors of the six-point 
demand was Rehman Sobhan, an economist at Dacca University.  Sobhan had 
written an influential article titled “The Problem of Regional Imbalance in the 
Economic Development of Pakistan” in 1962, highlighting growing disparity in 
incomes and standards of living between the two wings.3  Sobhan argued that 
growing disparity was due to deliberate policies of the central government that led to 
greater public and private sector investments in West Pakistan.  He highlighted the 
injustice of deliberate neglect with special reference to Pakistan’s national resource – 
jute.  “About 80% of all aids and loans went to West Pakistan as did the major part of 
exchange from national exports,” Sobhan stated, “this was true in spite of the fact 
that East Pakistan earned 60-70% of Pakistan’s foreign exchange, mainly from her 
exports of raw and manufactured jute.”4 
 With the creation of Bangladesh, a government belonging exclusively to the 
delta and its inhabitants took control over the region’s economy and resources – 
especially its jute.  Part of the aspiration of Bangladesh was that jute would now fulfill 
its promise of delivering higher standards of living and economic development to the 
region’s impoverished inhabitants, rather than for foreign capitalists and states in 
Britain or West Pakistan.  This desire was not realized.  The nationalization of the                                                         
3 Sobhan, Rehman, “The Problem of Regional Imbalance in the Economic Development of Pakistan,” 
Asian Survey, 2(5), June 1962, pp. 31-37 
4 ibid, p. 37 
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jute industry, one of the promises of the liberation movement, led to mismanagement, 
corruption, and under-investment in the jute sector.  Even more significantly, the 
emergence of Bangladesh was quickly followed by the decline of the global jute trade.  
Today, jute occupies an a far less significant position in Bangladesh’s national 
economy – it does not lie at the heart of most Bangladeshi’s livelihoods and fibre 
exports contribute a relatively small share of export earnings.5  While fibre is no 
longer integral to the national economy, memories of jute constitutes an important 
aspect of public and nationalist discourse.  Even as the economic significance of jute 
declines, the idea of jute retains significance in the delta’s political discourse.   
 During my research in Bangladesh, I was often asked if I was “going to bring 
jute back.”  If I protested that I was merely writing a history, I would be informed of 
the enormous benefits to be derived from a revival of the jute trade and industry – 
foreign exchange, employment, industrialization, and so forth.  The desire to revive 
of jute as a significant global commodity is frequently repeated and reiterated by 
intellectuals, politicians, businessmen, and other public figures.   Newspaper run 
editorials headlined “Revival of Golden Fibre” or “Lost Glory of Jute Needs to be 
Revived.”6  The news that jute exports were to cross one billion dollars was 
celebrated, as was the recent decoding of the jute genome by Bangladeshi scientists or 
the announcement that Bangladesh’s state-owned jute enterprises had finally turned a 
profit.  Through its celebration of the potential revival of jute, Bangladeshi nationalist 
                                                        
5 The proportion of the population employed in the agricultural sector has fallen below 50%.  For those 
who continue to make a living from agriculture, jute has become far less important as rice acreage has 
increased and market vegetables and oilseeds have displaced jute as the major cash crop.  On the other 
hand, Bangladesh’s exports primarily consist of readymade garments, with jute goods contributing less than 
10% of Bangladesh’s export earnings. 
6 There are many examples of such headlines, but I will cite the following three as instances: “Revival of 
Golden Fibre,” New Age, March 11, 2012; “Lost Glory of Jute Needs to be Revived,” New Age, February 
29, 2012; “Jute Will Regain its Lost Glory,” The Daily Star, March 15, 2011.   
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discourse seemingly clings on to the possibility of the nation finally realizing the fibre 
as a national resource. 
The demise of jute is widely and loudly lamented in Bangladesh.  The closure 
of the Adamjee Jute Mills in 2002 was a moment of public mourning, leading one 
economist to ask, “Is it only the Adamjee that has gone into history or is it a trend of 
this economy to become a land of supermarkets destroying potential manufacturing 
enterprises?”7  Assigning responsibility and blame for the demise of jute is an 
important aspect of political discourse in contemporary Bangladesh.  Bangladeshis 
blame the demise of jute on different agencies and factors, depending primarily on 
their political and ideological leanings.  For some, nationalization, state 
mismanagement and corruption are to blame for the demise of the fibre.  According 
to others, the World Bank and agents of neo-imperialist capitalism perpetrated the 
death of Bangladesh’s jute industry.  When the Bank cancelled an infrastructure loan 
to Bangladesh on grounds of corruption, the Prime Minister launched a “blistering 
attack on the World Bank,” stating that “the country’s jute industries … had been 
destroyed through accepting the global lender’s prescriptions.”8   
 The significance of jute in national and public discourses in contemporary 
Bangladesh far outweighs its economic importance, whether in terms of the 
livelihoods of its citizenry or Bangladesh’s national macro-economy.  This 
contemporary discourse of jute is a legacy of the Bangladesh nationalist movement of 
the 1960s and its project of claiming fibre for the projected nation.  This public 
discourse is also a reaction to the demise of jute as a significant article of international                                                         
7 Muhammad, Anu, “Closure of Adamjee Jute Mill: Ominous Sign,” Economic and Political Weekly, 37(38), 
Sept. 21-27, 2002, p. 3896 
8 “Padma Bridge with own funds,” The Daily Star, July 9, 2012 
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trade before the new nation could appropriate the fibre as its national resources.  The 
national memory of jute in Bangladesh is premised on this idea of jute as a national 
resource – the basis of economic modernization and industrialization, a source of 
foreign exchange and state revenue.  The nostalgia for jute in contemporary 
Bangladesh draws upon a statist idea of the commodity framed in post-colonial 
Pakistan.  At the same time, this national memory erases other discourses of fibre 
that were historically important: for instance, discourses that focused on peasant 
livelihoods and lifestyles or on capitalist and imperialist exploitation.   
 
*   *   * 
 
In this dissertation, I have tried to demonstrate how peasant production of a global 
commodity transformed the Bengal delta during the hundred years spanning the 
1850s and the 1950s.  I have argued that the production and circulation of fibre 
changed economic lives, livelihoods, and lifestyles, altered the physical landscape, 
created new social and cultural formations, and informed political and economic 
discourse.  The transformation wrought by jute was not a one-off process that can be 
characterized as a transition to capitalism.  Instead, jute cultivation inaugurated a 
continuous and on-going relationship between the region and global commodity 
markets.  This relationship lasted from the mid-nineteenth until the 1970s, when jute 
began to lose significance as a major global commodity and the basis of livelihoods 
for the delta’s inhabitants.  The dissertation has traced the impact of jute cultivation 
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and trade during the heyday of the fibre during the hundred years spanning the 1850s 
to the 1950s.   
 First, the dissertation explores the impact of jute cultivation on peasant 
livelihoods and lifestyles.  During the late nineteenth century, an era of relative 
prosperity, jute was associated with prosperity.  Prosperity manifested in peasant 
households’ consumption, and peasant politics of the period was closely related to 
their ability to consume goods and services out of their cash earnings from sales of 
jute.  During the 1870s, peasant households launched a movement to protect their 
ability to purchase enhanced property rights from colonial law courts and during the 
1900s they resisted the nationalist Swadeshi movements attempt to impose a boycott 
on the purchase of imported goods in marketplaces.   
World War I was a turning point in the economic history of the delta.  After 
WWI, a combination of increasing debt burdens and interest payments, uncertain 
commodity prices, fragmenting landholdings, and ecological deterioration drove 
peasant households into poverty.  The peasant politics of poverty was substantially 
different from that of prosperity.  While nineteenth century movements focused on 
the ability to consume goods from the marketplace, twentieth century politics 
focused on agrarian relations of production, particularly the main expropriators of 
peasant wealth – moneylenders and landlords.  As historians of agrarian Bengal have 
pointed out, the class relations of agrarian production overlapped with religious 
categories.  Hence, mostly-Muslim peasants protests and attacks against mostly-
Hindu moneylenders and landlords was characterized as “communal riots.”  As this 
dissertation has argued, following the work of more nuanced and sensitive historians, 
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these “communal riots” were jute cultivators’ responses to the increased difficulties 
of conducting market-oriented livelihoods after WWI. 
Second, my dissertation has focused on the spatial formations carved out by 
the circulation of fibre.  Almost the entirety of the jute produced in the delta was 
dispatched westwards, to Calcutta.  The rise of jute in the late nineteenth century was 
accompanied by intensified by railway and river-steamers connections, as the journey 
between the delta and Calcutta was shortened.  Jute transformed the delta into 
Calcutta’s hinterland and, conversely, Calcutta into the delta’s metropolis.  The 
opposition to Curzon’s 1905 partition of Bengal was informed, to a great extent, by 
concerns of the economic, political, and cultural ramifications of severing the 
hinterland from its metropolis.   
Another important spatial formation of jute were the market towns, or 
mofussil towns, that emerged along the delta’s rivers and railways to service the jute 
trade.  These towns were entrepots in the jute trade, where the fibre was bulked, 
stored, assorted and packaged before being dispatched to Calcutta.  These towns 
housed the agents of jute capitalists, intermediary traders, warehouses, baling presses, 
river-docks and railways.  These mofussil towns were most important centre of 
political and intellectual thought and the introduction of representative and electoral 
politics – with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 and, far more significantly, 
with the Government of India Act of 1935 – shifted the political centre of Bengal 
away from metropolitan Calcutta to the mofussil.  The peasant populist Krishak Praja 
movement of the 1930s and the Pakistan movement of the 1940s had their bases in 
these mofussil towns which owed their growth and vibrancy to jute.   
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Pakistan and partition in August 1947 severed the spatial formations of 
hinterland and metropolis that had been carved out by jute during the past hundred 
years.  The prospect of partition frightened the politicians who had championed the 
idea of Pakistan – a nation-state comprising the impoverished delta and shorn of the 
industrial and commercial metropolis of Calcutta was considered financially infeasible.  
Despite their misgivings, an East Pakistan comprising solely the delta’s jute hinterland 
came into being on August 14, 1947.  Over the following years, the post-colonial 
Pakistani state attempted to impose territorial sovereignty over flows of fibre – 
monitoring, policing and taxing flows of jute across its territorial boundaries.  
Through the frequently violent policing of its territorial limits, which included calling 
in the army with shoot-to-kill orders, the formerly united economic space of Bengal 
was gradually rent asunder.   
Third, this dissertation has looked at the intellectual and political history of 
jute.  Ideas of fibre varied between the eras of prosperity in the late nineteenth 
century and the period of impoverishment during the twentieth century.  During the 
period of relative prosperity, metropolitan anti-colonial nationalist movement viewed 
jute during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries very negatively – 
identifying the fibre with imperialist economic exploitation and ecological 
degradation.  In their view, jute cultivators were selfishly aggrandizing themselves at 
the expense of their communities and the imagined nation.  This view of jute and jute 
cultivators informed nationalist attacks on peasant consumers during the Swadeshi 
movement and peasant opposition to nationalist activists. 
As processes of pauperization and impoverishment set in after WWI, jute 
cultivators were no longer portrayed as aggrandizing themselves.  Instead, they were 
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seen as ignorant and stupid, as being duped and seduced by markets into producing 
jute and thereby causing their own impoverishment. The period of impoverishment 
was accompanied by a burst of intellectual creativity in the delta’s mofussil towns.  
The 1920s and 30s witnessed a boom in these towns’ print and publishing industries, 
particularly of poems and pamphlets consisting of peasant advice literature.  These 
didactic texts consisted of advice to peasants on how to survive and prosper in 
difficult economic conditions, preaching hard work, self-sufficiency, and austerity to 
peasant households.  Another set of mofussil texts lobbied for legislative reforms of 
agrarian relations of production – particularly, the abolishment of zamindari and the 
credit market reforms.  These texts together constituted mofussil ideas of jute and 
were closely related to the praja movement and its objectives of peasant economic 
emancipation.    
Simultaneously, another idea of jute emerged in metropolitan Calcutta – that 
of jute as a national resource.  During WWI, the colonial government imposed an 
export duty on jute, transforming the fibre into a significant source of government 
revenue.  Nationalist politicians who began to enter the provincial legislature from 
1919 onwards aspired to implement public programs – irrigation, education, and 
health projects – that required revenue.  For many nationalists, the importance of jute 
lay in the revenue it provided to the state, that could be used for the public benefit – 
once they, rather than the imperialist Britons, had control over the levers of the state.  
When Pakistan came into being, the idea of jute as a national resource trumped all 
other conceptions of fibre in making state policies.  The post-colonial state’s primary 
objective was to transform the former commodity of empire into a national resource 
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that generated revenue for the state.  As I have argued, this project led to the 
harassment, oppression, and alienation of Pakistan’s citizenry from the state.  
This dissertation has woven together a materialist narrative of peasant 
production and circulation of fibre with an intellectual and political history of the 
fibre.  The separation of material and intellectual history impoverishes both schools 
of the academic discipline of history – the realms economic lives and economic ideas 
are, as Marx recognized, intimately related.  Following David Harvey, I have overlaid 
Marxist categories of base and superstructure with the spatial categories of the 
metropolis, the hinterland, and the mofussil.  The base, as I understand it, consisted 
not only of the modes and relations of peasant production but also of the routes 
through which fibre circulated on its journey from farm to factory – the railways, 
rivers, and most significantly, market-towns.  Correspondingly, the superstructure is 
differentiated according to the location of ideas and politics – according to hinterland 
peasant producers, mofussil or small-town middle-classes, and metropolitan elites.  
The dynamics of base and superstructure – and of hinterland, mofussil, and 
metropolitan ideas of jute – constituted the political economy and intellectual history 
of fibre in the Bengal delta.   
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